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CROWN  PRINCE  HIROHITO 
has  recently  been  named  Regent  of  Japan  with  the  approval  of  the  Council  of 
l'riiit(s,  the  Imperial  Family  and  the  Privy  Councilors.     His  marriage  to  a  princess 
of  Satsuma  will  take  place  this  spring. 


ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

JAPAN   :   KOREA  :   CHINA  : 
PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS 


BY 

E.  ALEXANDER  POWELL 

AITTH(Ht   or    "the    LAST    FRONTIER,"    "FIGHTING    IN    FLAKDEB8," 
"where    THE    STRANGE    TRAILS    GO   DOWN,"    ETC. 


ILLUSTRATED 


♦w»^^<j<w««i 


NEW  YORK 

THE  CENTURY  CO. 

1922 


Copyright,  1922,  by 
The  Centuey  Co. 


Printed  in  U.  S.  A. 


To   THE 

Honorable 
WARREN    G.    HARDING 
President   of   the    United    States 
who,  by  his  vision  and  statesmanship 
in    calling    the    Washington    Conference, 
has  done  more   than   any  man  of  our  time 
to    preserve    the    peace    of    the    Pacific 
and   to    further   the    friendship    and 
mutual  understanding  of  the  peo- 
ples dwelling  upon  its  shores 


FOREWORD 

Most  writers  on  Far  Eastern  politics  make  the  mis- 
take of  crediting  their  readers  with  a  profounder 
knowledge  of  the  subject  than  they  in  fact  possess. 
They  take  too  much  for  granted.  They  talk  in  terms 
of  algebra  instead  of  arithmetic.  On  the  assumption 
that  those  who  read  their  books  already  understand 
the  meaning  of  such  phrases  as  "spheres  of  influence," 
"extraterritoriality,"  the  Shogunate,  the  Genro,  the 
tuchuns,  the  Anfu  Club,  the  Consortium,  the  Gentle- 
men's Agreement,  the  Twenty-one  Demands,  they 
make  repeated  use  of  them  without  pausing  long 
enough  to  explain  precisely  what  they  mean.  As  a 
result,  the  casual  reader,  who  usually  has  only  a 
vague  idea  of  the  subject  to  start  with,  either  becomes 
bewildered  and  gives  up  in  despair,  frankly  admitting 
that  he  does  not  understand  what  it  is  all  about,  or 
he  forms  conclusions  which,  being  based  on  miscon- 
ceptions, do  not  agree  with  the  facts. 

So,  though  the  shelves  of  the  public  libraries  sag 
beneath  the  volumes  that  have  been  written  on  various 
phases  of  Oriental  politics,  it  seems  to  me  that  there  is 
still  a  place  for  a  clear,  concise,  simply  written,  un- 
prejudiced explanation  of  the  various  problems,  po- 
litical, economic,  and  financial,  which,  taken  together. 


viii  FOREWORD 

form  what  is  commonly  referred  to  as  the  Far  Eastern 
Question.  Therefore,  even  at  the  risk  of  covering 
ground  with  which  some  of  my  readers  are  doubtless 
already  familiar,  I  have  endeavored  to  sketch  in 
outline,  using  simple,  every-day  language,  the  condi- 
tions and  events  which  have  combined  to  produce 
the  present  complex  situation.  Those  who  have  the 
patience  to  follow  me  to  the  end  will  have  gained,  I 
hope,  a  sound,  if  rudimentary,  understanding  of  one 
of  the  most  perplexing  subjects  in  the  whole  field  of 
international  politics. 

I  am  perfectly  aware  that,  so  far  as  the  chapters 
dealing  with  Japan  and  China  are  concerned,  this 
book  does  not  cover  much  new  ground  historically, 
nor  is  it  marked  by  any  special  originality  of  presen- 
tation. I  am  also  aware  that  much  of  the  material 
has  been  used  repeatedly  in  recent  years  by  other 
writers  on  Japanese  and  Chinese  questions.  But, 
in  spite  of  this,  the  book  has,  I  believe,  the  merits  of 
being  clear,  comprehensive,  accurate,  and  up-to-the- 
minute.  It  was  written,  in  the  main,  while  the  Wash- 
ington Conference  was  still  in  session — an  advantage 
in  that  it  enabled  me  to  discuss  the  mooted  questions 
with  the  very  men  best  qualified  to  discuss  them;  a 
disadvantage,  perhaps,  in  that  certain  of  the  condi- 
tions which  I  have  described,  particularly  in  China, 
will  necessarily  be  modified  by  the  conferees'  deci- 
sions. ' 


FOREWORD  ix 

A  certain  number  of  errors  inevitably  creep  into  the 
pages  of  any  book  of  this  nature,  no  matter  how 
carefully  it  may  be  written  and  edited,  but,  in  order 
to  keep  the  errors  to  a  minimum,  the  proof-sheets  of 
the  various  chapters  were  submitted  for  correction 
to  gentlemen  who  are  universally  recognized  as  among 
the  highest  authorities  on  the  subjects  treated  in  them. 
The  proofs  of  the  chapters  on  Japan  and  Korea  were 
read  and  corrected  by  His  Highness  Prince  Toku- 
gawa.  President  of  the  Japanese  House  of  Peers,  and 
by  His  Excellency  Baron  Shidehara,  Japanese  Am- 
bassador to  the  United  States,  both  members  of  the 
Japanese  Delegation  to  the  Washington  Conference, 
and  by  the  Honorable  Roland  S.  Morris,  formerly 
American  Ambassador  to  Japan.  The  chapters  on 
China  were  revised  by  Dr.  J.  C.  Ferguson,  Adviser 
to  the  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  a  distin- 
guished educator  and  probably  the  leading  foreign 
authority  on  Chinese  affairs.  The  chapters  on  the 
Philippines  were  corrected  by  the  Honorable  Wil- 
liam H.  Taft,  Chief  Justice  of  the  United  States  and 
formerly  Governor-General  of  the  Philippine  Islands ; 
by  the  Honorable  Cameron  Forbes,  also  a  former 
governor-general  and  a  member  of  the  Wood-Forbes 
Mission,  and  by  Major-General  Frank  Mclntyre, 
Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs.  It  should 
be  clearly  understood,  however,  that  the  opinions  ex- 
pressed in  the  following  pages  do  not  necessarily 


X  FOREWORD 

reflect  the  views,  nor  in  all  cases  meet  with  the  ap- 
proval, of  the  gentlemen  in  question.  The  opinions 
expressed  in  this  book  are  my  own. 

Some  of  the  things  which  I  have  written  will  prob- 
ably give  offense  to  those  governments  and  individuals 
from  whom  I  received  many  courtesies.  Those  who 
are  privileged  to  speak  for  governments  are  fond 
of  asserting  that  their  governments  have  nothing  to 
conceal  and  that  they  welcome  honest  criticism,  but 
long  experience  has  taught  me  that  when  they  are 
told  unpalatable  truths  governments  are  usually  as 
sensitive  and  resentful  as  friends.  Yet,  were  I  to 
attempt  to  retain  the  good-will  of  the  governments 
and  officials  of  the  countries  under  discussion  by  re- 
fraining from  unfavorable  comment,  this  book  would 
be  little  more  than  propaganda.  Perhaps  it  is 
too  much  to  expect,  but  I  would  like  those  who  showed 
me  so  many  kindnesses  in  Japan,  China,  Korea,  and 
the  Philippines  to  believe  that  I  have  leaned  back- 
ward in  an  effort  to  keep  these  pages  free  from  bias 
and  injustice,  that  I  have  tried  to  tell  the  truth  as  I 
understand  it  and  because  I  believe  that  it  is  to  the 
best  interests  of  all  the  peoples  concerned  that  the 
unvarnished  truth  should  be  told.  If  those  of  my 
country  people  who  honor  me  by  reading  this  book 
obtain  from  it  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  problems 
and  perplexities  which  confront  our  trans-Pacific 
neighbors,  if  it  teaches  them  to  regard  the  short- 


FOREWORD  xi 

comings  of  the  peoples  of  Eastern  Asia  a  little  more 
leniently  and  their  national  aspirations  a  little  more 
sympathetically,  then  I  shall  feel  that  my  purpose  in 
writing  it  has  been  accomplished. 

E.  Alexander  Powell. 
Washington,  January,  1922. 


AN  ACKNOWLEDGMENT 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  of  expressing  my  ap- 
preciation of  the  innumerable  courtesies  extended  to 
me  by  the  governments  of  Japan,  Korea,  China,  and 
the  Philippine  Islands,  and  of  the  many  personal 
kindnesses  shown  me  by  individuals  in  those  countries. 

My  studies  in  the  Japanese  Empire  were  greatly 
facilitated  by  the  hearty  cooperation  of  the  late 
Premier  Hara,  whose  tragic  death  at  the  hands  of  an 
assassin  in  November,  1921,  was  a  profound  shock  to 
all  who  knew  him.  For  the  assistance  and  hospitality 
which  I  received  everywhere  in  Japan  and  Korea  I 
am  also  grateful  to  His  Excellency  Baron  Shidehara, 
Japanese  Ambassador  to  the  United  States;  to  His 
Highness  Prince  Tokugawa,  President  of  the  House 
of  Peers;  to  His  Excellency  Masanao  Hanihara, 
Vice-Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs;  to  Major-General 
G.  Tanaka,  formerly  Minister  of  War;  to  His  Excel- 
lency Admiral  Baron  Saito,  Governor-General  of 
Korea,  and  to  Dr.  Kentaro  Midzuno,  the  Vice-Gov- 
ernor-General; to  Viscount  Kaneko;  to  Dallas 
McGrew,  Esq.,  and  Frederick  Moore,  Esq.,  of  the 
Japanese  Foreign  Office ;  to  Dr.  T.  lyenaga,  of  New 
York  City;  to  the  Hon.  Ransford  Miller,  American 
Consul-General  at  Seoul;  and  in  particular  to  the 

xiii 


xiv  AN  ACKNOWLEDGMENT 

Hon.  Roland  S.  Morris,  formerly  American  Ambas- 
sador to  Japan. 

Of  the  many  persons  who  assisted  me  in  China  my 
thanks  are  due  to  Dr.  J.  C.  Ferguson,  Adviser  to  the 
President  of  the  Chinese  Republic ;  to  the  Hon.  Paul 
R.  Reinsch,  formerly  American  Minister  to  China; 
to  Ray  Atherton,  Esq.,  Secretary  of  the  American 
Legation  at  Peking;  to  I.  Tokugawa,  Esq.,  Secretary 
of  the  Japanese  Legation  at  Peking;  to  P.  Loureiro, 
Esq.,  Assistant  Financial  Secretary  of  the  Salt  Rev- 
enue Administration;  and  to  Bertram  Lennox-Simp- 
son, Esq.  ("Putnam  Weale"). 

For  the  great  trouble  to  which  they  put  themselves 
in  rendering  my  visit  to  the  Philippines  instructive 
and  enjoyable  I  am  very  grateful  to  the  Hon.  Francis 
Burton  Harrison,  formerly  Governor-General  of  the 
Philippine  Islands;  to  the  Hon.  Manuel  Quezon, 
President  of  the  Philippine  Senate;  to  the  Hon. 
Sergio  Osmena,  Speaker  of  the  House;  to  the  Hon. 
Frank  C.  Carpenter,  Governor  of  the  Department 
of  Mindanao  and  Sulu;  to  the  Hon.  P.  W.  Rogers, 
formerly  Governor  of  Jolo;  to  Colonel  Ralph  W. 
Jones  of  the  Philippine  Constabulary;  to  Major  Ed- 
win C.  Bopp,  Chief  of  Police  of  Manila,  and  to  army, 
scout,  and  constabulary  officers  all  the  way  from 
northern  Luzon  to  Zamboanga. 

This  also  affords  me  an  opportunity  to  acknowl- 
edge my  indebtedness  for  many  suggestions  and  much 


AN  ACKNOWLEDGMENT  xv 

valuable  material  which  I  have  derived  from  the  fol- 
lowing sources :  "Modern  Japan,"  by  A.  S.  Hershey ; 
"What  Shall  I  Think  of  Japan?"  by  George  Gleason; 
"The  Japanese  Empire,"  by  Phihp  Terry;  "The  Far 
East  Unveiled,"  by  Frederick  Coleman;  "The  New 
Far  East,"  by  T.  J.  Millard;  "The  Mastery  of  the 
Far  East,"  by  Arthur  Judson  Brown;  "China,  Japan 
and  Korea,"  by  J.  O.  P.  Bland;  "These  from  the 
Land  of  Sinim,"  by  Sir  Robert  Hart;  "China  in 
Transformation,"  by  A.  B.  Colquhoun;  "Peking 
Dust,"  by  Ellen  La  Motte;  "Modern  China,"  by  S. 
G.  Cheng;  "Korea,"  by  Angus  Hamilton;  "In  Korea 
with  the  Marquis  Ito,"  by  George  T.  Ladd;  "Korea's 
Fight  for  Freedom,"  by  F.  A.  McKenzie;  "The  Pass- 
ing of  Korea,"  by  H.  B.  Hurlbert ;  "The  Truth  About 
Korea,"  by  C.  W.  Kendall;  "The  Rebirth  of  Korea," 
by  Hugh  H.  Cynn;  "The  Case  for  the  Filipinos," 
by  Maximo  M.  Kalaw;  "The  Philippine  Islands  and 
Their  People"  and  "The  Philippines,  Past  and  Pres- 
ent," by  Dean  C.  Worcester,  and  particularly  the 
extremely  able  despatches  of  the  New  York  Tribime's 
Far  Eastern  correspondent,  Mr.  Nathaniel  Peff  er. 

E.  Alexander  Powell. 


CONTENTS 

PART  PAOB 

I     Japan      3 

II     Korea 101 

1.  The  Peninsula  and  Its  People 101 

2.  The  Japanese  in  Korea 127 

III     China 181 

IV     The  Philippine  Islands 273 

Appendix  A 345 

Appendix  B 348 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

Crown  Prince  Hirohito Frontispiece 

FACINQ    PAGE 

Map  of  the  Japanese  Empire 32 

Fujiyama,  the  Sacred  Mountain,  and  Fuji  River  ,      .      .  48 

Sunset  in  Shiba  Park,  Tokyo 48 

A  Religious  Procession  in  Kioto 49 

Map  of  Chosen  (Korea) 112 

Korean  Peasant  Taking  Farm-Products  to  Market    .      .  128 

Korean  Peasant  Woman  and  Child 128 

Funeral  of  the  Ex-Emperor  of  Korea 129 

Devil-Posts  Outside  Korean  Village  to  Keep  Away  Evil 

Spirits 160 

Transporting  Fodder  on  the  Backs  of  Bulls  in  Korea  .      .  160 

Ancient  Korean  Temple  in  Seoul 161 

Palanquin  of  Prince  Li 161 

Map  of  China 181 

The  Great  Wall  of  China 188 

Another  View  of  the  Great  Wall 188 

Camels  under  the  Walls  of  Peking 189 

The  Tartar  Wall  and  a  Portion  of  the  Tartar  City  in 

Peking 189 

The  Jade  Pagoda  near  Peking 196 

A  Pagoda  of  the  Summer  Palace 197 

xix 


XX  ILLUSTRATIONS 

rACIKG   PAGB 

The  Temple  of  Heaven,  Peking 197 

Hsu  Shih-Chang 204 

Dr.  Sun  Yat-Sen 204 

In  the   Forbidden   City 205 

Canal  Scene  in  Canton 228 

The  Pawnshops  of  Canton 228 

View  from  the  Terrace  of  the  Summer  Palace  ....  229 

Bridge  in  the  Gardens  of  the  Summer  Palace,  Peking  .      .  229 

A  Funeral  Procession  in  Peking 240 

Funeral  Procession  of  a  High  Official 240 

An  Itinerant  Mendicant  of  the  Northern  Hill     .      .      .      .241 

Tibetan   Priests   at  the   Entrance  to  the  Lama   Temple, 

Peking 241 

Chinese  Railway  Guards 272 

Japanese  Railway  Guard 272 

A  Feast  Given  by  a  Boy  of  13  Years  and  His  12- Year-Old 

Wife  on  the  Anniversary  of  the  Death  of  Their  Son  273 

The  1911  Eruption  of  Taal  Volcano 276 

The  Little  River  that  Flows  Through  the  Town  ...  277 

A  Bit  of  Zamboanga 277 

A  Kalinga  Man  and  Woman 284 

A  Kalinga  Dancing-Girl 285 

A  Kalinga  Family 285 

Map  of  the  Philippine  Islands 288 

Rice  Terraces  Built  by  the  Ifugaoes  in  the  Mountain  Prov- 
ince, Luzon 292 

Filipinos  Threshing  Rice  with  Their  Feet 293 


ILLUSTRATIONS  xxi 

FACING    PAGE 

Plowing  and  Harrowing  the  Zacate  Fields 293 

Roasting  a  Dog  at  an  Igorot  Caniau  in  the  Mountains  of 

Luzon         300 

An   Igorot  Burial   Cave 300 

Fruit-Bats  in  Flight,  Lagangilang 301 

Boobies  on  Tubbataja  Reef 301 

Moros  of  Zamboanga 304 

A  Negrito 304 

A  Monobo-Manguangan  from  the  Upper  Agusan,  Mindanao  305 

A  Bagobo  Youth 305 

A  Moro  Enlisted  Man 320 

A  Moro  Dato 320 

An  Ifugao  Soldier 320 

The  Famous  "Zigzag"  on  the  Benguet  Road   .      .      .      .321 

The  Pasig  River,  Manila 321 


ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 


ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 


PART  I 
JAPAN 


IT  is  too  early  by  many  years  to  assess  at  their 
true  value  the  achievements  and  failures  of  the 
Washington  Conference  for  the  Limitation  of  Arma- 
ments. We  are  standing  too  near  the  picture  to  esti- 
mate with  accuracy  its  merits  and  its  faults.  But, 
when  history  has  lent  it  the  justice  of  perspective, 
the  assembly  of  nations  which  convened  on  the  banks 
of  the  Potomac  in  November,  1921,  will  assuredly 
be  recognized  as  one  of  the  most  remarkable  episodes 
of  our  time.  No  matter  what  else  it  accomplished,  or 
failed  to  accomplish,  it  provided  the  world  with  a 
striking  object-lesson  in  the  efficacy,  as  applied  to 
international  relations,  of  the  policy  of  let's-sit-down- 
and-talk-it-over. 

It  would  be  idle  to  deny  that,  when  the  Confer- 
ence was  called  by  President  Harding,  Japan  was 
regarded  as  a  potential  enemy  by  a  majority  of 
Americans.    I,  for  one,  am  convinced  that,  had  the 


4  ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

mutual  suspicions  and  misunderstandings  of  the  two 
peoples  been  permitted  to  continue,  had  their  respec- 
tive governments  clung  to  the  policies  which  they 
were  then  pursuing,  the  situation  would  have  ended 
in  war.  Yet  their  mutual  suspicions  were  so  largely 
allayed,  their  misunderstandings  so  successfully  com- 
posed by  the  frank  discussions  which  characterized  the 
Conference,  that,  when  it  ended,  the  sentiment  of 
most  thoughtful  persons,  Americans  and  Japanese, 
was  expressed  by  Prince  Tokugawa,  President  of  the 
House  of  Peers,  when  he  said  upon  his  departure 
from  our  shores:  "The  United  States  has  learned 
that  Japan  entertains  no  aggressive  designs  in  the 
Pacific  and  Japan  has  learned  that  she  has  nothing 
to  expect  from  this  side  of  the  Pacific  except  friendly 
cooperation." 

The  near-hostility  which  until  recently  embittered 
the  relations  of  the  United  States  and  Japan,  and 
which  threatened  at  one  time  to  break  into  an  open 
sore,  was  due,  I  am  convinced,  not  to  any  inherent 
ill-will  on  the  part  of  either  people  for  the  other,  but 
to  a  mutual  lack  of  knowledge  and  sympathetic  un- 
derstanding. In  other  words,  both  Americans  and 
Japanese  had  shown  themselves  unable,  or  unwilling, 
to  think  the  other's  mind.  It  was  not  enough  for 
groups  of  more  or  less  representative  Americans  and 
Japanese  to  gather  about  banquet  tables  and  indulge 
in  sonorous  protestations  of  mutual  friendship  and  in- 
ternational good-will,  or  to  cable  each  other  hands- 


JAPAN  5 

across-the-sea  greetings  couched  in  terms  of  fulsome 
praise.  The  possibihties  of  a  cordial  relationship  and 
a  harmonious  cooperation  between  the  two  nations 
are  so  tremendous,  the  interests  at  stake  are  so  vast 
and  far-reaching,  the  consequences  of  an  armed  con- 
flict would  be  so  catastrophic  and  overwhelming,  that 
it  is  unthinkable  that  the  two  peoples  should  ever 
again  permit  themselves  to  drift  into  the  frame  of 
mind  which  existed  in  both  countries  prior  to  the  Con- 
ference at  Washington. 

Yet,  if  such  a  perilous  situation  is  not  again  to 
arise,  each  people  must  make  an  earnest  endeavor  to 
gain  a  better  understanding  of  the  temperament,  tra- 
ditions, ambitions,  limitations,  and  problems  of  the 
other,  and  to  make  corresponding  allowances  for 
them — in  short,  to  cultivate  a  more  tolerant  and  sym- 
pathetic state  of  mind.  Japan  is,  and  probably  al- 
ways will  be,  one  of  the  most  important  countries,  if 
not  the  most  important,  on  our  political  horizon. 
Summoned  from  obscurity  by  an  American  commo- 
dore, adopting  with  avidity  the  devices  of  Western 
civilization,  advancing  as  in  seven-league  boots  to 
her  present  position  as  one  of  the  five  greatest  mili- 
tary and  naval  powers  in  the  world,  our  closest  com- 
petitor in  the  race  for  the  trade  of  Eastern  Asia,  one 
of  our  most  profitable  customers,  the  key  that  can 
lock  the  Open  Door — it  is  imperative  for  every  Amer- 
ican to  learn  more  about  this  great  Ocean  Empire  on 
the  other  side  of  the  Pacific  and  to  obtain  a  clearer 


6  ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

understanding  of  what  has  taken  place  in  those  nine- 
and-sixty  amazing  years — less  than  the  span  of  life 
which  the  Scriptures  allot  to  man — since  the  anchors 
of  Perry's  frigates  rumbled  down  in  the  Bay  of  Yedo. 

The  Japanese  Question  is  an  extremely  compli- 
cated one.  Its  ramifications  extend  into  the  realms 
of  politics,  industry,  commerce,  and  finance.  It 
stretches  across  one  hundred  and  fifty  degrees  of 
longitude.  It  affects  the  lives  and  destinies  of  six 
hundred  millions  of  people.  Its  roots  are  to  be  found 
as  far  apart  as  a  Japanese  military  outpost  in  Siberia 
and  the  headquarters  of  a  labor  union  in,  Sacramento, 
as  a  Korean  village  and  a  Californian  farm,  as  an 
obscure  harbor  on  the  coast  of  Mexico  and  a  cable- 
station  on  a  lonely  rock  in  the  Pacific,  as  the  offices 
of  a  firm  of  international  bankers  in  Wall  Street  and 
the  palace  of  the  President  of  China  in  the  Forbidden 
City. 

To  understand  algebra,  you  must  have  a  knowl- 
edge of  arithmetic.  To  understand  the  Japanese 
Question,  you  must  have  at  least  a  rudimentary 
knowledge  of  the  various  factors  which  have  combined 
to  produce  it.  It  grew  to  its  present  dimensions  so 
silently,  so  stealthily,  that  the  average  well-informed 
American  has  only  a  vague  and  frequently  erroneous 
idea  of  what  it  is  all  about.  He  has  read  in  the 
newspapers  of  the  anti-Japanese  agitation  in  Califor- 
nia, of  the  Gentlemen's  Agreement,  of  picture-brides. 


JAPAN  7 

of  mysterious  Japanese  troop-movements  in  Siberia, 
of  Japan's  "special  interests"  in  Manchuria,  of  Japa- 
nese oppression  in  Korea,  of  the  Shantung  contro- 
versy, of  the  dispute  over  Yap ;  but  to  him  these  iso- 
lated episodes  usually  had  about  as  much  significance 
as  so  many  fragments  of  a  complicated  jig-saw  puz- 
zle. Moreover,  the  avalanche  of  information,  near- 
information,  and  misinformation  about  Japan  which 
filled  the  columns  of  the  daily  papers  prior  to  and 
during  the  Washington  Conference  bewildered  rather 
than  enlightened  him.  Therefore,  even  at  the  risk  of 
repeating  some  facts  with  which  you  are  doubtless 
already  familiar,  I  will  endeavor  to  piece  the  puzzle 
together,  so  that  you  may  view  the  picture  in  its 
entirety  and  in  the  light  of  the  Conference's  decisions. 
But,  before  I  proceed,  let  me  make  it  amply  clear 
that  I  hold  no  brief  for  Japan.  I  am  an  American 
and,  because  I  wish  to  see  my  country  morally  in  the 
right,  I  deplore  the  unjust,  intolerant,  and  provoca- 
tive attitude  toward  the  Japanese  adopted  by  certain 
elements  of  our  population.  I  believe  that  the  poli- 
tician or  pubhcist  who  deliberately  inflames  public 
opinion  against  a  nation  with  which  we  are  at  peace, 
and  with  which  we  wish  to  remain  at  peace,  is  an 
enemy  to  the  best  interests  of  his  country  and  should 
be  treated  as  such  by  all  decent  citizens.  It  is  to  the 
great  mass  of  reasoning  and  fair-minded  people  in 
both  countries,  who,  I  am  convinced,  wish  to  learn 
the  unvarnished  truth,  no  matter  how  unflattering 


8  ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

it  may  be  to  their  national  pride,  how  disillusionizing, 
that  I  address  myself.  In  order  that  they  may  have 
the  clearest  possible  understanding  of  a  situation 
which  vitally  concerns  the  future  well-being  of  both 
the  United  States  and  Japan,  I  propose,  in  the  fol- 
lowing pages,  to  discard  all  euphemism  and  diplo- 
matic subterfuge  and  to  tell  as  much  as  possible  of 
"nothing  but  the  truth." 

n 

Some  truths,  more  half-truths,  many  untruths  have 
been  said  and  written  in  each  country  about  the  other. 
The  clear  waters  of  our  old-time  friendship  have  been 
roiled  by  prejudice  and  propaganda.  Much  of  our 
appalling  ignorance  of  Japanese  character,  aims, 
and  ideals  is  traceable  to  our  national  propensity  for 
generalization — always  an  inexact  and  dangerous 
method  of  estimating  another  people,  and  doubly 
dangerous  in  the  case  of  a  people  as  complex  as  the 
Japanese.  Let  us  not  forget  that  we  were  accus- 
tomed to  think  of  the  French  as  a  volatile,  excitable, 
easy-going,  pleasure-obsessed,  decadent  people  until 
the  Marne  and  Verdun  taught  us  the  truth.  Such  a 
misconception  was  deplorable  in  the  case  of  a  people 
from  whom  we  had  nothing  to  fear ;  it  is  inexcusable, 
and  might  well  prove  disastrous,  in  the  case  of  the 
Japanese.  I  have  heard  Americans  who  pride  them- 
selves on  being  well-informed,  men  whose  opinions 
are  listened  to  with  respect,  betray  ignorance  of  Japan 


JAPAN  9 

and  of  Japanese  institutions  which  would  be  ludicrous 
under  other  conditions. 

And  the  ignorance  of  many  intelligent  Japanese  in 
regard  to  ourselves  is  no  less  disheartening.  Their 
way  of  thinking  is  not  our  way  of  thinking;  many 
of  their  institutions  and  ideas  and  ideals  are  diametric- 
ally different  from  ours.  Believe  it  or  not,  as  you 
choose,  the  great  majority  of  intelligent  Japanese 
are  unable  to  understand  our  thinly  veiled  distrust 
and  disUke  of  them.  That  many  of  our  people  do  dis- 
trust and  dishke  the  Japanese  there  can  be  no  gainsay- 
ing. Yet  the  average  American  usually  finds  some 
difficulty  in  giving  for  his  attitude  toward  the  Jap- 
anese a  definite  and  cogent  reason.  This  unreasoning 
antipathy  was  illustrated  by  an  educated  and  charm- 
ing American  woman,  who  had  been  traveling  in 
Japan,  whom  I  met  on  a  homeward  bound  liner. 

"How  did  you  hke  the  Japanese?"  I  asked  her. 

"I  did  n't  like  them,"  she  replied. 

"Were  you  ill-treated  in  Japan?  Did  you  meet 
with  any  discourtesy  or  injustice?" 

"No,"  she  admitted,  with  some  embarrassment.  "I 
have  no  complaints  whatever  to  make  of  the  treat- 
ment I  received.  I  found  them  universally  courte- 
ous." 

"Then  why  did  n't  you  like  them?"  I  persisted. 

"Well,"  she  explained,  "I  just  made  up  my  mind 
before  I  went  to  Japan  that  I  was  n't  going  to  like 
the  Japanese,  and  I  did  n't." 


10         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

That  is  an  extreme  case,  I  admit,  but  if  you  will 
take  the  trouble  to  go  into  the  matter  you  will  find 
that  that  is  about  as  cogent  a  reason  as  many  Amer- 
icans can  offer  for  their  dislike  of  the  people  of 
Nippon. 

Underlying  all  the  misunderstandings  between  the 
two  nations  is  race  prejudice.  Our  racial  antipathy 
for  the  Japanese  is  instinctive.  It  has  its  source  in 
the  white  race's  attitude  of  arrogant  superiority 
toward  all  non-white  peoples.  We  inherited  it,  along 
with  our  Caucasian  blood,  from  our  Aryan  ancestors. 
It  is  as  old  as  the  breed.  The  Japanese  do  not 
realize  that  they  are  meeting  in  this  an  old,  old  prob- 
lem; that  the  American  attitude  is  not  dictated  by  a 
wish  to  place  a  stigma  of  inferiority  on  them,  but  is 
merely  the  application  to  them  of  the  Caucasian's  his- 
toric attitude  toward  aU  peoples  with  tinted  skins.  If 
the  Japanese  question  this,  let  them  observe  the  atti- 
tude of  the  Americans  resident  in  the  Philippines 
toward  the  Filipinos,  that  of  the  English  toward  the 
natives  of  India  and  Egypt,  that  of  the  French 
toward  their  brown-skinned  subjects  in  Indo-China. 
But  this  racial  prejudice  is  by  no  means  one-sided. 
The  Japanese  consider  themselves  as  superior  to  us 
as  we  consider  ourselves  superior  to  them.  Make  no 
mistake  about  that.  The  Japanese  are  by  no  means 
free  from  that  racial  dislike  for  Occidentals  which 
lies  near  to  the  hearts  of  all  Orientals ;  but  they  have 


JAPAN  11 

the  good  sense,  good  manners,  and  tact  to  repress 
their  feelings.  That  is  where  they  differ  from  Amer- 
icans. 

Another  reason  for  American  dislike  of  the  Jap- 
anese is  the  latter's  assertion  of  equality.  We  don't 
call  it  that,  of  course.  We  call  it  conceit — cockiness. 
The  reason  that  we  get  along  with  another  yellow 
race,  the  Chinese,  is  because  they,  by  their  abject 
abasement  and  submissiveness,  flatter  our  sense  of 
racial  superiority.  Our  pride  ilius  catered  to,  we 
give  them  a  condescending  pat  of  approval,  such  as 
we  would  give  a  negro  who  always  "knows  his  place," 
holds  his  hat  in  his  hand  when  he  addresses  a  white 
person,  says  "sir"  and  "ma'am,"  and  shows  no  sign  of 
resenting  ill- justice  or  mistreatment.  The  Japanese, 
on  the  contrary,  stands  up  for  his  rights;  he  is  not 
at  all  humble  or  submissive  or  in  the  least  awed  by 
threats,  and  if  an  irate  American  attempts  to  "put 
him  in  his  place,"  as  he  is  accustomed  to  do  with  a 
Chinese  or  a  FiHpino  or  a  negro,  he  is  more  likely 
than  not  to  find  himself  on  the  way  to  jail  in  the 
grasp  of  a  small  but  extremely  diicient  and  unsym- 
pathetic policeman. 

I  asked  an  American  whom  I  met  in  Yokohama 
if  he  had  enjoyed  his  stay  in  Japan. 

"Not  particularly,"  he  answered.  "I  don't  care 
for  the  Japs ;  give  me  the  Chinese  every  time." 

"Why?"  I  queried. 

He  pondered  my  question  for  a  moment. 


12         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

"I'll  sum  it  up  for  you  like  this,"  he  replied.  "The 
Chinese  treat  you  as  a  superior;  the  Japanese  treat 
you  as  an  equal." 

Until  Commodore  Perry  opened  Japan  to  western 
civilization  and  commerce,  we  held  all  Mongolians  in 
contempt,  being  pleased  to  consider  them  as  inferior 
peoples.  But  in  the  case  of  the  Japanese  this  con- 
tempt changed  in  a  few  years  to  a  patronizing  con- 
descension, such  as  a  grown  person  might  have  for 
a  precocious  and  amusing  child.  We  congratulated 
ourselves  on  having  discovered  in  the  Japanese  a 
sort  of  infant  prodigy ;  we  took  in  them  a  proprietary 
interest.  We  watched  their  rapid  rise  in  the  world 
with  almost  paternal  gratification.  And  the  Japanese 
flattered  our  self-esteem  by  their  open  admiration 
and  imitation  of  our  methods. 

I  think  that  our  national  antipathy  for  the  Japanese 
had  its  beginnings  in  their  victory  over  the  Russians. 
Up  to  that  time  we  had  looked  on  the  Japanese  as 
a  brilliant  and  ambitious  little  people  whom  we  had 
brought  to  the  notice  of  the  world  and  for  whose 
amazing  progress  we  were  largely  responsible.  But 
when  Japan  administered  a  trouncing  to  the  Russians, 
who  are,  after  all,  fellow-Caucasians,  American  sen- 
timent performed  a  volte-face  almost  overnight.  We 
were  as  pro-Russian  at  Portsmouth  as  we  had  been 
pro-Japanese  at  Port  Arthur.  This  sudden  change  in 
our  attitude  toward  them  has  always  mystified  the 


JAPAN  13 

Japanese.  Yet  there  is  really  nothing  mystifying 
I  about  it.  We  were  merely  answering  the  call  of  the 
blood.  As  long  as  we  believed  Japan  to  be  the  under 
dog,  we  were  for  her;  but  when  she  became  the  upper 
dog,  the  old  racial  prejudice  flamed  up  anew.  A 
yellow  people  had  humbled  and  humiliated  a  Cau- 
casian people,  and  we,  as  Caucasians,  resented  it. 
It  was  a  blow  to  our  pride  of  race.  (A  somewhat 
similar  manifestation  of  racial  prejudice  was  observ- 
able throughout  the  United  States  when  the  negro 
pugilist.  Jack  Johnson,  defeated  Jim  Jeffries. )  That 
a  yellow  race  could  defeat  a  white  race  had  never 
occurred  to  us,  and  we  were  correspondingly  startled 
and  alarmed.  We  abruptly  ceased  to  think  of  the 
Japanese  as  a  third-rate  nation  of  polite,  well-mean- 
ing, and  harmless  little  men,  drinkers  of  tea  and 
wearers  of  kimonos.  They  became  the  Yellow  Peril. 
Though  the  Japanese  are  of  Asia,  they  cannot  be 
treated  as  we  are  accustomed  to  treat  other  Asiatics. 
To  attempt  to  belittle  or  patronize  a  nation  that  can 
put  into  the  field  three  million  fighting  men  and  send 
to  sea  a  battle  fleet  not  greatly  inferior  to  our  own, 
would  be  as  ridiculous  as  it  would  be  short-sighted. 
Japan  is  a  striking  example  to  other  Oriental  races  of 
the  power  of  the  Big  Stick.  She  has  never  been 
subjugated  by  the  foreigner.  In  spite  of,  rather  than 
by  the  aid  of,  the  white  man,  she  has  become  one  of 
the  Great  Powers,  and  at  Versailles  helped  to  shape 
the  destinies  of  millions  of  Europeans.    Yet  when  she 


14         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

claims  racial  equality  we  deny  and  resent  it.  Our 
refusal  to  treat  the  Japanese  as  equals,  while  at  the 
same  time  showing  a  wholesome  respect  for  the  armed 
might  that  is  behind  them,  reminds  me  of  an  Amer- 
ican reserve  lieutenant,  a  Southerner,  on  duty  at  a 
cantonment  where  there  was  a  division  of  colored 
troops,  who  refused  to  salute  a  negro  captain.  He 
was  called  before  the  commanding  officer,  who  gave 
him  his  choice  between  saluting  the  negro  or  being 
tried  by  court-martial. 

"I  suppose  I  '11  have  to  salute  the  uniform,"  he 
muttered  rebelliously,  "but  damned  if  I  '11  salute  the 
nigger  inside  it." 

Ill 

I  have  already  said  that  racial  prejudice  is  at  the 
bottom,  the  very  bottom,  of  the  friction  between  the 
two  countries.  Immediately  overlying  it  is  our  fear 
of  Japanese  economic  competition.  For,  if  you  will 
look  into  it,  you  will  find  that  there  has  hardly  ever 
been  a  conflict  between  nations  into  which  some 
economic  question  has  not  entered  as  the  final  and 
essential  factor.  Never  was  this  truer  than  in  the 
American-Japanese  situation.  In  considering  the 
question  of  Japanese  economic  competition,  it  would 
seem  that  Americans  fail  to  realize  the  extent  to 
which  Japanese  business  is  aided,;  controlled,  and 
directed  by  the  Japanese  Government. 

The  Japanese  business  man  does  not  have  to  fight 


JAPAN  15 

unaided  for  foreign  trade,  as  does  the  American. 
He  has  his  government  solidly  behind  him.  Govern- 
ment-subsidized steamship  lines  and  government- 
owned  railways  give  him  every  possible  advantage. 
The  government's  ambassadors,  ministers,  consuls, 
and  commercial  agents  lend  him  encouragement  and 
assistance.  Allied  industries  support  him.  Virtu- 
ally all  of  the  industries  of  the  empire  belong  to  trade 
guilds,  which,  like  their  European  prototypes  of  the 
Middle  Ages,  are  licensed  by  the  government  and  are 
granted  special  privileges  and  immunities.  In  short, 
the  Japanese  business  man  is  really  a  part  of  a 
gigantic  trust,  which  differs  from  our  American 
trusts  only  in  that  it  is  a  government  instead  of  a 
corporation. 

The  Japanese  long  since  realized  that  their  ma- 
terial resources  were  greatly  inferior  to  those  of  other 
first-class  powers,  and  that  the  realization  of  their 
national  ambitions  required  great  wealth  as  much  as 
a  great  military  establishment.  They  could  not 
obtain  this  wealth  by  agriculture,  for  not  only  is 
Japan  a  comparatively  small  country  territorially, 
but  not  more  than  fifteen  per  cent,  of  its  area  is 
capable  of  profitable  cultivation.  Moreover,  there 
are  already  three  hundred  and  fifty  inhabitants  to 
the  square  mile,  and  the  birth-rate,  like  the  cost  of 
living,  is  steadily  rising. 

In  Japan,  as  in  the  United  States,  to  quote  the 
words  of  a  popular  song:  "The  rich  get  richer  and 


16         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

the  poor  get  children."  Now  the  Japanese  were 
fully  conscious  of  the  handicap  under  which  they  were 
struggling  in  their  race  for  wealth  and  power.  So 
they  set  about  overcoming  it  by  embarking  upon  a 
carefully  planned  campaign  of  industrial  develop- 
ment and  commercial  expansion  which,  in  its  inten- 
sity and  thoroughness,  has  no  parallel  save  that  which 
was  waged  by  Germany  prior  to  August,  1914.  Per- 
ceiving that  they  could  never  hope  to  overtake  their 
Western  rivals  by  wading  cautiously  into  the  sea  of 
commercial  competition,  they  resolved  to  risk  every- 
thing by  plunging  boldly  into  deep  water.  They 
risked  everything — and  they  won.  By  utilizing  to 
the  utmost  what  they  already  possessed,  by  taxing 
themselves  until  they  staggered  under  the  burden, 
by  borrowing  from  the  Occidental  nations  until  their 
credit  was  stretched  to  the  breaking-point,  by  speed- 
ing up  the  industrial  machine  until  it  was  running 
twenty-four  hours  a  day  and  three  hundred  and  sixty- 
five  days  a  year,  by  hard  work,  rigid  economy,  and 
self-denial,  they  succeeded  in  raising  the  huge  sums 
which  they  required  for  mills,  factories,  and  power- 
plants,  for  railway  and  steamship  lines,  for  docking 
and  terminal  facilities,  for  postal  and  telegraph  sys- 
tems. To-day,  as  a  result  of  their  courage  and  amaz- 
ing energy,  the  Japanese  are  running  neck-and-neck 
with  the  United  States  and  England  in  the  race  for 
the  commerce  of  the  world.  They  are  making  matches 
at  a  price  that  has  virtually  closed  the  Asiatic  markets 


JAPAN  17 

to  their  Western  competitors.  They  can  deliver 
sashes,  doors,  lilinds,  and  woodenware  in  North  and 
South  America  at  so  low  a  rate  that  our  manufac- 
turers would  be  driven  out  of  business  were  it  not 
for  the  protection  afforded  by  our  tariif  wall.  Though 
the  Japanese  do  not  themselves  grow  large  quantities 
of  cotton,  they  purchase  the  poorer  and  cheaper 
grades  of  the  raw  material  in  India  and  Egypt,  trans- 
port it  by  their  government-subsidized  steamers  and 
government-owned  railways  to  their  government- 
assisted  factories,  where,  as  the  result  of  low  wages 
and  long  hours,  it  is  spun  into  piece  goods  which  are 
sold  to  the  cotton-clad  millions  of  the  East  at  prices 
with  which  American  and  British  manufacturers  are 
finding  profitable  competition  almost  out  of  the  ques- 
tion. 

In  competing  with  Western  nations  for  the  trade  of 
the  Orient,  Japan  possesses  several  important  advan- 
tages. Government  control  of  transportation  lines 
by  land  and  sea,  government  subsidies  and  bounties, 
and,  in  the  trade  with  Asia,  short  hauls,  are  vital 
factors.  The  Japanese  are  so  near  to  the  great,  rich 
markets  of  the  Asian  mainland  that  they  can  fill 
orders  from  Eastern  Siberia,  Korea,  Manchuria,  and 
Eastern  China  before  the  American  manufacturer 
could  get  his  shipment  aboard  a  vessel  at  San  Fran- 
cisco or  Seattle.  Furthermore,  it  is  a  cardinal  prin- 
ciple of  Japanese  commercial  policy  to  constantly 
keep  in  touch  with  the  changing  tastes  and  fashions 


18         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

of  their  Asiatic  customers  and  to  give  them  exactly 
what  they  want,  which  American  manufacturers,  all 
too  frequently,  do  not.  It  must  also  be  kept  in  mind 
that  the  Japanese  Government  and  the  Japanese  man- 
ufacturers work  hand  in  hand  in  furthering  their 
commercial  ambitions.  Several  of  the  greatest  indus- 
trial enterprises  in  Japan,  as  I  shall  show  further 
on,  are  controlled  directly  or  indirectly  by  the  govern- 
ment, large  blocks  of  stock  being  held  by  members 
of  the  imperial  family  and  by  high  officials.  Strug- 
gling enterprises  are  frequently  assisted  by  govern- 
ment bounties,  and  money  at  low  rates  of  interest  is 
often  loaned  for  the  same  purpose.  The  principal 
Japanese  steamship  lines  are  so  liberally  subsidized 
by  the  government,  and  pay  their  seamen  such  low 
wages,  that  it  is  impossible  for  American-owned  ves- 
sels, with  highly-paid  white  crews  and  no  govern- 
ment subsidies,  to  compete  with  them.  As  a  result, 
the  carrying  trade  of  the  Pacific  is  in  Japanese  hands. 
Thus  it  will  be  seen  that,  in  their  struggle  for  the 
trade  of  the  Orient,  American  firms  are  not  merely 
competing  against  Japanese  firms.  In  effect,  they 
are  competing  against  the  Japanese  Government. 

And  here  is  another  point  which  should  be  empha- 
sized. American  business  men  bear  no  such  relation 
to  their  government  as  Japanese  business  men  bear 
to  theirs.  Unlike  Japan  and  Germany,  in  both  of 
which  countries  foreign  politics  and  foreign  com- 
merce are  closely  interrelated,  the  United  States  does 


JAPAN  19 

not  utilize  the  commercial  ventures  of  its  citizens  to 
advance  its  foreign  policies.  Indeed,  beyond  giving 
half-hearted  and  usually  inefficient  protection  in  case 
of  menace  to  their  lives  and  property,  the  government 
at  Washington  does  not  concern  itself  at  all  with  the 
business  interests  of  its  citizens  oversea.  When  an 
American  firm  makes  a  foreign  loan,  or  establishes 
a  bank,  or  leases  harbor  or  shore  rights,  or  secures  a 
contract,  or  obtains  a  concession,  every  one  knows  that 
the  venture  is  without  political  significance,  present 
or  prospective.  On  the  other  hand,  every  move  made 
by  Japanese  commercial  interests  abroad  has  some 
degree  of  political  significance.  If  a  Japanese  firm 
leases  harbor  or  shore  rights  in  a  foreign  country, 
that  lease  is  to  all  intents  and  purposes  a  government 
one,  and  may  be  controlled  as  such  whenever  the 
government  chooses.  Hence  the  alarm  which  was 
felt  by  well-informed  Americans  when  it  was  reported 
that  a  Japanese  business  house  was  negotiating  with 
the  Mexican  Government  for  the  lease  of  a  harbor 
on  Magdalena  Bay — for  they  recognized  how  simple 
a  matter  it  would  be  for  the  Japanese  Government  to 
take  over  that  lease  and  transform  an  innocent  com- 
mercial harbor  into  a  coaling  station  or  naval  base. 
Again,  the  Japanese  Government  has  not  hesitated 
to  utilize  the  concessions  held  by  its  subjects  in  China 
to  coerce  the  government  at  Peking.  In  short,  every 
Japanese  merchant  who  establishes  himself  abroad 
automatically  becomes  a  listening-post  for  the  Tokio 


20         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

Foreign  Office,  a  point  d'appui  for  Japanese  aggres- 
sion, a  picket  eternally  on  the  alert  to  serve  the  polit- 
ical interests  of  Nippon.^ 

No  one  can  travel  in  the  Far  East  without  being 
struck  by  the  bitterness  and  unanimity  with  which 
foreign  business  men,  American  and  European  alike, 
condemn  Japanese  business  methods.  Whether  jus- 
tified or  not,  this  feeling  of  disapproval  and  distrust 
has  done  more  than  anything  else,  save  only  the  racial 
prejudice  to  which  I  have  already  referred,  to  em- 
bitter the  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Japan.  Therefore,  dehcate  as  the  question  is,  I  pur- 
pose to  discuss  it  with  the  utmost  frankness.  To 
ignore  it  in  order  to  avoid  offending  Japanese  suscep- 
tibilities would  be  tantamount  to  permitting  a  wound 
to  fester  because  opening  it  would  cause  the  patient 
pain. 

I  will  give  the  foreigner's  side  first.  Here  is  the 
way  an  American  importer,  whom  I  met  in  Yoko- 
hama, expressed  himself: 

"The  Japanese  business  man  has  two  great  faults 
— conceit  and  deceit.  In  his  business  relations  he  is 
overbearing  and  underdeveloped.  In  order  to  make 
an  immediate  profit,  he  will  lose  a  life-long  and  valu- 
able customer.     Though  it  frequently  happens  that 

*A  high  Japanese  official,  to  whom  I  submitted  the  pr«ofs  of  this 
chapter  for  correction,  professes  to  see  a  parallel  t«  this  situation  in  the 
Siems-Carey  and  American  International  Corporation  railway  contracts  in 
China.    In  this  I  do  not  agree  with  him.    E.  A.  P. 


JAPAN  21 

he  does  not  understand  what  the  foreign  buyer  is 
talking  about,  his  vanity  will  not  permit  him  to  admit 
his  ignorance;  instead,  he  will  accept  the  order  and 
then  fill  it  unsatisfactorily.  He  will  accept  an  order 
for  anything,  whether  he  can  deliver  it  or  not.  He 
would  accept  an  order  for  the  Brooklyn  Bridge,  f.o.b. 
next  Thursday,  Kioto — hoping  that  something  might 
turn  up  in  the  meantime  that  would  enable  him  to 
fill  it." 

An  Englishman  doing  business  in  Japan  said  to 
me: 

"The  Japanese  has  his  nerve  only  on  a  rising 
market.  As  soon  as  the  market  shows  signs  of  falling, 
he  hesitates  at  nothing  to  get  from  under.  When 
the  silk  market  rose,  hundreds  of  Japanese  firms  de- 
faulted on  orders  which  they  had  already  accepted 
from  foreign  importers,  as  they  would  have  lost 
money  at  the  old  prices.  When,  on  the  other  hand, 
there  was  a  slump  in  the  money  market  in  the  spring 
of  1920,  the  customs  warehouses  at  Yokohama  and 
Kobe  were  piled  high  with  goods  ordered  from 
abroad  for  which  the  consignees  refused  to  accept 
delivery." 

Another  American  importer,  who  has  made  semi- 
annual buying  trips  to  Japan  for  more  than  a  quarter 
of  a  century  and  who  has  a  genuine  liking  for  the 
Japanese,  told  me,  with  regret  in  his  tone,  that,  of  all 
the  firms  with  whom  he  did  business,  those  upon 


22         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

whom  he  could  rely  implicitly  to  send  him  goods  of 
the  same  quality  as  their  samples  could  be  numbered 
on  the  fingers  of  one  hand. 

I  cite  these  complaints  because  they  are  typical  of 
many  I  heard  while  I  was  in  the  Far  East.  That  does 
not  mean,  however,  that  I  consider  them  entirely 
justified,  for  I  do  not.  Their  very  bitterness  reveals 
the  prejudice  which  gave  birth  to  some  of  them  and 
added  exaggeration  to  others.  But  I  concluded  that 
where  there  was  so  much  smoke  there  must  be  some 
flame,  so  I  made  it  my  business  to  question  as  many 
foreign  business  men  as  I  could,  as  well  as  commer- 
cial attaches  and  consuls,  both  European  and  Amer- 
ican. From  their  replies  I  gathered  that  a  trademark, 
copyright,  or  patent  does  not,  as  a  rule,  prevent  a  Jap- 
anese manufacturer  from  appropriating  any  idea  of 
which  he  can  make  use;  though  I  am  glad  to  say 
that  recent  legislation,  combined  with  an  awakening 
national  conscience,  has  done  much  to  protect  the 
foreigner  from  such  abuses.  For  example,  "Bentley's 
Code,"  which  sells  in  the  United  States  for  thirty 
dollars  and  which  is  fully  protected  by  copyright,  has 
been  copied  by  a  Japanese  publishing  house,  which 
sells  it  for  ten  dollars.  A  famous  brand  of  safety 
razor,  which  sells  in  the  United  States  for  five  dollars, 
is  copied  by  the  Japanese  in  everything  save  quality, 
and  is  marketed  by  them,  under  the  originator's  name 
and  in  a  facsimile  of  the  original  package,  for  one- 
fifth  of  the  price  charged  for  the  genuine  article. 


JAPAN  23 

The  same  is  true  of  widely  advertised  brands  of  soap, 
tooth  paste,  talcum  powder,  perfume,  and  other  toilet 
preparations.  An  imitation  of  Pond's  Extract,  for 
instance,  is  sold  in  a  bottle  exactly  like  that  contain- 
ing the  American-made  article  except  that  a  faint 
line,  scarcely  discernible,  turns  the  P  into  an  R.  This 
infringement  was  fought  in  the  Japanese  courts,  how- 
ever, which  decided  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff.  A  par- 
ticularly flagrant  example  of  these  questionable  com- 
mercial methods  came  to  light  in  the  spring  of  1920 
at  Tientsin,  when  the  American  consul-general 
made  an  official  protest  against  the  action  of  the  Jap- 
anese chamber  of  commerce  of  that  city,  which  had 
sent  broadcast  thousands  of  hand-bills  intimating  that 
a  certain  American  trading  company,  which  had  be- 
come a  dangerous  competitor  of  Japanese  firms,  was 
on  the  verge  of  insolvency — a  statement  which  was  en- 
tirely without  foundation  in  fact.  The  Japanese 
chamber  of  commerce  refused  to  retract  its  allega- 
tions and  the  American  house  was  nearly  ruined. 

These  are  only  a  few  examples  of  those  Japanese 
business  practises  to  which  foreigners  object.  I  heard 
similar  stories  from  almost  every  American  business 
man  whom  I  met  in  the  East.  Indeed,  I  cannot 
recall  having  talked  with  a  single  foreigner  (with  a 
solitary  exception)  doing  business  with  the  Japanese, 
who  did  not  have  some  complaint  to  make  of  their 
practise  of  imitating  patented  or  copyrighted  articles, 
of  substituting  inferior  goods,  of  giving  short  weight, 


24         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

and  of  not  keeping  their  engagements  when  it  suited 
them  to  break  them.  That  the  Japanese  Government 
recognizes  and  deplores  the  methods  of  certain  Jap- 
anese business  men  is  shown  by  the  following  quota- 
tion from  the  report  of  the  Japanese  consul-general 
at  Bombay,  as  quoted  in  the  Japan  Weekly  Chron- 
icle: 

Although  I  am  confident  that  the  credit  of  Japanese  mer- 
chants in  general  is  not  so  low  as  is  represented  by  a  small 
section  of  the  foreign  merchants,  yet  it  is  to  be  deplored 
as  an  indisputable  fact  that  there  is  one  sort  of  short- 
sighted dishonest  Japanese  merchants  who  are  always  eager 
to  obtain  a  temporary  profit  just  before  their  eyes,  who 
resort  to  extremely  detestable  and  crafty  expedients.  They 
will  send  samples  of  goods  far  superior  in  quality  in  com- 
parison with  the  price  quoted,  and  when  they  receive  orders 
according  to  these  samples,  they  never  manufacture  goods 
equal  to  the  samples  in  quality,  but  manufacture  and  ship 
inferior  goods  suitable  to  the  price. 

This  commercial  unscrupulousness  has  worked 
great  injury  to  the  friendly  relations  of  Japan  and 
the  United  States.  It  has  engendered  in  American 
business  men  a  distrust  and  a  dislike  which  it  will  take 
years  to  eradicate.  This  was  strikingly  illustrated  one 
evening  in  the  smoking-room  of  a  trans-Pacific  liner. 
While  chatting  with  a  group  of  returning  American 
business  men  I  casually  mentioned  the  case  of  a  fel- 
low-countryman who  had  recently  brought  American 
commercial  methods  into  disrepute  by  giving  "exclu- 
sive" agencies  for  certain  widely  advertised  articles  to 
several  firms  in  the  same  city.    Instead  of  deploring 


JAPAN  25 

such  trickery,  my  auditors  applauded  it  almost  to  a 
man.  "Fine!"  they  exclaimed.  "Good  work!  Glad 
to  hear  of  a  Yankee  who  can  beat  the  Japs  at  their 
own  game!"  They  were  as  jubilant  over  that  dis- 
honest American's  success  in  turning  the  tables  on 
the  Japanese  as  was  the  American  public  when  it 
learned  that  we  had  perfected  a  poison  gas  more  hor- 
rible in  its  effects  than  any  in  use  by  the  Germans. 

I  heard  other  criticisms,  too,  which,  if  they  are  jus- 
tified, would  indicate  that  the  Japanese  Government 
itself  sometimes  aids  Japanese  business  by  methods 
which  are  not  generally  considered  fair.  These  in- 
cluded charges  that  the  government-owned  railways 
give  rebates  to  Japanese  shippers;  that  Japanese 
freight  is  expedited  by  railway  and  steamship  lines 
while  that  shipped  by  foreign  firms  is  subjected  to 
ruinous  delay;  that,  owing  to  the  South  Manchuria 
Railway  being  under  Japanese  control,  Japanese  mer- 
chants shipping  their  goods  into  Manchuria  have  fre- 
quently been  able  to  evade  the  customs,  whereas  goods 
of  foreign  origin  are  subject  to  full  duties;  that  im- 
portant commercial  messages  sent  over  Japanese 
cables  have  been  revealed  to  the  senders'  Japanese 
competitors,  the  messages  in  some  cases  not  having 
been  delivered  to  the  addressees  at  all.^ 

Foreign  business  men  in  the  East  often  assert  that 

*I  am  informed  by  an  official  of  the  Japanese  Foreign  Office  tliat 
Japanese  business  men  in  the  United  States  are  making  precisely  the 
same  complaints  in  regard  to  the  handling  of  messages  by  American 
cable   companies.     E.    A.   P. 


r 


26         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

the  amazing  commercial  success  of  the  Japanese  is 
mainly  due  to  such  methods.  On  the  contrary,  it 
has  been  achieved  in  spite  of  them.  Japan's  com- 
mercial rise  is  due,  as  I  have  already  shown,  to  the 
courage,  energy,  industry,  and  self-denial  of  the  Jap- 
anese nation.  It  should  be  added,  however,  that  the 
tremendous  commercial  boom  which  reached  its  zenith 
in  1919-20  was  largely  the  result  of  artificial  and  tem- 
porary conditions.  At  a  period  when  the  rest  of  the 
world  was  engaged  in  a  life-and-death  struggle, 
Japan,  far  from  the  battlefields,  was  free  to  engage 
in  commerce,  and  she  possessed,  moreover,  certain 
articles  which  other  nations  must  have  and  for  which 
they  had  to  pay  any  price  she  demanded.  Nor  could 
the  Japanese  merchant,  any  more  than  the  American, 
realize  that  this  was  a  purely  temporary  condition  and 
could  not  continue  indefinitely. 

Now,  mind  you,  I  do  not  wish  to  be  understood 
as  suggesting  that  conmiercial  trickery  is  character- 
istic of  Japanese  business  men  as  a  class.  There  are 
business  houses  in  Japan — many  of  them — which  meet 
their  obligations  as  punctiliously,  which  fill  their  com- 
mitments as  scrupulously,  which  maintain  as  high  a 
standard  of  business  honor,  as  the  most  reputable 
firms  in  the  United  States.  But,  unfortunately,  there 
are  many — altogether  too  many — which  do  not.  It 
seems  a  thousand  pities  that  the  honest  and  far- 
sighted  business  men  of  Japan  and  the  Japanese  trade 
guilds  and  chambers  of  commerce  do  not  take  ener- 


JAPAN  27 

getic  steps  to  stamp  out  commercial  trickery,  if  for 
no  other  reason  than  the  effect  it  would  have  on  for- 
eign opinion.  The  series  of  conferences  held  in  Tokio 
in  1920  between  a  self-appointed  delegation  of  Amer- 
ican bankers  and  business  men  and  a  number  of  rep- 
resentative Japanese  offered  a  splendid  opportunity 
for  a  candid  discussion  of  this  delicate  and  irritating 
question.  If  the  Americans,  instead  of  confining 
themselves  to  hands-across-the-sea  sentiments  and 
platitudinous  expressions  of  friendship,  had  had  the 
courage  to  tell  the  high-minded  Japanese  who  were 
their  hosts  how  objectionable  such  methods  are  to 
Americans  and  what  incalculable  harm  they  are  caus- 
ing to  Japanese- American  relations,  it  would  have 
worked  wonders  in  promoting  a  better  understanding 
between  the  two  peoples. 

Despite  what  I  have  felt  compelled  to  say  about 
the  methods  of  a  section  of  the  Japanese  commercial 
class,  I  am  convinced  that  the  Japanese  people,  as  a 
race,  are  honest.  Though  pocket-picking  is  said  to  be 
on  the  increase  in  Japan,  burglary  and  highway  rob- 
bery are  extremely  rare,  while  the  murders,  shooting 
affrays,  daylight  robberies,  and  hold-ups  which  have 
become  commonplaces  in  American  cities  are  virtually 
unknown.  I  should  feel  as  safe  at  midnight  in  the 
meanest  street  of  a  Japanese  city  as  I  should  on  Com- 
monwealth Avenue  in  Boston — considerably  safer, 
indeed,  than  I  should  on  certain  New  York  thorough- 
fares after  nightfall.     I  asked  an  American  woman 


28         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

who  has  lived  for  many  years  in  Japan  if  she  consid- 
ered the  Japanese  honest. 

"I  never  think  of  locking  the  doors  or  windows  of 
my  house  in  Yokohama,"  she  replied,  "yet  I  have 
never  had  anything  stolen.  But  when  I  was  staying 
last  winter  at  a  fashionable  hotel  in  New  York,  I  was 
robbed  of  money,  jewels,  and  clothing  the  very  night 
of  my  arrival." 

Nor  could  I  discover  any  substantiation  of  the 
oft-repeated  assertion  that  fiduciary  positions  in  Jap- 
anese banks  are  held  by  Chinese.  Certainly  this  is 
not  true  of  Japanese-controlled  institutions,  such  as 
the  Yokohama  Specie  Bank,  the  Bank  of  Japan,  and 
the  Dai  Ichi  Ginko,  as  I  can  attest  from  personal 
observation.  It  is  true  that  Chinese  are  employed  in 
considerable  numbers  in  minor  positions  of  trust  in 
the  Japanese  branches  of  foreign  banks,  such  as  the 
Hong  Kong  &  Shanghai  Banking  Corporation  and 
the  Bank  of  India,  Australia  &  New  Zealand,  but 
these  have  generally  come  over  from  China  with  the 
banks'  European  officials,  their  employment  denoting 
no  lack  of  faith  in  Japanese  integrity.  Yet  such 
stories,  spread  broadcast  by  superficial  and  usually 
prejudiced  observers,  have  helped  to  give  Americans 
a  totally  erroneous  impression  of  the  Japanese. 

My  personal  opinion  is  that  the  commercial  trickery 
practised  in  Japan  is  not  due  to  any  inherent  dis- 
honesty in  the  Japanese  character,  but  rather  to  the 
contempt  in  which  merchants  were    held  in    that 


JAPAN  29 

country  for  centuries.  Until  recent  years  the  position 
of  the  merchant  in  Japan  was  analogous  to  that  of 
the  Jew  in  the  Europe  of  the  Middle  Ages.  He  was 
at  the  bottom  of  the  social  scale.  At  the  top  was  the 
noble ;  then  came  the  samurai ^  or  professional  fighting 
man ;  followed  in  turn  by  the  farmer  and  the  artisan ; 
and  last  of  all  came  the  merchant.  The  farmer  and 
the  artisan  have  always  held  a  higher  place  than  the 
merchant  because  they  are  producers,  whereas  the 
merchant  was  looked  upon  as  a  huckster,  a  haggler,  a 
bargainer,  who  made  his  living  by  his  wits.  As  a 
result,  business  was  in  the  hands  of  a  low  class  of 
Japanese.  Trading  was  regarded  as  beneath  the  dig- 
nity of  a  gentleman.  Furthermore,  the  Japanese 
merchant  has  had  less  than  seventy  years  in  which  to 
learn  the  rules  of  the  business  game  as  it  is  played 
in  the  West.  Coming  from  a  despised  and  down- 
trodden class,  is  it  any  wonder  that  in  that  brief 
span  he  has  not  wholly  eradicated  his  ancient  methods, 
that  he  has  not  yet  acquired  all  our  Western  virtues 
and  ideals?  The  Jew  has  been  under  the  influence  of 
the  West  for  two  thousand  years,  yet  his  business 
ethics  are  not  always  beyond  reproach.  Let  us,  then, 
be  charitable  in  judging  the  Japanese. 

Nor  should  we  forget  that  barely  a  score  of  years 
have  passed  since  American  business  houses  com- 
monly practised  the  very  methods  of  which  we  com- 
plain so  bitterly  when  they  are  practised  by  the  Jap- 
anese.   It  is  within  the  memory  of  most  of  us  when 


30         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

rebates,  discriminatory  freight  rates,  infringements 
of  copyrights  and  patents,  substitution,  adulteration, 
evasion  of  customs,  and  the  ruthless  crushing  of  com- 
petition by  unfair  methods  were  so  common  in  the 
United  States  as  scarcely  to  provoke  comment.  If 
you  question  this,  read  the  early  history  of  the  Stand- 
ard Oil  Company,  of  the  sugar,  beef,  and  steel  trusts, 
or  of  certain  of  our  great  railway  systems.  The  truth 
of  the  matter  is  that  the  Japanese  to-day  are  about 
where  we  were  two  decades  ago.  Not  having  entered 
the  commercial  contest  until  long  after  we  did,  it  is 
not  surprising  that  their  commercial  ethics  are  still 
several  laps  behind  our  own.  Business  ethics  in  the 
island  empire  are  at  present  undergoing  the  same 
rehabilitation  and  purification  that  were  forced  upon 
American  business  by  an  outraged  public  opinion. 
And,  according  to  most  unprejudiced  observers, 
that  transformation  is  being  effected  with  remarkable 
rapidity.  So  why  not  stop  throwing  stones  and  give 
the  Japanese  a  chance?    Rome  was  not  built  in  a  day. 

There  is  yet  another  explanation  of  the  question- 
able business  usages  practised  by  certain  Japanese 
merchants.  And  that  explanation,  curiously  enough, 
points  straight  at  ourselves.  It  remained  for  the  late 
Premier  Hara — himself  a  business  man  and  the  first 
commoner  to  hold  the  position  of  prime  minister — 
to  bring  that  embarrassing  fact  to  my  attention. 

"You  should  not  forget  that  my  people  learned 
what  they  know  of  modern  business  methods  from 


JAPAN  81 

your  own  countrymen,"  he  reminded  me.  "It  was 
your  Commodore  Perry  who,  in  the  face  of  Japanese 
opposition,  opened  Japan  to  American  commerce.  It 
was  from  the  American  traders  who  followed  him 
that  the  Japanese  received  their  first  lessons  in  the 
business  ethics  of  the  West.  The  early  American 
traders,  in  the  methods  they  practised,  provided  the 
Japanese  with  anything  but  a  laudable  example.  If 
they  could  cheat  a  Japanese,  they  considered  it  highly 
creditable;  they  took  advantage  of  his  ignorance  by 
selling  him  inferior  goods  and  by  driving  sharp  bar- 
gains; they  constantly  bamboozled  him.  Is  it  any 
wonder,  then,  that  the  Japanese  merchant,  patterning 
his  methods  on  those  pursued  by  the  Americans, 
adopted  American  commercial  trickery  along  with 
other  things?  But  mind  you,"  he  added,  *'I  am  not 
condoning  commercial  trickery  among  my  people.  I 
am  only  explaining  it." 

IV 

In  the  preceding  pages  I  have  endeavored  to  show 
how  important  are  the  racial  and  economic  elements 
in  their  effect  on  American-Japanese  relations.  We 
now  come  to  a  consideration  of  the  political  factor.  In 
order  to  estimate  this  factor  at  its  true  importance,  it 
is  necessary  to  envisage  the  trying  political  situation 
in  which  Japan  finds  herself. 

Since  their  victory  over  the  Russians  in  1904  the 
Japanese  have  seen  themselves  gradually  encircled 


82         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

by  a  ring  of  unsympathetic  and  suspicious,  if  not 
openly  hostile  peoples.  Overshadowing  the  island 
empire  on  the  north  is  the  great  bulk  of  Bolshevist 
Russia,  still  smarting  from  the  memories  of  the  Yalu 
River  and  Port  Arthur,  and  bitterly  resentful  of 
Japan's  military  occupation  of  Eastern  Siberia  and 
Northern  Sakhalin.  Every  patriotic  Russian  feels 
that  Japan,  in  occupying  these  territories,  has  taken 
unfair  advantage  of  Russia's  temporary  helplessness ; 
he  listens  cynically  to  the  protestations  of  the  Jap- 
anese Government  that  it  has  occupied  them  merely  | 
in  order  to  keep  at  arm's  length  the  menace  of  Bol- 
shevism and  that  it  will  withdraw  its  troops  as  soon 
as  this  menace  disappears. 

To  the  west,  the  Koreans,  though  now  officially' 
Japanese  subjects,  are  in  a  state  of  incipient  revolt, 
to  which  they  have  been  driven  by  the  excesses  of  the 
Japanese  military  and  the  harshness  of  Japanese] 
rule.  To  the  southeast,  China,  huge  and  inert,  loathes 
and  fears  her  island  neighbor,  their  common  hatred 
of  Japan  being  the  one  tie  which  binds  the  diverse 
elements  of  the  republic  together.  As  a  protest 
against  Japanese  aggression  in  Manchuria  and  Shan- 
tung the  Chinese  have  instituted  a  boycott  of  Japanese 
goods,  which  is  gravely  affecting  Japanese  commerce 
throughout  the  Farther  East.  In  regions  as  remote 
from  the  seat  of  the  controversy  as  the  Celebes  and 
Borneo,  as  Siam,  the  Straits  Settlements,  and  Java,  I 
found  Japanese  merchants  being  forced  out  of  busi-j 


i 


JAPAN  33 

ness  because  the  Chinese  living  in  those  countries  re- 
fused to  trade  with  them  or  to  purchase  goods  of  any- 
one else  who  traded  with  them.  In  Formosa,  taken 
from  China  as  spoils  of  war  in  1895,  the  head-hunting 
savages  who  inhabit  the  mountains  of  the  interior 
remain  unsubjugated,  only  the  Guard  Line,  a  series 
of  armed  blockhouses  connected  by  electrically 
charged  entanglements,  standing  between  the  Jap- 
anese settlers  and  massacre. 

In  the  Philippines  there  is  always  present  the  bogey 
of  Japanese  imperialism,  both  the  Filipinos  and  the 
American  residents  being  convinced  that  Japan  is 
looking  forward  to  the  day  when  she  can  add  those 
rich  and  tempting  islands  to  her  possessions.  In  far- 
distant  Australia  and  New  Zealand  the  Japanese  are 
distrusted  and  disliked,  stringent  legislative  measures 
having  recently  been  adopted  to  prevent  further  Jap- 
anese immigration  into  those  commonwealths.  On 
the  Pacific  coast  of  the  United  States  and  Canada  a 
violent  anti-Japanese  agitation  is  in  full  swing,  new 
and  severer  legislation  being  constantly  directed 
against  them.  In  Hawaii,  where  the  Japanese  out- 
number all  the  other  elements  of  the  population  put 
together,  the  Americans  and  Kanakas  view  the  situa- 
tion with  acute  apprehension.^ 

Influenced  by  the  frankly  hostile  attitude  of  her 
great  overseas  dominions,  and  fearful  of  its  effect  on 
her  relations  with  the  United  States,  England  eagerly 

*  There  were  109,274  Japanese  in  Hawaii  in  1920. 


34         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

seized  the  opportunity,  afforded  by  America's  offer 
at  the  Washington  Conference,  of  substituting  the 
Four-Power  Treaty  for  the  Anglo-Japanese  Al- 
liance. Holland,  having  ever  in  the  front  of  her 
mind  her  great,  rich  colonies  in  the  East  Indies,  looks 
with  a  suspicious  eye  on  Japan's  steady  territorial 
expansion  and  on  the  suggestive  augmentation  of  her 
naval  and  military  establishments.  France,  con- 
stantly seeking  new  markets,  views  with  thinly  veiled 
apprehension  Japan's  attempts  to  attain  political  and 
commercial  domination  in  China.  Nor  is  Germany 
likely  either  to  forget  or  forgive  the  conquest  of 
Tsingtau  and  her  former  insular  possessions  in  the 
Pacific.  Not  only  has  Japan  aroused  the  suspicions 
of  the  white  races,  but  she  has  antagonized  and 
alienated  the  yellow  races  who  are  her  nearest 
neighbors.  As  a  result  she  found  herself,  at  the  open- 
ing of  the  Washington  Conference,  as  completely 
isolated,  as  universally  distrusted,  as  was  Germany 
at  the  beginning  of  1914. 

The  Japanese  have  been  hurt  and  bewildered  by 
this  world-wide  suspicion.  Yet,  instead  of  attempting 
to  win  back  the  good-will  of  the  West,  which  was 
theirs  until  httle  more  than  a  decade  ago,  by  giving 
convincing  proofs  of  their  peaceable  intentions;  in- 
stead of  making  an  effort  to  regain  the  confidence  of 
half  a  billion  Chinese  and  Russians  by  a  prompt  with- 
drawal from  their  soil  and  abstention  from  further 
interference    in   their    affairs,   the    Japanese    made 


JAPAN  35 

the  psychological  blunder  of  adopting  an  attitude  of 
stubbornness  and  defiance.  They  replied  to  criticisms 
by  embarking  on  a  military  program  which,  had  it 
been  adhered  to,  would  have  made  them  the  greatest 
military  power  on  earth.  Their  naval  plans  called 
for  a  neck-and-neck  shipbuilding  race  with  the  United 
States;  they  had  steadily  strengthened  their  occupa- 
tional forces  on  the  mainland  of  Asia,  instead  of  show- 
ing a  disposition  to  withdraw  them.  They  seemed 
utterly  incapable  of  realizing  that  the  world  has,  in 
its  millions  of  soldier  dead  and  its  billions  of  war 
debt,  the  very  best  of  reasons  for  being  suspicious  of 
imperialistic  nations ;  that  it  is  in  no  mood  to  tolerate 
anything  savoring  of  militarism.  The  peoples  of  the 
world  had  hoped  that  those  dread  specters,  militarism 
and  imperiahsm,  had  passed  with  the  HohenzoUerns, 
never  to  return.  Is  it  any  wonder,  then,  that  they 
viewed  with  distrust  a  nation  which,  judged  by  its 
actions,  seemed  bent  on  recalling  them?  This  distrust 
of  Japanese  intentions  was  largely  dispelled,  however, 
by  Japan's  concurrence  in  the  Hughes  program  for 
the  limitation  of  naval  armaments. 


The  key  to  Japanese  militarism  and  imperialism  is 
to  be  found  in  the  dual  government  that  exists  in 
Japan.  It  is  another  case  of  Dr.  Jekyll  and  Mr. 
Hyde,  but  the  victim  of  this  dual  personality,  instead 


36         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

of  being  an  individual,  is  a  nation.  There  is  the  con- 
stitutional government,  functioning  in  the  open, 
normal,  aboveboard,  conciliatory,  presumably  sincere. 
But  behind  it,  in  the  shadows,  lurks  a  cloaked  and 
mysterious  government,  furtive,  untrustworthy,  pre- 
dacious, wholly  evil.  Unfortunately  for  Japan  and 
for  the  world,  this  invisible  government  is  the  more 
powerful  of  the  two.  Times  without  number  the  Dr. 
Jekyll  government  has  adopted  some  altruistic  course 
of  action  only  to  have  the  Mr.  Hyde  government  step 
in  and,  by  an  exertion  of  its  mysterious  power,  set  it 
all  at  naught.  It  is  a  most  curious  and  complicated 
situation,  without  parallel  in  any  other  country  in 
the  world.  Let  me  see  if  I  can  explain  it,  for  its  clear 
and  complete  comprehension  is  absolutely  essential 
to  an  intelligent  understanding  of  those  tortuous  and 
seemingly  contradictory  policies  pursued  by  Japan  in 
her  relations  with  foreign  nations,  which  have  so  per- 
plexed and  alarmed  the  world. 

To  begin  with,  you  must  understand  that  Japan  is 
nominally  governed  by  a  constitutional  government, 
consisting  of  a  cabinet,  a  legislative  assembly  known  as 
the  Diet,  and  a  civil  bureaucracy  composed  of  the 
chiefs  of  the  various  administrative  departments  and 
their  subordinates.  This  is  the  government  with  which 
the  world  is  familiar.  But  there  is  also  an  invisible 
government,  an  unseen  empire,  composed  of  a  clique 
of  officers  holding  high  rank  in  the  army  and  navy, 
certain   statesmen   with   military     sjTnpathies     and 


JAPAN  87 

affiliations,  and  a  few  representatives  of  big  business 
and  finance.  The  constitutional  government  functions 
through  the  cabinet,  and,  in  its  relations  with  foreign 
nations,  through  the  foreign  office,  being  represented 
abroad  by  regularly  accredited  ambassadors,  ministers, 
and  consuls.  The  invisible  government  functions 
through  the  general  staff,  its  activities  abroad  being 
carried  on  by  a  great  number  of  secret  agents,  whose 
identities  can  only  be  guessed  at,  and  by  the  military 
attaches  attached  to  the  various  embassies  and  lega- 
tions, who,  though  ostensibly  under  the  orders  of  their 
respective  ambassadors  and  ministers  are,  in  reality, 
answerable  only  to  the  general  staff.  Japanese 
policy,  particularly  in  foreign  affairs,  is  invariably 
shaped  by  this  unseen  government,  whose  wishes  are 
generally  translated  into  action  by  the  constitutional 
government,  on  which  it  is  able  to  exert  powerful  pres- 
sure. The  two  governments,  whose  interests  are  by 
no  means  always  opposed,  are  of  necessity  more  or  less 
closely  correlated,  like  interlocking  directorates.  For 
example,  many  of  the  permanent  civil  officials  of  the 
constitutional  government,  such  as  bureau  chiefs  and 
the  members  of  their  staffs,  are  drawn  from  the  mili- 
taristic clique,  which  is  identical  with  the  unseen  gov- 
ernment, with  which,  as  might  be  expected,  they  work 
in  harmony.  Thus  it  will  be  seen  that,  whereas  the 
militarists  who  compose  the  invisible  government  form 
a  bloc  bound  together  by  their  mutual  interests  and 
ambitions  and  working  always  in  unison,  the  constitu- 


38         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

tional  government  is  weakened  by  the  militarists  who 
have  insinuated  themselves  into  its  organization  and 
who,  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  between  the  constitu- 
tional government  and  the  unseen  government,  in- 
variably lend  their  power  and  influence  to  the  latter. 

At  the  head  of  the  Japanese  State  stands  the  em- 
peror, generally  spoken  of  by  foreigners  as  the 
Mikado  ("Honorable  Gate,"  a  title  comparable  with 
Sublime  Porte) ,  and  by  his  own  subjects  as  Tenno,  or 
Heavenly  King.  According  to  Japanese  history, 
which  reckons  from  660  B.C.,  when  Jimmu  ascended 
the  throne,  the  present  Emperor,  Yoshihito,  is  the 
one  hundred  and  twenty-second  ruler  of  his  line.*  But 
as  written  records  do  not  carry  us  back  further  than 
712  A.D.,  the  reigns  and  periods  of  the  early  monarchs 
are  more  or  less  apocryphal.  Still  the  fact  remains 
that  Japan  has  been  ruled  by  an  unbroken  dynasty 
ever  since  the  dawn  of  her  history,  in  which  respect 
she  is  unique  among  the  nations  of  the  world. 

The  whole  scheme  of  government  in  Japan  is  based 
on  the  recognition  of  the  divine  origin  of  the  emperor. 
According  to  popular  belief,  he  is  directly  descended 
from  the  Deity.  By  the  terms  of  the  constitution  he 
combines  in  himself  the  rights  of  sovereignty  and 
exercises  the  whole  of  the  executive  powers,  with  the 

advice  and  assistance  of  the  ten  ministers  who  compose 

*  In  December,  1921,  owing  to  the  mental  condition  of  the  emperor, 
Crown  Prince  Hirohito  was  proclaimed  Regent  of  Japan. 


i 


JAPAN  39 

his  cabinet.  Supplementing  the  cabinet  is  the  Privy 
Council,  a  purely  advisory  body  of  thirty-nine  mem- 
bers (including  the  ten  cabinet  ministers),  which  is 
only  consulted  upon  important  matters  and  policies. 
The  emperor  is  the  supreme  commander  of  the  army 
and  the  navy.  He  alone  can  declare  war,  make  peace, 
and  conclude  treaties.  He  convokes  the  Imperial 
Diet,  opens,  closes,  and  prorogues  it,  and  dissolves 
the  House  of  Representatives.  Should  a  national 
crisis  or  an  urgent  necessity  arise  when  the  Diet  is 
not  in  session,  the  emperor  may  issue  imperial  edicts 
which  take  the  place  of  laws,  though  such  edicts  must 
be  submitted  to  the  Diet  at  its  next  session,  when,  if 
not  approved,  they  become  invalid.  Thus  it  will  be 
seen  that,  though  Japan  is,  in  theory,  a  constitutional 
monarchy,  the  emperor  is  vested  with  virtually  abso- 
lute power.  But  it  should  be  added  that  his  abso- 
lutism has  never  degenerated  into  despotism  or 
tyranny.  In  fact,  he  is  more  or  less  a  figurehead  so 
far  as  the  administration  of  the  government  is  con- 
cerned, dwelling  in  Olympian  aloofness  and  ruling 
by  proxy.  He  is  regarded  by  his  people  not  as  a 
temporal  ruler,  but  rather  as  a  patriarch,  a  demigod, 
a  direct  representative  of  Heaven.  In  order  to 
strengthen  their  own  position,  the  militarists  who  sur- 
roimd  the  emperor  have  assiduously  encouraged  the 
people  in  this  delusion.  They  have  fostered  among 
the  masses  the  belief  that  the  emperor  can  do  no 
wrong,  that  no  sacrifice  is  too  great  for  a  son  or 


40         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

daughter  of  Nippon  to  make  for  him,  that  to  so 
much  as  question  his  Heaven-bestowed  authority  is 
the  apotheosis  of  sacrilege.  From  the  Wind  obedience 
to  the  sovereign  thus  created,  which  involves  a  curious 
mixture  of  religion  and  patriotism  difficult  for  the 
Western  mind  to  comprehend,  the  militarists  derive 
their  power. 

I  have  said  that,  according  to  the  terms  of  the  con- 
stitution, the  emperor  is  supposed  to  exercise  the  ex- 
ecutive power  with  the  advice  and  assistance  of  his 
cabinet.  But  between  the  cabinet  and  the  crown 
stand  a  rapidly  diminishing  body  of  men  who  are 
known  as  the  Genro,  or  Elder  Statesmen.  This 
sacred  and  secret  inner  circle,  as  at  present  consti- 
tuted, has  only  two  members:  Marquis  Saionji  and 
Marquis  Matsukata.  This  duumvirate  of  old  men  is 
the  mentor  and  mouthpiece  of  divinity  itself;  they, 
with  Field  Marshal  Uyehara,  the  chief  of  the  general 
staff,  constitute  the  occult  power  which  hedges  the 
imperial  throne ;  they  are  the  real  rulers  of  Japan. 

Now  let  me  make  it  clear  that  the  Elder  Statesmen 
are  neither  appointed  nor  elected.  They  have  no  legal 
status.  They  are  not  recognized  by  the  Japanese  con- 
stitution or  in  the  laws  of  Japan.  You  will  find  no 
mention  of  them  in  the  Japan  "Year  Book"  or  other 
official  publications.  Indeed,  there  is  no  such  office 
as  that  of  Elder  Statesman  per  se.  Though  they 
control  the  government,  form  cabinets,  and  shape  the 
national  policy,  they  are  not  officials,  save  as  they  are 


JAPAN  41 

members  of  the  Privy  Council  and  the  House  of  Peers. 
They  are  merely  a  little  group  of  veteran  counselors, 
representatives  of  the  great  clans,  who  have  grown 
by  mere  survival  and  the  confidence  reposed  in  them 
by  the  emperor  to  be  the  most  powerful  influence  in 
Japan. 

Imagine,  if  you  can,  a  pair  of  American  statesmen 
— Elihu  Root  and  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  let  us  say 
— attaining  such  unlimited  political  power  that  the 
President  of  the  United  States  was  their  mouth- 
piece and  the  heads  of  the  executive  departments 
of  the  government  their  obedient  instruments,  and  re- 
taining such  power,  irrespective  of  which  political 
party  was  in  the  saddle,  through  administration 
after  administration.  That  is  by  no  means  an 
exact  parallel,  but  it  is  the  best  that  I  can  offer  of  a 
situation  that  is  without  parallel  in  any  other  coim- 
try. 

When  the  shogunate  was  abolished  in  1868  and  the 
unification  of  the  country  under  the  youthful  Em- 
peror Mutsuhito  begun,  the  task  of  reconstruction 
was  undertaken  by  the  daimyos,  or  feudal  nobles. 
They  became  the  officials  of  the  new  government  and 
directed  the  transformation  of  Japan  into  a  modern 
state.  The  present  Genro,  then  young  men,  played 
minor  parts  in  the  restoration.  But,  as  the  years 
passed,  they  gradually  ascended  the  political  ladder 
and,  as  the  older  men  died  or  retired  from  office,  they 
automatically  succeeded  them,  themselves  eventually 


42         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

becoming  ministers  of  the  crown.  More  years  slipped 
by,  and  they,  now  old  themselves,  in  turn  gave  way 
to  younger  men.  But,  in  relinquishing  office,  they 
did  not  relinquish  their  power.  Autocrats  by 
training,  brought  up  in  an  atmosphere  of  mili- 
tarism, contemptuously  believing  with  Hegel 
that  "the  people  is  that  portion  of  the  state  which 
does  not  know  what  it  wills,"  they  viewed  with  deep 
misgivings  the  democratic  tendencies  which  were 
gradually  manifesting  themselves  in  the  new  Japan. 
They  were  sincere  in  their  convictions  that  the  safety 
of  the  empire  was  being  jeopardized  by  the  growing 
spirit  of  democracy  among  certain  elements  of  the 
population.  They  felt  that  they  alone  stood  between 
the  nation  and  ruin.  Conservatives  and  reactionaries 
to  the  very  marrow,  they  might  have  said  with  the 
French  king,  "Apres  moi  le  deluge"  So,  instead  of 
retiring  from  public  affairs  and  contenting  them- 
selves with  an  existence  of  innocuous  desuetude,  like 
superannuated  European  statesmen,  they  merely 
shifted  their  position,  withdrawing  from  the  fierce 
glare  that  beats  upon  the  front  of  the  throne  to  the 
shadows  at  its  rear.  From  there,  themselves  unseen, 
they  can  see  all  that  happens ;  they  are  always  at  the 
elbow  of  the  sovereign,  who,  because  he  trusts  them 
implicitly,  willingly  issues  as  commands  the  sugges- 
tions which  they  whisper  in  his  ear. 

The  prerogatives  of  the  crown,  as  I  have  already 
shown,  are  very  great,  and  they  are  exercised  as  the 


JAPAN  48 

Elder  Statesmen  "advise."  Ministers  rise  and  fall, 
but  the  Genro  abide,  independent  of  cabinet  and  diet 
alike  and  beyond  the  reach  of  either.  There  you  find 
the  explanation  of  why  the  Japanese  cabinet  does  not 
wield  the  power  of  European  ministries  and  why 
changes  of  cabinet  seldom  result  in  changes  of  national 
policy.  For,  though  parties  come  and  go,  the  Genro 
remain  forever — and  the  emperor  does  as  they  tell 
him  to  do.  No  further  explanation  is  needed,  surely, 
of  why  Japan,  whose  government  is  under  the  control 
of  a  little  group  of  self-appointed  and  reactionary 
dictators,  is,  though  greatly  advanced  for  an  Asiatic 
power,  still  far  behind  those  Western  nations  whose 
governments  are  in  the  hands  of  individuals  and 
bodies  chosen  by  the  people. 

So  closely  associated  with  the  Elder  Statesmen 
that  he  might  almost  be  considered  one  of  them  is 
the  chief  of  the  general  staff,  who,  everything  con- 
sidered, is  probably  the  most  powerful  single  indi- 
vidual in  the  empire  to-day.  His  title  is  really  a 
misnomer,  for,  whereas  in  other  countries  the  chief 
of  the  general  staff  is  the  executive  head  of  the  army 
alone,  in  Japan  the  chief  of  the  general  staff  exercises 
as  much  influence  in  naval,  colonial,  and  foreign  affairs 
as  he  does  in  those  of  the  army.  He  is  the  actual  head 
of  all  the  armed  forces  of  the  empire  on  land  and  sea. 
He  occupies  much  the  same  position  in  the  invisible 
government  that  the  premier  does  in  the  constitutional 
government.    The  only  superior  authority  recognized 


44         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

by  the  premier  is  the  emperor;  the  only  superior 
authority  recognized  by  the  chief  of  the  general  staif 
is  the  Genro.  And,  as  the  emperor  accepts  without 
question  the  decisions  of  the  Genro,  it  follows  that 
the  chief  of  the  general  staff  occupies  a  position  of 
altogether  extraordinary  power.  I  have  heard  it 
asserted,  indeed,  that  he  can  override  the  decisions 
of  the  premier  and  even  force  him  and  his  cabinet 
to  resign,  but  this  is  probably  an  exaggeration. 

That  the  chief  of  staff  might  be  able,  with  the 
concurrence  of  the  Elder  Statesmen,  to  wreck  a  min- 
istry is  due  to  the  curious  constitution  of  the  Japanese 
cabinet.  Of  the  ten  members  of  the  cabinet,  two — the 
minister  of  war,  who  must  always  be  an  army  officer 
of  a  grade  not  lower  than  major-general,  and  the  min- 
ister of  marine,  who  must  always  be  a  naval  officer  of 
a  grade  not  lower  than  rear-admiral — are  not  answer- 
able for  their  actions  to  the  premier  and  frequently 
act  independently  of  him,  being  responsible  only  to 
the  emperor,  which,  translated,  means  the  Elder 
Statesmen  and  the  chief  of  the  general  staff.  As  a  re- 
sult of  this  anomalous  situation,  these  ministers,  tak- 
ing their  orders  from  the  chief  of  the  general  staff, 
who  has  the  support  of  the  Genro,  who  in  turn  have 
the  support  of  the  emperor,  can,  and  frequently  do, 
defy  the  premier  and  block  legislation.  Due  to  the 
constitutional  provision  that  these  posts  can  be  held 
only  by  military  and  naval  men  of  high  rank,  their 
incumbents  always  represent  the  military  party  and 


JAPAN  45 

can  be  depended  upon  to  consistently  oppose  any  pol- 
icy of  an  anti-militaristic  nature. 

As  the  members  of  the  cabinet  are  appointed  by 
the  emperor,  instead  of,  as  in  most  European 
countries,  by  the  premier,  it  is  self-evident  that  the 
ministers  of  war  and  marine  are  always  persona 
gratissima  to  the  Elder  Statesmen  and  the  chief  of 
the  general  staff.  The  remaining  members  of  the 
cabinet,  including  the  premier,  though  they  may  not 
always  be  persona  grata,  or  even  entirely  acceptable, 
to  that  august  and  all-powerful  quartet,  are  rarely 
openly  hostile  to  it,  for  the  very  good  reason,  as  the 
Jiji  Shimpo,  the  Times  of  Japan,  puts  it,  that  "In 
this  country  the  work  of  cabinet-making  is  at  present 
in  the  hands  of  the  Elder  Statesmen."  It  is  scarcely 
probable,  then,  that  the  Genro,  whose  advice  the 
sovereign  invariably  accepts  in  such  matters,  would 
give  their  approval  to  the  appointment  of  a  minister 
who  was  likely  to  antagonize  them.  This  is  not  say- 
ing, however,  that  all  of  the  present  members  of  the 
cabinet  meet  with  the  unqualified  approval  of  the 
Genro,  or  that  they  represent  the  latter's  views.  Cer- 
tain of  them,  indeed,  are  supposed  to  be  in  opposition 
to  the  principles  for  which  the  Genro  stand.  But  the 
Genro  are  fully  awake  to  the  growing  power  of  pub- 
lic opinion  and  are  far  too  shrewd  to  alienate  it  by 
refusing  to  sanction  the  appointment  as  minister  of 
a  man  possessed  of  a  powerful  popular  backing,  even 
if  his  views  do  not  concur  with  their  own.    But  this 


46         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

much  can  be  said:  If  a  cabinet  minister  dared  to  defy 
the  Elder  Statesmen  or  the  chief  of  the  general  staff 
on  some  really  vital  question,  if  he  consistently  ob- 
structed their  policies,  he  would  almost  certainly  be 
forced  to  resign.  For,  in  a  contest  between  the  cab- 
inet and  the  militarists,  the  latter  always  win. 

The  procedure  followed  by  the  military  party  in 
wrecking  a  cabinet  is  as  simple  as  it  is  effective.  If 
it  does  not  approve  of  the  cabinet's  policy,  the  Genro 
and  the  chief  of  the  general  staff  send  for  the  min- 
ister of  war  and  tell  him  to  resign.  The  premier,  who, 
as  I  have  already  explained,  is  limited  by  law  in  his 
selection  of  a  successor  to  the  retiring  minister,  offers 
the  portfolio  in  turn  to  one  after  another  of  the  small 
group  of  army  officers  who,  by  virtue  of  their  rank, 
are  eligible  to  accept  it  under  the  provisions  of  the 
constitution.  Having  been  coached  in  advance  by  the 
chief  of  the  general  staff,  each  of  them  politely  de- 
clines. Thereupon  the  prime  minister  is  compelled 
to  admit  his  inability  to  complete  his  cabinet.  In 
Japan  such  an  admission  is  tantamount  to  withdrawal 
from  public  life,  whereupon  the  emperor  offers  the 
vacant  premiership  to  some  statesman  more  willing 
to  accept  the  dictation  of  the  militarists. 

The  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Herald,  Mr. 
Louis  Seibold,  has  quoted  "one  of  the  most  progres- 
sive of  Japanese  leaders"  as  saying,  in  this  connec- 
tion: 


JAPAN  4,7 

The  general  staff  of  Japan  is  quite  as  powerful  as  was  the 
general  staff  that  induced  the  German  kaiser  to  make  war 
upon  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  Japanese  General  Staff 
controls  the  mental  processes  of  the  emperor  to  an  even 
greater  extent  than  was  true  in  Germany  in  1914.  It,  in 
turn,  controls  the  cabinet.  The  minister  of  war,  instead  of 
being  the  master  of  the  general  staff,  is  its  servant.  It 
says  to  him,  "You  provide  us  with  the  recruits,  war  material, 
and  supplies,  and  we  will  decide  what  to  do  with  all  these 
things.  It  is  not  for  you  to  say."  That  is  precisely  what 
the  general  staff,  with  the  consent  of  the  emperor,  told 
Premier  Hara's  cabinet  a  few  weeks  ago,  when  the  wisdom 
of  deferring  to  universal  sentiment  regarding  the  military 
activities  of  the  government  in  Shantung  and  Siberia  was 
broached.  In  other  words,  the  general  staff  told  the  gov- 
ernment to  mind  its  own  business,  which  it  did  not  consider 
to  be  of  a  military  character. 

It  might  be  supposed  that,  when  the  militarists  thus 
attempt  to  dictate  to  the  constitutional  government, 
the  Diet  would  promptly  bring  them  to  terms  by  re- 
fusing to  vote  the  appropriations  necessary  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  military  establishment.  And  that 
is  exactly  what  would  happen  in  most  Western 
countries.  But  not  so  in  Japan.  For  the  militarists 
long  since  foresaw  and  guarded  against  just  such  a 
contingency  by  inserting  in  the  constitution  an 
article  providing  that  budgets  can  be  automatically 
reenacted  from  year  to  year.  Article  71  of  the  Jap- 
anese Constitution  reads  as  follows:  "When  the  Im- 
perial Diet  has  not  voted  on  the  Budget,  or  when 
the  Budget  has  not  been  brought  into  actual  existence, 
the  Government  shall  carry  out  the  Budget  for  the 
preceding  year." 


48         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

Moreover,  as  the  militarists  have  direct  access  to  the 
emperor  and  to  the  funds  of  the  imperial  household, 
which  is  the  richest  in  the  world,  they  never  lack  for 
money.  Indeed,  when  all  is  said  and  done,  it  is  they 
who  hold  the  national  purse-strings.  It  will  be  seen, 
therefore,  that  the  late  progressive  premier,  Mr. 
Hara,  was  in  a  trying  and  none  too  strong  position. 
The  military  party  and  the  forces  of  reaction,  as  typi- 
fied by  the  Genro  and  the  chief  of  the  general  staff, 
had  too  much  power  for  him.  Nothing  is  more  indica- 
tive of  the  increasing  strength  of  democracy  in  Japan 
chan  the  fact  that  Premier  Hara,  himself  a  progres- 
sive and  a  man  of  the  people,  remained  in  office  as 
long  as  he  did. 

The  effect  on  foreign  opinion  of  the  constant 
usurpation  of  power  by  the  invisible  government  is 
clearly  recognized  by  the  liberal  element  in  Japan,  as 
witness  a  recent  editorial  in  the  Yomi-Yuri  Shimhtm: 

It  is  regrettable  that  the  declarations  of  the  Japanese 
Government  are  often  not  taken  seriously.  The  Powers 
regard  Japan  as  a  country  that  does  n't  mean  what  it  says. 
The  most  important  reasons  for  this  will  be  found  in  the 
actions  of  the  militarists,  whose  utterances  are  the  cause 
of  the  Government's  attitude  being  misunderstood  abroad. 
Unless  the  militarist  evil  is  stamped  out,  a  hundred  declara- 
tions disavowing  territorial  ambitions  will  not  be  able  to 
convince  the  Powers. 

The  repeated  failures  to  keep  her  agreements, 
which  have  cost  Japan  the  confidence  of  other  nations, 


FUJIYAMA,    THE   SACRED   MOUNTAIN,   AND   FUJI  RIVER 


SUNSET  IN  SHIBA  PARK,  TOKYO 


1 


A  RELIGIOUS  PROCESSION  IN  KIOTO 


I 


JAPAN  49 

are  not  due  to  hypocrisy  or  insincerity  on  the  part 
of  the  Japanese  Government.  They  are  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  government  is  constantly  flouted  and 
overridden  by  the  military  party.  Japan's  failure  to 
abide  by  her  promise  to  evacuate  Siberia  upon  the 
withdrawal  of  the  American  and  European  troops 
provides  a  case  in  point.  This  commitment  was  made 
to  the  United  States  and  her  European  associates  by 
the  constitutional  government  of  Japan  as  repre- 
sented by  Premier  Hara.  But  the  militarists  wished 
Japan  to  remain  in  Siberia  for  reasons  of  their  own, 
so,  at  the  very  time  the  premier  was  notifying  the 
Western  Powers  of  Japan's  intention  to  withdraw 
her  Siberian  garrisons,  the  general  staff,  unknown  to 
the  premier,  was  rushing  troops  north  to  reenforce 
them. 

The  militarists  placed  the  constitutional  govern- 
ment in  an  almost  equally  embarrassing  situation  in 
Korea.  Premier  Hara,  stirred  to  action  by  the  ex- 
cesses of  the  Japanese  soldiery,  issued  orders  that  the 
military  forces  in  Korea  should  be  subordinated  to 
the  civil  authorities,  but  the  military  men,  secure  in 
a  knowledge  of  their  power,  virtually  refused  to  obey 
these  orders,  doing  everything  that  they  dared  to 
obstruct  the  newly  appointed  governor-general, 
Baron  Saito,  in  carrying  out  the  promised  reforms. 

It  is  the  military  party,  again,  that  applies  the 
screws  to  the  distracted  government  of  China,  com- 


50         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

pelling  it  to  grant  to  Japanese  firms  concessions  of 
one  kind  and  another  which  give  Japan  virtually  com- 
plete control  in  the  regions  where  the  concessions 
are  operative.  It  is  the  military  party  that  buys  up 
the  Chinese  generals  and  politicians,  hatches  the  plots, 
and  directs  the  propaganda  that  produce  the  sporadic 
revolutions  which  are  tearing  China  to  pieces. 

This  continued  exercise  of  irresponsible  authority 
by  the  military  party  is  the  most  important  and  the 
most  dangerous  factor  in  the  whole  Japanese  Ques- 
tion. Until  the  invisible  government  is  suppressed 
in  favor  of  the  constitutional  government,  there  can 
be  no  real  hope  of  a  satisfactory  understanding  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Japan.  A  democracy 
like  ours  cannot  do  business  with  a  government  that 
is  masked ;  we  must  know  with  whom  we  are  dealing. 
The  high-minded  and  progressive  statesmen  who  com- 
posed the  Japanese  Delegation  to  the  Washington 
Conference  were  unquestionably  sincere  when  they 
disavowed  for  their  country  any  militaristic  ambi- 
tions. But  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  mili- 
tarists will  support  them.  For  we  can  no  more  trust 
the  militarists  of  Tokio  than  we  could  trust  the  mili- 
tarists of  Potsdam.  We  do  not  speak  the  same  lan- 
guage. Our  standards  of  honor  are  not  the  same.  If 
Japan  sincerely  desires  the  friendship  of  the  United 
States,  then  she  must  give  valid  assurances  that  the 
promises  of  her  government  will  henceforward  be 
binding  on  her  military,  as  well  as  her  civil  agents. 


JAPAN  51 

Let  me  resume,  now,  my  explanation  of  the  struc- 
ture and  mechanism  of  the  Japanese  Government. 
The  Diet,  hke  the  American  Congress,  consists  of 
two  branches — ^the  House  of  Peers  and  the  House 
of  Representatives.  The  House  of  Peers,  which,  ac- 
cording to  the  late  Marquis  Ito,  is  intended  to  "repre- 
sent the  higher  grades  of  society,"  is  composed  of  the 
members  of  the  imperial  family,  the  nobility,  and  one 
hundred  and  twenty-four  imperial  nominees,  the  lat- 
ter including  forty-five  representatives  of  the  largest 
taxpayers.  These  last,  who  are  mostly  rich  merchants 
and  wealthy  landowners,  are  elected  for  seven  years, 
one  from  each  prefecture,  by  the  fifteen  male  inhabit- 
ants thereof  who  pay  the  greatest  amount  of  taxes. 
The  balance  of  the  imperial  nominees  are  for  the  most 
part  government  officials  appointed  by  the  emperor 
for  life  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  cabinet.  As 
might  be  expected,  they  are  strongly  bureaucratic  in 
their  sympathies.  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the 
moneyed  element  of  the  empire  is  well  represented, 
the  House  of  Peers  is  not  a  plutocratic  body.  Neither 
is  it  a  stronghold  of  the  landed  interests,  like  the 
British  House  of  Lords.  Essentially  aristocratic,  it 
represents  the  interests  of  the  clans,  the  nobles,  the 
bureaucrats,  and  the  military  classes. 

The  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
which  is  the  lower  branch  of  the  Diet,  are  elected  by 
the  people.  By  the  provisions  of  the  election  law,  as 
revised  in  March,  1919,  every  male  Japanese  who  is 


52         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

not  less  than  twenty-five  years  of  age  and  who  pays 
a  direct  annual  tax  of  not  less  than  three  yen  ($1.50) 
— ^instead  of  fifteen  yen  ($7.50),  as  formerly — can 
vote  for  the  members  of  the  lower  house,  who  are 
known  as  deputies.  This  law  increased  the  number 
of  possible  voters  from  about  half  a  million  to  nearly 
three  million ;  that  is,  about  one  out  of  every  nineteen 
Japanese  now  possesses  voting  privileges,  instead  of 
one  in  every  eighty-seven,  as  was  the  case  under  the 
old  statute.  The  astonishing  increase  in  the  number 
of  qualified  voters  effected  by  a  reduction  of  six  dol- 
lars in  the  tax  franchise  provides  a  striking  illustra- 
tion of  the  dire  poverty  of  the  Japanese  masses.  Even 
more  astonishing,  from  a  Western  viewpoint,  is  the 
utter  indifference  to  the  franchise  displayed  by  both 
the  voting  and  the  non-voting  population.  The  truth 
of  the  matter  is  that  the  great  mass  of  the  people  are 
too  heavily  burdened  with  taxation,  too  busily  en- 
gaged in  the  struggle  for  the  bare  necessities  of  life, 
to  concern  themselves  with  politics.  This  explains 
why  there  is  almost  no  public  opinion,  as  we  under- 
stand the  term,  in  Japan.  Though,  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  constitution,  the  Japanese  taxpayer  has 
a  voice  in  the  government  of  the  country,  he  is  seldom 
able  to  raise  it  above  a  whisper. 

Again,  those  of  the  masses  who  do  take  some  in- 
terest in  politics  are,  generally  speaking,  quite  sat- 
isfied with  the  present  situation.  Looking  back,  they 
compare  the  Japan  of  feudal  days  with  the  present 


JAPAN  53 

powerful  empire,  and,  marking  the  progress  that  has 
been  made,  they  are  quite  content  to  let  it  continue. 
As  a  result  of  this  indifference  on  the  part  of  the 
masses,  there  is  no  check  on  the  ruling  classes,  which, 
believing  with  von  Rochow  in  "the  limited  intel- 
ligence of  subjects,"  find  no  difficulty  in  keeping  the 
reins  of  power  in  their  own  hands.  It  must  be  ad- 
mitted, however,  that  in  the  main  they  have  ruled  in 
the  national  interest.  Everything  considered,  the 
present  organization  of  the  state  is  a  great  advance 
from  the  feudalism  which  it  supplanted,  and  it  gives 
Japan  a  remarkably  efficient  and  flexible  administra- 
tion. But,  without  taking  an  unpardonable  liberty 
with  the  truth,  present-day  Japan  cannot  be  called 
democratic.  It  is  a  government  for  rather  than  by 
or  of  the  people. 

VI 

I  have  now  sketched  in  outline  the  double-barreled 
administration  which  rules  Japan,  where  two  distinct 
governments — one  constitutional  and  aboveboard,  the 
other  unconstitutional  and  unseen — exist  and  func- 
tion side  by  side.  I  have  also  made  it  reasonably 
clear,  I  hope,  that  the  constitutional  government, 
were  it  free  from  outside  influences,  would  be  demo- 
cratic in  its  tendencies  and  pacific  in  its  policies, 
whereas  the  invisible  government  is  autocratic,  mili- 
taristic, aggressive,  and  reactionary.    Broadly  speak- 


54         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

ing,  one  stands  for  the  ballot,  the  other  for  the  bullet. 

It  might  be  supposed  that  the  former,  having  the 
constitution  behind  it,  would  be  in  the  strongest  posi- 
tion. But  such  is  not  the  case.  For  the  unseen  gov- 
ernment has  behind  it  the  Elder  Statesmen,  who, 
through  their  influence  with  the  emperor,  are  able  to 
override  the  constitution.  Furthermore,  as  its  moving 
spirits  include  the  highest  officers  of  the  army  and 
the  navy,  it  has  complete  control  of  the  armed  forces 
of  the  empire ;  it  has  the  allegiance  of  the  great  cap- 
tains of  industry  and  finance;  and  it  represents  the 
clans.  The  position  of  the  unseen  government  is  still 
further  buttressed  by  the  attitude  of  the  proletariate, 
in  whose  eyes  it  stands  for  military  glory  and  natural 
expansion — a  bulwark  against  foreign  aggression. 

This  invisible  government  is  not  a  modern  develop- 
ment ;  it  goes  back  into  Japanese  history  for  centuries. 
It  dates  from  the  days  of  the  shogunate,  when  the 
emperor  was  the  titular  ruler  and  the  shogun  the 
actual  ruler  of  Japan.  The  power  of  the  shogun 
was  made  possible  by  the  support  of  the  great  military 
clans,  which  were  the  forerunners  of  the  military  party 
of  to-day.  When  it  is  remembered  that  the 
Elder  Statesmen,  all  the  officers  of  the  army  and 
navy,  and  most  of  the  higher  officials  of  the  govern- 
ment are  members  of  these  clans,  it  is  not  difficult  to 
understand  the  ascendancy  of  the  militarists  in  Japa- 
nese politics.  For  example,  nearly  all  the  members  of 
the  military  clique  belong  to  the  Chosu  clan,  while 


JAPAN  55 

the  navy  clique  is  recruited  from  the  Satsuma  clan. 
Thus  it  comes  about  that  the  policy  of  the  govern- 
ment in  fundamental  matters  is  dictated  and  con- 
trolled by  men  who  represent  the  warrior  clans, 
abetted  by  a  few  men  who,  though  not  themselves 
clansmen,  are  in  sympathy  with  the  policies  for  which 
they  stand. 

Though  close  observers  have  detected  of  late  a 
noticeable  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  younger  gen- 
eration of  Japanese  toward  the  emperor,  who  is  no 
longer  venerated  as  he  was  by  past  generations ;  and 
though,  with  the  spread  of  education  and  the  conse- 
quent growth  of  democratic  ideas,  the  anti-militarist 
party  is  steadily — though  slowly — gaining  ground,  to 
talk  glibly,  as  certain  American  visitors  to  Japan  have 
done,  of  Japanese  militarism  being  on  its  last  legs 
is  to  betray  profound  ignorance  of  actual  conditions. 
Were  the  system  of  unseen  government  merely  transi- 
tory, it  might  easily  yield  before  the  pressure  of  edu- 
cation and  enlightened  public  opinion.  But  it  is  not 
transitory.  Its  tentacles  sink  deep  into  the  traditions 
of  the  nation.  It  would  be  strange,  indeed,  if  the  mili- 
tarists were  not  dominant  in  Japan,  for  the  whole 
history  of  the  country  is  punctuated  by  wars,  feuds, 
and  rebellions;^  it  climbed  to  its  present  position  as 
one  of  the  great  powers  on  the  guns  of  its  battleships 

*  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  for  two  hundred  and  fifty  years, 
under  the  Tokugawa  shogunate,  Japan  had  no  wars,  civil  or  foreign. 
Perhaps  no  other  nation  of  virile  character  can  boast  a  period  of  such 
length  entirely  free  from  strife.    E.  A.  P. 


56         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

and  the  bayonets  of  its  soldiers;  it  has  always  been 
ruled  by  military  men.  Though  in  the  last  fifty  years 
the  Japanese  have  reared  an  imposing  governmental 
structure,  apparently  built  on  constitutional  lines,  you 
will  find  upon  examination  that  it  is  founded  on  the 
bed-rock  of  stern  and  uncompromising  militarism.^ 
In  order  that  you  may  have  a  clear  comprehension 
of  how  this  came  about,  let  us  take  a  hasty  survey 
of  the  events  leading  up  to  the  Restoration  of  1868. 
Until  that  time,  you  will  understand,  the  politico-so- 
cial conditions  prevailing  in  Japan  approximated 
those  which  characterized  the  Europe  of  the  Middle 
Ages.  The  emperor  was  a  spiritual  rather  than  a  tem- 
poral ruler,  a  sort  of  high  priest,  an  object  of  awe  and 
veneration,  dwelling  in  his  great  moated  castle  in 
Kioto  in  magnificent  seclusion.  In  certain  respects 
his  position  might  be  likened  to  that  now  occupied 
by  the  Pope  at  Rome.  So  far  as  the  practical  work 
of  government  was  concerned,  he  was  only  an  abstrac- 
tion. The  real  power  was  in  the  hands  of  a  military 
dictator,  known  as  the  shogun.  This  title  originated 
in  1192,  when  the  Emperor  Takahira  made  one  of 
his  generals,  Yorimoto,  a  S ei-i-tai-shogun  (literally, 
"barbarian-subjugating  generalissimo"),  or  comman- 
der-in-chief, and  this  office  became  stereotyped  in  the 
persons  of  successive  great  military  leaders  until,  in 
1603,  lyeyasu  Tokugawa  became  shogun  and  estab- 

^  A  high  Japanese  official  to  whom  I  submitted  the  proofs  of  this 
chapter  writes,  "Instead,  we  think  it  was  Western  militarisoa  that  made 
us  militaristic"    E.  A.  P. 


JAPAN  57 

lished  the  dynasty  which  bore  his  name.  For  more 
than  two  centuries  and  a  half  the  shogunate  remained 
in  the  Tokugawa  family,  the  shoguns,  though  ^n 
theory  subordinate  to  the  emperor,  exercising  the  de 
facto  sovereignty  in  Japan. 

Ruling  under  and  with  the  permission  of  the  sho- 
gun,  who  held  them  in  subjection  with  an  iron  hand, 
'  were  the  daimyos,  the  chieftains  of  the  various  clans. 
In  the  course  of  centuries  these  great  feudal  chief- 
tains had  become  as  powerful  as  the  Norman  barons 
who  crossed  with  William  the  Conqueror  into  Eng- 
land. They  lived  in  fortress-like  castles  in  medieval 
arrogance  and  splendor;  they  maintained  miniature 
armies;  they  made  and  executed  their  own  laws; 
they  exercised  the  rights  of  high  justice,  the  middle, 
and  the  low ;  they  grew  rich  from  the  labors  of  an  op- 
pressed and  exploited  peasantry;  in  their  own  terri- 
tories their  will  was  supreme.  Each  of  these  feudal 
lords  collected  the  revenues  of  his  fief  and  used  them 
as  he  saw  fit,  subject  to  the  sole  condition  that  he 
maintain  a  body  of  troops  proportionate  to  his  hold- 
ings and  income.  The  daimyos  recruited  these  mili- 
tary contingents  from  the  samurai,  or  fighting  men, 
of  their  respective  clans.  These  retainers  occupied  a 
position  in  the  social  scale  somewhat  below  that  of 
the  knights  of  the  Middle  Ages  but  considerably  above 
that  of  the  men-at-arms.  Armed,  armored,  and 
highly  trained  for  war,  each  of  them  was  entitled  to 
wear  two  swords  as  a  symbol  of  his  station,  very 


58         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

much  as  the  European  knights  were  distinguished  by 
their  golden  spurs.  Enjoying  innumerable  preroga- 
tives, they  formed  a  class  by  themselves,  shaping  their 
conduct  in  strict  accordance  with  the  rules  laid  down 
in  the  celebrated  code  of  Btishido — the  Ways  of  the 
Fighting  Man.  But  for  the  common  people  there  was 
no  Bushido.  They  had  no  rights,  save  the  right  to 
work.  They  were  looked  upon  merely  as  machines 
for  grinding  out  wealth  for  the  support  of  the  daimyos 
and  the  pay  of  the  samurai. 

Japan  has  made  such  amazing  progress  along  mod- 
ern lines  in  the  last  fifty  years  that  it  is  difficult  for 
us  to  realize  that  these  medieval  conditions  persisted 
until  well  past  the  middle  of  the  last  century.  Gen- 
eral William  Verbeck,  the  son  of  that  Dr.  Guido 
Verbeck  who  was  the  most  celebrated  of  the  early 
American  missionaries  sent  to  Japan,  has  told  me 
that  one  of  the  clearest  recollections  of  his  boyhood 
is  of  a  force  of  samurai^  clad  in  full  armor,  encamp- 
ing on  his  father's  grounds.  At  about  the  time  that 
the  revolver  and  the  repeating  rifle  were  making  their 
appearance  in  the  West,  the  arms  and  armor  of  the 
Middle  Ages  were  still  in  use  by  the  fighting  men  of 
Nippon. 

When  the  nineteenth  century  reached  the  halfway 
mark,  therefore,  the  actual  government  of  the  coun- 
try was  still  in  the  hands  of  a  Tokugawa  shogun. 
Satsuma  and  Chosu  were  the  two  most  powerful 
clans.  But  the  arrival  in  1853  of  Commodore  Perry's 


JAPAN  59 

squadron  with  the  demand  that  Japan  open  her  gates 
to  foreign  commerce;  followed  in  1861  by  the  bom- 
bardment of  the  Satsuma  capital,  Kagoshima,  by- 
British  men-o'war;  and  by  the  destruction  in  1864  of 
the  Chosu  ships  and  fortifications  at  Shimonoseki  by 
a  fleet  of  British,  French,  Dutch,  and  American  war- 
ships, brought  the  great  feudal  chieftains  to  an  abrupt 
realization  of  the  nation's  weakness  and  of  the  sho- 
gunate's  inability  to  successfully  resist  foreign  aggres- 
sion. This  unwelcome  discovery  was  accompanied 
by  a  recognition  of  the  fact  that  Japan's  only  hope  of 
preserving  her  independence  lay  in  the  immediate 
abolition  of  the  shogunate  and  the  reorganization  of 
the  government  under  the  emperor  along  modern 
lines.  The  hopelessness  of  the  situation,  if  the  dual 
form  of  government  was  persisted  in,  was  made  clear 
in  a  memorial  addressed  to  Yoshinobu,  the  last  of 
the  shoguns,  who,  on  October  14,  1867,  gave  con- 
vincing proof  of  his  patriotism  by  placing  his  resigna- 
tion in  the  hands  of  his  sovereign,  the  fifteen-year-old 
Mutsuhito.  The  young  emperor  was  brought  from 
Kioto,  the  old  capital,  to  Tokio,  the  new  capital,  where 
the  daimyos  laid  their  privileges  and  possessions  at 
his  feet.  This  act  of  self-renunciation  has  been  de- 
servedly applauded  by  the  historians,  yet,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  it  was  a  sacrifice  of  form  rather  than  of  sub- 
stance. For  the  youthful  sovereign,  thus  suddenly 
restored  to  power,  must  have  ministers,  so,  in  the  very 
nature  of  things,  the  higher  offices  of  the  new  govern- 


60         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

ment  were  allotted  to  the  former  daimyos — now  be- 
come, under  the  new  order  of  things,  princes,  mar- 
quises, counts,  and  barons — while  the  less  important 
posts  went  to  their  samurai  retainers.  It  could  hardly 
have  been  otherwise,  for  at  that  period  the  daimyos 
and  samurai — that  is,  the  nobles  and  the  fighting 
men — were  the  only  classes  possessed  of  the  necessary 
education  and  training.  Thus  the  leaders  of  the 
great  clans  stepped  almost  automatically  into  posi- 
tions of  leadership  and  power  in  the  reorganized  state, 
while  their  retainers,  now  become  subordinate  officials 
in  the  new  government,  continued  to  give  allegiance 
to  their  former  chieftains  and  to  obey  their  commands, 
just  as  they  did  in  the  old  feudal  days.  But,  though 
the  ex-daimyos  and  the  former  samurai  laid  aside 
their  armor  with  the  dawning  of  the  new  era,  though 
they  exchanged  the  pike  for  the  pen,  they  remained 
at  heart  military  men.  For  a  leopard  cannot  change 
its  spots.  Thus  was  born  the  military  autocracy  which 
rules  Japan  to-day,  and  the  no  less  mihtary  bureau- 
cracy which  supports  it. 

With  such  training  and  traditions,  it  was  not  sur- 
prising that  the  Japanese  of  the  ruling  classes  early 
became  convinced  that  the  development  of  a  powerful 
nation  depended  upon  the  development  and  main- 
tenance of  a  powerful  army  and  navy.  It  would 
have  been  more  surprising  had  they  thought  otherwise. 
Now  the  militarists  realized  that  they  would  have  no 
difficulty  in  carrying  out  their  policies  as  long  as  they 


JAPAN  61 

could  keep  the  reins  of  power  in  their  hands,  but 
they  also  realized  that,  should  the  people  ever  get 
control  of  the  government,  their  schemes  for  building 
up  a  great  military  machine  were  certain  to  meet  with 
serious  opposition.  For  the  people  could  be  counted 
on  to  grudge  the  vast  sums  which  the  militarists 
deemed  necessary  for  an  adequate  system  of  national 
defense.  Let  it  be  clear,  however,  that  in  working 
for  the  upbuilding  of  a  huge  mihtary  machine,  the 
militarists  were  working  for  what  they  firmly  believed 
to  be  the  highest  interests  of  the  nation.  For,  what- 
ever else  may  be  said  of  them,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
they  are  genuinely  patriotic  men,  even  if  their  ideas 
of  what  constitutes  patriotism  are  not  the  same  as 
ours.  They  are  perfectly  sincere  in  their  conviction 
that  Japan's  safety  from  foreign  aggression  requires 
the  maintenance  of  military  and  naval  estabhshments 
second  to  none.  Compared  with  this  question,  all 
other  questions,  to  their  way  of  thinking,  are  of 
negligible  importance.  In  order  to  make  certain, 
therefore,  that,  in  the  event  of  the  people  gaining 
control  of  the  government,  the  nation  should  always 
have  adequate  means  of  defense,  they  devised  a 
scheme  which  has  proved  as  effective  as  it  is  ingenious. 
At  the  direction  of  the  Elder  Statesmen  (whose 
doyen.  Prince  Yamagata,  was  regarded  as  the  head  of 
the  military  party)  the  emperor  issued  a  decree  pro- 
viding that  laws  relating  to  certain  phases  of  the  na- 
tional defense  need  not  be  submitted  to  the  Diet,  but 


62         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

could  become  operative  upon  receiving  the  approval 
of  the  crown.  It  was  likewise  provided  that  regard- 
ing such  matters  the  members  of  the  Diet  did  not  even 
have  the  right  to  ask  questions.  This  freed  the  min- 
ister of  war  and  the  minister  of  marine  from  the  neces- 
sity of  consulting  the  premier  on  military  and  naval 
matters.  Instead,  they  can  carry  such  matters 
straight  to  the  emperor,  who,  guided  by  the  Elder 
Statesmen,  is  certain  to  do  as  the  militarists  advise. 
In  other  words,  the  militarists  in  some  degree  enjoy 
a  law-making  power  of  their  own.  Not  only  that, 
but  they  are  able  to  carry  out  their  plans  in  absolute 
secrecy,  for  under  such  a  system  not  even  the  premier 
himself  knows  what  is  going  on  within  the  inner  circle. 
The  militarists  guard  their  secrets  from  those  mem- 
bers of  their  own  government  who  are  not  in  sympathy 
with  them  as  zealously  as  they  guard  them  from  the 
agents  of  foreign  nations.  So  fearful  are  they,  in- 
deed, lest  their  plans  should  become  known  to  the 
constitutional  government  that,  when  the  military 
leaders  are  received  in  audience  by  the  emperor,  the 
precaution  is  taken  of  substituting  a  military  aide-de- 
camp for  the  civilian  court  chamberlain  who  is  cus- 
tomarily in  attendance  on  the  sovereign.  Thus  the 
premier,  the  cabinet,  the  Diet,  and  the  people  are 
kept  in  profound  ignorance  of  many  important  de- 
cisions. For  example,  it  is  asserted  that  the  Chinese 
Government  has  frequently  made  representations  to 
the  foreign  office  in  Tokio  relative  to  the  actions  of 


JAPAN  63 

Japanese  officials  in  China,  only  to  find  that  the 
foreign  office  was  totally  ignorant  of  the  whole  mat- 
ter. 

"The  result,"  as  Professor  Yoshino,  one  of  the  fore- 
most political  students  and  publicists  in  Japan,  has 
said,  "is  that  the  cabinet  and  people  of  Japan  are 
held  responsible  for  things  done  in  China,  Korea,  and 
other  places  of  which  the  government  and  the  people 
have  not  the  shghtest  knowledge.  Because  of  this 
dual  government,  Japan  has  been  greatly  misunder- 
stood by  America  and  other  foreign  nations,  as  the 
military,  being  the  most  powerful,  is  the  Japan  known 
to  the  outside  world." 

Let  me  see,  now,  if  I  can  give  you  a  concrete  illus- 
tration of  how  this  system  of  dual  government  works 
in  practice.  Let  us  suppose  that  the  American  Gov- 
ernment favors  the  withdrawal  of  Japanese  troops 
from  Siberia,  leaving  the  Russians  to  work  out  their 
own  salvation.  A  note  to  this  effect  is  despatched  by 
the  secretary  of  state  to  the  American  Ambassador  at 
Tokio,  who  in  turn  transmits  it  to  the  premier,  as  the 
responsible  head  of  the  Japanese  Government.  The 
premier  calls  a  meeting  of  his  cabinet  and  submits  the 
note  for  consideration.  If  the  cabinet  agrees  to  the 
American  suggestion  the  premier  directs  the  minister 
of  war  to  issue  the  necessary  orders  to  the  chief  of 
the  general  staff  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  in 
Siberia,  at  the  same  time  instructing  the  Japanese 
Ambassador  in  Washington  to  inform  the  secretary  of 


64         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

state  that  the  suggestion  of  the  American  Government 
has  been  approved  and  that  the  troops  will  be  with- 
drawn forthwith.  Had  Japan  a  normal  system  of 
government,  like  that  of  England  or  France  or  Italy, 
that  would  end  the  matter.  But  Japan  has  not  a 
normal  system  of  government.  For  the  invisible  gov- 
ernment now  steps  in.  The  minister  of  war,  who,  as 
I  have  already  explained,  is  always  a  general,  loses 
no  time  in  informing  the  Elder  Statesmen  and  the 
chief  of  the  general  staff  of  the  cabinet's  action. 
They  disapprove  of  what  the  cabinet  has  done.  Being 
miHtarists,  they  believe  that  the  best  interests  of  Japan 
will  be  served  by  strengthening,  rather  than  relaxing, 
her  grip  on  Siberia.  So  the  emperor,  acting  on  the 
advice  of  the  Elder  Statesmen,  summons  the  minister 
of  war  and  directs  him  to  despatch  an  additional  di- 
vision of  troops  to  Siberia  forthwith.  The  minister 
of  war  so  directs  the  chief  of  the  general  staff,  who 
promptly  issues  the  necessary  orders,  and  the  deed  is 
done.  All  this  is  done,  mind  you,  without  consulting 
the  premier  and  without  his  knowledge.  The  first 
intimation  that  he  has  that  his  policy  has  been  reversed 
by  the  militarists,  and  his  promise  to  the  American 
Government  broken,  is  when  he  reads  the  news  de- 
spatches from  Washington  announcing  that  the  Japa- 
nese Government  has  gone  back  on  its  word  and  that, 
instead  of  withdrawing  its  garrisons  in  Siberia,  as  it 
had  solemnly  agreed  to  do,  it  is  secretly  pouring  more 
troops  into  that  region.    It  is  obvious  that  the  con- 


JAPAN  65 

stitutional  government  of  Japan  cannot  justly  be 
blamed  for  this  sort  of  thing.  The  men  who  make  the 
promises  are  not  those  who  break  them.  It  is  not  Dr. 
Jekyll  who  is  insincere ;  it  is  Mr.  Hyde. 

To  again  quote  Professor  Yoshino: 

"Of  course  this  scheme  of  a  double  government  is 
not  constitutional.  It  ought  to  be  easily  broken  up. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  the  government  itself,  cer- 
tainly in  the  present  cabinet  and  among  the  people, 
the  opposition  to  this  scheme  is  very  strong  and  very 
pronounced.  But  it  is  very  difficult  to  be  undertaken. 
The  stronger  the  opposition  among  the  people  be- 
comes, the  stronger  the  opposition  of  the  militarists. 
Their  whole  attitude  is  that  whatever  is  best  for  Japan 
is  the  thing  that  is  to  be  done,  no  matter  who  or  what 
is  sacrificed.  Their  aim  is  to  make  Japan  powerful 
and  to  insure  her  influence  as  a  nation.  If  that  means 
that  China  or  Korea  is  to  be  sacrificed,  it  is  unavoid- 
able." 


VII 

Though  the  Japanese  are  gradually  becoming 
more  democratic  in  their  tendencies;  though  the 
number  of  young  men,  mostly  students,  who  realize 
where  the  militarists  are  leading  the  nation,  is  steadily 
increasing;  let  us  not  delude  ourselves  into  thinking 
that  the  disappearance  of  militarism  is  a  probability 
of  the  near  future.     That  it  will  eventually  dis- 


I 


66         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

appear  is  as  certain  as  that  dawn  follows  the  dark. 
But  it  may  take  a  generation  or  even  longer.  At 
present  the  militarists  are  too  strongly  intrenched  for 
a  public  opinion  as  feeble  as  that  of  Japan  to  dis- 
turb, much  less  dislodge  them.  Certainly  there  seems 
to  me  little  justification  for  the  prediction  recently 
made  by  Dr.  Jacob  Gould  Schurman,  American  Min- 
ister to  China,  that  Japan  will  be  a  democracy  in 
twenty  years.  That  the  militarists  will  remain  in  the 
ascendant  during  the  lifetime  of  the  Elder  States- 
men there  can  be  but  little  doubt.  Not  until  the  grip 
of  those  aged  dictators  has  been  relaxed  by  death  is 
the  power  of  the  militarists  likely  to  wane.  Nor  is 
there  any  certainty  that  it  will  wane  then;  for  in  re- 
cent years  their  power  has  been  immensely  strength- 
ened by  a  force  far  mightier  and  more  sinister  than 
that  of  the  Genro.  I  refer  to  the  force  of  organized 
capital,  of  big  business.  As  Mr.  Nathaniel  Peffer, 
one  of  the  shrewdest  and  best-informed  students  of 
Far  Eastern  politics  has  pointed  out,  it  is  big  business 
which  has  reinforced  and  is  keeping  in  power  the  un- 
seen government — the  military  party. 

Only  recently  has  modern  industrial  Japan  awak- 
ened to  a  realization  of  its  own  strength.  But  it  is  now 
fully  alive  to  the  almost  unlimited  power,  the  endless 
possibilities,  to  be  realized  by  the  great  business  inter- 
ests of  the  country  joining  hands  with  the  militarists 
and  working  with  them  for  a  common  purpose.  One 
who  could  trace  through  the  political  structure  of  the 


JAPAN  67 

empire  the  ramifications  of  the  great  industrial  and 
trading  companies  would  be  in  a  position  to  analyze 
Japanese  politics,  domestic  and  foreign.  Those  ac- 
tions of  the  Japanese  Government  which  are  usually- 
attributed  by  foreigners  to  the  ambitions  of  the  mili- 
tarists are  in  reality  quite  as  frequently  due  to  the 
predacity  of  the  capitalists.  Here  you  have  the  key 
to  the  annexation  of  Korea,  to  Japanese  aggression  in 
Manchuria  and  Siberia,  to  the  unreasonable  demands 
made  on  China,  to  the  opposition  to  the  restoration  of 
Shantung.  All  of  those  regions  are  immensely  rich 
in  natural  resources,  they  offer  unlimited  opportuni- 
ties for  profitable  exploitation.  And  it  is  Japanese 
big  business  which  proposes  to  do  the  exploiting.  So, 
in  order  that  it  may  obtain  control  of  the  territories 
which  it  proposes  to  exploit,  it  has  joined  forces  with 
the  land-hungry  militarists.  It  is  the  most  sinister 
combination  of  high  politics  and  big  business  that  the 
world  has  ever  seen. 

Consider  for  a  moment  what  similar  but  far  less 
powerful  combinations  have  achieved  in  other  parts 
of  the  world.  It  was  the  influence  of  the  Rhodes-Beit- 
Bamato  interests,  remember,  that  was  chiefly  instru- 
mental in  inducing  England  to  embark  on  her  con- 
quest of  the  Transvaal,  thereby  bringing  under  the 
unchallenged  control  of  British  capitalists  the  dia- 
mond mines  of  Kimberley  and  the  gold-diggings  of 
the  Rand.  It  was  the  interests  of  the  great  West- 
phalian  firm  of  Mannesmann  Brothers  in  the  mines 


68         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

of  Morocco  which  led  to  Germany's  naval  demonstra- 
tion off  Agadir.  It  was  the  greed  of  Muscovite  cap- 
italists for  further  concessions  in  Manchuria  and 
Korea  which  precipitated  the  war  between  Russia  and 
Japan.  It  was  the  avarice  of  French  capitalists,  far 
more  than  the  persecutions  of  French  missionaries, 
which  led  to  the  tricolor  being  raised  over  Indo-China. 
It  was  American  sugar  interests  which  brought  about 
the  annexation  of  Hawaii  and  American  oil  interests 
which  have  helped  to  shape  our  policy  toward  Mexico. 
And  in  the  ambition  of  Japanese  big  business  to  con- 
trol and  exploit  the  mines,  forests,  grain-fields,  rail- 
ways, and  markets  of  Eastern  Asia  is  found  the  ex- 
planation of  Japan's  policy  of  expansion  by  military 
force.  The  expansion  may  be  commercial  or  terri- 
torial, and  the  force  may  be  used  or  merely  threat- 
ened, but  the  policy,  and  the  influences  which  shape 
the  poHcy,  are  the  same. 

Dominating  Japanese  business  and  finance  are  a 
few  great  corporations — Mitsui,  Mitsubishi,  Suzuki, 
Okura,  Sumimoto,  Kuhara,  Takata,  Furukawa.  So 
much  larger  than  the  others  that  they  are  in  a  class  by 
themselves  are  the  Mitsui  and  Mitsubishi  companies, 
owned  respectively  by  the  Mitsui  and  Iwasaki  families. 
Indeed,  it  is  a  common  saying  in  Japan  that  no  one 
knows  where  Mitsui  ends  and  the  government  begins. 
Their  tentacles  sink  deep  into  every  phase  of  national 
life — commercial,  industrial,  financial,  political.  They 
own  banks,  railways,  steamship  lines,  mills,  factories. 


JAPAN  69 

dockyards,  mines,  forests,  fisheries,  plantations,  insur- 
ance companies,  trading  corporations.  They  and  the 
leaders  of  the  unseen  government — ^the  military  party 
— are  as  closely  bound  together  by  political,  financial, 
and  family  ties  as  were  the  Chicago  packers  before  the 
dissolution  of  their  monopoly.  They  are  as  inter- 
twined by  marriage,  mutual  interests,  and  interlock- 
ing directorates  as  President  Wilson  boasted  that  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  was  intertwined  with  the  Cove- 
nant of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Each  of  these  great  companies,  according  to  Mr. 
Peffer,  has  its  political,  financial,  or  family  alliance 
with  the  leaders  of  the  unseen  government.  For  ex- 
ample, the  late  Marquis  Okuma,  one  of  the  Elder 
Statesmen,  was  related  by  marriage  to  the  Iwasakis, 
who,  as  I  have  said,  own  the  great  house  of  Mutsu- 
bishi.  Another  of  the  Elder  Statesmen,  Marquis 
Matsukata,  is  adviser  to  one  of  these  industrial  dy- 
nasties, while  his  third  son,  Kojiro  Matsukata,  is  the 
head  of  the  great  Kawasaki  shipbuilding  plant  at 
Kobe,  where  more  than  one  dreadnought  has  been 
built  for  the  government.  The  late  Marquis  Inoue, 
who  held  in  turn  the  portfolios  of  agriculture  and 
commerce,  home  affairs,  finance,  and  foreign  affairs, 
was  closely  connected  with  the  house  of  Mitsui.  The 
late  Field-Marshal  Terauchi,  at  one  time  Prime  Min- 
ister of  Japan  and  one  of  the  .foremost  leaders  of  the 
military  party,  was  equally  close  to  Okura,  a  relation- 
ship which  explains  that  house's  success  in  obtaining 


70         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

highly  profitable  army  contracts  as  well  as  important 
concessions  in  the  Japanese  spheres  of  influence  on  the 
mainland.  Baron  Shibusawa,  whom  they  call  "the 
Rockefeller  of  Japan,"  has  long  been  on  the  most  in- 
timate terms  with  Prince  Tokugawa,  the  President  of 
the  House  of  Peers,  having  gone  to  Europe  as  the 
companion  of  the  prince  and  his  brother  as  long  ago 
as  1868.  And  so  with  the  highest  mihtary  men  of  the 
empire  and  the  leading  statesmen.  Each  has  his  rela- 
tionship to  some  great  financial  house,  to  some  captain 
of  industiy.  Big  business  uses  these  afiiliations  with 
the  militarists  to  obtain  for  their  schemes  the  support 
and  cooperation  of  the  unseen  government.  And  by 
the  same  token  the  unseen  government  is  enormously 
strengthened  by  the  support  of  big  business.  It  is  like 
a  crossruff  at  bridge. 


Tin 

"Japan's  future  hes  oversea."  In  those  four 
words  is  found  the  policy  of  the  military-finan- 
cial combination  which  rules  the  empire.  The  an- 
nexation of  Formosa  and  Korea  and  Sakhalin,  the 
occupation  of  Manchuria  and  Siberia  and  Shantung, 
are  not,  as  the  world  supposes,  examples  of  hap- 
hazard land-grabbing.  They  are  phases  of  a  vast 
and  carefully-laid  scheme  which  has  as  its  ultimate 
object  the  control  of  all  Eastern  Asia.  Ostensibly  to 
solve  the  problems  with  which  she  has  been  confronted 


JAPAN  71 

by  her  amazing  increase  in  population  and  produc- 
tion, but  in  reality  to  gratify  the  greed  of  big  business 
and  the  restless  ambitions  of  the  military  party,  Japan 
has  embarked  on  a  campaign  of  world-expansion  and 
exploitation.  Convinced  that  she  requires  a  colonial 
empire  in  her  business,  she  has  set  out  to  build  one  up 
as  she  would  build  a  dry-dock  or  a  bridge.  The  fact 
that  she  had  nothing,  or  next  to  nothing,  to  start  with 
did  not  discourage  her  at  all.  Having  once  made  up 
her  mind  that  the  realization  of  her  political,  economic, 
and  territorial  ambitions  necessitated  the  acquirement 
of  overseas  dominions,  she  has  permitted  nothing  to 
stand  in  the  way  of  her  getting  them.  Land  and 
trade-hunger  and  the  lust  for  power  have  whipped 
her  on.  So,  wherever  a  pretext  can  be  provided  for 
raising  a  flag-staff,  whether  on  an  ice-floe  in  the  Arctic 
or  on  an  atoll  in  the  Pacific,  there  the  Rising  Sun 
flag'shall  flutter ;  wherever  trade  is  to  be  found,  there 
Yokohama  cargo-boats  shall  drop  their  anchors,  there 
Osaka  engines  shall  thunder  over  Kobe  rails,  there 
Kioto  silks  and  Nagoya  cottons  shall  be  sold  by  mer- 
chants speaking  the  language  of  Dai  Nippon.  It  is  a 
scheme  astounding  in  its  very  vastness,  as  methodi- 
cally planned  and  as  systematically  executed  as  an 
American  presidential  campaign ;  and  already,  thanks 
to  Japanese  audacity,  aggressiveness,  and  persever- 
ance, backed  by  Japanese  banks,  battleships,  and  bay- 
onets, it  is  much  nearer  realization  than  the  world 
dreams. 


72         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

In  China,  Siberia,  and  the  Philippines,  in  Cali- 
fornia, Canada,  and  Mexico,  in  the  East  Indies,  Aus- 
tralia, and  New  Zealand,  on  three  continents  and  on 
all  the  islands  of  the  Eastern  seas,  Japanese  mer- 
chants and  money  are  working  twenty-four  hours  a 
day  to  build  up  that  overseas  empire  of  which  the 
financiers  and  the  militarists  dream.  The  activities  of 
these  outposts  of  trade  are  as  varied  as  trade  itself. 
Their  voices  are  heard  in  every  Eastern  market-place ; 
their  footsteps  resound  in  every  avenue  of  Oriental 
endeavor.  Their  mines  in  Siberia  and  Manchuria  and 
China  rival  the  cave  of  Al-ed-Din.  The  railways  that 
converge  on  Peking  from  the  north  and  east,  the  great' 
trunk-line  across  Manchuria,  and  the  eastern  section 
of  the  trans-Siberian  system  are  already  in  their 
hands.  They  work  tea  plantations  in  China,  coffee 
plantations  in  Java,  rubber  plantations  in  Malaya, 
cocoanut  plantations  in  Borneo,  hemp  plantations  in 
the  Philippines,  spice  plantations  in  the  Celebes,  sugar 
plantations  in  Hawaii,  prune  orchards  in  CaHfornia, 
apple  orchards  in  Oregon,  dairy-farms  in  British  Co- 
lumbia, coal-mines  in  Manchuria,  gold-mines  in 
Korea,  forests  in  Siberia,  fisheries  in  Kamchatka. 
Their  argosies,  flying  the  house-flags  of  the  Toyo 
Kisen  Kaisha,  the  Nippon  Yusen  Kaisha,  the  Osaka 
Shosen  Kaisha,  and  a  score  of  other  lines,  bear  Japa- 
nese goods  to  Japanese  traders  on  every  seaboard  of 
the  world,  while  Japanese  warships  are  constantly 
aprowl  up  and  down  the  Eastern  seas,  ready  to  pro- 


JAPAN  73 

tect  the  interests  thus  created  by  the  menace  of  their 
guns. 

In  regions  where  Japanese  banks  have  been  estab- 
lished and  Japanese  traders  have  settled,  it  is  seldom 
difficult  for  Japan  to  find  an  excuse  for  aggression. 
It  may  be  that  a  Japanese  settler  is  mistreated  or  a 
Japanese  consul  insulted,  or  that  a  Japanese  bank  has 
difficulty  in  collecting  its  loans.  So  the  slim  cables 
flash  the  complaint  to  Tokyo ;  there  are  secret  consul- 
tations between  the  leaders  of  the  military  party  and 
the  chieftains  of  big  business ;  a  spokesman  of  the  im- 
seen  government  rises  in  the  Diet  to  announce  that  in 
Siberia  or  China  Japanese  interests  have  been  imper- 
illed or  Japanese  dignity  affronted;  the  newspapers 
controlled  by  big  business  inflame  the  national  resent- 
ment ;  the  aged  trio  behind  the  throne,  speaking  in  the 
name  of  the  emperor,  issue  the  necessary  orders  to  the 
ministers  of  war  and  marine  and  to  the  chief  of  the 
general  staff ;  and  before  the  offending  country  awak- 
ens to  a  realization  of  what  is  happening,  Japanese 
transports  are  at  anchor  in  her  harbors  and  Japanese 
troops  are  disembarking  on  her  shores.  Before  they 
are  withdrawn, — if  they  are  withdrawn, — Japan 
usually  succeeds  in  extorting  a  concession  to  build  a 
railway,  or  to  work  a  coal-mine,  or  to  contract  a  loan, 
or  a  ninety-nine  year  lease  of  a  harbor  which  can  be 
converted  into  a  naval  base,  or  the  cession  of  a  more 
or  less  valuable  strip  of  territory — and  so  the  work 
of  building  up  an  overseas  empire  goes  steadily  on. 


74         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS  / 

This  territorial  expansion  (or  rather,  the  spirit  of 
aggression  which  has  inspired  it  and  the  readiness  to 
advance  it  by  the  employment  of  military  force)  has 
naturally  aroused  foreign  suspicion  of  Japan's  inten- 
tions. In  less  than  a  quarter  of  a  century  we  have 
seen  the  area  of  the  empire  increased  by  nearly  eighty 
per  cent. — and  every  foot  of  this  new  territory  was 
won  by  the  sword.  We  have  seen  Formosa  and  the 
Pescadores  filched,  as  spoils  of  war,  from  a  helpless 
China.  We  have  witnessed  the  annexation  of  Korea 
against  the  wishes  of  its  people.  We  have  seen  Man- 
churia become  Japanese  in  fact,  if  not  in  name.  We 
have  watched  first  Southern  and  then  Northern  Sak- 
halin brought  under  the  rule  of  Tokyo.  We  have  seen 
Japan,  not  content  with  the  seizure  of  the  German 
possessions  on  the  Shantung  Peninsula,  push  her  gar- 
risons two  hundred  and  fifty  miles  into  the  interior 
of  China.  We  have  noted  Japan's  reluctance  to  per- 
mit the  neutralization  of  Yap.  We  have  even  heard 
of  Japanese  agents  at  work  in  Outer  Mongolia,  at  the 
court  of  the  Living  Buddha.  To-day  Japan  has  a 
chain  of  forts,  garrisons,  naval  bases  and  coaling  sta- 
tions stretching  from  the  mid-Pacific  to  mid-Asia, 
from  the  ice  of  the  Arctic  to  the  fierce  heat  of  the 
Line.  Her  guns  watch  the  whole  eastern  seaboard 
of  the  continent.  The  strategic  railways  converg- 
ing on  Peking,  the  Manchurian  trunk-line,  and  the 
eastern  section  of  the  trans-Siberian  system  are  in  her 
hands.     Sakhalin  and  Hokkaido  on  the  north  guard 


I 


JAPAN  75 

the  approaches  to  Kamchatka  and  the  rich  basin  of  the 
Amur.  Port  Arthur,  Chemulpo,  and  Tsing-tau  are 
Japanese  watchdogs  at  the  gateways  to  the  vast  un- 
developed wealth  of  Northern  China.  Kyushu  and 
Formosa  look  out  on  the  populous  and  fertile  littoral 
which  stretches  from  Shanghai  to  Canton.  Her  naval 
bases  in  the  Pescadores  are  within  easy  striking  dis- 
tance of  the  Philippines.  And,  a  thousand  miles  out 
in  the  Pacific,  the  Marshall,  the  Caroline,  and  the 
Bonin  groups  form  her  eastern  skirmish  line.  Is  it  a 
matter  for  surprise,  then,  that  our  suspicions  and  ap- 
prehensions have  been  aroused  by  this  steady  and 
implacable  Japanese  advance?  The  Japanese  resent 
these  suspicions  and  apprehensions  as  unjustified. 
My  answer  to  that  is :  Let  them  look  at  the  map. 


IX 

Japan  finds  herself  to-day  in  a  most  difficult  and 
perplexing  situation.  With  her  population  increasing 
at  the  rate  of  nearly  three  quarters  of  a  million  an- 
nually, and  with  less  than  fifteen  per  cent,  of  her  soil 
capable  of  cultivation,  her  government  finds  itself 
faced  by  three  grave  and  pressing  problems :  the  first, 
that  of  finding  sources  from  which  to  obtain  the  raw 
materials  with  which  to  keep  her  factory-wheels  turn- 
ing; the  second,  that  of  finding  markets  for  her  manu- 
factured products ;  the  third,  that  of  finding  room  for 


76         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

the  expansion  of  her  surplus  population.  Barred  by 
legislation  from  North  America  and  Australia,  she 
has  found  on  the  mainland  of  Asia — in  China  proper, 
in  Manchuria,  and  to  a  lesser  degree  in  Mongolia  and 
Siberia — suitable  fields  for  colonial,  industrial,  and 
commercial  expansion.  But  the  energetic,  aggressive, 
and  at  times  unscrupulous  methods  which  she  has  pur- 
sued in  these  regions  have  brought  her  into  sharp  con- 
flict with  American  interests,  with  American  moral 
sentiment,  and  particularly  with  the  American  poHcy 
of  the  Open  Door.  American  opinion  appears  to  be 
fairly  evenly  divided  as  to  the  attitude  which  should 
be  adopted  by  the  United  States  in  regard  to  Japan's 
claims  of  preponderant  rights  and  "special  interests" 
on  the  Asian  mainland,  one  section  (which  is  strongly 
pro-Chinese)  insisting  that  she  must  be  forced  to 
withdraw  unconditionally  from  Chinese  and  Russian 
territory ;  the  other  holding  that,  so  long  as  she  makes 
no  attempt  to  shut  us  out  from  the  markets  of  those 
regions  which  she  considers  within  her  sphere  of  in- 
fluence, it  would  be  impractical  and  impolitic  for  the 
United  States  to  interfere  with  her  activities  on  the 
mainland.  These  diametrically  opposed  views  are 
admirably  summed  up  in  the  following  extracts,  the 
first  being  taken  from  an  editorial  in  a  well-known 
periodical  :* 

As  long  ago  as  the  time  of  the  Paris  Conference  we  urged 
the  necessity  of  giving  the  Japanese  a  reasonable  outlet  in 

*  Tovm  <md  Country,  January  1,  1922. 


JAPAN  77 

Northern  China  and  Eastern  Siberia.  We  held  that  it  was 
manifestly  impossible  to  bar  the  Japanese  from  the  western 
coast  of  the  twin  American  continents  and  all  of  Australia 
and  New  Zealand  and  the  larger  islands  of  the  Pacific  which 
are  controlled  by  the  English-speaking  peoples,  and  also 
to  prevent  her  from  overflowing  onto  the  mainland  of  Asia. 
At  least,  it  was  impossible  to  do  this  without  eventually 
going  to  war.  We  also  disagreed  entirely  with  the  outcry 
against  the  assigning  at  Paris  of  the  German  leases  in 
Shantung  to  Japan.  Japan  had  exactly  the  same  right 
to  those  German  assets,  which  she  seized  by  process  of  war, 
as  we  had  to  the  German  ships  which  we  seized  in  the  North 
River.  When,  therefore,  the  Washington  Conference  takes 
a  course  which  gives  Japan  a  fairly  clean  bill  of  health  in 
the  Far  East,  tacitly  allows  her  a  wide  field  for  expansion 
there,  and,  in  addition,  does  away  with  the  Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance,  which,  in  our  view,  was  a  real  stumbling  block  in 
the  way  of  peace,  we  need  hardly  say  that  our  sympathy  is 
all  with  the  action  of  the  Conference.  ...  It  is  entirely 
reasonable,  to  our  view,  that  we  should  give  the  Japanese  a 
fairly  free  hand  in  Northern  China  and  Siberia ;  at  least,  it 
is  the  business  of  China,  with  her  four  hundred  million  popu- 
lation, to  stop  Japan,  and  not  our  business. 

This  is  manifestly  the  expression  of  a  narrow  and 
selfish  point  of  view,  being  in  striking  contrast  to 
the  following  extract  from  a  letter  written  me,  shortly 
before  the  opening  of  the  Washington  Conference,  by 
a  former  American  diplomatist,  a  gentleman  of  dis- 
tinguished attainments,  and,  by  reason  of  his  long 
residence  in  Japan,  a  recognized  authority  on  Fas 
Eastern  affairs: 

For  us  to  acknowledge  unreservedly  Japan*s  preponderant 
rights  on  the  Asian  mainland  and  to  recognize  that  Eastern 
Asia  is  her  political  sphere  of  influence  would  mean  not  only 
a  general  recognition  by  us  of  the  validity  of  spheres  of  in- 


78         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

fluence  which  would  be  fatal  to  our  foreign  policy,  but  might 
involve  us  in  a  practical  approval  of  what  would  amount  to 
a  partition  of  China.  Such  an  approval  woiild  mean  a  re- 
versal of  our  whole  attitude  toward  China,  which  would  be 
a  tragedy  to  the  people  of  China  and  would  furthermore  be 
a  serious  political  blunder,  as  we  would  thus  acquiesce  in  the 
practical  elimination  of  all  our  trade  with  the  Orient.  Our 
choice  has  always  seemed  to  me  reasonably  simple.  We 
must  either  maintain  our  disapproval  of  spheres  of  influ- 
ence or  we  must  surrender  our  ideals  of  an  open  market  and 
play  the  game  with  the  other  Powers,  demanding  our  par- 
ticular spheres  as  they  demand  theirs.  This  latter  position 
I  am  confident  our  people  would  never  support.  I  realize 
that  Japanese  propaganda  has  endeavored  to  find  an  an- 
alogy between  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  their  claim  of  a 
paramount  interest  on  the  mainland  of  Asia,  but  in  my 
judgment  there  is  no  such  analogy.  There  is  one  final  rea- 
son why  I  think  that  this  method  of  averting  a  conflict 
between  the  United  States  and  Japan  is  not  only  impractical 
and  impolitic,  but  also  what  I  venture  to  term  immoral.  In 
eff'ect,  it  would  be  appropriating  the  rights  and  property  of 
China  and  Russia  and  then  using  them  to  complete  a  bargain 
in  the  interest  of  our  own  exclusion  policy!  What  right 
have  we  to  bargain  away  China's  sovereignty  in  Manchuria 
in  order  to  solve  our  own  controversy  with  Japan  ?  It  strikes 
me  as  a  form  of  international  embezzlement.  And  then, 
worst  of  all,  it  simply  wouldn't  work.  It  would  not  leave 
peace  in  Asia.  It  would  create  problems  in  the  future  in 
which  we  would  be  viewed  by  the  Russian  and  Chinese  peoples 
as  co-conspirators  in  Japan's  aggression.  ...  Of  course, 
you  realize  that  such  a  solution  is  the  one  that  the  Japanese 
ruling  class  most  earnestly  desire. 

Now  it  seems  to  me  that,  speaking  in  the  language 
of  practical  politics,  the  only  feasible  solution  lies 
somewhere  between  these  views.  For  I  do  not  believe 
that  the  majority  of  Americans  are  selfish  enough  to 
endorse  the  first  view  any  more  than  I  believe  that 


JAPAN  79 

they  are  altruistic  enough  to  insist  on  the  latter. 
Moreover,  we  must  recognize  the  existence  of  certain 
conditions  and  be  prepared  to  accept  them,  whether 
we  approve  of  them  or  not.  For  example,  we  might 
as  well  realize  first  as  last  that  there  is  not  the  slight- 
est probability  of  Japan  evacuating  the  Kwantung 
peninsula — that  is,  the  leased  territories  of  Dalny  and 
Port  Arthur.  She  is  there  to  stay — make  no  mistake 
about  that — at  least  until  the  expiration  of  the  ninety- 
nine-year  lease  which  she  took  over  from  Russia. 
This  great  stronghold  at  the  entrance  to  the  Gulf  of 
ChihU  forms  a  vital  link  in  Japan's  scheme  of  national 
defense,  it  has  cost  her  thousands  of  lives  and  millions 
of  yen,  and  there  is  no  more  likelihood  of  her  restoring 
it  to  China  than  there  is  of  Great  Britain  restoring 
Gibraltar  to  Spain. 

As  regards  Shantung,  the  situation  is  entirely  dif- 
ferent. The  possession  of  Kiauchau  is  not  vital  to  the 
Japanese  scheme  of  national  defense  nor  are  the  Japa- 
nese people  particularly  attached  to  it  by  sentiment. 
Ever  since  the  Peace  Conference  at  Paris,  Japan  has 
realized  that,  in  remaining  on  the  peninsula,  she  was 
defying  world  opinion.  Moreover,  her  statesmen 
have  proclaimed  over  and  over  again,  in  the  most  un- 
equivocal of  terms,  that  it  was  Japan's  intention  to 
restore  the  German  leasehold  to  China,  and  it  is 
hardly  conceivable  that  the  nation  intends  to  break 
the  pledge  thus  given.  The  truth  of  the  matter  is 
that  the  delay  in  the  withdrawal  of  the  Japanese  has 


80         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

been  largely  due  to  the  obstinacy  and  excessive  pride 
shown  by  both  parties  and  to  petty  bickering  over  the 
form  and  details  of  the  transaction.  Prophecy  in  in- 
ternational affairs  is  always  unwise,  but  I  think  it  safe 
to  predict  that  the  Japanese  evacuation  of  Shantung 
will  have  begun  before  this  book  is  published. 

The  greatest  obstacle  in  the  path  of  a  friendly  un- 
derstanding between  Japan  and  China  is  provided  by 
Manchuria,  where  Japan  has  extensive,  varied,  and 
valuable  interests — railways,  mines,  timber,  and  other 
concessions — some  of  which  she  took  over  from  Rus- 
sia by  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  and 
others  which  she  has  acquired  since.  She  has  ex- 
pended millions  of  yen  on  the  development  of  these 
concessions  and  there  have  settled  in  Manchuria, 
moreover,  a  very  considerable  number  of  Japanese 
subjects.  And  finally,  the  borders  of  Manchuria  are 
conterminous  with  the  borders  of  Korea  for  nearly  a 
thousand  miles.  Now,  in  view  of  the  notorious  weak- 
ness and  instability  of  the  Peking  government,  which 
has  shown  itself  powerless  to  make  its  authority  felt 
throughout  the  Eighteen  Provinces  of  the  Chinese 
homeland,  much  less  in  the  outlying  territories,  it 
seems  to  me  too  much  to  expect  Japan  to  renounce 
her  enormously  valuable  interests  in  Manchuria,  with- 
draw the  guards  from  her  railways,  and  abandon  her 
nationals  and  their  properties  to  Chang  Tso-lin  and 
his  fellow-bandits,  who,  once  the  firm  hand  of  Japa- 
nese control  was  removed,  would  have  the  land  at 


JAPAN  81 

their  mercy.  No  one  who  has  a  first-hand  knowledge 
of  the  conditions  which  prevail  in  Manchuria  can 
truthfully  assert  that  the  substitution  of  Chinese  for 
Japanese  control  in  that  region  at  this  time  would  be 
for  the  best  interests  of  the  inhabitants  themselves. 
But  this  should  not  be  interpreted  as  meaning  that  I 
believe  in  perpetuating  Japan's  claims  to  "special  in- 
terests" in  Manchuria,  for  I  do  not.  Let  the  Chinese 
give  convincing  proof  of  their  ability  to  establish  a 
strong  and  efficient  central  government,  let  them  put 
an  end  to  the  civil  war  which  is  disrupting  the  repub- 
lic, let  them  suppress  the  misrule,  corruption,  and 
brigandage  which  prevail  throughout  the  Eighteen 
Provinces,  and  then  they  will  have  substantial 
grounds  for  demanding  that  Japan's  privileged  posi- 
tion in  Manchuria  shall  be  terminated.  Manchuria 
is  indubitably  Chinese  territory,  and  its  complete  con- 
trol should  be  restored  to  her  as  soon  as  she  is  in  a 
position  to  exercise  it. 

'  But  Japan  has  not  the  same  justification  for  her 
conduct  in  the  Eighteen  Provinces  that  she  has  had 
for  her  policy  in  Manchuria.  Her  behavior  in  the 
Chinese  homeland  has  been  characterized  by  inexcus- 
able selfishness,  arrogance,  discrimination,  and  greed. 
If  she  wishes  to  convince  the  world  that  she  is  sincere 
in  her  protestations  that  she  has  no  designs  on  Chinese 
sovereignty,  no  desire  to  shut  the  Open  Door,  then 
she  should  lose  no  time  in  withdrawing  her  troops 
(she  has  a  garrison  as  far  inland  as  Hankow)  and 


82         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

her  police,  in  abandoning  her  post-offices,  and  in  ter- 
minating certain  offensive  agreements  which  she  has 
coerced  the  Chinese  into  accepting.  In  short,  she 
must  conduct  herself  henceforward  like  a  guest  in  a 
friend's  house,  rather  than  like  a  burglar. 

On  the  other  hand,  so  long  as  Japan  confines  her- 
self to  strictly  legitimate  methods  I  fail  to  see  how 
exception  can  be  taken  by  the  Chinese,  or  by  any  one 
else,  to  Japanese  commercial  expansion  in  China.  By 
commercial  expansion  I  mean  the  establishment  of 
banks,  the  flotation  of  loans,  the  construction  of  rail- 
ways, the  operation  of  mines,  and  similar  industrial 
activities,  provided  always  that  they  meet  with  the 
approval  of  the  Chinese  Government  and  are  con- 
ducted in  a  fashion  which  in  no  way  imperils  the  sov- 
ereignty of  China  or  infringes  on  the  rights  of  other 
nations.  Japan  miist  obtain  raw  materials  for  her 
home  industries,  and  I  can  see  no  more  objection  to 
her  obtaining  them  from  China  than  I  can  to  the 
United  States  obtaining  oil  from  Mexico.  Japan 
must  find  markets  for  her  products,  and  I  can  see  no 
more  objection  to  her  seeking  those  markets  in  China 
than  I  can  to  the  United  States  seeking  markets  in 
Latin- America.  Japan  miist  provide  for  her  surplus 
population,  and  I  can  see  no  more  objection  to  Japa- 
nese emigrants  settling  in  China — provided  they  are 
willing  to  abide  by  Chinese  laws — ^than  I  can  to  Euro- 
pean emigrants  settling  in  the  United  States.  But 
Japan  must  abandon  for  good  and  all  her  old  policy 


JAPAN  8a 

of  monopolization  and  coercion.  There  must  be  no 
further  alienation  of  Chinese  territory  on  any  pretext 
whatsoever.  There  must  be  no  further  attempts  to 
intimidate  the  Chinese  Government  into  granting  con- 
cessions, accepting  Japanese  "advice,"  or  signing  ob- 
noxious treaties.  If  Japan  will  give  convincing  proof 
of  her  sincerity  by  putting  an  immediate  end  to  these 
abuses,  then  there  is  no  reason  why  the  two  great 
Oriental  nations  should  not  become  friends  and  allies, 
thereby  dispelling  for  all  time  the  ominous  cloud  that 
has  so  long  overshadowed  the  Farther  East. 

I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  Japanese  policies  in 
China  which  have  caused  so  much  uneasiness  abroad 
are  dictated  by  imperative  economic  necessity  rather 
than  by  a  spirit  of  wanton  aggression.  If  you  will  take 
the  trouble  to  look  into  the  matter  you  will  find  that 
Japan's  territorial  expansion  on  the  Asian  mainland 
is  not  due,  as  her  enemies  would  have  you  believe,  to 
greed  for  military  glory,  to  an  insatiable  lust  for 
power.  It  is  due,  as  I  have  already  pointed  out, 
to  the  necessity  of  providing  food  for  a  popula- 
tion which  is  already  greater  than  the  soil  of 
the  homeland  can  support,  and  which  is  de- 
barred by  exclusion  acts  or  racial  hostility  from 
seeking  its  livelihood  on  the  American  or  Australian 
continents.  Consider  the  facts.  With  a  birth-rate  of 
32  per  1000,  the  population  of  Japan  is  increasing 
at  the  rate  of  approximately  750,000  a  year.    Though 


I 


84         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

much  of  its  surface  is  so  mountainous  as  to  be  unin- 
habitable, or  at  least  unsusceptible  to  cultivation, 
Japan  already  has  nearly  four  hundred  inhabitants 
to  the  square  mile,  and  this  number  is  steadily  rising. 
Though,  during  the  last  decade,  the  area  of  land 
under  cultivation  has  been  increased  by  five  per 
cent,  and  the  production  of  rice  by  four  per  cent.,  the 
number  of  mouths  that  must  be  fed  have  increased 
by  twelve  per  cent.  In  the  same  period  the  cost  of 
living  in  Japan  has  increased  nearly  four  hundred 
per  cent.  With  emigration  to  America  and  Aus- 
tralia out  of  the  question,  the  nation  is  faced,  then,  by 
three  alternatives :  ( 1 )  a  reduction  of  the  birth-rate ; 
(2)  an  increase  in  food  production;  (3)  territorial 
expansion  into  the  thinly  populated  regions  of  East- 
em  Asia.  As  a  reduction  of  the  birth-rate  is  not 
to  be  expected,  and  as  food  production  in  Japan  itself 
has  already  reached  the  maximum,  Japanese  states- 
men have  been  compelled  by  sheer  economic  necessity 
to  adopt  the  third  alternative — expansion  on  the 
Asian  mainland.  There  you  have  in  tabloid  form  the 
true  expansion  of  Japan's  political  and  military  activ- 
ities in  Shantung,  Manchuria,  Mongolia,  and  Siberia 
and  her  claims  to  "special  interests"  in  all  those 
regions.  In  short,  Japan  has  reached  the  point  where 
she  must  overflow  or  perish,  just  as  the  congested 
countries  of  Europe  overflowed  into  the  Americas  and 
Africa.  But  in  her  case  there  is  no  New  World,  no 
Dark  Continent,  in  which  her  surplus  millions  can 


JAPAN  85 

find  homes  and  livelihoods.  The  waste  lands  were 
long  ago  parceled  out  among  the  Western  nations. 
Japan  came  into  the  world  a  century  too  late.  De- 
barred from  expanding  to  the  eastward  or  the  south- 
ward, she  is  expanding  westward  into  the  loosely  held, 
thinly  peopled,  undeveloped  fringes  of  China  and 
Siberia.  That  her  expansion  should  be  at  the  ex- 
pense of  other  and  weaker  nations  is  unfortunate  but, 
imder  the  circumstances,  unavoidable.  As  a  Japanese 
writer  in  "The  World's  Work"  has  put  it:  "The 
Japanese  people  must  either  die  a  saintly  death  in 
righteous  starvation,  or  expand  into  the  neighbor's 
backyard — and  Japan  is  not  that  much  of  a  saint." 


We  now  come  to  the  most  delicate,  the  most 
difficult,  and  the  most  dangerous  of  all  the  ques- 
tions in  dispute  between  America  and  Japan — ^that 
of  Japanese  immigration  into  the  United  States.  Now 
I  have  no  intention  of  embarking  on  a  discussion  of 
the  pros  and  cons  of  this  question.  But  because  I  have 
foimd  that  most  Americans  have  only  an  inexact  and 
fragmentary  knowledge  of  it,  and  because  a  rudi- 
mentary understanding  of  it  is  essential  to  a  clear 
comprehension  of  the  larger  question,  our  relations 
with  Japan,  I  trust  that  you  will  bear  with  me  while 
I  sketch  in  outline  the  events  which  led  up  to  the 


86         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

present  immigration  situation.    I  will  compress  them 
into  tabloid  form. 

Under  the  administrative  interpretation  of  our 
naturalization  laws,  Japanese  aliens  are  ineligible  to 
American  citizenship.  But  down  to  the  summer  of 
1908  there  was  no  restriction  on  Japanese  immigra- 
tion. Up  to  that  time,  in  other  words,  a  Japanese 
could  enter  and  settle  in  the  United  States,  but  he 
could  not  become  an  American  citizen.  In  that  year, 
however,  the  much-discussed  "Gentlemen's  Agree- 
ment," whereby  Japanese  laborers  are  excluded  from 
the  United  States,  went  into  effect.  That  agreement 
is  not  in  the  shape  of  a  formal  treaty  or  undertaking. 
The  term  applies  simply  to  the  substance  of  a  num- 
ber of  informal  notes  exchanged  between  the  then 
Secretary  of  State,  Elihu  Root,  and  Mr.  K.  Takahira, 
at  that  time  the  Japanese  Ambassador  in  Washing- 
ton. The  terms  of  this  agreement  provided  that  no 
Japanese  could  enter  our  ports  from  Japan  or  from 
Hawaii  without  a  proper  passport  from  his  own  gov- 
ernment, and  Japan  promised  to  give  no  passports 
to  prospective  emigrants  of  the  coolie,  or  laboring 
class.  There  has  been  no  charge  that  Japan  has  failed 
to  keep  both  letter  and  spirit  of  this  agreement  with 
absolute  integrity.  In  fact,  the  Japanese  Foreign 
Office  has  at  times  leaned  backward  in  its  endeavor 
to  keep  faith.  But  the  labor  elements  in  California, 
unable  to  meet  Japanese  industrial  competition  and 
jealous  of  Japanese  success,  continued  their  anti- 


\  JAPAN  87 

Japanese  agitation,  being  aided  by  politicians  seeking 
the  labor  vote,  and  in  1913  laws  prohibiting  the  pur- 
chase of  land  by  Japanese  in  that  state  were  placed 
on  the  statute  books  of  California. 

But  there  were  certain  loopholes  left  by  this  law. 
These  loopholes  permitted  of  agricultural  land  being 
leased  by  Japanese  for  three  years ;  of  land  being  pur- 
chased by  corporations  in  which  Japanese  were  inter- 
ested ;  and  of  land  being  purchased  by  American-born 
children  of  Japanese  parents.  To  block  up  these 
loopholes  the  Oriental  Exclusion  League  circulated  a 
petition  to  place  an  initiative  act — ^known  as  the  Alien 
Land  Act — on  the  ballot  in  1920.  To  bolster  up  its 
arguments  in  favor  of  this  act,  the  League  called  at- 
tention to  the  rapid  increase  in  the  Japanese  birth- 
rate in  California.  This  increase  in  the  birth-rate  was 
due,  it  was  claimed,  to  the  custom  followed  by  many 
of  the  poorer  Japanese  settlers  in  California  of  having 
sent  to  them  from  Japan  pictures  of  eligible  girls.  In 
this  manner  the  Japanese  in  America  selected  their 
wives,  to  whom  they  were  married  in  absentia.  These 
so-called  "picture  brides,"  being  thus  legally  married, 
had  the  right  under  our  laws  to  join  their  husbands  in 
the  United  States,  which  they  did  in  considerable 
numbers.  And  the  more  picture  brides,  the  more  chil- 
dren. And  the  more  children,  the  more  land  passing 
under  Japanese  control;  for  the  Japanese  circum- 
vented the  prohibition  against  their  holding  land  by 
purchasing  land  in  the  name  of  their  American-born 


88         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

children,  who  were  automatically  American  citizens 
and  of  whom  the  parents  were  the  legal  guardians. 
This  method  of  circimiventing  the  law  created  such 
an  uproar  among  the  anti-Japanese  elements  in  CaU- 
fornia  that  in  February,  1920,  Japan,  in  order  to  re- 
move another  source  of  controversy,  ceased  to  issue 
passports  to  picture  brides.  But  this  did  not  satisfy 
the  Calif ornian  agitators,  who  succeeded  in  having  the 
adoption  of  the  Alien  Land  Act  put  to  a  popular  vote. 
This  act — ^perhaps  the  most  stringent  measure  ever 
directed  against  the  civil  rights  of  residents  in  the 
United  States — ^provides : 

1.  Prohibition  of  land-ownership  by  Japanese. 

2.  Prohibition  of  leasing  of  agricultural  lands  by  Japa- 
nese. 

3.  Prohibition  of  land-ownership  by  companies  or  cor- 
porations in  which  Japanese  are  interested. 

4.  Prohibition  of  land-ownership  by  Japanese  children 
bom  in  the  United  States,  by  removing  them  from  the 
guardianship  of  their  parents  in  such  cases. 

At  the  elections  in  November,  1920,  this  measm-e 
was  carried  by  a  majority  of  the  registered  voters  and 
by  a  three-to-one  vote  of  those  who  expressed  an  opin- 
ion on  the  subject.  The  vote  stood  668,483  in  favor 
and  222,086  opposed. 

There  you  have  the  Japanese  immigration  situation 
up  to  date. 

Right  here  let  me  interject  the  remark  that,  in  re- 
senting the  American  attitude  of  racial  superiority, 
the  restrictions  imposed  by  the  United  States  on 


JAPAN  89 

Japanese  immigration,  and  the  prohibition  of  land- 
ownership  by  Japanese  in  California,  the  people  of 
Nippon  are  not  consistent.  They  refuse  to  see  that 
the  American  attitude  toward  the  Japanese  is  almost 
identical  with  the  Japanese  attitude  toward  the 
Chinese — but  with  this  difference:  we  do  not  hold 
the  Japanese  in  contempt,  as  the  Japanese  hold  the 
Chinese.  The  Japanese  regard  the  Chinese  as  an  in- 
ferior race,  considering  themselves  immeasurably  su- 
perior to  them  intellectually  in  culture  and  in  effi- 
ciency. His  supreme  contempt  for  the  Chinese  ex- 
plains why  the  Japanese  so  bitterly  resents  being 
placed  in  the  same  category  with  them  by  our  immi- 
gration laws.  The  Japanese  see  nothing  anomalous 
in  the  fact  that  their  own  laws  prohibiting  Chinese 
from  settling  in  Japanese  territory  are  fully  as  rigid 
as  the  restrictions  placed  on  Japanese  immigration 
into  the  United  States.  Indeed,  they  have  carried 
their  exclusion  policy  to  far  greater  lengths  than  we 
have  ours,  for  unskilled  foreign  laborers  are  not  per- 
mitted to  settle  in  those  regions  on  the  Asian  main- 
land which,  though  they  do  not  belong  to  Japan,  are 
under  Japanese  control.  In  other  words,  a  Chinese 
coolie  cannot  settle  in  the  Chinese  province  of  Shan- 
tung, because,  forsooth,  Japan  regards  it  as  within 
her  own  sphere  of  influence.  The  subjects  of  the  em- 
peror admit  of  no  inconsistency  in  the  fact  that, 
though  approximately  27,000  acres  are  owned  by 
Japanese  settlers  in  California,  not  a  single  foot 


90         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

of  Japanese  soil  can  be  owned  by  a  foreigner.  They 
fail  to  recognize  anything  anomalous  in  the  fact  that, 
though  nearly  48,000  acres  in  California  are  owned  by 
American  corporations  controlled  by  Japanese  capi- 
tal, very  few,  if  any,  foreigners  are  represented  in 
corporations  holding  land  in  Japan.  There  are,  it  is 
true,  a  few  foreigners  in  Japan  who  hold  land  under 
perpetual  leases,  but  these  holdings,  insignificant  in 
number  and  extent,  have  come  down  from  the  days 
when  the  Western  nations  exacted  extraterritorial 
privileges.  As  a  people,  the  Japanese  are  not  blessed 
with  a  sense  of  humor.  If  they  were,  they  would  see 
the  humor  of  their  insistence  on  being  accorded  the 
same  rights  which  they  deny  to  another  Oriental  race, 
the  Chinese. 

But  the  point  I  wish  to  emphasize  is  this:  the 
Japanese  Government  is  not  clamoring  for  the  re- 
moval of  any  of  the  present  restrictions  on  the  inmii- 
gration  of  its  nationals  into  the  United  States.  The 
Japanese  consider  these  restrictions  offensive  and 
humiliating, — ^that  goes  without  saying, — ^but  they 
concede  our  right  to  decide  who  shall  enter  our  doors 
and  who  shall  stay  out.  Not  for  a  moment,  however, 
have  the  Japanese  been  blinded  by  our  assertions  that 
our  exclusion  of  them  is  based  purely  on  economic 
grounds.  They  are  far  too  shrewd  not  to  recognize 
that  this  explanation  was  advanced  to  soothe  their 
wounded  vanity,  as  a  sop  to  their  pride.  They  know, 
and  we  know,  that  the  real  cause  of  their  exclusion  is 


I 


JAPAN  91 

racial.  No  one  realizes  more  clearly  than  the  Japanese 
themselves  that,  in  excluding  them  from  the  United 
States,  we  have  in  effect  stigmatized  them  as  an  in- 
ferior race.  I  repeat,  however,  that  they  concede  om* 
right  to  exclude  whom  we  please.  But  what  they  do 
not  concede,  what  they  will  not  agree  to,  is  the  right 
of  the  United  States,  or  of  any  state  in  the  United 
States,  to  discriminate  against  those  Japanese  who 
are  lawfully  resident  in  this  country.  To  attempt  to 
deprive  those  Japanese  legally  dwelling  within  our 
borders  of  those  personal  and  property  rights  which 
we  grant  to  all  other  aliens  is  so  obviously  unjust  that 
it  scarcely  merits  discussion.  The  Japanese  have  ex- 
cellent grounds  for  believing  that  such  discriminatory 
legislation  is  unconstitutional ;  they  know  that  it  con- 
stitutes an  open  defiance  of  equity  and  justice.  They 
feel — and  their  feeling  is  apparently  shared  by  the 
222,000  Californians  who  voted  against  it — that  such 
legislation  makes  ridiculous  and  hypocritical  our  oft- 
repeated  boast  that  we  stand  for  the  square  deal. 

The  bitterness  of  Japanese  resentment  over  the 
immigration  question  is  not  entirely  due,  however,  to 
wounded  racial  pride,  but  quite  as  much,  I  think,  to 
the  rudeness  and  lack  of  tact  which  have  characterized 
the  anti-Japanese  agitation  in  California.  For  it 
should  be  remembered  that  in  no  country  is  the  code 
of  social  courtesy  or  consideration  for  foreigners  so 
rigidly  observed  as  in  Japan.  In  dealing  with  the 
Japanese,  nothing  is  ever  gained  by  insults  or  bully- 


92         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

ing.  Politeness  is  the  shibboleth  of  all  classes,  and 
the  lowest  coolie  usually  responds  to  it  instantly.  Is 
it  to  be  wondered  at,  then,  that  the  Japanese  are  irri- 
tated and  resentful  at  the  lack  of  courtesy  and  ordi- 
nary good  manners  which  we  have  displayed  in  our 
handling  of  so  peculiarly  delicate  a  matter  as  the  im- 
migration question? 

It  may  be  that  local  conditions  justify  the  wave  of 
anti-Japanese  hysteria  which  is  sweeping  the  Pacific 
Coast.  It  may  be  that  the  people  of  the  Western 
states  can  offer  valid  reasons  for  their  constant  pin- 
pricking  and  irritation  of  Japan.  But  I  doubt  it.  I 
am  no  stranger  to  California — I  have  lived  there  oif 
and  on  for  years — ^nor  am  I  ignorant  of  the  relations 
between  labor  and  poHtics  in  that  state.  That  is  why 
I  refuse  to  become  excited  over  the  threatened  "con- 
quest" of  California  by  a  little  group  of  aliens  which 
comprises  only  two  per  cent,  of  the  population  of  the 
state  and  which  owns  or  leases  only  one  and  six  tenths 
per  cent,  of  its  cultivated  lands.  The  last  census 
shows  that  there  are  111,010  Japanese — men, 
women,  and  children — in  the  United  States.  And  no 
more  are  coming  in.  Surely  this  is  not  a  very  serious 
menace  to  a  nation  of  110  millions  of  people! 

The  Californians  assert  that  their  anti-Japanese 
legislation  is  a  matter  for  them  to  decide  and  does  not 
concern  the  rest  of  the  country.  Therein  they  are 
wrong.  For  in  the  unwished-for  event  of  war  with 
Japan,  it  would  not  be  a  war  between  California  and 


JAPAlSr  93 

Japan,  but  between  the  United  States  and  Japan. 
Therefore,  in  its  treatment  of  the  Japanese,  it  be- 
hooves California  to  take  the  rights  and  interests  of 
the  rest  of  the  country  into  careful  consideration.  So, 
because  we  must  all  share  in  the  responsibility  for 
California's  treatment  of  the  Japanese  problem,  let 
us  make  certain  beyond  doubt  or  question  that  that 
treatment  is  based  on  equity  and  justice.  Under  no 
conditions  must  racial  prejudice,  economic  jealousy, 
or  political  expediency  be  permitted  to  serve  as  an 
excuse  for  giving  the  Japanese  anything  save  a  square 
deal. 


XI 

Just  and  permanent  solutions  of  the  various  ques- 
tions at  issue  between  the  United  States  and  Japan 
have  been  greatly  retarded  by  trouble-making  and 
dangerous  elements  in  both  countries:  in  Japan,  by 
the  arrogant,  avaricious,  unscrupulous  militarists  who 
shape  the  policies  of  the  government;  in  America  by 
jingoes  with  selfish  aims  to  serve,  irresponsible  gossip- 
mongers,  professional  alarmists,  and  yellow  journal- 
ists. For  example,  not  a  little  of  the  American  dis- 
trust of  Japan  is  directly  traceable  to  the  highly 
circumstantial  stories  told  by  returning  tourists, 
whose  opportunities  for  observation  have  usually 
been  limited  and  whose  opinions  are  generally  super- 
ficial, of  Japan's  secret  designs  against  the  Philip- 


94         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

pines.  In  substantiation  of  these  stories  they  point 
to  Japan's  imperative  need  for  an  outlet  for  her  ex- 
cess population,  to  the  temptation  offered  by  the  Phil- 
ippines, which  form  a  prolongation  of  the  Japanese 
archipelago  (Formosa,  the  southernmost  island  under 
the  Japanese  flag,  can  be  seen  from  the  highlands  of 
Luzon  on  a  clear  day),  and  to  the  alleged  alarming 
increase  in  the  number  of  Japanese  settlers  in  the 
Philippines,  most  of  whom,  so  the  gossips  will  assure 
you  earnestly,  are  military  reservists  disguised  as 
laborers.  Before  proceeding,  let  me  dispose  of  the 
latter  assertion  by  saying  that  investigations  con- 
ducted by  American  intelligence  officers  have  proved 
conclusively  that  there  are  less  than  ten  thousand 
Japanese  in  the  entire  archipelago,  and  that,  though 
the  men  have  doubtless  had  military  training,  they 
are  simple  farmers,  traders,  and  artisans,  who  are  in 
the  Philippines  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  living. 
That  the  Philippines  would  be  the  first  objective 
of  Japanese  attack  in  the  event  of  war  between  the 
United  States  and  Japan  is  a  foregone  conclusion. 
That  the  Japanese  General  Staff  is  in  possession  of 
accurate  and  detailed  information  as  to  our  scheme  of 
defense  and  the  strength  and  disposition  of  our  forces 
in  the  islands,  goes  without  saying.  Our  own  general 
staff  is  presumably  equally  well  informed  about 
Mexico.  That,  in  the  event  of  war,  the  Japanese 
could  seize  the  islands  with  little  difficulty,  and  hold 
them  indefinitely,  is  conceded  by  most  military  men. 


JAPAN  95 

But  I  am  convinced  that,  as  things  stand  to-day, 
Japan  is  as  innocent  of  designs  against  the  Philippines 
as  we  are  of  designs  against  Mexico.  (What  her 
attitude  might  be  were  we  to  withdraw  from  the 
islands,  leaving  the  natives  to  manage  their  own  af- 
fairs, is  quite  another  question. )  It  is  true  that  Japan 
objects  to  the  fortification  of  the  Philippines,  regard- 
ing it  as  an  implied  threat  against  herself,  but  I 
imagine  that  we  would  object  to,  and  probably  would 
prohibit,  the  establishment  of  a  fortified  Japanese 
naval  base  on  the  coast  of  Mexico.  Those  persons 
who  talk  so  loosely  of  Japan's  determination  to  seize 
the  Philippines  at  the  first  opportunity  that  offers  are 
doubtless  unaware  that  she  once  had  an  opportunity 
to  purchase  them  at  a  bargain  price — and  declined  it. 
Viscount  Kaneko  told  me  that,  some  years  prior  to 
the  Spanish- American  War,  representatives  of  the 
Spanish  Government  inquired  whether  Japan  would 
care  to  purchase  the  Philippines  for  the  equivalent  of 
eight  million  dollars  gold,  and  that  Japan  refused  to 
consider  the  proposal  on  the  ground  that  the  Philip- 
pines were  too  far  away  for  her  to  administer  easily 
and  that  Japanese  do  not  thrive  in  tropical  climates. 
It  has  long  been  a  popular  pastime  among  certain 
of  our  people  to  prophesy  an  eventual  war  between 
the  two  countries.  Let  us  look  at  this  question  from 
the  viewpoint  of  common  sense.  Neither  the  Jap- 
anese Government  nor  the  Japanese  people  want  war 
with  the  United  States.    It  is  possible  that  some  of 


96         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

the  younger  and  more  hot-headed  military  men  might 
welcome  such  a  conflict  because  of  the  opportunities 
it  would  afford  them  for  winning  promotion,  decora- 
tions, and  glory.  But  you  may  be  quite  certain  that 
the  older  and  wiser  men  who  direct  the  military 
policies  of  the  empire  have  no  desire  to  embark  on 
such  an  adventure.  Confident  as  they  are  of  Japan's 
prowess,  they  do  not  blind  themselves  to  the  fact 
that  such  a  conflict  could  have  onlj'^  one  conclusion. 
The  lessons  taught  by  America's  achievements 
in  the  World  War  have  not  been  lost  on  them. 
When  the  United  States  in  less  than  eighteen  months 
raised  an  army  of  five  million  men  and  equipped  them, 
and  put  nearly  half  of  them  down  on  a  battle-line 
three  thousand  miles  away,  it  gave  the  Japanese  mili- 
tarists much  food  for  thought.  They  were  as 
astounded  by  this  revelation  of  the  republic's  military 
might  as  were  the  Germans.  Though  it  is  entirely 
possible  that  the  Japanese  might  be  victorious  in 
the  earlier  stages  of  a  conflict  with  the  United  States, 
the  Japanese  strategists  know  perfectly  well  that,  in 
view  of  America's  immensely  superior  man-power, 
wealth,  and  natural  resources,  such  a  struggle  would 
be  hopeless  for  Japan  from  the  beginning.  They 
have  not  forgotten  how  desperate  was  their  plight 
when  President  Roosevelt's  intervention  brought  the 
war  with  Russia  to  a  close,  nor  do  they  shut  their 
eyes  to  the  certainty  that,  in  a  war  with  the  United 
States,  the  nations  of  the  world,  including  those  of 


JAPAN  97 

the  Orient,  would  infallibly  give  their  moral  support 
to  America.  Even  were  the  militarists  mad  enough 
to  embark  on  such  an  enterprise,  which  they  are  not, 
they  could  never  obtain  the  support  of  Japan's  cap- 
tains of  finance  and  industry.  These  shrewd,  far- 
seeing  business  men  do  not  forget  that  America  is 
Japan's  largest  customer ;  that  more  than  one  third  of 
all  the  products  of  the  empire  go  to  the  United  States. 
Practically  all  of  Japan's  exported  tea,  seventy  per 
cent,  of  her  raw  and  manufactured  silk  and  large 
quantities  of  her  other  products  are  sold  in  American 
markets.  I  have  heard  it  declared,  indeed,  that  were 
the  United  States  to  double  her  import  duties  on  tea 
and  silks  it  would  bring  Japan  to  the  verge  of  ruin. 
Nor  do  the  Japanese  overlook  the  fact  that  the  United 
States  is  now  the  greatest  reservoir  of  capital  in  the 
world.  Japan  needs  money.  Europe,  impoverished 
by  the  war,  cannot  supply  it.  America  can.  I  repeat, 
Japan  does  not  want  war  with  the  United  States. 

And  it  is  equally  certain  that  the  United  States 
does  not  want  war  with  Japan.  We  want,  and  expect 
to  get,  our  fair  share  of  the  trade  of  the  Far  East, 
but  we  have  not  the  remotest  desire  for  territorial  ex- 
pansion in  those  regions.  We  shall  continue  to  insist 
on  the  Open  Door  in  China  remaining  open,  but  we 
freely  concede  that  the  Japanese  have  as  much  right 
to  use  that  door  as  ourselves.  We  shall  continue  to 
insist  that  our  rights  in  the  Pacific  be  recognized,  but 
this  imphes  no  hostility  toward  Japan.    A  sugges'  ion 


98         ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

that  any  considerable  section  of  the  American  people 
cherishes  sentiments  hostile  to  the  Japanese  would 
be  greeted  with  derision  anywhere  in  the  United 
States,  save  perhaps  in  a  few  local  communities  on 
the  Pacific  Coast,  whose  sentiments  are  in  no  wise 
indicative  of  the  attitude  of  the  country  as  a  whole. 
I  do  not  believe  that  the  majority  of  fair-minded 
Americans  object  to  Japanese  commercial  expansion 
on  the  Asian  mainland — so  long  as  that  expansion 
is  legitimately  conducted.  But  we  do  object  to  ex- 
pansion by  intrigue  or  force.  We  can  sympathize 
with  Japan's  undeniable  need  for  more  elbow-room, 
but  we  cannot  countenance  the  plans  of  the  Tokio 
militarists  for  extending  Japanese  dominion  by  the 
sword.  Though  we  conceded,  through  the  Lan- 
sing-Ishii  Agreement,  that  Japan  possesses  "special 
interests"  on  the  Asian  mainland,  we  cannot  see 
those  interests  multiplied  until  they  block  the  Open 
Door.*  For  sentimental,  political,  and  economic  rea- 
sons we  are  averse  to  the  expansion  of  Japan  at  the 
expense  of  China  and  Russia,  but  we  have  no  thought 
of  actively  opposing  such  expansion  so  long  as  it 
takes  the  form  of  peaceful  penetration  of  thinly  peo- 
pled, undeveloped,  and  misgoverned  regions,  partic- 
ularly as  we  believe  that  those  regions  will  be  im- 
proved by  scientific  development  and  their  peoples 
benefited  by  decent  government.     I  am  myself  of 

*One  of  the  first  acts  of  Mr.  Hughes,  upon  becoming  Secretary  of 
State,  was  to  make  it  amply  clear  to  the  Japanese  Grovemment  that 
the  United  States  no  longer  recognizes  these  "special  interests." 


JAPAN  99 

the  opinion  that  the  future  policy  of  Japan  will  tend 
rather  in  the  direction  of  economic  penetration  than 
of  territorial  expansion.  Several  recent  events  have 
contributed  to  bring  about  this  change  in  policy.  To 
begin  with,  \he  sudden  collapse  of  Prussian  militarism 
was  a  staggering  blow  to  the  Japanese  miUtarists. 
It  brought  them  to  an  abrupt  realization  of  the  fact 
that  the  world  was  heartily  sick  of  militarism  and  im- 
perialism, and  that  their  dreams  of  building  up  a  Pan- 
Asian  empire  by  conquest  could  never  be  fulfilled. 
They  realized  that  America,  now  the  greatest  mili- 
tary-naval-financial power  on  earth,  would  never 
consent  to  the  Japanese  making  themselves  masters 
of  the  Pacific  or  overlords  of  Asia.  Again,  they 
recognized  the  growing  strength  of  public  opinion  in 
Japan  itself — a  public  opinion  which  is  beginning  to 
make  itself  heard  and  which  demands  peace  and 
friendship  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  And  lastly, 
but  by  far  the  most  important,  came  the  Washington 
Conference,  with  its  full,  frank,  and  friendly  discus- 
sions of  all  pending  questions,  its  clarification  of 
Japan's  and  America's  position,  and  the  correspond- 
ing enlightenment  of  public  opinion  in  both  countries. 
From  talks  that  I  have  recently  had  with  many  of 
the  leading  men  of  Japan,  including  the  premier, 
several  members  of  his  cabinet,  and  the  president  of 
the  House  of  Peers,  I  am  convinced  that  there  is  not 
a  single  question  pending  between  the  two  countries 
on  which  an  understanding  cannot  be  reached,  pro- 


100       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

vided  we  go  about  it  in  a  courteous  manner  and  a 
sympathetic  frame  of  mind.  My  conversations  with 
the  Japanese  leaders  showed  me  that  they  have  a 
much  clearer  understanding  of  our  difficulties  and 
perplexities  than  I  had  supposed.  It  might  be  well 
for  us  to  remember  that  the  Japanese  Government  is 
itself  in  an  extremely  trying  position,  and  that  its 
leaders  are  extremely  apprehensive  of  the  effect  on 
public  opinion  of  any  settlement  of  the  questions  at 
issue  which  might  be  interpreted  as  an  affront  to 
Japanese  national  dignity  or  racial  pride.  But  of 
this  I  can  assure  you:  Japan  is  genuinely,  almost 
pathetically,  anxious  for  American  confidence  and 
good-will,  and,  in  order  to  obtain  them,  her  responsible 
statesmen  are  prepared  to  make  almost  every  con- 
cession that  self-respect  will  permit  and  that  a  fair- 
minded  American  can  demand. 


PART  II 
KOREA 

1.      THE  PENINSULA  AND   ITS  PEOPLE 


KOREA  is  the  Ireland  of  the  East.  The  more 
I  consider  the  comparison  the  better  I  hke  it, 
for  between  the  two  countries,  one  on  the  eastern 
edge  of  the  Old  World,  the  other  on  the  western,  there 
is  a  most  singular  and  striking  analogy.  Ireland  is 
separated  from  the  nation  which  is  its  suzerain  by 
a  narrow,  landlocked  sea.  So  is  Korea.  Ireland  is 
a  land  of  surpassing  beauty.  So  is  Korea.  The 
Irish  are  an  agricultural  people,  as  are  the  Koreans, 
the  national  industries  of  both  being  connected  with 
the  tilling  of  the  soil.  The  peasantry  of  both  coun- 
tries are  ignorant,  simple,  patient,  industrious,  good- 
natured.  Both  are  prone  to  use  intoxicants  to  excess 
on  occasion.  Both  are  extremely  superstitious,  with 
a  terrified  belief  in  the  existence  of  spirits,  goblins, 
and  demons.  Both  are  desperately  poor,  dwelling  in 
wretched  hovels  amid  filth  and  squalor.  The  Irish  are 
turbulent  and  fond  of  intrigue.  The  same  character- 
istics are  found  in  the  Koreans.  The  histories  of  both 

101 


102       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

nations  are  punctuated  by  invasions,  rebellions,  and 
internecine  wars.  Both  have  been  the  victims  of 
cruelty,  injustice,  and  oppression.  Cromwell's  inva- 
sion of  Ireland  in  1649,  with  its  accompanying  mas- 
sacres and  systematic  devastation,  had  its  counterpart 
in  the  shocking  scenes  which  marked  Hideyoshi's  in- 
vasion of  Korea  in  the  preceding  century.  The  Irish 
have  been  held  in  subjection  by  a  people  of  ahen  race 
and  religion.  The  Koreans  still  are.  Irish  distrust 
and  detestation  of  England  is  equalled  only  by  Ko- 
rean distrust  and  detestation  of  Japan.  Heretofore 
the  Irish  have  failed  to  give  convincing  proof  of  their 
ability  to  maintain  a  just  and  stable  government. 
This  is  likewise  true  of  the  Koreans.  Most  English- 
men are  convinced  that  an  independent  Ireland  would 
prove  a  menace  to  the  safety  of  the  British  Empire. 
Most  Japanese  are  equally  convinced  that  an  inde- 
pendent Korea  would  threaten  the  safety  of  the 
Empire  of  Japan. 

Korea,  or,  to  give  it  its  official  Japanese  name. 
Chosen,  "Land  of  the  Morning  Calm,"  though 
scarcely  larger  than  the  state  of  Kansas,  has  a  popula- 
tion equal  to  that  of  Spain.  Its  immense  importance 
to  Japan  will  be  better  realized  when  I  add  that  it 
comprises  one  third  of  the  total  land  area  of  the 
empire  and  that  its  seventeen  millions  of  inhabitants 
form  one  fourth  of  the  empire's  total  population.  One 
of  the  oldest  nations  in  the  world,  its  early  history 


KOREA  103 

is  lost  in  the  mists  of  antiquity.  But  this  much  we 
know:  it  maintained  its  independence  for  three  thou- 
sand years  and  for  nine  centuries  its  frontiers  never 
changed.  The  ignorance,  insularity  and  intolerance 
of  its  peasantry,  the  degeneracy  and  corruption  of 
its  ruling  classes,  and  its  misfortune  in  lying  between 
two  powerful  and  predatory  empires,  proved  its 
undoing. 

Korea  is  essentially  a  mountain  land.  Rising 
abruptly  from  its  northern  boundary,  like  a  great 
buttressed  wall  striving  to  hold  back  the  flowing  Si- 
berian steppes,  is  a  sinuous  range  of  towering  peaks. 
Running  south  from  this  chain  is  a  lofty  central  range 
which  forms  the  backbone  of  the  country,  its  lateral 
spurs  corrugating  the  entire  surface  of  the  peninsula. 
Ancient  lava  streams  and  craters  of  long-extinct  vol- 
canoes are  constantly  met  with,  the  appearance  of 
the  country  being  strongly  suggestive  of  the  Rand, 
with  all  its  mineralogical  possibilities.  Like  the 
Transvaal,  Korea  is  extremely  rich  in  minerals. 
There  are  nimierous  coal  deposits,  both  anthracite 
and  bitimiinous,  and  the  natives  claim  that  gold  is 
found  in  every  one  of  the  three  hundred  and  sixty-five 
prefectures.  This  is  an  exaggeration,  but  it  is  near 
enough  to  the  truth  to  explain  why  for  centuries 
Korea  has  aroused  the  cupidity  of  her  powerful 
knd  avaricious  neighbors.  Indeed,  I  have  been  as- 
sured by  American  mining  engineers  that  the  penin- 
sula is  as  highly  mineralized  as  Mexico. 


104       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

Sandwiched  between  the  rugged  range  which  forms 
the  spine  of  the  country  and  the  eastern  coast  is  a 
narrow  strip,  fertile  but  comparatively  inaccessible, 
which  slopes  sharply  to  the  Japan  Sea.  But  by  far 
the  greater  part  of  the  arable  land  of  Korea  lies 
on  the  western  side  of  this  watershed;  all  the 
long  and  navigable  rivers  are  there  or  in  the  south; 
almost  all  the  harbors  are  on  the  Yellow  Sea.  Thus 
it  may  be  said  that  Korea  has  her  back  to  Japan 
and  her  face  turned  toward  China,  a  topographical 
circumstance  which  has  had  no  inconsiderable  effect 
on  the  history  of  the  country.  Though  the  moun- 
tains along  the  northern  border  are  densely  wooded 
— ^the  timber  concessions  along  the  Yalu,  it  will  be 
remembered,  were  one  of  the  contributing  causes  of 
the  Russo-Japanese  War, — ^those  to  the  south  are 
so  bare  and  desolate  that  the  Japanese  often  refer 
to  the  peninsula  as  "the  land  of  treeless  mountains." 
One  of  the  causes  of  this  lack  of  timber  may  be  found 
in  the  history  of  Korea,  which  records  that  during 
the  terrible  days  of  the  Hideyoshi  invasion  the  peas- 
ants, fleeing  to  the  mountains  for  their  lives,  were 
forced  to  burn  the  trees  to  keep  from  freezing.  As 
a  result  of  this  widespread  deforestation,  great  areas 
are  to-day  as  bare  as  a  bald  man's  head  or  clothed  only 
with  low,  straggling,  discouraged-looking  vegetation. 
But  the  Japanese  Bureau  of  Forestry  has  displayed 
commendable  foresight  and  energy  in  systematically 
reforesting  the  country,  and  every  year  sees  more 


KOREA  105 

and  more  of  the  bare  brown  slopes  covered  with  young 
trees. 

Though  Korea  possesses  an  extensive  river  sys- 
tem, the  country  consequently  being  well  watered, 
the  streams  are,  with  but  few  exceptions,  too  shal- 
low to  permit  of  navigation.  The  largest  of  the 
rivers,  the  Yalu,  called  by  Koreans,  Am  Nok,  "Green 
Duck,"  from  the  bluish-green  tinge  it  assumes  after 
the  melting  of  the  snow  and  ice  near  its  mountain 
birthplace,  forms  part  of  the  boundary  between  Korea 
and  Manchuria.  It  is  navigable  for  sixty  miles  above 
its  mouth  and  is  much  used  for  rafting  the  timber 
cut  on  its  upper  reaches  down  to  the  Yellow  Sea. 
The  cold  Tumen,  which  rises  in  the  Ever  White  Moun- 
tains and  empties  into  the  Japan  Sea,  is  likewise  a 
frontier  river,  being  bordered  on  the  south  by  Korea 
and  on  the  north  by  Siberia  and  Manchuria.  But, 
though  upwards  of  two  hundred  miles  in  length,  it 
is  of  little  benefit  to  the  Koreans,  for  it  is  frozen 
solid  throughout  the  fierce  Siberian  winter,  and  in 
the  spring,  when  the  snows  melt,  it  becomes  a  raging 
and  almost  unnavigable  torrent.  By  far  the  finest 
of  the  Korean  rivers  is  the  stately  Han,  sometimes 
referred  to,  because  of  the  auriferous  deposits  in  its 
bed,  as  the  River  of  Golden  Sand.  It  has  its  nativity 
in  the  mile-high  fastness  of  Diamond  Mountain, 
near  the  eastern  coast,  swings  south  and  west  across 
the  peninsula  to  Seoul,  where  it  is  nearly  a  thousand 
feet  in  width,  and  forty-five  miles  farther  on  joins  the 


106       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

Yellow  Sea.  It  is  navigable  for  small,  flat-bottomed 
craft  for  nearly  nine  score  miles  above  its  mouth,  and 
up  and  down  its  sinuous  course,  through  gorges  as 
wild  and  imposing  as  those  of  the  Upper  Yangtze, 
go  lumbering  junks  with  towering  sterns  and  huge 
lug-sails  and  great  goggle  eyes  painted  on  their 
bows.  The  Han  flows  through  the  most  fertile 
portion  of  Korea,  the  rich  alluvial  soil,  sometimes 
ten  feet  deep,  being  capable  of  bearing  two  bumper 
crops  a  year  with  little  or  no  enriching.  Considering 
the  remarkable  fertility  of  the  soil,  the  Korean  agri- 
culturist has  not  obtained  the  results  that  might  be 
expected,  though  this  is  due  not  to  any  lack  of  indus- 
try but  rather  to  his  antiquated  methods  and  imple- 
ments, which  are  as  crude  as  those  used  in  the  Egypt 
of  the  Pharaohs.  The  backward  condition  of  agri- 
culture in  the  peninsula  is  being  remedied,  however, 
by  the  Japanese — themselves  the  most  intensive  and 
successful  farmers  in  the  world — ^who  are  establishing 
experiment  stations,  introducing  modern  methods  and 
machinery,  and  displaying  the  same  energy  and  abil- 
ity which  have  made  them  such  formidable  competi- 
tors in  California.  Mark  my  words:  Korea,  under 
Japanese  tutelage,  will  be  one  of  the  most  prosperous 
agricultural  countries  in  the  world  some  day. 

Korea  is  a  land  where  poverty  should  be  unknown, 
for  nature  has  lavishly  endowed  it  with  resources 
and  blessed  it  with  a  superb  climate.  During  nine 
months  of  the  year  the  climate  is  dehghtful — most 


KOREA  107 

nearly  comparable,  perhaps,  to  that  of  northern  Cali- 
fornia. Though  the  three  summer  months  are  char- 
acterized by  heat,  humidity,  and  heavy  rains,  they 
are  quite  supportable,  even  for  foreigners.  Particu- 
larly delightful  are  the  bright,  beautiful,  strangely 
calm  and  perfect  mornings — clear  as  crystal  and  ex- 
hilarating as  dry  champagne — which  give  Chosen  its 
name.  With  such  a  climate,  a  productive  soil,  an 
abundant  rainfall,  with  mountains  rich  in  minerals 
and  coastal  waters  teeming  with  every  variety  of  fish, 
Korea  needs  only  the  security  and  encouragement  of 
a  decent  and  unselfish  government  to  make  it  one  of 
the  most  opulent  countries  in  the  East. 

The  condition  of  any  people  may  be  gaged  with 
considerable  accuracy  by  their  facilities  for  intercom- 
munication. Judged  by  this  standard,  the  Koreans 
must  be  set  down  as  an  extremely  unprogressive  peo- 
ple, for  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the  roads  in  the 
peninsula  are  merely  trails,  so  rough  that  even  the 
ubiquitous  bicyclist  sometimes  has  to  pick  up  his  ma- 
chine and  carry  it  on  his  back  over  the  worst  stretches, 
often  so  narrow  that  laden  bulls  cannot  pass.  The 
constant  shuffling  of  feet  through  untold  centuries 
has  worn  these  narrow  paths  down  below  the  level 
of  the  ground,  so  that  during  the  rains  they  become 
miniature  canals.  Indeed,  during  the  rainy  season, 
when  the  streams  have  become  brawling  torrents  and 
the  flimsy  bridges  have  been  swept  away,  all  traffic 
save  that  by  junk  along  the  rivers  is  perforce  sus- 


108       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

pended.  Towns  of  considerable  size  are  sometimes 
connected  only  by  narrow  foot-paths  running  along 
the  tops  of  the  embankments  between  the  rice-fields. 
Though  the  Japanese  are  steadily  expanding  and 
improving  the  peninsular  highway  system,  it  will  be 
some  years  before  motoring  in  Korea  will  be  practi- 
cable outside  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  larger 
cities  and  still  longer  before  it  will  be  enjoyable. 

The  government-owned  Chosen  Railway,  which 
now  has  close  to  fifteen  hundred  miles  of  line  in  op- 
eration, is  one  of  the  best  built,  best  equipped,  and 
best  run  systems  in  the  Farther  East.  The  main  line, 
which  makes  connections  at  Antung  with  the  South 
Manchuria  Railway,  traverses  the  entire  length  of 
the  peninsula  to  Fusan,  whence  extremely  comfort- 
able steamers  maintain  a  rapid  service  across  the 
Korea  Strait  to  Shimonoseki,  where  the  Japanese 
system  begins.  It  is  approximately  six  hundred  miles 
from  Fusan  to  Antung,  and  the  express  trains  make 
the  journey  in  about  nineteen  hours.  A  first-class 
ticket  costs  in  the  neighborhood  of  $15.00;  the  fare 
for  second-class,  which  is  scarcely  distinguishable 
from  first,  is  $10.00;  while  $5.50  will  pay  for  a  third- 
class  ticket  from  one  end  of  Korea  to  the  other. 
Branches  connect  the  main  line  with  Mok-po,  Kun- 
san,  Jinsen  (Chemulpo),  and  Chinnampo,  the  four 
chief  ports  on  the  Yellow  Sea,  and  with  Gensan,  on 
the  east  coast  of  the  peninsula,  it  being  only  a  matter 
of  time  before  this  latter  line  is  pushed  north  to 


KOREA  109 

Vladivostok.  Most  of  the  equipment  is  American, 
though  the  sleeping  and  dining-cars  were  built  at 
Dairen  or  in  Japan  and  mounted  on  American-made 
trucks.  The  aisles  in  the  day-coaches,  instead  of 
running  down  the  center,  as  in  the  United  States, 
run  down  the  side  of  the  car,  thus  making  the  seats 
almost  twice  as  wide  as  those  in  American  trains. 
The  sleeping-cars  are  divided  into  compartments, 
after  the  European  fashion,  thereby  affording  for- 
eign travelers  a  privacy  which  is  highly  desirable  in 
an  Oriental  country.  The  meals  on  the  dining-cars 
are  well  cooked  and  well  served,  Korea  being  one  of 
the  few  countries  where  the  old  "dollar  dinner"  is  still 
to  be  had.  At  every  station  is  a  large  sign-board  in 
English  and  Japanese,  giving  a  brief  description  of 
the  places  of  historic  and  scenic  interest  in  the  neigh- 
borhood, their  distance  from  the  station,  and  how  to 
reach  them — an  idea  which  might  well  be  adopted  in 
Western  lands. 

When  the  Japanese  adopted  the  standard  four-foot 
eight-inch  gage  for  the  Korean  system  they  assimil- 
ated it  with  the  Chinese  railways,  though  at  the  same 
time  rendering  it  altogether  different  from  their  own 
system  in  Japan,  which  is  still  upon  the  now  inade- 
quate meter  gage.  In  adopting  the  standard  gage 
they  had  in  mind  something  far  more  important,  how- 
ever, than  providing  Korea  with  an  up-to-date  rail- 
way system.  In  shaping  her  Korean  railway  policy 
Japan  had  three  distinct  objectives:  first,  to  facilitate 


110       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

the  rapid  movement  of  troops  and  supplies  into  Si- 
beria, Manchuria,  and  China;  second,  to  place  the 
empire  in  direct  railway  communication  with  Europe 
via  Mukden,  Harbin,  Manchouli,  and  the  Trans- 
Siberian  ;  third,  to  bring  the  South  China  market  for 
Japanese  piece  goods  and  the  mid-China  ore  supply, 
which  is  required  for  the  Japanese  steel  works,  into 
connection  with  Fusan,  whence  it  is  but  a  short  half- 
day's  steam  to  the  great  Japanese  port  of  Shimono- 
seki.  As  a  result  of  the  linking  of  the  Korean  and 
Manchurian  systems,  Japan  is  now  enabled  to  send 
her  manufactured  goods  by  rail  from  Fusan  to 
Peking  and  Hankow,  while  the  impending  comple- 
tion of  the  Hankow-Canton  Railway  will  give  her 
vast  new  markets  for  her  merchandise  among  the 
teeming  millions  of  southern  China.  The  Shantung 
Railway,  which  connects  the  seaport  of  Tsingtau  with 
the  Peking-Shanghai  system,  provides  Japan  with 
still  another  means  of  access  to  the  Chinese  markets — 
a  fact  which  explains  her  reluctance  to  surrender  con- 
trol of  that  much  discussed  and  highly  important 
line.  Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  these  railways  are 
something  more  than  twin  lines  of  steel  laid  down  for 
the  convenience  of  travelers  and  shippers.  They  are 
the  instruments  which  Japan  is  using  to  effect  her 
political  and  commercial  penetration  of  eastern  Asia. 
Barring  the  busy  port  of  Chemulpo,  where  the 
first  shot  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  was  fired  on 
February  8,  1904,  when  the  Japanese  fleet  attacked 


KOREA  111 

the  Russian  cruisers  Variag  and  Korietz;  and  Ping- 
Yang,  the  ancient  and  highly  picturesque  town  which 
was  for  centuries  the  capital  of  Korea,  the  only  city 
in  the  peninsula  of  more  than  passing  interest  to  the 
foreigner  is  the  present  capital,  Seoul  (pronounced 
sowl,  if  you  please),  or,  as  the  Japanese  have  re- 
named it,  Keijo.  Encircled  by  a  crumbling,  crene- 
lated wall,  obviously  modeled  after  the  Great  Wall 
of  China  and  built  a  century  before  Columbus  set 
foot  on  the  beach  of  San  Salvador,  it  stands  on  the 
eastern  bank  of  the  broad,  swift-flowing  Han,  nest- 
ling in  a  bowl-shaped  valley  formed  by  two  semi-cir- 
cular mountain  ranges  whose  bare  brown  peaks  tower 
above  it  in  somber  grandeur.  Arid  and  forbidding  as 
these  mountains  look  in  winter,  summer  finds  them 
clothed  in  vivid  green  relieved  here  and  there  by  great 
splashes  of  heliotrope,  honeysuckle  and  azalea.  In 
springtime  the  budding  orchards  of  cherry,  peach  and 
plum  transform  the  valley  into  a  sea  of  snowy  blos- 
soms. 

Seoul,  with  not  far  from  half  a  million  inhabitants, 
is  the  political,  commercial  and  intellectual  center  of 
Korea.  For  upward  of  eight  centuries  it  was  the 
home  of  the  Korean  sovereigns,  and  few  cities  have 
witnessed  more  cruelty,  bloodshed,  licentiousness  and 
corruption.  It  has  several  picturesque  palaces,  now 
falling  into  decay,  a  small  but  exceptionally  fine  art 
museum,  mediocre  botanical  and  zoological  gardens, 
a  number  of  government  buildings,  erected  by  the 


112       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

Japanese,  which,  though  substantial,  have  small 
architectural  merit,  street-ci..,  electric-light  and  tele- 
phone systems,  and  a  hotel  that  has  only  one  superior 
in  Eastern  Asia.  The  Chosen  Hotel,  which  is  op- 
erated by  the  Korean  Railways,  stands  in  the  walled 
compound  of  an  ancient  temple  amid  a  garden  heavy 
with  the  fragrance  of  many  roses.  At  night,  when 
the  paper  lanterns  on  the  terrace  are  reflected  in  the 
lotos  pools,  and  the  incense  from  the  Temple  of 
Heaven  mingles  with  the  perfume  of  the  flowers,  it 
is  a  place  to  be  marked  with  a  white  mile-stone  on  the 
road  of  memory. 

Seoul  is  a  city  of  magnificent  distances  and  of  re- 
markably wide  streets — several  of  them  are  wider 
than  the  Avenue  du  Bois  in  Paris — ^which  are  in 
curious  contrast  to  the  mean  and  garish  shops  of  tin- 
der-box construction  with  which  they  are  lined.  One 
great  thoroughfare,  the  Chon-no,  or  Big  Bell  Street, 
bisects  the  entire  city,  running  from  the  East  Gate 
to  the  West  Gate  and  far  into  the  country  in  both 
directions.  It  is  not  only  the  principal  artery  of  the 
capital  but  the  "Main  Street"  of  all  Korea,  for  along 
its  dusty  length  flow  placid,  slow-moving  townsmen, 
dignified  despite  their  absurd  topknots  and  strag- 
gling goatees,  their  enormous,  horn-rimmed  goggles 
and  transparent  fly-trap  hats;  short,  squat  women 
with  olive  skins  and  coarse  black  hair  and  figures 
which  look  like  meal  sacks  with  a  string  tied  around 
the  middle,  their  shapeless  garments  of  white  cotton 


CHOSEN 

(KOREA) 

SCALE  OF  MILES 


I     ^K 


C.S.Hammond  &  Co.,N.Y, 


KOREA  113 

concealing  everything  save  their  breasts,  which  are 
brazenly  exposed;  Yang-hans,  as  the  native  officials 
are  known,  loUing  somnolently  in  palanquins  borne 
by  sweating  coolies;  peasants,  fresh  from  the  coun- 
try districts,  leading  strings  of  squeahng,  kicking 
ponies  laden  with  farm  produce  or  bulls  piled  high 
with  the  twigs  which  the  Koreans  use  for  fuel ;  Japa- 
nese officials  in  ill-fitting  European  clothes  and  Japa- 
nese officers  in  red-banded  caps  and  smart  khaki 
uniforms ;  school-boys  with  knapsacks  on  their  backs, 
speeding  by  on  bicycles,  their  baggy  garments  flap- 
ping in  the  breeze;  rickshaws,  drawn  by  half -naked 
cooHes,  skimming  along  on  silent  wheels;  creaking 
carts  hauled  by  lumbering  bullocks;  clanging 
street-cars ;  motors  of  all  makes  and  sizes,  from  lordly 
Rolls-Royces  to  bustling  members  of  the  well  known 
Ford  family  of  Detroit — all  these  combine  to  im- 
part to  the  great  thoroughfare  a  strange  blend  of  the 
medieval  and  the  modern,  of  the  backward  and  the 
progressive,  of  the  Orient  and  the  Occident. 

But  of  all  the  things  I  saw  in  this  most  picturesque 
and  curious  city,  there  were  two  which  struck  me  as 
being  of  peculiar  significance.  One  is  a  deserted  gar- 
den, overgrown  by  shrubbery  and  rank  with  weeds. 
It  is  at  the  back  of  the  North  Palace,  surrounded  by 
a  crumbling  and  discolored  wall.  Here,  in  the  cold 
gray  dawn  of  an  autumn  morning  in  1895,  the  clever 
and  ambitious  queen,  the  most  brilliant  and  the  most 
cruel  Korean  woman  of  her  time,  was  brutally  mur- 


114       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

dered  by  a  band  of  Japanese  and  Korean  assassins.* 
The  other  place  to  which  I  refer  is  a  long,  low,  unpre- 
tentious cottage  in  the  gardens  of  the  East  Palace, 
screened  from  observation  by  shrubbery  and  high 
hedges.  Here,  guarded  by  Japanese  sentries  and 
watched  by  Japanese  spies,  dwells  in  enforced  seclu- 
sion a  pasty-faced,  unhealthy-looking  youth,  who,  ac- 
cording to  popular  report  at  least,  is  little  better  than 
an  imbecile.  He  is  the  dethroned  emperor,  now 
feaiown  as  His  Imperial  Highness  Prince  Yi  Kon,  the 
title  which  the  Japanese  have  bestowed  upon  him,  the 
last  of  that  long  line  of  sovereigns  who  ruled  in 
Korea  for  upward  of  two  thousand  years.  In  the 
palace,  not  a  stone's  throw  distant,  is  a  vast  and  lofty 
room,  its  walls  hung  with  the  richest  of  brocades,  its 
carven  woodwork  embellished  in  all  the  colors  of  the 
chromatic  scale.  On  a  dais  in  the  center  of  this  mag- 
nificent apartment,  flanked  by  the  gorgeous  trappings 
of  royalty  and  cushioned  in  the  imperial  yellow,  is 
an  empty  throne. 


n 

The  first  impressions  of  most  visitors  in  Korea  are 
generally  unfavorable  to  the  Koreans.  This  is  due, 
in  the  first  place,  to  the  disgusting  filth  and  squalor 
amid  which  the  great  mass  of  the  people  live,  which 

*  Though  the  Japanese  Minister,  Viscount  Miura,  appears  to  have 
instigated  this  shocking  crime,  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  he 
acted  without  the  knowledge  of  his  government. 


KOREA  115 

has  led  some  one  to  describe  the  country  as  "a  going 
piggery";  secondly,  to  the  cowed  manner  and  abject 
servility  of  the  average  Korean,  which  reminds  one 
of  a  dog  that  has  been  beaten  and  which  is  probably 
due  to  the  same  cause;  and  lastly,  to  the  grotesque 
and  unbecoming  national  costume.  Every  adult  male 
in  Korea  wears  on  the  top  of  his  otherwise  shaven 
head  what  looks  for  all  the  world  like  a  twist  of  navy 
plug.  This  is  the  topknot,  which  is  as  distinguish- 
ing a  mark  of  the  Korean  as  the  queue  formerly  was 
of  the  Chinese.  But,  whereas  the  queue  was  a  sym- 
bol of  subjugation,  the  topknot  is  the  Korean's  badge 
of  legal  manhood,  and,  until  he  reaches  the  age  when 
he  is  permitted  to  wear  it,  he  is  known  as  "a  half- 
man."  It  is  protected  by  a  transparent  hat  of  woven 
horsehair,  many  sizes  too  small,  held  in  place  by 
broad  black  ribbons  tied  beneath  the  chin,  which  lend 
to  the  wearer's  chubby  face,  with  its  drooping  and  at- 
tenuated mustaches  or  straggling  chin-whisker,  an 
infantile  and  comical  expression.  Should  the  horse- 
hair hat  get  wet,  it  is  ruined,  so,  to  prevent  this,  it 
is  covered  in  inclement  weather  with  a  conical  affair 
of  oiled  paper,  producing  an  effect  as  ludicrous  as 
it  is  bizarre.  The  rest  of  the  costume  consists  of 
a  short,  shapeless  jacket  and  enormously  baggy 
trousers  which  are  confined  at  the  ankles  by  means 
of  strings.  The  garments  of  the  poorer  classes  are 
made  of  a  coarse  white  grasscloth,  woven  by  the  peas- 
ants themselves,  but  the  upper  classes,  when  they  can 


116       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

afford  it,  wear  thin  silks  that  vie  with  Joseph's  coat 
in  their  diversity  of  colors.  In  the  case  of  the  Yang- 
hans — officials  and  men  of  leisure — ^this  curious  en- 
semble is  completed  by  the  addition  of  an  enormous 
pair  of  horn-rimmed  spectacles  and  a  pipe  with  a 
yard-long  stem  and  a  bowl  the  size  of  a  thimble. 
Thus  arrayed,  the  Greek  gods  would  have  looked 
like  circus  clowns. 

The  garb  of  the  Korean  women,  though  less  ludi- 
crous than  that  of  the  men,  is  equally  unattractive: 
an  apology  for  a  zouave  jacket  and  exaggerated 
Turkish  trousers,  the  latter  all  but  concealed,  how- 
ever, by  a  petticoat  as  shapeless  as  a  sheet.  Between 
the  petticoat  and  the  jacket  there  is  a  hiatus  of  bare 
skin,  the  breasts  being  displayed  as  fully  and  un- 
blushingly  as  the  damsels  of  Mr.  Ziegfeld's  chorus 
display  their  legs.  Were  the  Korean  women  less 
faded  and  of  more  youthful  mold  this  daring  decol- 
letage  might  be  more  alluring. 

To  form  a  just  appreciation  of  the  mental  and 
moral  characteristics  of  an  alien  race,  particularly  an 
Oriental  race,  is  a  delicate  and  difficult  matter,  even 
for  those  who  have  spent  years  among  the  people  in 
question,  while  a  casual  observer  like  myself  is  in 
constant  danger  of  indulging  in  hasty  and  inaccurate 
observations  based  on  inadequate  knowledge  and  lim- 
ited opportunities  for  observation.  In  order,  there- 
fore, that  I  may  not  lay  myself  open  to  charges  of 


KOREA  117 

superficiality  or  prejudice,  I  have  drawn  the  mate- 
rials for  the  following  sketch  of  Korean  character 
and  characteristics  from  the  statements  of  Mr.  Homer 
B.  Hurlbert,*  one  of  the  foremost  authorities  on 
Korean  history,  life  and  customs,  and  an  avowed 
friend  of  the  Koreans. 

Let  it  be  emphasized,  in  the  first  place,  that  the 
Korean  is  a  man  of  high  intellectual  possibilities,  his 
present  state  of  moral  and  mental  stagnation  being 
directly  traceable  to  his  unhappy  history,  his  wretched 
condition,  and  his  discouraging  surroundings.  Lift 
him  out  of  this  slough  of  despondency,  set  him  on 
his  feet,  give  him  a  chance  to  develop  independently 
and  naturally,  and  you  would  have  as  good  a  brain 
as  the  Far  East  can  produce.  It  is  the  experience 
of  those  who  have  had  to  do  with  the  various  peoples 
of  the  extreme  Orient  that  it  is  easier  to  understand 
the  Korean  and  to  get  close  to  him  than  it  is  to  under- 
stand either  the  Japanese  or  the  Chinese.  While  the 
Japanese  inclines  toward  the  idealistic,  and  the  Chi- 
nese leans  toward  the  materialistic,  the  temperament 
of  the  Korean  lies  midway  between  the  two,  even  as 
his  country  lies  between  Japan  and  China.  In  other 
words,  he  is  the  most  rational,  judged  by  Western 
standards,  of  all  the  Far  Eastern  races.  I  am  per- 
fectly aware  that  those  who  possess  only  a  superficial 
acquaintance  with  the  Korean,  and  those  others  who, 
actuated  by  political  motives  or  racial  prejudices, 

*See  Mr.  Hurlbert's  "The  Passing  of  Korea." 


118       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

make  it  their  business  to  belittle  and  discredit  him, 
will  jeer  at  this  appreciation;  but  those  who  have 
had  the  opportunity  and  patience  to  go  to  the  bot- 
tom of  the  Korean  character,  and  are  able  to  dis- 
tinguish the  true  Korean  from  some  of  the  caricatures 
which  have  been  drawn  of  him,  will  confirm  the  asser- 
tion that  he  possesses  certain  qualities  which,  were 
they  developed,  would  make  him  a  reputable  member 
of  the  community  of  nations. 

The  Korean  always  looks  toward  yesterday  instead 
of  toward  to-morrow.  He  has  a  proverb^  '^If  you 
try  to  shorten  the  road  by  cutting  'cross  lots  you  will 
fall  in  with  robbers."  In  other  words,  he  believes 
in  staying  in  the  old  ruts  instead  of  making  new  ones. 
What  was  good  enough  for  his  great-great-grand- 
father, he  argues,  is  good  enough  for  him.  Yet  he  can 
be  induced  to  abandon  his  conservatism  by  convinc- 
ing him  that  a  change  would  be  to  his  own  advantage, 
as  is  shown  by  his  enthusiastic  adoption  of  bicycles, 
phonographs,  sewing-machines,  and  other  Western 
innovations. 

Foreigners  are  unfavorably  impressed  by  the  read- 
iness of  the  impecunious  Korean  to  live  on  his  rela- 
tives or  friends,  but  to  a  large  extent  this  is  offset  by 
his  willingness,  when  his  finances  are  in  a  flourishing 
condition,  to  let  his  relatives  and  friends  live  on  him. 
The  moment  a  man  attains  prosperity  he  automati- 
cally becomes  the  social  head  of  his  clan,  and  his  rela- 
tives, no  matter  how  far  removed,  descend  upon  him 


KOREA  119 

in  droves  to  live  indefinitely  upon  his  bounty.  It 
amounts  to  a  sort  of  nepotistic  communism  in  which 
every  successful  man  has  to  divide  his  profits  with 
the  less  prosperous  members  of  his  family,  many  a 
Korean  having  been  impoverished  by  the  heavy  de- 
mands thus  made  upon  him.  It  should  be  added, 
however,  that  this  custom  is  by  no  means  peculiar 
to  the  Koreans,  for  precisely  the  same  practice  pre- 
vails among  the  Filipinos  and,  to  a  certain  extent, 
among  the  Malays. 

Mr.  Hurlbert  seems  to  be  of  the  opinion,  however, 
that  the  average  Korean  rather  welcomes  the  burden 
thus  imposed  upon  him,  for  it  caters  to  his  over- 
whelming egotism  and  pride  and  gives  him  an  excuse 
for  lording  it  over  his  less  fortunate  relatives  and 
friends.  For  the  Korean  is  a  born  social  climber, 
and,  Hke  social  climbers  in  every  country,  any  acces- 
sion of  importance  goes  to  his  head  like  champagne. 
Give  a  Korean  a  position  of  even  minor  responsibility 
and  he  will  swell  up  like  a  toy  balloon.  The  slightest 
social  or  business  promotion  is  prone  to  make  him 
very  offensive,  his  overbearing  manners  and  pro- 
nounced self-esteem  rendering  him  quite  unfitted  for 
employment  in  positions  where  tact  and  courtesy  are 
required.  The  medal  has  another  and  more  pleasing 
side,  however,  for  there  is  the  best  of  evidence  that 
a  large  number  of  Koreans  die  annually  from  starva- 
tion because  they  are  too  proud  to  beg  or  borrow  or 
to  som  upon  their  friends.     In  Seoul  there  is  one 


120       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

whole  quarter  almost  wholly  populated  by  those  on 
whom  Fortune  has  turned  a  cold  shoulder.  It  lies 
under  the  slopes  of  South  Mountain,  and  you  have 
only  to  say  of  a  man  that  he  is  a  "South  Ward  gentle- 
man" to  tell  the  whole  story. 

In  the  matter  of  veracity  the  Korean  measures  well 
up  to  the  best  standards  of  the  Orient,  which  are 
none  too  high  at  best.  Some  people  lie  out  of  pure 
maliciousness;  others  for  the  fun  of  the  thing.  The 
Korean  does  not  belong  in  either  of  these  categories ; 
but  if  he  gets  into  trouble  or  is  faced  by  a  sudden 
emergency,  or  if  the  success  of  some  plan  necessitates 
a  lie,  he  does  not  hesitate  to  take  a  few  liberties  with 
the  truth.  The  difference  between  the  Korean  and 
the  European  is  illustrated  by  their  reactions  if  given 
the  lie  direct.  Before  calling  a  European  a  liar  it 
is  the  part  of  wisdom  to  prepare  for  sudden  emer- 
gencies, whereas  it  is  as  common  for  Koreans  to  use 
the  expression  "You're  a  liar!"  as  it  is  for  an  Ameri- 
can to  remark  "What,  really?"  or  "Is  it  possible?" 
or  "You  don't  say  so!"  As  Mr.  Hurlbert  succinctly 
puts  it,  a  Korean  sees  about  as  much  moral  turpitude 
in  a  lie  as  we  see  in  a  split  infinitive. 

Though  nothing  in  my  own  experience  in  Korea  led 
me  to  believe  that  the  Korean  is  any  more  dishonest 
than  his  Japanese  or  Chinese  neighbors,  I  was  told 
that  he  does  not  hesitate  to  appropriate  anything 
which  excites  his  cupidity  when  he  can  do  so  with 
safety   to   himself.      The    Korean    costume    struck 


KOREA  121 

me  as  affording  a  standing  inducement  to  pocket- 
picking,  the  capacious  sleeves  and  balloon-like  trous- 
ers providing  ideal  places  of  concealment  for  pur- 
loined articles.  Like  all  Orientals,  the  Korean  is  an 
inveterate  gambler,  making  his  appeals  to  Lady  Luck 
through  the  medium  of  dominoes  or  cards,  the  latter 
being  made  of  stiff  oiled  paper,  half  an  inch  wide  and 
eight  inches  long.  There  are  few  harder  or  more 
constant  drinkers  than  the  Korean.  He  is  as  fond 
of  "fire  water"  as  the  red  man  of  the  West  and 
periodically  embarks  on  drunken  and  disorderly 
sprees.  On  these  occasions  he  is  prone  to  display 
unusual  assertiveness,  which  he  manifests  by  forcibly 
abducting  some  neighboring  beauty  or  emphasizing 
his  opinions  by  beating  in  the  head  of  a  friend. 

As  for  morality  in  its  narrower  sense,  the  Koreans 
are  as  easy  as  an  old  shoe.  And  it  would  be  surpris- 
ing if  they  were  otherwise,  for  from  the  dawn  of 
Korea's  history  her  ruling  classes  have  set  an  ex- 
ample of  depravity  and  debauchery  without  parallel 
save  in  ancient  Greece  and  Rome.  Indeed,  the  Greek 
hetaera  has  her  nearest  modern  equivalent  in  the 
Korean  Msang,  or  dancing-girl.  These  "leaves  of 
sunlight,"  a  feature  of  Korean  life,  stand  apart  in 
a  class  of  their  own.  In  the  days  of  Korea's  inde- 
pendence they  were  attached  to  a  department  of  the 
government,  were  controlled  by  a  special  bureau  of 
the  court,  and  were  supported  from  the  national  treas- 
ury.   They  are  trained  from  earliest  childhood  with 


122       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

a  view  to  making  them  brilliant  and  entertaining  com- 
panions, the  one  sign  of  their  profession,  indeed,  be- 
ing their  culture,  intellectual  development,  and  charm. 
Korean  parents,  upon  meeting  with  financial  reverses, 
frequently  dedicate  their  daughters  to  the  career  of 
a  kisang,  just  as,  in  the  days  of  the  empire,  they  ap- 
prenticed their  sons  to  that  of  a  eunuch.  Besides 
these  privileged  and  pampered  playthings  of  the  rich, 
Korea  has  another  and  far  larger  class  of  women  of 
easy  virtue  of  a  lower  and  less  attractive  grade.  But 
this  much  must  be  said  for  the  Koreans:  until  the 
Japanese  came  prostitutes  were  not  recognized  by 
law  or  advertised  by  segregation. 

The  Korean,  as  both  Mr.  Hurlbert  and  Mr.  Philip 
Terry  ^  have  noted,  is  devoid  of  humane  instincts 
where  animals  are  concerned.  If  a  lame  dog  or  a  sick 
cat  is  seen  upon  the  street,  old  and  young  enthusiasti- 
cally join  in  the  sport  of  stoning  it  to  death.  They 
take  particular  delight  in  catching  insects  and  pulling 
off  their  legs  and  wings,  going  into  gales  of  laughter 
at  the  contortions  of  the  tortured  creatures.  Their 
callousness  to  suffering  is  exemplified  in  their  meth- 
ods of  slaughtering  animals  for  food.  In  killing  a 
beef  the  butcher  first  cuts  the  throat  of  the  animal  and 
inserts  a  peg  in  the  opening,  after  which  he  proceeds 
to  beat  the  frenzied  creature  on  the  rump  with  a  heavy 
mallet  until  it  is  dead.    The  process  takes  about  an 

*See  Terry's  "The  Japanese  Empire." 


KOREA  128 

hour  and  the  poor  animal  suffers  agonies  before  death 
intervenes,  but,  as  the  Korean  will  point  out,  very 
little  blood  is  lost  by  this  method,  the  meat  is  full  of  it, 
and  its  greater  weight  consequently  means  more  profit 
for  the  butcher.  Goats  are  killed  by  pulling  them 
to  and  fro  in  a  stream,  thus  destroying  the  rank  taste 
of  the  meat  and  enabling  it  to  be  sold  for  mutton. 
Dogs  are  despatched  by  twirhng  them  in  a  noose 
until  they  are  dead,  after  which  they  are  bled,  dog- 
meat  being  a  common  article  of  food  among  the 
poorer  classes. 

It  would  be  easier  to  overlook  the  Korean's  other 
weaknesses  were  it  not  for  his  incurable  aversion  to 
clearJiness.  Water  he  never  uses  except  with  his 
meals,  and  then  only  when  there  is  nothing  stronger 
to  be  had;  with  soap  he  does  not  possess  so  much  as 
a  nodding  acquaintance.  As  might  be  expected,  there- 
fore, his  voluminous,  dirt-caked  clothing  is  usually 
alive  with  vermin.  His  villages  are  but  one  degree 
removed  from  pig-sties — ^mere  clusters  of  hovels  open- 
ing on  narrow,  refuse-littered  streets  from  whose  open 
drains  assorted  stenches  rise  to  high  heaven.  You 
do  not  have  to  see  a  Korean  village  to  be  made  aware 
of  its  existence,  for  when  the  wind  is  in  the  right  di- 
rection it  is  as  manifest  as  a  fertilizer  plant.  If  the 
filth  and  squalor  amid  which  he  lives  are  distasteful 
to  the  Korean,  he  never  shows  it;  he  is  always  com- 
placent.   One  might  say  of  Korea,  as  Artemas  Ward 


124       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

once  remarked  of  Spain,  that  there  would  be  more 
arable  land  in  the  country  if  the  people  did  not  carry 
so  much  of  it  around  on  their  persons. 

Though  the  upper  class  Koreans  are,  with  few  ex- 
ceptions, slothful,  purposeless,  and  born  dawdlers, 
the  peasants,  when  well  trained  and  competently  su- 
pervised, make  excellent  workmen,  the  success  of 
those  who  have  emigrated  to  Hawaii  testifying  to 
their  willingness  to  work.  American  and  British 
mine  managers  have  told  me  that  the  Korean  miner, 
if  tactfully  handled,  has  no  superior  in  the  world. 
Taking  him  by  and  large,  however,  the  countryman 
and  the  town  dweller,  the  upper  class  and  the  lower, 
the  Korean  can  hardly  be  characterized  as  a  hard 
worker.  The  trouble  is  that  he  is  without  ambition. 
The  thing  he  does  best  is  nothing;  his  clothes  always 
wear  out  first  in  the  seat.  Indeed,  he  might  appro- 
priately adopt  that  favorite  doggerel  of  the  American 
negro,  whom,  in  his  distaste  for  physical  exertion,  he 
so  greatly  resembles: 

Dat's  de  reason  why 
I's  as  happy  as  a  bee, 
Fur  I  don't  trouble  work 
An'  work  don't  trouble  me. 

Yet  there  are  a  fair  number  of  items  to  be  listed 
on  the  credit  side  of  the  ledger.  First  of  all  is  the 
Korean's  good  nature,  for  when  even  passably  well 
treated  he  is  docile  and  easy  to  control.  Secondly 
comes  his  unfailing  hospitality,  both  to  utter  strangers 


KOREA  125 

and,  as  I  have  already  shown,  to  impecunious  rela- 
tives and  friends.  Another  redeeming  trait  is  a  cer- 
tain sturdiness  of  character — perhaps  stubbornness 
would  be  a  better  word — which  has  enabled  him  to 
preserve  his  nationality  under  the  sorest  trials.  The 
want  of  courage  and  self-reliance  so  frequently  com- 
mented on  by  foreigners  are  not,  I  am  convinced, 
the  result  of  constitutional  cowardice,  but  are  prob- 
ably due  to  centuries  of  servitude  and  oppression. 
Koreans  have  fought  well  on  occasion,  the  irregular 
bands  who  have  been  conducting  a  guerilla  warfare 
along  the  Manchurian  border  having  time  and  again 
I  proved  themselves  the  equals  of  the  best  troops  that 
Japan  could  send  against  them,  while  during  the  sup- 
pression of  the  independence  movement  many  of  the 
Korean  prisoners  displayed  a  very  high  order  of 
moral  courage  in  the  face  of  death.  I  doubt,  indeed, 
if  braver  men  are  to  be  found  anywhere  than  the 
tiger-hunters  of  the  hills,  who,  armed  with  antiquated, 
long-barreled,  percussion  muskets,  follow  the  great 
Korean  tiger  into  its  den,  approach  to  within  a  few 
paces,  and  kill  it  with  a  single  shot.  As  there  is  no 
time  to  reload,  the  man  who  misses  dies;  the  tiger 
attends  to  that. 

Now  it  should  be  remembered  that  in  my  estimate 
of  the  Korean  character  I  have  been  speaking  of  the 
average  Korean,  which  means  the  peasant,  for  the 
peasantry  form  the  great  mass  of  the  population. 
But,  though  the  Korean  of  the  old  school  admittedly 


126       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

presents  a  discouraging  problem,  the  country  is  grad- 
ually gaining  a  considerable  class  of  young  men  who 
have  been  educated  abroad  and  who  are  intelligent, 
cultured,  progressive,  and  genuinely  patriotic.  An- 
other encouraging  sign  is  the  growing  demand  among 
all  classes  for  education,  the  number  of  students  reg- 
istered last  year  being  unprecedented  in  the  history 
of  the  country.  The  Koreans  make  excellent  stu- 
dents, displaying  particular  aptness  for  mathematics. 
They  are  quick  of  comprehension,  and  those  who  know 
them  well  assure  me  that  there  is  no  doubt  that  they 
are  the  intellectual  equals  of  the  Japanese.  All  they 
need  is  the  opportunity  and  the  incentive. 

I,  for  one,  can  perfectly  well  understand  how  the 
alert,  energetic,  industrious,  progressive,  aggressive 
Japanese  have  been  exasperated  to  the  limit  of  their 
patience  by  the  ignorance,  slothfulness,  irresolution 
and  squalor  of  this  people  whom  they  have  under- 
taken to  reform.  I  can  understand  why  the  Japanese 
consider  them  and  treat  them  as  inferiors.  Yet  there 
are  traits  of  mind  and  heart  in  the  Korean  which,  if 
developed,  would  prove  an  enormous  asset  to  the  em- 
pire. Make  no  mistake  about  that.  Japan  cannot 
afford  to  permit  the  Koreans,  who  form  one  quarter 
of  her  total  population,  to  be  overrun  and  crushed 
beneath  the  wheels  of  a  selfish  and  short-sighted 
policy  directed  by  a  little  group  of  military  men. 
Were  she  to  do  so  she  would  be  guilty,  in  the  words 
of  Talleyrand,  of  something  worse  than  a  crime — 
a  mistake. 


KOREA  127 

2.      THE  JAPANESE  IN  KOREA 


On  a  sultry  August  afternoon  in  1905,  four  men 
— ^two  burly,  bearded  Russians  and  two  slight, 
suave  Japanese — bending  over  a  table  in  an  unim- 
pressive red  brick  building  within  the  walls  of  the 
Navy  Yard  at  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire, 
scrawled  their  signatures  at  the  bottom  of  a  closely 
written  parchment,  thereby  bringing  to  an  end  the 
stupendous  struggle  between  their  respective  coun- 
tries for  the  mastery  of  the  Farther  East.  But,  in 
thus  concluding  a  peace  between  their  own  great  em- 
pires, the  plenipotentiaries  were  signing  the  death 
warrant  of  a  third  nation,  a  nation  which  had  kept 
its  independence  for  upward  of  two  thousand  years, 
for,  by  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth,  Rus- 
sia recognized  Japan's  "paramount  political,  military, 
and  economical  interests"  in  Korea.  Thus  guaran- 
teed complete  freedom  of  action  in  the  peninsula, 
Japan  proclaimed  a  protectorate  over  the  ancient 
little  kingdom  before  the  ink  on  the  treaty  was  fairly 
dry,  and  Korea  passed  into  the  limbo  of  subject 
nations. 

The  Koreans  and  their  champions  have  never 
ceased  to  denounce  the  methods  employed  by  Japan 
in  the  establishment  of  the  protectorate,  asserting, 
and  probably  with  some  degree  of  truth,  that  the 


128       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

Emperor  of  Korea  and  his  ministers  were  intimi- 
dated into  signing  away  the  independence  of  their 
country.  But,  though  the  methods  which  Japan  em- 
ployed in  effecting  this  step  may  be  open  to  criticism, 
that  the  step  was  imperative  and  inevitable  cannot 
seriously  be  questioned.  Korea's  loss  of  independ- 
ence was  primarily  due  to  her  unfortunate  geograph- 
ical position.  Her  internal  condition,  bad  as  it  was, 
was  only  contributory  in  bringing  about  her  down- 
fall. Glance  at  the  map  and  you  will  see  that  the 
peninsula  of  Korea  is  a  pistol  pointed  straight  at  the 
heart  of  Japan.  As  long  as  that  weapon  remained, 
unloaded,  on  the  table,  Japan  felt  tolerably  secure. 
But  when  she  saw  an  unfriendly  hand  moving  stealth- 
ily to  grasp  it,  she  was  forced  to  take  decisive  action 
in  order  to  insure  her  own  safety.  For  with  nations, 
as  with  individuals,  self-preservation  is  the  first  law 
of  nature. 

In  1894  China,  which  had  long  claimed  a  shadowy 
suzerainty  over  Korea — a  suzerainty  not  recognized 
by  Japan — despatched  a  military  force  to  the  penin- 
sula for  the  ostensible  purpose  of  stabilizing  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  little  kingdom  and  effecting  internal 
reforms.  In  reality  it  was  a  move  to  bring  Korea 
under  the  rule  of  Peking.  China's  curt  refusal  to 
withdraw  her  troops  forced  Japan  to  choose  between 
a  permanent  Chinese  occupation  of  the  peninsula 
and  war.  She  chose  the  latter  and,  by  a  series  of 
continuous  and  easy  victories,  quickly  won  an  over- 


o 

O 
o 

:^ 

«: 

^^ 

< 
< 

PU 

« 
O 


t"l\ 


The  catafalque 


The   white  garments  are  a   sign  of  mourning  for  the  emperor.      The  pointed  head- 
coverings  are  of  oiled  paper,  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  hat  from   the  rain 

FUNERAL  OF  THE  EX-EMPEROR  OF  KOREA 


KOREA  129 

whelming  triumph.  By  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of 
peace  China  abandoned  her  pretensions  to  the  suze- 
rainty of  Korea,  which  remained,  in  theory  at  least, 
an  independent  kingdom.  This  was  Japan's  first 
modern  war  and  it  was  fought  to  keep  China  from 
obtaining  possession  of  the  Korean  pistol. 

Scarcely  was  Japan  rid  of  the  Chinese  menace, 
however,  than  another  and  far  more  formidable 
enemy  reached  down  from  the  north  to  snatch  the 
weapon  so  temptingly  displayed.  In  1903  the  Em- 
peror of  Korea  granted  permission  to  a  Russian 
lumber  company  to  fell  timber  on  the  Korean  side 
of  the  Yalu  River.  This  seemingly  innocent  com- 
mercial concession  provided  the  land-hungry  Musco- 
vites with  a  pretext  for  demanding  the  cession  of  a 
Korean  harbor — Yongampo — on  the  Yellow  Sea. 
The  Bear  was  coming  down  to  the  Warm  Water. 
Fully  awake  to  her  peril,  Japan  promptly  and  vigor- 
ously protested  against  this  aggression,  insisting  that 
Russia  should  keep  out  of  Korea  and  demanding  that 
her  own  special  interests  in  the  peninsula  should  be 
recognized.  Russia,  made  over-confident  by  her  huge 
army  and  enormous  resources,  contemptuously  re- 
fused. Thus  Japan  found  herself  confronted  by  the 
same  problem  with  the  Muscovite  that  she  had  fought 
out  with  the  Celestial  a  decade  before.  The  announce- 
ment of  her  decision  came  with  paralyzing  sudden- 
ness in  the  dimness  of  a  February  dawn  in  1904, 
when  she  launched  a  torpedo  attack  against  the  Rus- 


180       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

sian  squadron  lying  under  the  guns  of  Port  Arthur. 
The  struggle  that  followed  cost  the  island  empire 
135,000  lives  and  eight  hundred  million  dollars,  but 
in  eighteen  months  the  men  from  the  little  islands, 
who  in  their  youth  had  worn  skirts  and  carried  painted 
fans  and  drunk  their  tea  from  eggshell  cups  the  size 
of  thimbles,  whipped  to  a  standstill  the  Colossus  of 
the  North. 

Having  thus  waged  two  wars  on  account  of  Korea, 
Japan  emerged  from  the  second  conflict  fully  con- 
vinced that  her  national  security  depended  upon  her 
preventing  the  peninsula  from  again  falling  under 
the  dominance  of  a  third  power.  Nor  could  she  per- 
mit the  little  kingdom  to  drift  into  a  condition  of 
such  internal  chaos  as  to  imperil  foreign  interests 
and  thereby  provide  an  excuse  for  foreign  interfer- 
ence. There  seemed  only  one  way  for  Japan  to  dis- 
pel for  good  and  all  the  threatening  cloud  which  had 
so  long  overshadowed  her:  she  must  herself  assume 
supervision  of  Korea's  affairs.  Instead  of  permitting 
the  pistol  to  remain  upon  the  table,  a  standing  invita- 
tion to  her  enemies,  she  decided  to  take  charge  of  it 
herself.    It  was  a  case  of  "safety  first." 

The  establishment  of  the  protectorate  placed 
Korea  in  much  the  same  relation  to  Japan  that  Egypt 
bore  to  England  when  the  latter  intervened  in  the 
Nile  country  in  1882.  There  is,  indeed,  a  striking 
analogy  between  the  two  cases.  Egypt,  its  peas- 
antry cruelly  oppressed  and  exploited  by  a  corrupt 


KOREA  131 

and  vicious  government,  occupied  a  position  of  im- 
mense strategic  importance  astride  the  Suez  Canal, 
the  gateway  to  England's  eastern  possessions.  Korea, 
with  an  equally  wretched  population  and  an  even 
worse  government,  by  virtue  of  her  commanding  posi- 
tion on  the  Straits  of  Korea  lay  squarely  athwart 
Japan's  road  to  her  sphere  of  influence  in  Manchuria. 
Japan  could  no  more  take  the  risk  of  another  power 
gaining  a  foothold  in  Korea  and  thereby  threatening 
her  causeway  to  the  Asian  mainland  than  England 
could  take  the  risk  of  another  power  gaining  a  foot- 
hold in  Egypt  and  threatening  her  sea-road  to 
India.  England  intervened  in  Egypt  in  order  to 
avert  foreign  complications  by  reforming  its  gov- 
ernment and  ameliorating  the  condition  of  its  peo- 
ple. Japan  intervened  in  Korea  for  precisely  the 
same  reasons.  England  sent  to  Egypt  as  proconsul 
her  greatest  administrator,  Evelyn  Baring,  later  Lord 
Cromer.  Japan  sent  to  Korea  her  greatest  adminis- 
trator, Marquis  I  to.  Each  was  confronted  by  the 
same  problem :  to  reform  a  government  rotten  to  the 
core  and  to  ejffect  the  regeneration  of  a  people  re- 
duced to  the  lowest  depths  of  misery  and  degrada- 
tion by  centuries  of  spoliation  and  oppression.  Had 
Ito  not  fallen  by  the  bullet  of  a  Korean  assassin  at  the 
moment  when  the  patient,  tactful,  sympathetic  ad- 
ministration which  he  had  estabhshed  was  beginning 
to  show  results,  there  is  little  doubt  that  he  would 
have  met  with  as  astonishing  success  in  rehabilitating 


182       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

the  "Land  of  the  Morning  Calm"  as  Cromer  did  in 
the  "Land  of  the  VaUey  of  the  Nile." 

When  the  Japanese  undertook  the  task  of  regen- 
erating Korea  there  were  but  two  classes  in  that 
unhappy  country — the  spoilers  and  the  spoiled.  Ex- 
tortion, bribery,  and  peculation  were  the  rule  in  every 
branch  of  the  government  and  in  every  grade ;  every 
position  was  for  sale  to  the  highest  bidder.  The  peas- 
antry had  neither  rights  nor  privileges,  save  that  of 
being  the  ultimate  sponge.  The  court  at  Seoul  was 
permeated  with  treachery  and  intrigue.  Foreigners 
found,  as  the  natives  had  long  known,  that  no  man's 
life  or  property  was  safe  from  the  rapacity  of  the 
court  party  and  its  henchmen.  Political  assassina- 
tions were  so  common  as  scarcely  to  provoke  com- 
ment. Never,  perhaps,  has  there  existed  a  weaker 
government,  one  more  degraded  and  corrupt,  one 
more  utterly  incapable  of  governing.  No  govern- 
ment more  richly  deserved  its  fate. 

In  June,  1907,  the  weak,  intrigue-loving  old  em- 
peror, notwithstanding  his  agreement  not  to  engage 
in  any  act  of  an  international  character  except 
through  the  medium  of  Japan,  secretly  despatched 
three  emissaries  to  The  Hague,  where  the  Second 
Peace  Conference  was  sitting,  in  an  attempt  to  bring 
about  foreign  intervention.  In  order  to  save  their 
country  from  the  consequences  of  the  emperor's  in- 
discretion, which  the  Japanese  regarded  as  treach- 
ery, the  Korean  cabinet,  composed,  for  a  wonder,  of 


KOREA  188 

patriotic  and  far-seeing  men,  virtually  insisted  on 
the  sovereign's  abdication.  He  was  succeeded  by 
the  crown  prince,  a  youth  who,  if  popular  report  is 
to  be  believed,  has  been  mentally  incompetent  from 
birth,  but  his  tenure  of  the  puppetship  was  destined 
to  be  of  brief  duration. 

Meanwhile,  political  conditions  in  Seoul  were  go- 
ing from  bad  to  worse.  Plot  and  counterplot  fol- 
lowed each  other  in  rapid  succession.  To  avert  an- 
archy, the  Japanese  put  down  these  conspiracies  with 
an  iron  hand.  And  to  protect  the  peasantry,  who 
were  powerless  to  protect  themselves,  they  suppressed 
extortion  and  oppression  with  equal  firmness.  The 
firm  attitude  of  the  government  so  alarmed  and  in- 
furiated the  corruptionists  and  conspirators  that  they 
had  recourse  to  the  Korean's  traditional  method  of 
political  retaliation — assassination.  This  campaign 
of  terrorism,  which  culminated  in  the  brutal  murder 
of  Prince  Ito,  Korea's  staunchest  friend,  only  served 
to  hasten  the  end,  which  came  on  the  twenty-second 
of  August,  1910,  when  Korea  was  formally  annexed 
to  the  Empire  of  Japan. 

The  imperial  rescript  proclaiming  the  annexation 
was  th^  signal  for  the  systematic  Japahization  of 
Korea  to  begin.  And  it  was  begun  with  all  the 
method  and  thoroughness  so  characteristic  of  the  peo- 
ple of  Nippon.  The  conciliatory  policy  of  Prince 
Ito  gave  way  to  a  Bismarckian  policy  of  blood  and 
iron.    Those  who  now  shaped  Japan's  Korean  policy 


184       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

were  not  content  to  work  toward  a  genuine  amalga- 
mation of  the  Koreans  with  the  Japanese  by  a  proc- 
ess of  education  and  conciliation.  They  insisted  on 
forcible  denationalization.  Instead  of  being  far- 
sighted  enough  to  grant  the  Koreans  the  large  meas- 
ure of  autonomy  which  we  have  given  to  the  Filipinos 
and  the  Porto  Ricans,  which  England  has  given  to 
the  Boers  and  the  Egyptians,  they  made  the  mistake 
of  attempting  to  extirpate  the  language  and  the  lit- 
erature of  the  Koreans,  to  destroy  their  national 
ideals,  to  root  out  their  ancient  manners  and  customs. 
In  short,  they  tried  to  mold  these  new  subjects  over 
again,  mistakenly  believing  that,  were  sufficient  pres- 
sure applied,  they  would  emerge  from  the  process  as 
Japanese,  though  I  imagine  that  it  was  never  intended 
that  they  should  be  anything  except  an  inferior  grade 
of  Japanese,  subject  to  restrictions  and  disabilities 
from  which  the  islanders  themselves  were  immune.  I 
may  be  doing  those  who  were  responsible  for  this 
policy  a  grave  injustice,  but,  judging  their  aims  by 
their  actions,  I  am  tempted  to  believe  that  they 
dreamed  of  eventually  bringing  the  Koreans  to  a 
status  not  far  removed  from  that  of  the  American 
negro,  thereby  giving  to  the  empire  seventeen  millions 
of  patient,  uncomplaining,  and  submissive  subjects, 
hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water,  who  would  ac- 
cept without  remonstrance  the  role  of  social,  political, 
and  economic  inferiority  assigned  to  them.  In  adopt- 
ing this  policy  they  committed  the  first  of  the  series 


KOREA  135 

of  psychological  and  political  blunders  which  have 
caused  such  grave  criticism  of  Japanese  rule  in  Korea 
and  which  have  provided  the  enemies  of  Japan  with 
so  much  ammunition.  Mind  you,  I  am  not  suggesting 
that  progressive  Japanese  opinion  approved  of  this 
policy,  for  it  did  not.  The  Korean  program  repre- 
sented the  views  of  the  mihtary  party  alone.  Indeed, 
there  was  a  considerable  element  in  Japan  which  dis- 
approved of  the  annexation  altogether,  holding  that 
a  resentful  and  rebellious  Korea,  annexed  against  her 
will,  standing  at  Japan's  door,  would  prove  a  source 
of  weakness  rather  than  of  strength  to  the  empire. 

Korea  was  now  an  integral  part  of  the  Japanese 
Empire.  But  though  the  instrument  which  brought 
the  two  peoples  together  specifically  and  by  implica- 
tion provides  that  Koreans  shall  share  in  the  public 
affairs  of  Japan,  the  Japanese  proceeded  to  treat 
Korea  as  a  conquered  nation.  It  was  at  once  placed 
under  military  rule,  General  Count  Terauchi,  a  grim 
soldier  of  the  old  samurai  school,  being  appointed 
resident-general  and  clothed  with  almost  sovereign 
powers.  Soldiery,  gendarmerie,  and  police  were 
poured  into  the  new  province  until  it  assumed  the 
appearance  of  a  great  armed  camp.  Then,  with  the 
stage  set,  the  curtain  rose  on  the  tragic  spectacle  of 
the  denationalization  of  a  people. 


186       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 


II 

What  I  now  have  to  say  cannot  but  prove  distaste- 
ful reading  for  the  Japanese  and  their  friends.  Yet 
to  minimize,  or  apologize  for,  or  ignore  the  deplorable 
blunders  which  marred  Japan's  administrative  record 
in  Korea  during  the  decade  immediately  following 
the  annexation,  as  certain  American  champions  of 
Japan  have  done,  would  only  impair  the  value  of 
this  book  in  the  eyes  of  thoughtful  and  impartially- 
minded  men,  without  rendering  any  corresponding 
service  either  to  the  Japanese  or  the  Koreans.  Were 
I  to  attempt  to  make  the  picture  more  flattering  to 
Japanese  pride  by  leaving  out  the  blemishes,  I  should 
be  failing  in  that  duty  which  every  self-respecting 
author  owes  to  his  readers  and  to  himself.  On  the 
other  hand,  I  shall  not  permit  myself  to  be  influenced 
by  the  usually  exaggerated  and  frequently  untruthful 
charges  made  against  the  Japanese  administration 
by  the  Koreans  and  their  champions.  I  believe  that 
every  statement  contained  in  the  succeeding  pages 
can  be  fully  substantiated,  in  many  cases  by  the 
"Annual  Report"  of  the  Government-General  of 
Korea  itself. 

One  of  the  first  steps  taken  by  the  Japanese  in 
their  organized  campaign  of  denationalization  was 
the  enactment  of  legislation  denying  freedom  of  the 
press,  of  speech,  and  of  assembly  to  the  Koreans.    In 


KOREA  137 

pursuance  of  this  policy  all  the  papers  and  periodi- 
cals owned  or  managed  by  Koreans  were  suppressed. 
**At  the  end  of  the  fiscal  year  1916  there  were  twenty 
newspapers  published  in  Chosen,  of  which  eighteen 
were  in  Japanese,  one  in  Korean,  and  one  in  Eng- 
lish," says  the  "Annual  Report,"  which  might  have 
added  that  they  were  all  Japanese,  and  that  three  of 
them,  including  the  last  two,  were  government  organs. 
During  the  reign  of  repression  the  only  non- Japanese 
publications  in  Korea  were  certain  newspapers 
printed  secretly,  while  their  publishers  were  "on  the 
run,"  and  distributed  from  hand  to  hand,  like  the 
famous  Belgian  journals  issued  during  the  German 
occupation.  The  hand-presses  and  type  were  con- 
veyed from  hiduig-place  to  hiding-place  under  cover 
of  night,  the  lives  of  the  editors  being  as  thrilhng  as 
the  Japanese  police  and  spies  could  make  them. 

It  having  been  determined  that  the  Korean  lan- 
guage, like  Korean  literature,  should  die,  an  attempt 
was  made  to  destroy  it  by  making  Japanese  the  offi- 
cial tongue  not  only  in  public  documents  and  court 
proceedings,  but  wherever  possible  in  the  schools. 
It  is  instructive  to  compare  this  with  our  own  policy 
in  the  Philippines,  where  Spanish  is  taught  as  freely 
and  as  widely  as  English.  The  text-books  used  in 
the  schools  were  printed  in  Japanese  under  the  super- 
vision of  Japanese  censors;  the  teachers  were  either 
Japanese  or  Japanese-speaking  Koreans.  And,  as 
though  to  impress  the  children  with  the  military  might 


138       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

of  Japan,  the  teachers  wore  sabers.  Imagine  the 
effect  on  a  class  of  little  girls  when  their  teacher  em- 
phasized his  authority  by  rattling  his  sword  I 

Though  Korea  has  a  history  reaching  back  into 
the  past  for  two  thousand  years,  its  teaching  in  the 
schools  was  forbidden.  Nor,  with  the  exception  of 
certain  specially  favored  individuals,  were  Koreans 
permitted  to  go  abroad  for  study,  except  to  Japan, 
and  those  who  had  been  studying  abroad  were 
not  permitted  to  return.  Moreover,  those  who  suc- 
ceeded in  obtaining  permission  to  attend  the  Imperial 
University  at  Tokyo  were  discouraged,  if  not  actually 
forbidden,  from  specializing  in  such  subjects  as  law, 
constitutional  government,  history,  or  economics,  it 
being  the  Japanese  policy  to  encourage  industrial 
education  along  practical  lines  for  their  new  subjects 
to  the  exclusion  of  everything  else.  The  Japanese 
have  always  held  that  England,  by  encouraging  a 
purely  academic  education  for  the  higher  class  Hindus 
in  India,  was  breeding  discontent  and  agitation,  and 
they  had  no  intention  of  trying  a  similar  experiment 
in  Korea. 

"The  holding  of  public  meetings  in  connection  with 
political  affairs,  or  the  gathering  of  crowds  out  of 
doors,  was  also  prohibited,  except  open-air  religious 
gatherings  or  school  excursion  parties,  permission  for 
which  might  be  obtained  of  the  police  authorities." 
Thus  reads  a  passage  in  the  "Annual  Report,"  which 
further  states  that  "most  of  the  political  associations 


KOREA  139 

and  similar  bodies  were  ordered  to  dissolve  themselves 
at  the  time  of  annexation.  .  .  .  Since  then  there  has 
been  no  political  party  or  association,  as  such,  among 
the  Koreans."  This  regulation  was  even  more  com- 
prehensive than  its  wording  would  suggest.  For  ex- 
ample, a  Y.  M.  C.  A.  had  to  submit  to  the  police  the 
date,  hour,  speaker,  and  topic  of  discussion  of  a  pro- 
posed meeting  before  it  could  obtain  permission  to 
hold  it;  the  same  prohibitive  principle  applied  to 
interscholastic  field-meets  in  which  two  or  more 
schools  proposed  to  participate. 

Another  source  of  Korean  resentment  was  provided 
by  the  Japanese  attitude  toward  religion.  Broadly 
speaking,  religious  instruction  was  forbidden  in  Ko- 
rean schools.  Religious  gatherings  of  more  than  five 
persons  were  required  to  obtain  a  permit  from  the 
police  and  native  Christians  had  to  obtain  special 
authorization  to  hold  religious  services.  This  interfer- 
ence with  religious  liberty  was,  in  itself,  the  height 
of  political  unwisdom,  but  the  over-zealous  police, 
by  their  harsh  and  unintelligent  methods  of  enforce- 
ment, turned  it  into  something  perilously  close  to  re- 
ligious persecution.  For  example,  such  hymns  as 
"Onward,  Christian  Soldiers"  were  forbidden  on  the 
ground  that  they  tended  to  develop  a  militaristic 
spirit  among  the  Koreans — an  inhibition  only  equaled 
in  recent  times,  in  its  patent  absurdity,  by  Abdul 
Hamid's  famous  dictum  against  the  importation  into 
Turkey  of  dynamos  "because  they  sound  too  much 


140       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

like  dynamite!"  Prominent  churchmen,  leaders  in 
Korean  thought  and  education,  were  arrested  and 
sometimes  thrown  into  prison  on  charges  so  ridiculous 
that  they  sounded  more  like  a  passage  from  a  Gilbert 
and  Sullivan  opera  than  a  serious  court  proceeding. 
For  example,  the  pastor  of  one  of  the  native  churches 
was  arrested  for  having  referred  in  his  sermon  to  the 
Kingdom  of  Heaven.  He  was  freed  with  an  admoni- 
tion not  to  repeat  the  offense,  the  police  magistrate 
warning  him  that  the  only  kingdom  in  which  the 
Koreans  should  display  an  interest  was  the  King- 
dom of  Japan!  Mr.  C.  W.  Kendall,  in  "The  Truth 
About  Korea,"  cites  the  case  of  Pastor  Kil  of  Ping- 
Yang,  who,  for  preaching  against  the  evils  of  cigar- 
ette-smoking by  boys,  was  charged  by  the  Japanese 
authorities  with  treason.  The  argument  of  the  Jap- 
anese prosecutor,  according  to  Mr.  Kendall,  ran 
something  after  this  fashion: 

Pastor  Kil  preached  against  the  use  of  cigarettes. 

The  manufacture  of  cigarettes  is  a  government  monopoly. 

To  speak  against  their  use  is  to  injure  a  government  in- 
stitution. 

To  injure  a  government  institution  is  to  work  against  the 
government. 

To  work  against  the  government  is  treason. 

Ergo,  Pastor  Kil  is  guilty  of  treason. 

Though  upon  annexation  Korea  became,  in  theory 
at  least,  a  province  of  the  empire,  the  Koreans  were 
permitted  neither  a  national  assembly  nor  representa- 
tion in  the  Japanese  Diet,  thus  giving  them  justifica- 


KOREA  141 

tion  for  adopting  the  slogan,  "Taxation  without  rep- 
resentation is  tyranny."  Had  the  Japanese  been  more 
familiar  with  American  history  they  would  have  real- 
ized that  the  same  slogan  cost  England  her  American 
colonies.  Though  in  principle  the  Koreans  were  to  be 
accorded  the  same  treatment  as  other  subjects  of  the 
emperor,  discrimination  of  the  most  flagrant  character 
was  practised  against  them  everywhere.  Koreans  and 
Japanese  were  subject  to  two  entirely  different  codes 
of  legal  procedure.  The  codes  applying  to  Koreans 
were  severer,  on  the  assumption  that  they  needed 
heavier  penalties  to  bring  about  a  desired  result. 
For  example,  corporal  punishment  could  be  legally 
administered  only  to  Koreans.  Hence,  if  a  Japa- 
nese was  convicted  of  a  misdemeanor,  he  was  im- 
prisoned or  fined.  If  a  Korean  was  convicted  of 
the  same  offense,  he  was  flogged — sometimes  into 
insensibility.  If  a  Japanese  was  killed  by  the  Seoul 
street-railways,  his  family  was  paid  two  hundred  yen. 
If  the  victim  was  a  Korean,  the  indemnity  was  half 
that  sum.  A  Japanese  common  laborer  received 
over  half  again  as  much  pay  as  a  Korean  laborer 
engaged  in  the  same  task,  and  the  same  rule  applied 
to  skilled  workmen  and,  for  that  matter,  to  govern- 
ment officials.  While  eleven  years  are  allotted  to 
Japanese  youths  for  primary  and  secondary  edu- 
cation, only  eight  years  were  allowed  the  Koreans. 
It  has  been  suggested,  incidentally,  that  this  discrim- 
ination in  the  curricula  was  the  highest  imintentional 


142       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

compliment  the  Japanese  could  pay  the  exceptional 
intellectual  ability  of  the  sons  and  daughters  of 
Korea. 

Even  more  humiliating  and  degrading  were  the 
various  forms  of  social  discrimination  practised 
against  the  Koreans.  As  staunch  a  defender  of 
Japan's  policy  in  Korea  as  Dr.  George  Gleason  ad- 
mits this  in  his  book,  "What  Shall  I  Think  of  Japan?" 
"Nearly  all  Japanese  assume  an  air  of  superiority 
toward  the  Koreans,"  he  says.  I  can  assert  from  per- 
sonal observation  that  the  great  majority  of  Japanese 
treat  the  Koreans  in  personal  intercourse  as  the  dirt 
beneath  their  feet.  A  Japanese  always  takes  his 
place,  as  by  right,  at  the  head  of  a  waiting  line  at  a 
post-office,  bank,  or  railway- station.  The  Japanese 
coolie  kicks  or  punches  the  Korean  who  chances  to 
stand  in  his  way.  The  Japanese  petty  functionaries 
assume  an  air  of  hauteur  and  disdain  in  their  deal- 
ings with  the  Koreans.  Even  the  Korean  nobles 
and  princes  of  the  royal  house  are  treated  with  studied 
condescension.  It  is  only  fair  to  add,  however,  that 
this  disregard  of  Korean  susceptibilities  is  confined 
in  the  main  to  Japanese  of  the  lower  and  middle 
classes.    Every  nation  has  its  gentlemen. 

Immediately  upon  annexation  the  peninsula  was 
flooded  with  gendarmes,  police,  spies,  and  informers, 
who  promptly  proceeded  to  inaugurate  a  reign  of  ter- 
rorism. On  the  pretext  of  searching  for  arms  or  se- 
ditious hterature  the  police  entered  private  residences 


KOREA  148 

without  search-warrants,  still  further  irritating  the 
Koreans  by  invading  the  apartments  of  the  women. 
Spies,  usually  low-class  Koreans,  were  everywhere, 
adding  to  the  general  demoralization.  No  one  knew 
when,  or  in  what  form,  the  most  harmless  acts  or 
words  might  be  reported  to  the  authorities.  Yet  the 
Koreans  had  no  appeal  from  these  oppressions,  be- 
cause, with  no  newspapers,  they  had  no  way  of  mak- 
ing themselves  heard. 

"In  the  peninsula,"  tc  quote  again  from  the  official 
"Annual  Report,"  "miiior  offenses  relating  to  gam- 
bling, bodily  harm,  etc.,  or  to  a  violation  of  administra- 
tive ordinances,  which  would  ordinarily  come  under 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  lowest  courts,  are  adjudicated 
by  the  police,  instead  of  by  ordinary  judicial  pro- 
cedure." Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  the  police,  in  addi- 
tion to  their  regular  functions  of  crime  prevention 
and  the  apprehension  of  criminals,  were  given  judi- 
cial power.  They  could  sentence  prisoners  to  fines, 
flogging,  imprisonment,  or  exile.  The  extreme  un- 
wisdom of  granting  such  wide  powers  to  the  police, 
who  were  totally  incompetent  to  exercise  them  with 
discretion  and  who,  to  make  matters  worse,  were  for 
the  most  part  men  of  petty  minds  and  narrow  sym- 
pathies, requires  no  comment.  Add  to  this  the  fact, 
of  which  there  exists  indubitable  proof,  that  the  police 
frequently  tortured  innocent  persons  in  order  to  ex- 
tract testimony  from  them,  and  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  Koreans  had  abundant  ground  for  complaint. 


144       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

That  the  police  had  gendarmes  and  soldiers  asso- 
ciated with  them  in  the  enforcement  of  the  law  led 
the  Koreans  to  regard  the  police  not  as  civil  servants 
and  protectors,  but  as  oppressors.  This  feeling  was 
intensified  by  the  multitude  of  petty  and  vexatious 
regulations,  many  of  which  the  people  could  not 
understand,  and  by  the  harsh  and  indiscriminate  man- 
ner in  which  they  were  administered.  The  records  of 
the  summary  courts — which  correspond  to  our  pohce 
courts — for  1915  show  a  total  of  59,483  persons 
brought  to  trial  and  only  seven  acquitted.  Dr.  Glea- 
son,  who  is  strongly  pro-Japanese  in  his  sympathies, 
asserts  that  in  the  four  years,  1913-16,  221,000  per- 
sons were  tried  and  only  496  acquitted.  In  the  re- 
port issued  by  the  government-general  for  the  year 
1916-17  it  is  stated  that  out  of  82,121  offenders  dealt 
with  "in  police  summary  judgment,"  81,139  were  sen- 
tenced, 952  were  pardoned,  and  only  30  were  able 
to  prove  their  innocence.  Dr.  Hugh  C.  Cynn,  in  his 
dispassionate  and,  on  the  whole,  remarkably  just 
book,  "The  Rebirth  of  Korea,"  dryly  remarks  that 
"either  the  Japanese  police  in  Korea  are  so  superior 
to  those  of  all  other  nations  in  detecting  crime  that 
they  almost  never  run  down  any  but  the  actual  crim- 
inals, or  the  Koreans,  when  they  get  into  the  meshes 
of  the  police  and  gendarme-interpreted  ordinances, 
find  it  next  to  impossible  to  prove  their  innocence." 

Instead  of  putting  Korean  interests  first,  Japan 
made  the  mistake  of  ruling  the  peninsula  primarily 


KOREA  145 

for  her  own  giory  and  the  benefit  of  her  own  people. 
The  Japanese  settler,  the  Japanese  trader,  the  Japa- 
nese concessionaire,  were  the  men  whose  needs  the 
government-general  at  Seoul  studied  and  whose  de- 
mands it  heeded.  The  Koreans,  without  influence  and 
without  protection  and  hampered  by  serious  political 
disabilities  and  restrictions,  could  be  exploited  with 
impunity,  provided  the  methods  used  were  not  too 
outrageous.  Under  the  old  Korean  Government  the 
land  was  divided  into  four  classes:^ 

1.  Private  lands,  owned  by  individuals. 

2.  Crown  lands,  belonging  to  the  emperor  but 
leased  in  perpetuity  to  private  individuals. 

3.  Municipal  lands,  the  titles  to  which  were  vested 
in  the  various  municipalities,  but  the  practical  owner- 
ship of  which  was  in  the  hands  of  private  individuals. 

4.  Lands  belonging  to  the  Buddhist  temples. 

Owners  of  private  lands  paid  taxes  to  the  govern- 
ment. Tenants  of  crown  lands  paid  rental  to  the 
royal  household.  Those  occupying  municipal  lands 
paid  fees  to  the  respective  municipalities.  The  tem- 
ple lands,  which  were  held  under  a  communistic  ar- 
rangement by  the  Buddhists,  were  exempt  from  taxa- 
tion. In  many  cases  the  leasehold  of  these  lands  had 
acquired  a  value  almost  equal  to  that  of  land  held 
in  full  possession.  One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  Japa- 
nese administration  was  to  survey  the  country  and 
expropriate  all  crown,  municipal,  and  temple  lands, 

» "The  Truth  About  Korea,"  by  C.  W.  KendaU. 


146       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

on  the  ground  that,  as  they  did  not  belong  to  private 
individuals,  they  must  be  the  property  of  the  govern- 
ment. They  were  then  turned  over  to  a  concern 
known  as  the  Oriental  Development  Company,  which 
was  a  government- fostered  organization  for  encourag- 
ing the  immigration  of  Japanese  into  Korea.  This 
company,  by  demanding  greatly  increased  rentals 
from  the  Korean  tenants,  forced  them  to  abandon  the 
lands  which  they  had  tilled  for  generations  in  favor 
of  government-assisted  Japanese  settlers.  The  eco- 
nomic unwisdom  of  this  policy  is  shown  by  the  fact 
that,  though  some  400,000  Japanese  have  settled  in 
the  peninsula  since  the  annexation,  upward  of  1,500,- 
000  Koreans  have  gone  into  voluntary  exile  in  Man- 
churia and  Siberia  because  they  could  not  stand  the 
pressure  thus  brought  to  bear  upon  them.  The  re- 
peated assertions  of  the  Japanese  that  they  went  into 
Korea  for  the  benefit  of  the  Koreans  reminds  me  of 
an  anecdote  about  one  of  the  rulers  of  the  House  of 
Hanover — I  think  it  was  George  the  First — who, 
addressing  his  new  subjects  upon  his  arrival  in  Eng- 
land, assured  them  in  his  broken  English,  "I  am  here 
for  your  own  good — for  all  your  goods." 

By  virtue  of  Article  V  of  the  Treaty  of  Annexa- 
tion, which  bound  "the  Emperor  of  Japan  to  confer 
peerages  and  monetary  grants  upon  Koreans  who, 
on  account  of  meritorious  services,  are  regarded  as 
deserving  such  special  recognition,"  some  seventy-two 


KOREA  147 

Koreans  were  made  counts,  viscounts,  and  barons. 
Had  Japan  chosen  for  the  new  nobility  those  men 
who,  by  reason  of  their  integrity,  ability,  and  patriot- 
ism, held  the  respect  of  the  Korean  people,  this  meas- 
ure would  have  met  with  popular  approval.  But  in- 
stead she  chose  to  honor  the  corruptionists  and  con- 
spirators who  had  ruined  the  country,  most  of  the 
more  upright  and  respected  statesmen  being  con- 
spicuous by  their  omission  from  the  honors  list.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  leaders  of  the  former  progressive 
party,  who  were  the  real  brains  of  the  country,  were 
proscribed  and  persecuted.  As  a  result,  many  of 
them  were  forced  to  leave  the  country  and  the  lives 
of  those  who  remained  were  made  miserable  by  espion- 
age and  bullying.  Had  these  men,  the  real  leaders 
of  Korean  public  opinion,  been  treated  in  a  tactful 
and  friendly  manner  by  the  Japanese,  had  they  been 
consulted  on  Korean  problems,  as  England  consulted 
and  honored  her  great  Boer  adversaries,  Botha  and 
Smuts,  I  am  convinced  that  it  would  have  done  more 
than  anything  else  to  have  won  the  confidence  of  the 
Korean  people  and  to  have  brought  peace  and  content- 
ment to  the  new  province,  for  the  Koreans  were 
heartily  sick  of  the  follies  and  extravagances  of 
the  old  regime.  Instead  of  availing  herself  of 
their  knowledge  of  Korea's  needs  and  profiting 
by  their  advice,  Japan  made  the  mistake  of  driving 
them  into  exile  or  imprisoning  them.    In  so  doing  she 


148       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

made  martyrs  of  them  in  the  eyes  of  their  own  people. 
What  a  pity  that  the  Japanese,  in  their  treatment 
of  these  men,  could  not  have  been  blessed  with  the 
shrewd  common  sense  of  that  English  sovereign  who, 
speaking  of  the  leader  of  a  rebellious  faction,  said,  "I 
won't  let  him  make  a  martyr  of  himself."     « 

In  the  foregoing  pages  I  have  sketched  in  brief  out- 
line the  methods  by  which  Japan  sought  to  assimilate 
the  Korean  people  during  the  ten  years  following  the 
annexation.  In  doing  this  I  have  tried  to  be  abso- 
lutely fair.  All  of  the  abuses  which  I  have  cited  are 
fully  substantiated  by  the  official  reports  of  the  gov- 
ernment-general itself.  Of  certain  other  charges, 
which  I  have  not  been  able  to  verify  to  my  own  satis- 
faction, I  have  made  no  mention.  Viewing  the  ques- 
tion impartially,  it  appears  to  me  that  at  the  begin- 
ning of  1920,  when  Japan  inaugurated  a  milder  and 
more  sympathetic  rule  in  the  peninsula,  the  Koreans 
had  no  less  than  a  dozen  distinct  and  justifiable 
grounds  for  complaint  against  the  Japanese  adminis- 
tration.   These  might  be  summed  up  as  follows: 

1.  Taxation  without  representation. 

2.  Denial  of  freedom  of  the  press,  of  speech,  and 
of  assembly. 

3.  Measures  tending  to  the  eventual  extirpation 
of  the  Korean  language. 

4.  Educational  discrimination. 

5.  Interference  with  the  rehgious  activities  of  the 
people. 


KOREA  149 

6.  Abuse  of  power  by  the  police. 

7.  Multiplicity  of  irritating  laws  and  lack  of  judg- 
ment in  their  enforcement. 

8.  Expropriation  of  public  lands. 

9.  Economic  pressure  against  Koreans. 

10.  Persecution  of  Korean  leaders. 

11.  Lack  of  tact,  sympathy,  and  understanding 
on  the  part  of  Japanese  officials. 

12.  Social  discrimination. 

By  these  methods  the  Japanese  sought  to  remold 
their  new  subjects  in  their  own  image.  But,  much 
to  their  surprise  and  perturbation,  they  discovered 
in  the  Korean  a  character  as  hard,  as  obstinate,  and 
as  unyielding  as  their  own.  At  every  turn  they  found 
themselves  confronted  by  that  most  baffling  of  all 
obstacles — passive  resistance.  Had  the  Japanese 
been  far-sighted  enough  to  treat  the  Koreans,  who  are 
not  a  conquered  race,  as  England  treated  the  con- 
quered Boers,  there  would  have  been  a  genuine  amal- 
gamation of  the  two  peoples.  And  it  is  not  a  long  step 
from  amalgamation  to  assimilation.  But  the  Japa- 
nese ignored  this  golden  opportunity  to  win  the 
loyalty  and  friendship  of  their  new  subjects.  They 
entered  on  their  task  in  a  wrong  spirit;  they  were 
hampered  by  mistaken  ideas.  Faihng  utterly  to 
understand  the  Korean's  psychology,  they  assumed 
an  attitude  of  contempt  instead  of  sympathy.  And 
without  sympathy  on  the  part  of  the  governors  for 


150       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

the  governed,  good  government  is  impossible.^ 
Imagine  the  upheaval  in  the  British  Empire  if  Eng- 
land should  suppress  the  vernacular  newspapers  of 
the  Hindus,  if  she  should  forbid  the  use  of  Arabic  in 
the  courts  of  Egypt,  if  she  should  expropriate  the 
lands  of  the  Indian  princes,  if  she  should  prohibit  the 
teaching  of  the  Koran  in  the  schools  of  her  Moham- 
medan possessions.  Yet  that  is  a  fair  parallel  to 
the  policy  of  the  Japanese  in  Korea.  They  insisted 
that  the  Koreans  should  speak  their  language,  read 
their  newspapers,  follow  their  customs,  lead  their 
lives,  even  wear  their  clothing;  in  short,  permit  them- 
selves to  be  remade  mentally,  spiritually,  and  out- 
wardly. That  the  complete  breakdown  of  this  policy 
has  been  clearly  recognized  by  the  more  progressive 
and  discerning  of  the  Japanese  themselves  is  shown 
by  the  report  of  Mr.  Kenosuke  Morya,  whom  the 
Japanese  constitutional  party  sent  to  Korea  to  in- 
vestigate conditions  on  the  spot.  In  it  he  says,  "It 
is  a  great  mistake  of  colonial  policy  to  enforce  upon 
the  Koreans,  with  their  two-thousand-year  history, 
the  same  spiritual  and  mental  training  as  the  Japa- 
nese people." 

ni 

Yet  during  this  same  discouraging  decade  the  Japa- 
nese made  amazing  material  progress  in  Korea.    The 

*  "Korea's  Fight  for  Freedom,"  by  F.  A.  McKenzie. 


KOREA  151 

old,  effete,  corrupt  administration  was  swept  away. 
A  cabinet  was  formed  on  the  model  of  that  in  Japan. 
An  elaborate  system  of  local  government  was  adopted. 
The  judiciary  was  reformed.  A  sound  monetary  sys- 
tem was  established  and  maintained.  Prisons,  were 
cleansed  and  modernized.  The  mileage  of  the  rail- 
ways was  doubled.  The  inadequate  Korean  harbors 
were  transformed  into  spacious  ports  equipped  with 
all  modern  appliances.  Remarkable  improvements 
in  the  public  health  were  effected  by  government  hos- 
pitals and  systems  of  sanitation.  New  waterworks 
were  built  in  fourteen  cities  and  towns.  The  500 
miles  of  road  which  existed  in  1910  were  increased  to 
8000,  it  being  proposed  to  eventually  cover  the  penin- 
sula with  a  network  of  highways.  New  industries 
were  introduced,  nearly  800  factories,  something 
hitherto  unknown  in  the  land,  being  established, 
thereby  providing  occupation  for  thousands  of  Ko- 
reans. Handsome  and  substantial  public  buildings 
were  erected.  Streets  were  extended  and  paved  and 
charming  parks  laid  out.  Primary,  secondary,  tech- 
nical, agricultural,  forestry,  and  other  schools,  as  well 
as  model  farms  and  experimental  stations,  were 
opened.  Agriculture — the  mainstay  of  the  country — 
was  enormously  developed,  the  Korean  farmer  being 
taught  new  and  profitable  side-lines — fruit,  cotton, 
sugar-beet,  hemp,  tobacco,  and  silk-worm  culture,  and 
sheep -breeding.  Afforestation  was  pushed  forward 
on  a  truly  astounding  scale,  no  less  than  half  a  bil- 


152       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

lion  young  trees  being  set  out  by  the  Japanese  fores- 
try service  on  the  bare,  brown  hillsides.  The  area  of 
cultivated  land  was  doubled.  Fruit  production  was 
more  than  doubled.  The  output  of  the  Korean  coal 
mines  was  trebled.  Cotton  acreage  increased  by  more 
than  4500  per  cent,  and  salt  production  by  more 
than  7000  per  cent.  There  were  increases  of  several 
hundred  per  cent,  in  the  acreages  of  wheat,  beans,  and 
barley.  By  the  introduction  of  modem  appliances 
the  value  of  the  fishery  products  doubled.  The  for- 
eign trade  of  Korea  went  up  from  59,000,000  yen  to 
131,000,000  yen  in  seven  years.  In  less  than  a  decade 
after  the  annexation  there  were  a  million  depositors 
in  the  postal  savings-banks — and  this  in  a  country 
with  a  notoriously  shiftless  and  improvident  popula- 
tion. In  short,  more  public  improvements  were  made, 
civic  reforms  instituted,  and  economic  progress  ef- 
fected in  these  ten  years  than  the  Koreans  had  so 
much  as  thought  of  since  their  history  began. 

For  this  great  work  Japan  deserves  the  highest 
commendation.  It  is  a  striking  testimonial  to  her 
efficiency  in  effecting  material  reforms.  And  it  is 
likewise  a  testimonial  to  the  capacity  for  making  prog- 
ress of  the  Koreans  themselves.  If  successful  col- 
onial administration  consisted  only  in  effecting  ma- 
terial benefits,  Japan's  record  in  Korea  would  entitle 
her  to  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  most  successful  col- 
onizing nations  in  the  world.  The  curious  fact  re- 
mains that  few,  if  any,  of  the  writers  on  Korea  have 


KOREA  153 

appraised  this  record  of  achievement  at  its  true  valu- 
ation.^ Their  perspective  is  distorted  by  their  preju- 
dices. The  pro-Korean  writers,  almost  without 
exception,  have  either  minimized  Japan's  accomplish- 
ments in  the  peninsula  or  have  denied  their  benefit 
to  the  Koreans  themselves.  On  the  other  hand,  such 
pro-Japanese  writers  as  Messrs.  Sherrill,  Glea- 
son,  and  Hershey  have  magnified  the  chronicle  of 
progress  until  it  all  but  obscures  everything  else.  It 
can  no  more  benefit  the  Koreans  for  their  champions 
to  shut  their  eyes  to  the  undeniable  good  that  the 
Japanese  have  accomplished  than  it  can  serve  Japan  to 
have  her  partisans  ignore  those  evils  which  cry  for 
redress. 


IV 

Following  the  annexation  many  of  the  Korean  lead- 
ers who  had  tried  to  save  their  dying  country  in  its 
last  desperate  moments,  recognizing  the  futility  of 
attempting  to  do  anything  further  at  that  time,  fled 
to  foreign  countries.  Some  settled  across  the  frontier 
in  Siberia  and  Manchuria;  others  established  them- 
selves in  the  Treaty  Ports,  in  Manila,  Honolulu,  San 
Francisco.    A  number  of  these  political  refugees  con- 

» In  "ITie  Truth  About  Korea"  Mr.  C.  W.  Kendall  devotes  only  four 
lines  to  what  Japan  has  done  for  the  good  of  the  Koreans.  In  his 
"Modem  Japan"  Dr.  A.  S.  Hershey  devotes  scarcely  more  space  to  dis- 
cussing the  shortcomings  of  the  Japanese  administration.  The  only 
fearless  and  non-partisan  account  I  have  been  able  to  find  is  that  con- 
tained in  Mr.  J.  O.  P.  Bland's  "Japan,  China  and  Korea." 


154       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

stituted  themselves  into  a  "Provisional  Government 
of  Korea,"  with  headquarters  at  Shanghai,  it  being 
claimed  that  the  self-appointed  members  of  this 
"government"  are  supported  by  funds  voluntarily 
paid  as  taxes  by  the  Korean  people.  It  is  very  doubt- 
ful, however,  whether  these  enthusiastic  young  pa- 
triots are  as  truly  representative  of  the  great  mass  of 
the  Korean  people  as  the  Korean  National  Associa- 
tion, a  society  which  claims  to  have  a  membership  of 
over  a  million  Koreans  living  in  exile  throughout  the 
Farther  East.  At  the  same  time,  despite  the  activity 
of  the  Japanese  police,  other  secret  societies,  likewise 
dedicated  to  freeing  Korea  from  Japanese  rule,  were 
organized  in  the  peninsula  itself.  From  all  I  have 
been  able  to  learn  these  associations  are  not  composed 
of  dangerous  radicals,  disgruntled  politicians,  and  bol- 
shevist  terrorists,  as  charged  by  the  Japanese  author- 
ities, but,  on  the  contrary,  consist  for  the  most  part 
of  Korean  scholars  and  progressives,  many  of  them 
graduates  of  American  and  European  universities, 
who  have  the  best  interests  of  their  country  sincerely 
at  heart.  They  are  agitators,  it  is  true,  in  that  they 
are  agitating  for  their  country's  independence,  but 
what,  pray^  were  Patrick  Henry  and  Bolivar,  Kos- 
ciuszko  and  Juarez  and  Gomez? 

Throughout  the  four  years  of  the  World  War 
there  were  manifest  to  keen  observers  many  evidences 
that  a  new  spirit  was  gradually  taking  possession  of 
the  Koreans.    It  would  be  stating  only  a  part  of  the 


KOREA  155 

truth,  however,  to  assert  that  the  Japanese  adminis- 
tration was  the  sole  cause  of  this  national  unrest. 
Obnoxious  though  that  administration  was,  it  was 
only  contributory;  the  real  cause  was  to  be  found  in 
the  innate  and  irresistible  desire  of  the  Koreans  to 
govern  themselves.  They  were  hungry  for  freedom. 
Now  that  the  world  had  been  made  safe  for  democ- 
racy; now  that  the  Poles  and  the  Croats  and  the 
Czechs  and  the  Lithuanians  were  about  to  achieve  their 
independence,  is  it  any  wonder  that  the  Koreans  felt 
that  the  hour  when  they  should  strike  for  liberty  was 
likewise  at  hand?  It  was  Woodrow  Wilson's  pronun- 
ciamento  on  the  right  of  small  nations  to  self-deter- 
mination which  gave  them  their  text  and  battle-cry.  It 
was  the  assembling  of  the  peacemakers  at  Versailles 
which  gave  them  their  opportunity.  The  Korean 
leaders,  believing,  no  doubt,  that  they  could  ride  to 
success  on  the  wave  of  political  freedom  which  was 
sweeping  the  world,  chose  the  time  set  for  the  opening 
of  the  Peace  Conference  to  launch  their  "passive 
revolution."  For  the  most  part  impractical  vision- 
aries, there  is  something  of  the  pathetic  in  their  fail- 
ure to  realize  how  hopeless  was  their  attempt  to  inter- 
est a  distracted  Europe  in  the  fortunes  of  an  obscure 
little  nation  half  the  world  away. 

It  was  planned  that  the  "revolution"  should  be 
unique  in  the  history  of  political  uprising  in  that  there 
should  be  neither  bloodshed  nor  violence.  The  par- 
ticipants were  explicitly  warned  that  no  one  was  to 


156       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

be  harmed.  No  property  was  to  be  destroyed  or 
damaged.  No  rowdyism,  no  bolshevism,  no  terrorism 
was  to  be  tolerated.  Orders  were  given  that  under  no 
circumstances  were  the  demonstrators  to  resist  the 
Japanese  poHce.  If  they  were  beaten,  imprisoned, 
or  even  killed  they  were  to  take  their  punishment 
without  complaint.  Nothing  must  be  done  which 
would  bring  reproach  upon  the  name  of  Korea  or 
their  movement.  It  was  arranged  that  these  passive 
demonstrations  should  break  out  simultaneously  in 
all  the  larger  towns  and  cities  of  the  peninsula,  while 
in  Seoul  itself  the  demonstrators  were  to  divide  them- 
selves into  groups  of  three  thousand,  each  under  a 
leader,  and  march  to  the  various  foreign  consulates 
and  government  offices,  singing  the  Korean  national 
anthem  and  shouting  "Mansei!'\  which  is  the  Korean 
equivalent  of  "Hurrah!"  In  short,  it  was  to  be  a 
nation-wide  demonstration  in  which  seventeen  million 
Koreans  were  to  impress  on  their  Japanese  rulers  by 
strictly  peaceable  methods  that  they  would  no  longer 
submit  to  misgovernment  and  oppression.  When  it 
is  remembered  that  for  every  Japanese  in  the  penin- 
sula there  are  fifty  Koreans,  it  is  not  hard  to  guess 
what  would  have  happened  if  the  demonstration  had 
not  been  a  passive  one. 

How  the  great  number  of  country  people  who  were 
to  participate  in  the  demonstration  were  to  gain  ac- 
cess to  the  capital  without  arousing  the  suspicions  of 
the  Japanese  police  was  a  question  which  caused  some 


KOREA  157 

perplexity  to  the  leaders  of  the  movement,  but  it 
was  suddenly  solved  in  the  latter  part  of  January, 
1919,  when  the  old  ex-Emperor  Yi  passed  away  in 
his  palace  in  Seoul.  Though  he  had  been  of  no  service 
to  his  countrymen  when  alive,  it  seemed  that  he  might 
aid  them  unwittingly  now  that  he  was  dead,  for  his 
funeral,  set  for  March  4,  provided  the  excuse  the 
Korean  leaders  had  been  seeking  for  a  sudden  influx 
of  peasantry  into  the  capital.  In  some  way,  however, 
the  carefully  guarded  secret  reached  the  ears  of  the 
police,  whereupon  the  resourceful  leaders  suddenly 
changed  the  date  for  the  demonstration  to  March  1, — 
the  day  set  for  the  rehearsal  of  the  funeral.  Now  the 
rehearsal  of  a  Korean  funeral  is  almost  as  magnificent 
as  the  event  itself,  so  the  authorities  saw  nothing  to 
cause  alarm  in  the  great  numbers  of  Koreans  who 
came  pouring  into  the  capital  by  train  and  road,  afoot, 
and  in  lumbering  carts  and  astride  of  horses. 

The  morning  of  March  1  found  upward  of  two 
hundred  thousand  people  assembled  in  the  streets 
of  Seoul.  The  whole  city  was  tense  with  anxiety, 
mingled  with  some  vague  expectancy.  In  the  mean- 
time thirty-three  men,  representing  all  religions, 
sects,  and  classes,  had  drawn  up  and  signed  what  was 
virtually  a  declaration 'of  independence.  These  men 
thoroughly  believed  that  President  Wilson's  declara- 
tion that  the  civilized  world  was  determined  hence- 
forth to  protect  the  rights  of  weaker  nations  pro- 
claimed the  end  of  Korea's  vassaldom.    "A  new  era," 


158       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

they  declared,  "wakes  before  our  eyes;  the  old  world 
of  force  is  gone,  and  the  new  world  of  righteousness 
and  truth  is  here."  As  an  English  writer,  Mr.  J.  • 
O.  P.  Bland,  has  put  it,  "Of  practical  politics,  of  the 
great  world  beyond  the  Hermit  Kingdom,  these  sim- 
ple old-world  scholars  and  guileless  enthusiasts  knew 
little  or  nothing;  they  only  knew  that  under  the  rule 
of  Japan  they  were  humiliated  and  unhappy,  and 
that  after  the  agony  of  ten  years  of  foreign  oppres- 
sion the  clarion  call  had  sounded  which  was  to  give 
them  unfettered  liberty."  Copies  of  the  proclama- 
tion, together  with  instructions  as  to  what  was  ex- 
pected of  the  people,  were  sent  to  local  leaders  all 
over  Korea  through  the  aid  of  little  school-girls,  who 
hid  the  incriminating  documents  in  their  capacious 
sleeves  and  trudged  from  town  to  town,  bearing  the 
message  of  freedom. 

Shortly  before  noon  on  March  1  twenty-nine  of 
the  thirty-three  signers  of  the  declaration  met  in  the 
Tai-wha  Kwan,  where  the  independence  of  Korea 
had  been  signed  away  nearly  a  decade  before.  It  is 
said  that  all  the  higher  officials  of  the  Japanese  admin- 
istration had  been  invited  to  attend  the  meeting,  but 
that  only  one  had  come,  the  others  having  official 
duties  which  took  them  elsewhere.  After  the  mo- 
mentous document  had  been  read  to  the  assemblage 
a  messenger  was  despatched  to  communicate  its  con- 
tents to  the  great  crowd  which  had  gathered  in  Pa- 
goda Park.     Then,  after  drinking  success  to  the 


KOREA  159 

movement  thus  initiated,  one  of  the  signers  went  to 
the  telephone,  called  up  the  chief  of  poHce,  told  him 
what  they  had  done,  and  informed  him  that  they  were 
ready  to  go  to  prison.  The  suggestion  was  promptly 
complied  with. 

The  demonstration,  taken  as  a  whole,  followed  the 
instructions  of  the  leaders  to  the  letter.  The  demon- 
strators were  unarmed,  and  among  them  were  as 
many  old  men  and  women  as  young  people.  For- 
eigners who  witnessed  the  affair  told  me  that  it  was 
one  of  the  most  curious  and  impressive  sights  they  had 
ever  seen.  The  masses  of  white-clad  people,  pulsat- 
ing with  the  new  spirit  of  freedom,  surged  through  the 
streets  in  human  billows,  waving  little  Korean  flags, 
of  which  thousands  had  been  distributed  secretly, 
singing  the  Korean  national  anthem,  which  is  set 
to  the  tune  of  "Auld  Lang  Syne,"  and  shouting 
"Mansei!  Manseil  Mansei!  Ten  thousand  years 
for  Korea  !"^ 

So  skilfully  had  the  demonstration  been  planned 
and  executed  that  the  authorities  were  taken  com- 
pletely by  surprise.  The  Japanese  secret  service, 
which  had  boasted  that  it  had  its  fingers  constantly  on 
the  pulse  of  Korean  public  opinion,  had  been  outwit- 
ted and  out-manoeuvered  at  every  turn.  Because  of 
the  magnitude  of  the  movement  the  police  were  help- 

*This  sketch  of  the  independence  agitation  has  been  drawn,  in  the 
main,  from  Korean  sources— "The  Truth  About  Korea,"  by  C.  W. 
Kendall  and  "The  Rebirth  of  Korea,"  by  Hugh  Heung-wo  Cynn— in 
BO  far  as  they  agree  with  the  testimony  of  unprejudiced  witnesses. 


160       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

less,  but  as  soon  as  the  seriousness  of  the  situation 
was  realized  the  troops  were  called  out  and  the  par- 
aders  were  dispersed  by  force,  hundreds  being 
wounded  or  trampled  upon.  By  nightfall  of  "Inde- 
pendence Day"  the  prisons  of  Korea  were  filled  to 
overflowing. 

It  was  here,  in  my  opinion,  that  the  authorities  were 
guilty  of  a  serious  blunder.  It  must  be  patent  to 
every  fair-minded  person  that  they  could  not  tolerate 
disorders  and  revolutionary  acts,  however  patrioti- 
cally intended,  and  that  in  adopting  stern  measures 
for  their  suppression  they  only  did  what  all  govern- 
ments are  likely  to  do  under  similar  circumstances. 
The  question  is  whether,  in  view  of  the  eminently 
passive  character  of  the  demonstration,  they  chose  the 
wisest  course.  So  long  as  there  was  no  violence  it 
would  have  been  the  part  of  wisdom,  it  seems  to  me, 
to  have  let  the  pent-up  emotions  of  the  people  escape 
through  the  safety-valve  provided  by  the  demonstra- 
tion, instead  of  attempting  forcibly  to  suppress  them. 
Much  bloodshed  might  have  been  averted  if  the  au- 
thorities had  possessed  the  psychology  of  one  village 
policeman,  who  permitted  the  people  in  his  district 
to  celebrate  for  three  days  without  molestation.  Then 
he  told  them  that  if  they  wanted  independence  they 
should  build  up  an  army  and  navy ;  this  would  require 
much  money,  so  they  had  better  return  to  their  work 
and  accumulate  the  wealth  necessary  to  develop  the 
nation.     They  agreed  with  him  that  it  was  sound 


DEVIL-POSTS  OUTSIDE  KOREAN  VILLAGE  TO  KEEP  AWAY  EVIL  SPIRITS 


TRANSPORTING  FODDER  ON  THE  BACKS  OF  BULLS  IN  KOREA 


ANCIENT  KOREAN  TEMPLE  IN  SEOUL 


PALANQUIN   OP   PRINCE   LI 
(Former   Emperor  of   Korea) 


KOREA  161 

advice  and  dispersed  peaceably  without  any  harm  hav- 
ing been  done.^ 

Notwithstanding  official  attempts  to  minimize  the 
extent  and  significance  of  the  agitation,  there  seems  to 
be  little  doubt  that  it  was  a  genuine  national  move- 
ment. When  I  went  to  Korea  I  was  quite  prepared 
to  find  certain  classes  of  the  population,  particularly 
the  students  and  intellectuals  and  those  having  polit- 
ical aspirations,  permeated  by  the  spirit  of  national- 
ism. But  I  expected  to  find  the  farmers,  who  com- 
pose the  great  mass  of  the  people  and  are  the  back- 
bone of  the  country,  largely  ignorant  of  and  indif- 
ferent to  the  new  movement.  I  found,  however,  that 
the  emotions  aroused — which  might  be  described  as 
a  new  national  consciousness — have  gone  deep  and 
broad  into  the  lives  of  the  people  as  a  whole.  When 
Yi  Sang-Chai,  who  has  been  called  "the  Tolstoy  of 
Korea,"  was  interrogated  by  a  secret  service  man  as 
to  who  were  the  persons  behind  the  movement,  he 
replied:  "All  the  Korean  people,  from  Fusan  to  the 
Ever  White  Mountains.  They  are  all  in  it.  They 
are  the  committee  back  of  the  agitation." 

Now  it  is  not  my  intention  to  enter  into  any  de- 
tailed account  or  discussion  of  the  excesses  which 
marked  the  suppression  of  the  independence  move- 
ment. That  the  Japanese  police  and  gendarmes  were 
guilty  of  many  brutalities  and  some  horrible  reprisals 
is  not  open  to  question.     Not  only  have  they  been 

*"What  Shall  I  Think  of  Japan?"  by  George  Gleason. 


162       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

confirmed  by  a  host  of  reputable  witnesses,  foreigners 
as  well  as  natives,  but  the  Japanese  Government  it- 
self has  virtually  admitted  them  by  punishing  the 
perpetrators.  In  certain  of  the  provincial  towns,  if 
the  testimony  of  trustworthy  witnesses  is  to  be  be- 
lieved, unarmed  and  unresisting  Koreans,  both  men 
and  women,  were  bayoneted  or  shot  down  in  cold 
blood.  Houses  were  looted  and  burned.  In  order 
to  extort  confessions  or  to  obtain  evidence,  many  of 
the  prisoners  were  subjected  to  torture.  Women  and 
young  girls  were  stripped,  beaten,  and  subjected  to 
shameful  indignities,  though  I  might  add  that  I  found 
no  evidence  of  a  single  case  of  assault  on  Korean 
women  by  Japanese  police  or  soldiers.  Yet,  brutal 
and  cruel  though  they  undeniably  were,  that  is  no 
excuse  for  the  grossly  exaggerated  accounts  that  have 
been  spread  broadcast.  For  example,  Mr.  C.  W. 
Kendall  in  "The  Truth  About  Korea"  is  authority 
for  the  statement  that  in  the  first  three  months  of  the 
agitation  over  50,000  Koreans  were  killed  or  wounded. 
In  December,  1919,  The  World  Outlook  published 
a  report  placing  the  killed  at  between  30,000  and  40,- 
000.  According  to  official  reports,  631  Koreans  were 
killed  and  1409  wounded.  This  is  perhaps  an  under- 
statement, but  none  of  the  foreigners  with  whom  I 
discussed  the  question  when  I  was  in  Korea  estimated 
the  killed  at  over  one  thousand. 

Mr.  George  Gleason,  who  certainly  cannot  be  ac- 
cused of  any  anti-Japanese  leanings,  has  summed  up 


KOREA  168 

the  results  of  the  rising  as  follows,  drawing  his  figures, 
it  is  to  be  assumed,  from  official  reports : 

"Of  the  2500  village  districts  in  Korea,  there  were 
uprisings  in  577,  the  total  number  of  demonstrations 
being  779,  with  demonstrators  numbering  452,868. 
[Heaven  only  knows  how  such  exact  figures  were  ob- 
tained!] Riots  took  place  in  236  places.  The  police 
and  gendarmes  numbered  8000  Koreans  and  6000 
Japanese  located  in  1800  villages.  There  were,  be- 
sides these,  about  25,000  Japanese  soldiers,  all  of 
whom  at  one  time  were  engaged  in  suppressing  the 
demonstrations.  In  185  places  guns  were  fired  at 
the  demonstrators;  631  Koreans  were  killed  and  1409 
wounded.  Nine  Japanese  policemen  were  killed  and 
186  wounded.  In  87  places  public  buildings  were 
destroyed  and  in  88  places  private  houses  were  burned. 
Up  to  July  20,  1919,  28,934  Koreans  were  arrested. 
While  there  is  some  duplication  in  the  reports,  the  fol- 
lowing treatment  was  given  those  arrested:  7111  were 
set  free  without  trial;  8993  were  committed  to  trial; 
5156  were  sent  to  prison;  10,592  were  flogged  and 
released.  In  only  two  out  of  the  nearly  600  villages 
where  demonstrations  took  place  did  the  Koreans  use 
firearms.  That  such  a  peaceful  movement  resulted 
in  the  killing  and  wounding  of  2000,  the  arrest  of  29,- 
000,  and  the  flogging  of  10,000  is  a  fact  which  calls 
for  meditation  more  than  for  comment.  No  Japanese 
can  be  surprised  at  the  widespread  wave  of  protest." 

In  considering  the  methods  which  the  Japanese 


164       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

authorities  used  in  suppressing  the  independence 
movement,  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  they  were 
by  no  means  indicative  of  the  sentiments  of  the  Japa- 
nese people  as  a  whole,  who,  on  the  contrary,  disap- 
proved and  deplored  them.  They  were  indicative 
of  the  sentiment  of  only  a  small,  though  powerful, 
section  of  the  Japanese  people — the  military  party. 
These  men,  brought  up  in  the  stem  school  of  the 
soldier,  steeped  in  military  traditions,  believing  in 
inflexible  discipline  and  unquestioning  obedience  to 
authority  as  a  Mohammedan  believes  in  the  Koran, 
took  the  position  that  Korea  and  the  Koreans  were 
the  absolute  property  of  Japan,  that  the  subjugation 
and  Japanization  of  the  Koreans  was  a  military  neces- 
sity, and  that  the  independence  movement  constituted 
a  defiance  of  the  imperial  power  which  must  be 
stamped  out  with  fire  and  sword.  I  am  not  excusing 
the  Japanese,  mind  you,  when  I  remind  my  readers  of 
the  massacre  ordered  by  the  British  general,  Dwyer, 
at  Amritsar;  of  Captain-General  Weyler's  treatment 
of  the  Cubans;  of  the  behavior  of  the  "Black  and 
Tans"  in  Ireland;  of  the  excesses  perpetrated  by  the 
Greeks  in  Albania  and  Asia  Minor.  The  Japanese 
excesses  in  Korea  should  not  be  condoned  because 
other  people  have  committed  them.  I  am  merely 
calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  history  has  repeat- 
edly shown  that  enlightened  and  humane  nations  have 
frequently  been  disgraced  by  the  action  of  their  mili- 
tary men. 


KOREA  165 

It  is  due  to  historical  accuracy  and  to  the  Japa- 
nese army  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  three  bodies 
of  men  have  been  sent  by  the  Japanese  Government 
to  Korea  to  restore  order.  One  is  the  regular  army. 
Another  is  the  gendarmerie — a  police  force  organized 
on  military  lines.  The  third  is  the  police,  or  rather, 
those  contingents  of  police  recruited  in  Japan.  These 
forces  are  distinct  and  should  not  be  confused.  Nor 
should  their  deeds.  In  organization,  discipline,  tem- 
per, and  ideals  the  police  and  gendarmerie  are  sev- 
eial  degrees  removed  from  the  regular  army.  Unlike 
the  regular  army,  their  discipline,  training,  and  tem- 
per could  not  withstand  the  trials  and  temptations  to 
which  they  were  subjected  in  Korea.  Neither  their 
discipline  nor  methods  could  compare  with  army  dis- 
cipline, so  it  is  scarcely  a  matter  for  surprise  that  at 
certain  times  and  places  they  broke  loose — ^that  they 
burned,  destroyed,  killed,  tortured,  intimidated.  In 
the  vast  majority  of  cases  the  excesses  in  Korea  were 
committed  by  police  and  gendarmes ;  not  by  Japanese 
soldiers. 

Now  here  is  the  most  significant  and  discouraging 
feature  of  the  whole  deplorable  business.  When  the 
news  of  what  had  happened  in  the  peninsula  became 
known  in  Japan  there  was  no  public,  and  very  little 
political,  reaction.  The  wave  of  indignation  which 
swept  England  when  the  conduct  of  the  "Black  and 
Tans"  in  Ireland  became  known,  had  no  parallel  in 
Japan.     Scarcely  more  than  a  ripple  disturbed  the 


166       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

political  waters,  while  the  public  remained  as  pro- 
foundly apathetic  as  though  the  excesses  had  occurred 
in  Central  Africa  instead  of  in  a  province  of  the  em- 
pire, six  score  miles  away.  It  is  true  that  the  Japa- 
nese Constitutional  Party  despatched  an  independ- 
ent investigator  to  Korea  to  examine  the  situation  on 
the  spot,  and  that  his  report  ascribed  the  movement  to 
discriminatory  treatment  of  the  Koreans,  complicated 
and  impracticable  administrative  measures,  and  ex- 
treme oppression,  but  I  have  the  feeling  that  in  this 
the  constitutionalists  were  inspired  by  a  desire  to 
embarrass  the  government  as  much  as  by  humani- 
tarian motives.  It  is  also  true  that  the  resident-gen- 
eral. Count  Hasegawa,  the  director  of  pohtical  af- 
fairs, Mr.  Yamagata,  and  the  chief  of  gendarmerie 
were  recalled,  though  the  government  "saved  the 
face"  of  the  militarists  by  making  General  Hasegawa 
a  field-marshal.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  govern- 
ment was  gravely  concerned  over  the  excesses,  though 
not  so  much  on  moral  grounds  as  because  of  its  fear 
of  the  effect  on.  Western  opinion.  And  this  concern 
was  shared  by  a  small  group  of  men  who  had  had 
long  associations  with  Western  life  and  were  familiar 
with  Western  thought.  In  discussing  the  excesses 
some  months  later  with  Viscount  Kaneko,  who  is  a 
graduate  of  Harvard  and  one  of  the  most  advanced 
Japanese  statesmen,  he  said  with  great  earnestness: 
"Unfortunately  they  are  only  too  true.  I  do  not  pre- 
tend to  deny  them ;  I  can  only  deplore  them,  the  more 


KOREA  167 

so  because  they  were  committed  by  my  own  people. 
I  only  hope  that  they  will  not  be  interpreted  abroad 
as  indicative  of  the  real  attitude  of  the  Japanese  peo- 
ple toward  the  Koreans."  I  do  not  wish  to  do  the 
Japanese  Government  or  people  an  injustice,  but  in 
my  opinion  the  reforms  which  were  promptly  insti- 
tuted in  Korea  were  inspired  not  by  public  opinion  in 
Japan,  but  almost  wholly  by  public  opinion  outside 
of  Japan.  For  the  Peace  Conference  was  then  sit- 
ting in  Paris,  and  Japan,  with  enormous  interests  at' 
stake  in  the  ante-bellum  settlements,  could  ill  afford 
to  have  her  case  prejudiced  by  criticism  of  her  con- 
duct in  Korea. 

The  government  thus  found  itself  in  a  difficult  and 
trying  situation.  Premier  Hara  was  quick  to  recog- 
nize that  something  must  be  done,  and  done  at  once, 
to  convince  America  and  the  European  nations  that 
Japan  was  sincere  in  her  desire  to  ameliorate  condi- 
tions in  the  peninsula.  But  he  likewise  realized  that 
he  could  not  afford  to  do  anything  which  would  arouse 
the  animosity  of  the  military  party.  He  steered  a 
middle  course,  therefore,  by  designating  Admiral 
Baron  Saito,  a  retired  naval  officer,  as  the  new  gov- 
ernor-general of  Korea,  this  appointment  being  in  the 
nature  of  a  compromise  between  the  militarists,  who 
demanded  that  the  independence  movement  be  sup- 
pressed with  an  iron  hand,  and  those  statesmen  of 
broader  vision,  who,  recognizing  the  danger  of  flout- 
ing foreign  opinion,  insisted  on  a  new  deal  for  the 


168       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

Koreans.  I  might  add,  parenthetically,  that  as  a 
captain  in  command  of  a  Japanese  warship  Baron 
Saito  was  present  when  the  American  squadron  under 
Dewey  destroyed  the  Spanish  fleet  in  Manila  Bay, 
and  that  he  unreservedly  sided  with  the  American 
commodore  when  the  commander  of  a  German  war- 
ship attempted  to  interfere  in  behalf  of  the  Spaniards. 
The  portfolio  of  pohtical  affairs  in  Baron  Saito's  cabi- 
net is  held  by  Dr.  Kentaro  Midzuno,  formerly  minister 
of  the  interior  of  Japan,  an  enlightened  and  progres- 
sive statesman  of  the  highest  type.  Though  I  believe 
that  Baron  Saito's  administration  has  the  best  interests 
of  the  Koreans  genuinely  at  heart,  its  freedom  of  ac- 
tion has  been  hampered  by  the  military  party.  Men 
like  Baron  Saito  and  Dr.  Midzuno  could  and  would 
accomplish  far-reaching  reforms  in  Korea  if  they  were 
not  discouraged  in  their  efforts  by  the  apathetic  state 
of  public  opinion  at  home. 

I  had  a  long  conference  with  Baron  Saito  when 
I  was  in  Seoul.  He  spoke  fair  English  and  answered 
my  queries  as  to  Japan's  future  course  in  Korea  with 
every  appearance  of  candor.  He  freely  admitted 
that  many  mistakes  had  been  made ;  he  deplored  the 
harshness  which  had  characterized  the  preceding  ad- 
ministration; and  he  expressed  his  intention  of  mak- 
ing Japanese  rule  in  Korea  of  real  benefit  to  the 
Koreans,  who,  he  felt,  had  never  been  given  a  fair 
chance.  He  impressed  me  as  being  sincere,  deeply  in 
earnest,  and  possessed  of  a  large  measure  of  sym- 


[ 


KOREA  169 

pathy  for  the  Koreans,  and  this  despite  the  fact  that 
upon  the  very  day  of  his  arrival  in  Seoul  to  take  over 
his  new  duties,  before  he  had  an  opportunity  to  make 
his  policy  known,  an  attempt  was  made  by  a  Korean 
to  assassinate  him. 


More  than  two  years  have  passed  since  the  Im- 
perial Rescript  of  August  20,  1919,  in  which  the 
emperor  called  upon  his  officials  "to  rush  reforms," 
which  was  followed  by  .Premier  Hara's  proclamation 
announcing  that  "it  is  the  government's  fixed  deter- 
mination to  forward  the  progress  of  the  country  in 
order  that  all  differences  between  Korea  and  Japan 
proper  in  matters  of  education,  industry,  and  the 
civil  service  may  be  finally  obliterated.  ...  It  is  the 
ultimate  purpose  of  the  Japanese  Government  in  due 
course  to  treat  Korea  as  in  all  respects  on  the  same 
footing  with  Japan  proper."  In  that  period  a  credit- 
able number  of  reforms  have  been  effected.  The 
objectionable  gendarmerie  system  has  largely  been 
done  away  with  and  the  police  system,  improved, 
enlarged,  and  under  the  direct  control  of  the  civil 
instead  of  the  military  authorities,  has  been  substi- 
tuted. The  much  criticized  custom  of  flogging  was 
definitely  abolished  on  April  1, 1920 — about  the  time, 
incidentally,  that  American  newspapers  were  carry- 
ing reports  of  the  movement  to  aboHsh  the  public 


170       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

flogging  of  women  in  Georgia.  The  prisons  have 
been  enlarged  and  improved.  New  school  regulations 
have  been  adopted,  lengthening  the  courses  of  study, 
granting  wider  options  in  the  curricula,  permitting 
rehgious  instruction  in  private  schools,  and  relaxing 
the  requirements  as  to  the  use  of  the  Japanese  lan- 
guage in  certain  subjects.  The  regulations  governing 
religious  activities  have  been  revised,  simplifying  the 
requirements  as  to  reports  concerning  the  opening  of 
new  churches,  the  number  of  adherents,  and  the  like. 
The  so-called  "Company  Law,"  restricting  the  estab- 
lishment of  commercial  companies,  has  been  repealed. 
Newspapers  in  the  Korean  language,  owned  and 
edited  by  Koreans,  have  again  appeared,  and  freedom 
of  the  press,  at  least  in  some  degree,  has  been  re- 
stored, though  the  newspapers  are  still  frequently 
suppressed  by  the  authorities.  The  spies  and  in- 
formers who  so  long  swarmed  in  the  peninsula  have 
largely  disappeared.  The  salaries  of  Japanese  and 
Koreans  in  government  employ  have  been  equalized 
in  the  various  grades.  Koreans  have  been  appointed 
to  high  posts  in  the  government,  including  those  of 
provincial  governor,  judge,  and  public  procurator. 
The  custom  of  wearing  swords  by  civil  officials  has 
been  abolished.  The  Advisory  Council,  composed  of 
Korean  statesmen,  which  had  fallen  into  innocuous 
desuetude,  has  been  revived,  it  being  convened  regu- 
larly once  a  week,  and  by  the  infusion  of  new  blood 
has  been  made  more  representative  of  all  classes  of 


KOREA  171 

Korean  opinion — including  the  anti-Japanese — ^thus 
providing  at  least  the  germ  of  representative  govern- 
ment in  Korea.  Though  admittedly  much  remains  to 
be  done,  this,  as  most  fair-minded  persons  will  admit, 
is  a  creditable  showing  for  two  years. 

The  Korean  leaders  with  whom  I  discussed  the 
situation,  though  guarded  in  their  comments,  were 
dissatisfied — as  might  have  been  expected — with  the 
extent  of  the  reforms  and  frankly  skeptical  of  Japa- 
nese sincerity.  Their  chief  criticisms  appeared  to  be 
(1)  that  the  new  administration  is  supporting  the 
leaders  of  the  old,  corrupt,  discredited  regime,  rather 
than  the  leaders  of  the  progressive  party ;  ( 2 )  that  it 
is  keeping  the  Korean  standard  of  education  fully 
two  years  behind  that  of  Japan;  (3)  that  the  police 
still  have  altogether  too  much  authority,  particularly 
in  the  rural  districts,  where  an  ignorant  constable  is 
often  vested  with  almost  autocratic  powers ;  ( 4 )  that 
the  treatment  of  prisoners  is  not  yet  in  accordance 
with  enlightened  standards,  those  charged  with  polit- 
ical offenses  being  confined  in  overcrowded  cells  and 
permitted  insufficient  exercise. 

Though  I  am  myself  convinced  that  substantial 
progress  is  really  being  made,  and  though  I  am  satis- 
fied of  the  sincerity  of  the  new  administration,  it  is 
my  opinion  that  no  program  of  reform  can  be  ex- 
pected in  the  immediate  future  that  will  satisfy  a 
large  section  of  the  Korean  people  and  their  friends. 
They  expect  and  will  continue  to  demand  more  than 


172       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

the  Japanese  Government  will  feel  able  to  grant.  A 
complete  reversal  of  Japanese  policy  in  Korea  will 
come  only  when  military  autocracy  definitely  has  been 
subordinated  to  democracy  in  Japan  itself.  It  should 
be  remembered  that  the  late  Premier  Hara  was  in 
none  too  strong  a  position,  for  the  forces  of  reaction, 
as  personified  by  the  militarists,  had  too  much  power 
for  him  to  do  as  he  would  perhaps  have  liked  to  do 
if  left  to  his  own  devices.  And  if  the  prime  minister 
of  the  empire  is  not  his  own  master  in  this  respect, 
the  governor-general  of  Korea  is  still  less  so. 

Notwithstanding  the  reforms,  the  independence 
movement,  though  at  the  moment  in  abeyance,  has  by 
no  means  dissolved,  being  carried  steadily  forward 
despite  the  vigilance  of  the  police.  I  was  given  to 
understand  that  there  are  two  factions  among  the 
Korean  leaders;  one  which  favors  advancing  their 
cause  by  forcible  methods,  the  other  favoring  peace- 
able means,  and  that  the  latter  is  at  present  in  control 
of  the  situation.  The  prevailing  belief  in  Korea  is 
that  the  continuance  in  power  of  the  peace  party  will 
largely  depend  upon  the  sincerity  and  energy  dis- 
played by  the  new  administration  in  prosecuting  the 
promised  reforms.  "All  that  is  now  asked,"  a  well- 
informed  foreign  official  in  Seoul  told  me,  "is  that  the 
Korean  people  be  treated  with  respect,  be  given  jus- 
tice, and  be  permitted  to  develop  along  various  lines." 
Should  the  promises  of  the  government  and  the  ex- 
pectations of  the  people  remain  unfulfilled,  however. 


KOREA  173 

there  is  every  likelihood  of  an  outbreak  of  a  more 
serious  nature  than  has  yet  occurred.  For  the  sake 
k  of  peace  in  the  peninsula  it  is  sincerely  to  be  hoped 
that  the  new  administration  will  prove  itself  so  en- 
lightened that  the  peace  party  may  remain  in  the 
ascendant.  I  was  told  by  a  foreign  official  in  whom  I 
have  confidence  that  the  leaders  of  the  secret  organiza- 
tion which  has  been  directing  the  independence  move- 
ment were  rapidly  becoming  convinced  of  the  futility 
of  open  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Koreans  at 
present,  and  were  counseling  the  people  to  attend  to 
their  business,  and  the  students  to  their  studies,  until 
such  time  as  they  are  better  able  to  make  their 
strength  felt.  If  that  is  true — and  it  is  borne  out  by 
the  fact  that  the  student  registration  for  last  year 
(1921)  was  unprecedented — it  explains  the  present 
lull  and  is  an  indication  of  what  may  be  expected  in 
the  future,  provided  the  reforms  proceed  at  a  reason- 
able pace.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment fails  to  keep  its  promises,  if  it  makes  the 
blunder  of  returning  to  the  old,  short-sighted  policy 
of  repression  and  oppression,  then  I  fear  that  the  next 
chapter  in  Korea's  troubled  history  will  be  written  in 
blood. 

VI 

No  account  of  existing  conditions  in  Korea  would 
be  complete  without  at  least  passing  reference  to  the 
work  and  influence  of  the  missionaries,  of  whom  there 


174       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

are  in  the  peninsula  at  present  nearly  five  hundred, 
about  three  quarters  of  these  being  Americans.  They, 
with  their  native  assistants,  shepherd  churches  which 
have  not  far  from  100,000  regular  members,  these 
native  Christians  constituting  the  most  enlightened 
and  reputable  element  of  the  indigenous  population. 
It  has  long  been  the  fashion  for  a  certain  brand  of  tour- 
ist to  sneer  at  the  missionary.  Usually  these  are  per- 
sons who  have  never  traveled  beyond  the  treaty  ports, 
whose  knowledge  of  Oriental  conditions  is  largely 
confined  to  irresponsible  gossip  picked  up  on  hotel 
verandas  or  over  hotel  bars  in  Yokohama  and  Hong 
Kong  and  Shanghai.  I  imagine  that  most  thoughtful 
people  will  prefer  to  accept  the  testimony  of  such  a 
man  as  Mr.  Thomas  W.  Lamont,  who  said,  in  speak- 
ing of  the  American  missionaries  in  China,  that  they 
are  giving  their  lives  to  develop  a  people  into  a 
nation.  And  that  is  even  truer  of  the  American  mis- 
sionaries in  Korea.  For  they  are  something  more 
than  prosely tizers ;  they  are  educators,  sanitary  ex- 
perts, agricultural  advisers,  physicians,  statesmen. 
The  statistics  of  their  conversions  by  no  means  repre- 
sent the  sum  total  of  their  activities  or  give  an  ade- 
quate idea  of  the  enormous  service  they  are  perform- 
ing in  carrying  civilization,  as  well  as  Christianity, 
into  the  world's  dark  corners. 

Though  there  is  no  disguising  the  fact  that  the 
independence  movement  in  Korea  owed  its  inspiration 
originally  to  the  influence  and  teaching  of  American 


KOREA  175 

missionaries,  the  attitude  of  the  missionary  body  has 
been,  as  a  whole,  formally  correct.  When  the  reform 
program  was  first  announced  the  attitude  of  the  mis- 
sionary body  in  Korea  was  distinctly  one  of  benevo- 
lent neutrality,  but  as  time  passed  and  the  reforms 
were  slow  in  coming,  while  many  of  the  worst  abuses 
of  the  old  regime  remained,  this  attitude  was  largely 
replaced  by  one  of  skepticism  and  a  neutrality  con- 
fined to  speech  and  action  alone — and  in  some  cases 
not  to  speech.  But  there  is  no  word  of  truth  in  the 
charges  made  in  certain  sections  of  the  Japanese  press 
that  the  disorders  in  Korea  were  instigated  by  the 
missionaries.  The  falsity  of  such  assertions  is  con- 
vincingly shown  by  an  interview  with  Mr.  Yamagata, 
formerly  director  of  political  affairs  in  Korea,  which 
appeared  in  The  Japanese  Advertiser:  "No  mission- 
ary in  Korea,  directly  or  indirectly,  took  part  in  the 
Korean  demonstrations,  although  it  is  quite  probable 
that  some  missionaries  have  shown  their  sympathy 
with  the  Koreans."  Everything  considered,  the 
American  missionaries  have  succeeded  to  a  remark- 
able degree  in  maintaining  a  discreet  and  neutral 
attitude  in  a  most  difficult  situation,  the  factors  of 
which  have  tended  to  draw  their  hearts  and  their 
heads  in  opposite  directions. 

I  cannot  let  pass  this  opportunity  to  deprecate  and 
deplore  the  short-sighted  and  injudicious  methods 
which  the  Japanese  authorities  are  using  in  an 
attempt  to  convince  foreign  visitors  to  Korea  of  the 


176       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

justice  of  their  policy  and  to  prejudice  them  against 
the  Koreans.  Indeed,  foreign  travelers  in  the  penin- 
sula have  been  misinformed  and  blinded  by  a  propa- 
ganda against  the  Koreans,  a  manipulation  of  the 
press,  which  has  seldom  been  equaled  in  audacity  of  un- 
truth and  dexterity  of  misrepresentation.  Piled  high 
on  the  desks  of  the  admirably  run  Japanese  hotels  in 
Seoul,  Fusan,  and  Mukden  are  pamphlets,  written  by 
an  American,  Frank  Herron  Smith,  in  which  the 
Koreans  are  painted  in  the  most  unflattering  colors, 
while  in  the  same  breath  the  author  not  only  defends 
Japan's  policy  but  lauds  it  to  the  skies.  Another 
American,  T.  Philip  Terry,  has  apparently  attempted 
to  earn  Japanese  gratitude  by  the  savage  and  intem- 
perate attacks  on  the  Koreans,  in  which  he  has  ex- 
hausted the  unflattering  adjectives  in  his  vocabulary, 
which  he  has  introduced  into  his  otherwise  admirable 
guide-book  to  the  Japanese  Empire.  The  tone  of 
The  Seoul  Press,  a  daily  newspaper  in  English  owned 
and  edited  by  Japanese,  is  far  more  temperate  and 
sympathetic  than  the  writings  of  these  Americans. 
The  Koreans  are  now  as  much  subjects  of  the  em- 
peror as  the  Japanese  themselves,  and  as  deserving  of 
consideration.  By  lending  its  approval  to  such 
attacks  on  a  section  of  its  people  the  government  is  as 
guilty  of  bad  judgment  as  their  American  authors 
are  of  bad  taste.  It  is  a  form  of  propaganda  which 
is  discreditable  to  those  who  are  responsible  for  it  and 
should  be  discontinued  forthwith. 


KOREA  177 


VII 

I  have  now  sketched  for  you  the  conditions  which 
prevailed  in  Korea  before  the  Japanese  came  and 
those  which  obtain  there  to-day.  What  the  future  of 
the  peninsula  is  to  be  depends  wholly  upon  whether 
the  Koreans  and  the  Japanese  adopt  an  attitude  of 
mutual  sympathy  and  understanding.  Were  Japan 
to  evacuate  the  country  now,  or  in  the  near  future — 
as  there  is  not  the  slightest  prospect  of  her  doing — 
she  would  leave  it  under  conditions  which  would  soon 
result  in  chaos,  and  the  good  that  she  has  done  would 
be  largely  lost.  The  extensive  schemes  for  agricul- 
tural and  industrial  development  upon  which  she  has 
entered,  and  upon  which  the  prosperity  of  the  penin- 
sula largely  depends,  could  never  be  financed  by  an 
independent  Korea,  and  the  same  is  true  of  her  plans 
for  improving  the  means  of  communication,  which  are 
at  the  bottom  of  all  the  problems  of  economic  devel^ 
opment  in  Korea. 

However  critical  we  may  be  of  the  methods  by 
which  it  was  accomplished,  the  annexation  of  Korea 
seems  to  me  to  have  been  justified.  For  the  fact  must 
not  be  lost  sight  of  that  the  country  was  doomed  to 
become  either  Japanese  or  Russian.  The  Japanese 
occupied  it  to  forestall  a  Russian  occupation,  which 
would  have  menaced  their  independence  as  a  nation. 


178        ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

And  they  have  remained  in  the  peninsula  for  reasons 
similar  to  those  which,  in  the  opinions  of  reasonable 
men,  justify  Great  Britain  in  retaining  control  of 
Egypt  and  of  Ireland. 

The  Koreans  insist  that  they  are  themselves  per- 
fectly capable  of  establishing  and  maintaining  a  just 
and  stable  government.  But  their  ability  to  do  this 
is,  I  believe,  open  to  grave  question.  Certainly  there 
is  nothing  in  the  twenty  centuries  of  their  history  as 
an  independent  nation  to  justify  such  confidence,  for 
the  old  government  of  Korea  was  perhaps  the  worst 
on  which  the  sun  ever  shone.  Though  they  are  now 
making  encouraging  progress,  it  is  being  made  under 
Japanese  guidance  and  tuition.  The  leaders  of  the 
independence  movement  are,  for  the  most  part,  young 
men,  students,  intellectuals,  idealists,  who,  no  matter 
how  able  individually,  are  wholly  without  experience 
in  practical  government.  To  turn  a  nation  of  seven- 
teen millions  of  ignorant,  simple-minded  people  over 
to  their  guidance  would  be  to  invite  disaster. 

Mind  you,  I  do  not  think  that  the  Japanese  admin- 
istration of  Korea  has  been  all,  or  nearly  all,  that  it 
should  have  been.  I  cannot  agree  with  Dr.  Hershey, 
who  asserts  that  "the  government  of  Chosen  must  be 
pronounced  a  great  success,"  any  more  than  I  can 
agree  with  Mr.  Kendall,  who  claims  that  "the  nine 
years  following  the  egregious  annexation  has  been 
one  of  the  most  shameful  pages  in  the  history  of  the 
Japanese  Empire."     The  truth  lies  somewhere  be- 


KOREA  179 

tween  these  extremes.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Japa- 
nese officials  have  worked  hard  and  in  many  instances 
effectively  for  the  amelioration  of  the  Korean  people 
and  the  improvement  of  Korean  conditions,  but  their 
method  has  been  lacking  in  tact,  sympathy,  and 
understanding.  But  criticism  of  Japan's  stern  mili- 
taristic policy  and  of  the  harsh  methods  she  has  per- 
mitted in  its  execution  should  not  blind  us  to  her 
integrity,  her  large  administrative  ability,  and  to  the 
energy  she  has  displayed  in  carrying  out  material 
reforms.  From  personal  observation  on  the  spot,  I 
am  convinced  that  the  general  condition  of  the  Korean 
peasantry  is  appreciably  higher  than  it  ever  was,  or 
could  have  been,  under  Korean  administration.  This 
is  not  to  be  interpreted  as  meaning  that  I  do  not 
sympathize  with  the  Koreans,  for  I  do.  They  have 
been  the  victims  of  cruelty,  injustice,  and  oppression. 
Nor  would  they  be  worthy  of  respect  if  they  did  not 
prefer  to  rule  themselves.  But  I  can  also  sympathize 
with  Japan.  During  one  of  the  most  trying  periods 
in  the  world's  history — disliked,  distrusted,  and  op- 
posed by  Koreans,  Chinese,  Russians,  and  most  of 
the  foreigners  living  in  the  Far  East — she  has  jerked 
a  nation  out  of  the  depths  of  poverty,  degradation, 
and  despair,  as  though  by  its  collar,  set  it  on  its  feet, 
and  is  teaching  it  to  "play  the  game."  And,  as  Count 
Terauchi  once  remarked,  "It  is  no  easy  task  to  uplift 
a  decayed  people." 

Viewing  the  question  from  an  unbiased  standpoint, 


180       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

I  believe  that  the  balance  inclines  heavily  in  favor  of 
Japan.  I  will  go  further  than  that  and  assert  that 
Korea  could  suffer  no  greater  calamity  than  to  have 
Japan  go.  Not  that  there  is  the  slightest  probability 
of  her  doing  so,  for  the  unrest  in  China,  combined 
with  the  uncertainty  in  Russia,  is  likely  to  cause  her 
to  tighten,  rather  than  relax  her  grip  on  the  peninsula. 
For,  when  all  is  said  and  done,  Korea  is  the  key  to 
the  whole  Far  Eastern  situation.  Upon  her  control 
of  it  depends  Japan's  entire  scheme  for  the  economic 
penetration  of  Siberia,  Manchuria,  and  China.  For 
her  to  withdraw  from  Korea  would  be  tantamount 
to  leaving  the  gateway  to  these  great,  rich  markets 
imguarded,  and  that,  I  am  convinced,  she  will  never 
do.  The  sooner  the  Koreans  realize  that  Japan's 
determination  to  remain  in  the  peninsula  is  adaman- 
tine, and  the  sooner  the  Japanese  realize  that  the 
Koreans  will  resist  further  attempts  at  forcible  dena- 
tionalization to  the  bitter  end,  the  better  it  will  be  for 
both  peoples.  If  the  Japanese  will  adopt  a  concilia- 
tory and  unselfish  policy  toward  the  Koreans  with  a 
view  to  granting  them  a  very  large  measure  of 
autonomy  as  soon  as  they  are  prepared  for  it,  and  if 
the  Koreans,  on  their  part,  will  drop  their  demands 
for  complete  independence,  which  it  is  obviously  im- 
possible for  Japan  to  accede  to,  and  set  to  work  to  fit 
themselves  for  self-government  under  the  empire,  it 
will  set  forward  the  hands  of  progress  in  the  Farther 
East  and  there  will  no  longer  be  a  Korean  Question. 


"^       r 
••••«i^ 


PART  III 
CHINA 


WE  have  witnessed  one  of  the  most  brazen  ex- 
amples of  international  brigandage  in  the 
history  of  the  world.  In  less  than  four-score  years 
we  have  seen  China,  a  country  as  large  as  Europe, 
with  a  civilization  extending  back  into  the  mists  of 
antiquity,  rifled  of  territory  and  resources  by  a  hand- 
ful of  predatory  nations  with  as  little  compunction  as 
a  gang  of  lawless  boys  would  raid  a  farmer's  orchard. 
We  have  seen  this  vast,  rich,  peaceable,  defenceless 
country  bullied,  intimidated,  reduced  to  a  state  of 
virtual  vassalage,  and  parceled  out  in  spheres  of  in- 
fluence, leases  obtained  under  duress,  and  enforced 
concessions  by  methods  which,  in  their  effrontery  and 
callousness,  are  reminiscent  of  the  freebooters  of  the 
Spanish  Main.  The  story  of  the  pillage  of  China  is 
saturated  with  intrigue  and  corruption,  deceit  and 
trickery,  selfishness  and  greed.  It  forms  one  of  the 
most  shameful  and  depressing  chapters  in  the  history 
of  our  times  and  makes  a  mockery  of  Europe's  sancti- 
monious championship  of  justice  and  fair-dealing. 

181 


182       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

The  bewilderment  and  discouragement  which 
usually  reward  those  foreigners  who  attempt  to 
acquire  a  clear-cut  understanding  of  the  Chinese 
situation  are  primarily  due,  in  my  opinion,  to  their 
failure  to  comprehend  the  peculiar  geographic  divi- 
sions of  the  country  and  the  ethnologic  distinctions 
of  its  inhabitants.  Opening  the  atlas  to  the  map  of 
Asia,  they  see  an  enormous  wedge-shaped  territory, 
nearly  one  third  larger  than  the  United  States,  driven 
so  deeply  into  the  continent  that  its  point  impinges 
on  the  Afghan  border.  Because  this  wedge  is  tinted 
yellow  and  labeled  "China,"  they  naturally  assume 
that  it  is  a  compact  nation,  like  Italy  or  France,  and 
that  its  three  hundred  million  inhabitants  are  one 
homogeneous  race,  like  the  Italians  or  the  French. 
Strictly  speaking,  however,  the  term  "China"  is  ap- 
plicable only  to  a  single  section  of  this  vast  territory, 
and  the  term  "Chinese"  only  to  the  natives  of  that 
section. 

The  territory  which  comprised  the  Chinese  Em- 
pire, and  which  was  inherited,  at  least  in  theory,  by 
the  Chinese  Republic,  consists  of  five^  great  racio- 
political  divisions :  Manchuria  in  the  northeast,  Mon- 
golia in  the  north,  Sinkiang^  in  the  west,  Tibet  in 
the  southwest,  and  China  proper  in  the  southeast. 
Though  the  design  adopted  by  the  republic  for  its 

*The  Chinese  assert  that  the  republic  consists  of  only  four  political 
divisions,  China,  Mongolia,  Sinkiang,  and  Tibet,  claiming  that  Manchuria 
should  be  considered  a  part  of  China  proper. 

*  Sinkiang,  or  the  New  Dominion,  consists  of  Kulja,  Kashgaria,  and 
Chinese  Turkestan. 


CHINA  183 

new  flag,  on  which  the  old  yellow  dragon  has  been 
replaced  by  five  latitudinal  stripes — crimson,  yellow, 
blue,  white,  and  black — to  denote  the  five  races — 
Mongol,  Chinese,  Manchu,  Turki,^  and  Tibetan — 
which  comprise  the  Chinese  people,  might  be  inter- 
preted as  symbolic  of  national  solidarity,  the  very  re- 
verse is  the  truth,  for  these  five  divisions,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  are  bound  together  by  the  loosest  and  weakest 
of  ties.  This  lack  of  homogeneity  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  various  elements  of  the  population  have  little 
in  common,  being  wholly  distinct  in  origin,  history, 
characteristics,  traditions,  and  language.  For  ex- 
ample, the  speech  of  a  Tibetan  is  as  unintelligible  to 
a -Mongol,  a  Manchu,  or  a  Chinese  as  Gaelic  is  to  an 
Englishman. 

Now  it  should  be  clearly  understood  that  of  these 
five  great  divisions  three — Mongolia,  Sinkiang,  and 
Tibet — are  little  more  than  outlying  dependencies 
over  which  the  central  government  exercises  the 
vaguest  and  most  shadowy  control.  Tibet,  for  in- 
stance, is  nominally  a  territory  of  the  Chinese  Re- 
public, yet  the  Peking  government  may  not  appoint 
or  dismiss  a  single  Tibetan  official  without  the  sanc- 
tion of  the  government  of  British  India.  In  fact, 
Tibet  may  be  said  to  be  far  more  under  the  rule  of 
Calcutta  than  of  Peking.  The  vast  and  ill-defined 
tract  of  country  known  as  Mongolia,  a  region  five 
times  the  size  of  Texas,  is  likewise  considered  a  part 

*The  Turkis  are  the  Mohammedan  inhabitants  of  Sinkiang. 


184       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

of  the  republic,  yet  the  central  government  has  seen 
fit  to  raise  a  tariff  wall  between  this  border  territory 
and  the  homeland  by  imposing  a  duty  of  ten  per  cent, 
ad  valorem  on  goods  imported  from  Mongolia  into 
China,  or  vice  versa,  whereas  Mongolian  products 
are  permitted  to  enter  Russian  territory  duty  free. 

Though  the  three  outlying  dependencies  have  a 
combined  area  of  nearly  two  and  one  half  million 
square  miles,  or  about  two  thirds  of  the  total  area  of 
the  republic,  they  are  very  sparsely  settled,  their  in- 
habitants comprising  not  more  than  seven  per  cent,  of 
the  total  population.  They  are,  moreover,  remotely 
situated  and  are  entirely  destitute  of  modem  means 
of  communication,  being  accessible  only  by  the 
ancient  caravan  routes.  Hence,  notwithstanding 
their  enormous  extent  and  their  immense  wealth  in 
undeveloped  resources,  Mongolia,  Sinkiang,  and 
Tibet  play  no  greater  part  in  Chinese  politics  than 
Alaska,  Porto  Rico,  and  the  Philippines  play  in 
American  politics,  if  as  much.  But,  politically  and 
economically  unimportant  though  they  are  at  present, 
I  would  stake  my  life  that  these  remote  and  little- 
known  regions  will  be  great  countries  some  day. 

Manchuria,  owing  to  its  greater  population  (about 
twenty  millions),  its  extensive  railway  system,  and 
its  strategic  position  athwart  the  routes  from  Siberia 
and  Korea  to  China  proper,  has  a  status  quite  dif- 
ferent from  that  of  the  dependencies  just  mentioned. 
Though  most  foreign  authorities  regard  Manchuria 


CHINA  185 

as  an  outlying  territory  of  the  republic,  the  Chinese 
themselves — for  reasons  of  political  expediency,  I 
imagine — assert  that  its  correct  desi^ation  is  not 
"Manchuria,"  which  is  not  a  Chinese  term,  but  "The 
Three  Eastern  Provinces,"^  and  that  it  forms  an 
integral  part  of  China  proper.  This  region  is  now 
colonized  almost  entirely  by  immigrants  from  the 
northern  provinces  of  China  and  the  immigration 
continues  steadily  by  road  and  sea.  As  a  result,  the 
Manchu  population  has  been  almost  completely  ab- 
sorbed by  the  Chinese,  a  few  scattered  Manchu  com- 
munities alone  remaining.  Manchuria's  position  as 
a  debated  borderland,  its  unsettled  political  condi- 
tion, the  prevalence  of  brigandage,  the  great  tide  of 
immigration,  the  high-handed  and  often  lawless 
methods  pursued  both  by  the  local  governors  and  the 
Japanese  mihtary  authorities — all  these  find  striking 
parallels  in  the  conditions  which  prevailed  along  the 
Rio  Grande  during  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  when  Texas  was  a  bone  of  contention  be- 
tween Mexico  and  the  United  States. 

When  all  is  said  and  done,  the  only  one  of  the  five 
divisions  of  the  republic  that  counts  pohtically  is 
China  proper.  This  is  the  great  apple-shaped  ter- 
ritory in  the  southeast,  consisting  of  the  eighteen 
provinces — Chihh,  Shansi,  Shantung,  Kangsi,  Shensi, 
Honan,  Anhwei,  Kiangsu,  Szechwan,  Hupeh,  Che- 

*The  region  commonly  referred  to  as  Manchuria  consists  of  the  prov- 
inces of  Fengtien,  Kirin,  and  Heilungchiang. 


186       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

kiang,  Kwaichow,  Hunan,  Kiangsi,  Fukien,  Yunnan, 
Kwangsi,  and  Kwantung — ^which  bulges  out,  like  a 
huge  bay-window,  into  the  China  Sea.  Though  China 
comprises  only  about  one  third  of  the  country's  total 
area,  it  contains  nearly  nine  tenths  of  the  total  popu- 
lation, together  with  virtually  the  whole  of  the  sea- 
board and  nearly  all  of  the  larger  cities,  which  ex- 
plains its  dominancy  in  national  affairs. 

As  I  have  already  pointed  out,  the  inhabitants  of 
the  various  divisions  of  the  republic  speak  entirely 
different  tongues.  Hence,  intercommunication  is 
slow  and  uncertain.  And  history  has  repeatedly 
shown  that  a  country  handicapped  by  inadequate 
means  of  communication  rarely  is  well  governed.  The 
difficulty  of  welding  these  various  races  into  a  homo- 
geneous nation  is  still  further  increased  by  the  fact 
that  even  in  China  proper  we  find  not  one  spoken 
language,  but  a  number  of  dialects,  all  clearly  of  a 
common  stock,  yet  differing  from  one  another  as 
widely  as  the  various  Romance  languages  of  Europe 
— say,  French,  Spanish,  and  Italian.  It  is  a  common 
occurrence,  indeed,  when  a  man  from  Chihli  meets  a 
man  from  Kwantung  for  them  to  fall  back  on  Pidgin 
English  as  a  medium  of  communication.  In  the 
South,  Cantonese  is  generally  spoken  on  the  coast 
and  Hakka  in  the  interior.  Proceeding  northward, 
we  find  in  succession  the  Swatow,  Foochow,  Wen- 
chow,  and  Ningpo  dialects.  Still  farther  north  we 
come  into  the  range  of  the  great  dialect  popularly 


CHINA  187 

known  as  Mandarin,  which  sweeps  around  behind  the 
narrow  coastal  strip  where  the  various  dialects  just 
mentioned  are  spoken  and  dominates  a  hinterland 
constituting  nearly  four  fifths  of  China  proper.  Of 
all  these  tongues.  Mandarin  is  by  far  the  most  im- 
portant. Not  only  can  it  claim  to  be  the  native  speech 
of  the  majority  of  Chinese,  but  it  is  the  recognized 
medium  of  oral  communication  between  all  Chinese 
officials,  even  when  they  come  from  the  same  part  of 
the  country  and  speak  the  same  patois.  In  the  de- 
pendencies, though  the  officials  usually  are  familiar 
with  Mandarin,  the  natives  speak  only  their  own  out- 
landish tongues.  Hence,  a  Chinaman  traveling  in 
Mongolia,  Sinkiang,  or  Tibet  has  almost  as  much  diffi- 
culty in  making  himself  understood  as  would  a  Euro- 
pean, while  the  services  of  interpreters  are  frequently 
required  at  official  conclaves  in  Peking. 

By  glancing  at  the  map  you  will  see  that  China 
proper  is  bisected  latitudinally  by  Asia's  greatest 
river,  the  three-thousand-mile-long  Yangtze.  It 
might  naturally  be  supposed  that  this  mighty  water- 
way would  form  the  dividing  line  between  "the 
North"  and  "the  South"— a  sort  of  Chinese  Mason 
and  Dixon's  Une,  as  it  were — but  this  is  not  the  case. 
The  real  Hne  of  demarcation  is  ethnologic  rather  than 
geographic.  "The  North,"  speaking  broadly,  may 
be  said  to  embrace  those  regions  inhabited  by  the 
descendants  of  those  Mongol-Tartar  tribes  who  set- 
tled in  the  basin  of  the  Yellow  River  in  the  dim  dawn 


188       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

of  history,  at  least  forty  centuries  ago,  and  who,  as 
the  years  passed,  gradually  spread  in  all  directions, 
forming  the  race  known  to  ethnologists  as  the  "conti- 
nental" Chinese.  "The  South,"  on  the  other  hand, 
consists  of  those  districts  along  the  Chinese  littoral, 
from  the  frontiers  of  Indo-China  nearly  to  the 
Yangtze,  together  with  their  immediate  hinterlands, 
which  were  colonized  by  immigrants  of  Malay  origin 
early  in  the  Christian  era.  Though  these  two  races 
have  lived  side  by  side,  under  the  same  rule,  for  close 
on  two  thousand  years,  they  have  never  become  com- 
pletely amalgamated,  still  being  distinguished  by 
many  of  their  ancient  characteristics.  The  "conti- 
nental" Chinese,  for  example,  speak  the  Mandarin 
tongue,  while  the  "coastal"  Chinese  cling  to  the  va- 
rious dialects  spoken  along  the  littoral.  Thus  it  will 
be  seen  that  the  existing  differences  between  the 
North  and  the  South  are  not  wholly  political.  Racial 
characteristics  also  enter  into  the  question.  Surely 
it  is  no  matter  for  surprise  that  the  children  of  those 
fierce  Tartar  tribesmen  who  swept  out  of  Inner  Asia 
should  not  always  see  eye  to  eye  with  the  descendants 
of  those  daring  sea-rovers  who  came  sailing  up  in 
their  fragile  prahus  from  the  islands  and  jungles  of 
Malaysia.  / 

n 

The  last  of  the  thirty-odd  dynasties  that  ruled 
China   was   the    Ta   Tsing    ("Great    Bright")    or 


\ 


THE  GREAT  WALL  OP  CHINA 
It  stretches  from  the  sea   to  the  borders  of  Turkestan 


ANOTHER  VIEW  OF  THE  GREAT  WALL 

It   runs  for  2500  miles  across  China 


CAMELS  UNDER  THE  WALLS  OF  PEKING 


^  W   JIB'    i 
THE  TARTAR  WALL  AND  A  PORTION  OP  THE  TARTAR  CITY  IN  PEKING 


CHINA  189 

Manchu,  whose  fierce  Tartar  chieftains  began  to  make 
their  power  felt  in  Manchuria  about  the  beginning 
of  the  sixteenth  century,  when  the  Mings,  a  Chinese 
house,  sat  on  the  Dragon  Throne.  Early  in  the  fol- 
lowing century  the  Ming  emperors  appealed  to  the 
Manchus  for  aid  in  putting  down  a  rebellion,  where- 
upon these  men  of  the  horse  and  the  tent  came  riding 
into  China  like  a  whirlwind,  just  as  another  Tartar 
tribe,  the  Osmanlis,  poured  into  Europe  behind  the 
horse-tail  standards.  Once  over  the  Great  Wall, 
they  quickly  secured  victory  for  those  who  had  called 
upon  them.  But,  recognizing  at  once  the  wealth  of 
the  land  and  the  weakness  of  its  rulers,  they  decided 
to  remain.  Establishing  themselves  in  the  rich  and 
populous  provinces  below  the  Wall,  they  quickly  suc- 
ceeded in  making  themselves  masters  of  the  country, 
monopohzing  the  military  and  most  of  the  civil  offices 
and  revenues.  In  1644  the  Ming  dynasty  came  to  an 
end  and  the  Manchus  assumed  the  reins  of  power. 
Holding  themselves  aloof  from  the  Chinese,  whom 
they  regarded  as  an  inferior  race,  they  compelled 
them  to  shave  the  fore-skull  and  to  adopt  the  queue 
as  a  mark  of  submission.  But  in  time  they  too  suc- 
cumbed to  luxury,  their  moral  fiber  disintegrated, 
and  they  gradually  lost  their  language  and  their  cus- 
toms, virtually  being  conquered  by  the  people  on 
whom  they  had  imposed  their  rule. 

Centuries  passed.    The  Chinese  slowly  yielded  to 
the  spirit  of  progress,  but  the  Manchus  appeared  for 


190       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

the  most  part  incapable  of  responding  to  the 
exigencies  of  the  modern  world.  Reformers  and 
thinking  men  began  to  realize  that  the  continuance 
in  power  of  the  Manchus  boded  disaster  and  spelled 
the  ultimate  partition  of  the  country  by  foreigners. 
Young  men  educated  abroad,  on  coming  home,  found 
the  situation  intolerable.  Every  branch  of  the  gov- 
ernment was  paralyzed  by  incompetence,  injustice, 
and  corruption.  And  while  the  great  mass  of  Chinese 
toiled  and  starved,  thousands  of  indolent  Manchu 
officials  battened  on  the  bounty  that  flowed  from  the 
Dragon  Throne.  The  death  in  1908  of  the  feeble- 
minded young  emperor,  shortly  followed  by  that  of 
the  empress  dowager,  "the  old  Buddha,"  and  the  ap- 
pointment of  Prince  Chun,  a  reactionary  of  the  reac- 
tionaries, as  regent  for  the  infant  named  to  fill  the 
throne,  hastened  the  inevitable.  Though  the  govern- 
ment at  Peking,  reading  the  signs  of  the  times, 
reluctantly  promised  a  modern  constitution  and  a 
representative  government,  it  postponed  the  promul- 
gation of  the  one  and  the  convocation  of  the  other, 
thereby  irritating  the  discontented  elements  and  pro- 
voking open  rebellion. 

Now  appeared  a  leader,  a  Cantonese  named  Dr. 
Sun  Yat-sen,  a  Christian,  a  man  of  science,  and  a 
physician.  Educated  in  the  British  colony  of  Hong 
Kong,  converted  to  Christianity  in  Honolulu,  long 
a  resident  in  San  Francisco  and  London,  he  is  one  of 
the  most  picturesque  and  interesting  figures  ever 


CHINA  191 

produced  in  the  East.  The  story  of  his  life  would 
provide  material  for  a  dozen  novels.  Unsuccessful 
in  his  attempts  to  enter  official  life,  he  turned  against 
the  government,  being  compelled  to  flee  from  China 
while  still  a  young  man  because  of  his  seditious 
activities.  Estabhshing  himself  in  London,  he  quickly 
became  the  leading  spirit  in  a  revolutionary  junta 
which  aimed  to  rid  China  of  Manchu  rule.  Brought 
to  a  tardy  realization  of  the  rapidity  with  which 
the  movement  led  by  Sun  Yat-sen  was  spreading,  the 
court  at  Peking  offered  a  reward  of  fifty  thousand 
dollars  for  his  death  or  capture.  His  escapes  from 
assassination  partook  of  the  miraculous.  While  stay- 
ing in  London  he  was  kidnapped  by  agents  of  the 
imperial  government  and  conveyed  to  the  Chinese 
Legation,  preparatory  to  smuggling  him  aboard  a 
ship  bound  for  China.  Had  not  the  British  Govern- 
ment insisted  on  his  release,  he  would  have  met  his 
end  beneath  the  sword  of  a  Manchu  executioner,  and 
the  revolutionary  movement  might  well  have  perished 
with  him. 

In  the  North  the  man  of  destiny  was  Yuan  Shih- 
kai,  a  pupil  of  and  a  worthy  successor  to  that  great 
statesman,  Li  Hung-chang.  A  native  of  Honan,  a 
mandarin,  and  a  devout  Gonfucian,  he  had  served  in 
turn  as  Chinese  Resident  in  Korea,  as  Viceroy  of  the 
metropolitan  district  of  Chihli,  in  which  Peking  is 
situated,  as  head  of  the  Waiwupu,  or  foreign  office, 
and,  at  the  very  end  of  the  Manchu  reign,  as  prime 


192       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

minister  of  the  empire.  A  past-master  in  all  the  arts 
of  mandarin  intrigue,  an  expert  in  opportunism,  an 
adherent  of  the  corrupt  traditions  which  have  char- 
acterized the  government  of  China  for  centuries,  a 
staunch  supporter  of  the  imperial  dynasty,  he  was 
nevertheless  sufficiently  shrewd  and  far-sighted  to 
realize  that  the  Manchu  government  as  it  had  hitherto 
existed,  incompetent  and  rotten  to  the  core,  could 
not  endure. 

Thus  the  coimtry  became  divided  into  two  camps: 
the  party  of  the  North,  composed  in  the  main  of  reac- 
tionary office-holders  and  militarists,  some  of  whom 
were  foreign-trained,  headed  by  Yuan  Shih-kai;  and 
the  party  of  the  South,  consisting  of  students,  intel- 
lectuals, men  of  progressive  tendencies,  many  of 
whom  had  been  educated  abroad,  under  the  leader- 
ship of  Sun  Yat-sen.  It  was  autocracy  versus  de- 
mocracy, the  "stand-patters"  against  the  progres- 
sives, the  old  order  of  things  as  opposed  to  the  new. 

By  1910  the  revolutionary  movement,  starting  in 
Canton  and  Hunan,  had  spread  over  all  of  the  south- 
ern provinces.  The  men  of  the  reorganized  army, 
well  armed  and  ably  led,  had  early  thrown  in  their 
lot  with  the  insurgents,  and  against  them  the  troops 
of  the  imperial  household  could  make  httle  headway. 
There  was  desultory  fighting  throughout  1911,  but 
on  the  whole  the  revolution  was  comparatively  blood- 
less, far  fewer  lives  being  sacrificed  than  has  been  the 
case  in  far  less  important  political  upheavals  in  West- 


CHINA  193 

era  countries.  Toward  the  close  of  1911  the  revolu- 
tionary committee,  which  had  been  joined  by  Wu 
Ting-fang,  at  one  time  Chinese  Minister  to  the 
United  States  and  one  of  the  ablest  men  in  China, 
met  at  Nanking,  organized  a  provisional  government, 
drafted  a  provisional  constitution,  and  proclaimed  a 
republic.  The  presidency  of  the  new  government 
was  offered  to  Yuan  Shih-kai,  then  prime  minister 
of  the  tottering  empire,  but  he  declined,  presumably 
because  he  questioned  the  strength  of  the  movement. 
Sun  Yat-sen,  the  father  of  the  revolution,  thereupon 
consented  to  become  the  first  provisional  president 
of  the  Chinese  Republic.  But  when  the  monarchists 
acknowledged  the  fait  accompli,  in  February,  1912, 
by  announcing  the  abdication  of  the  boy-emperor, 
Suan-t'ung,  Sun  Yat-sen,  anxious  to  bring  to  the 
support  of  the  republic  the  powerful  northern  ele- 
ment represented  by  Yuan  Shih-kai,  offered  to  resign 
the  presidency  in  his  favor.  This  time  Yuan  accepted 
and  was  duly  elected  by  the  provisional  government 
the  second  provisional  president  of  China. 

The  constitution  drafted  by  the  revolutionists  in 
Nanking  provided  for  a  provisional  president  and 
vice-president,  and  a  national  council,  which  was  to 
exercise  legislative  powers  until  such  time  as  a  regular 
parliament  could  be  convened  in  accordance  with  laws 
which  the  National  Council  was  to  enact.  These  laws 
were  enacted  and  a  parhament,  consisting  of  a  Senate 
and  a  House  of  Representatives,  was  duly  elected. 


194       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

The  members  of  the  Lower  House  were  to  serve  for 
three  years,  the  members  of  the  Senate  for  six  years, 
one  third  retiring  every  two  years.  This  parliament 
was  opened  in  Peking  early  in  1913,  the  world  being 
treated  to  the  curious  spectacle  of  elected  representa- 
tives from  every  province  of  China  proper  and  from 
the  outlying  dependencies,  most  of  them  wearing 
frock-coats  and  top-hats,  assembling  in  the  ancient 
stronghold  of  the  Manchu  power,  within  the  walls  of 
the  Forbidden  City,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  China, 
which  for  four  thousand  years  had  been  the  most 
absolute  of  monarchies,  a  democratic  form  of  govern- 
ment. 

Parliament,  in  addition  to  being  the  national  legis- 
lative body  of  the  republic,  was  to  draft  and  promul- 
gate a  permanent  constitution  and  to  elect  the  presi- 
dent and  vice-president,  it  being  obviously  unwise,  in 
view  of  the  ignorance  and  political  inexperience  of  the 
great  mass  of  the  people,  to  have  the  head  of  the 
nation  elected  by  popular  vote.  A  presidential  elec- 
tion law,  dealing  with  the  election  and  term  of  office 
of  the  president,  was  accordingly  passed,  and  on 
October  6,  1913,  at  a  joint  session  of  the  two  Houses, 
Yuan  Shih-kai,  already  provisional  president,  was 
elected  as  the  first  (regular)  president  of  the  Chinese 
Republic.  The  vice-presidency  went  to  Li  Yuan- 
hung,  a  graduate  of  the  Peiyang  Naval  College,  who 
served  on  a  cruiser  during  the  Chino-Japanese  War, 
afterward  entering  the  army,  in  which  he  rose  to  the 


CHINA  195 

grade  of  general,  eventually  being  appointed  Chief 
of  the  General  Staff. 

The  Parliament  of  1913  was  dominated  by  the 
Kuo-min-tang,  or  People's  Party,  which  was  the 
original  revolutionary  organization  and  which, 
broadly  speaking,  represented  the  views  of  southern 
China.  As  might  have  been  expected,  the  new  par- 
liament was  extremely  jealous  of  its  constitutional 
rights,  particularly  the  control  of  the  cabinet  and  the 
treasury.  But,  from  the  very  beginning.  President 
Yuan  Shih-Kai,  steeped  in  the  traditions  of  autocracy 
and  accustomed  to  exact  unquestioning  obedience  to 
his  commands,  refused  to  submit  to  parliamentary 
dictation.  He  had  been  in  office  only  a  few  weeks 
before  he  defied  parliament  by  placing  his  personal 
friends,  men  of  the  North,  in  cabinet  positions  and 
by  contracting  a  loan  without  parliamentary  authori- 
zation. These  high-handed  and  unconstitutional  pro- 
ceedings instantly  aroused  the  violent  opposition  of 
the  Kuo-min-tang,  whose  members,  led  by  Sun  Yat- 
sen,  foresaw  that,  were  they  to  be  permitted  to  con- 
tinue, the  republican  structure  which  they  had  so 
painstakingly  reared  would  quickly  be  undermined. 
Sun  Yat-sen  and  his  adherents  demanded  govern- 
ment by  the  people  through  their  representatives  in 
parliament,  while  President  Yuan  Shih-kai  soon  made 
it  clear  that  he  proposed  to  reign  without  a  parliament 
rather  than  be  hampered  by  systematic  opposition. 
But  the  opposition,  instead  of  declining,   steadily 


196       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

gained  in  strength,  whereupon  President  Yuan  de- 
cided to  rid  himself  of  it  for  good  and  all.  Accord- 
ingly, on  the  night  of  November  4,  1913,  he  issued 
orders  for  the  immediate  dissolution  of  the  Kuo-min- 
tang  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  seditious  organiza- 
tion and  that  its  members  were  rebels.  It  was  as 
though  President  Wilson  had  dissolved  the  Repub- 
lican party  and  driven  its  members  from  the  Senate 
and  the  House  in  order  to  rid  himself  of  Republican 
opposition.  The  effect  of  this  coup  d'etat  was  to 
unseat  more  than  half  of  the  members  of  Parliament, 
thereby  depriving  it  of  the  quorum  necessary  for  the 
transaction  of  business.  As  the  Kuo-min-tang  repre- 
sented the  South,  this  arbitrary  procedure  left  all 
southern  China  without  parliamentary  representa- 
tion, the  government  now  being  completely  domi- 
nated by  Yuan  Shih-kai  and  his  northern  adherents. 
The  unseated  legislators,  threatened  with  arrest, 
fled  to  Canton,  where  they  established  a  schismatic 
government  under  the  leadership  of  Sun  Yat-sen.  A 
southern  army  was  organized  for  the  purpose  of 
marching  on  Peking  and  restoring  the  constitutional 
government,  but  Yuan  Shih-kai,  possessing  a  superi- 
ority of  force,  had  no  difficulty  in  crushing  the  con- 
stitutionalists, or,  to  put  it  more  accurately,  in  con- 
fining their  activities  to  the  south  of  the  Yangtze. 
This  was  the  second  revolution,  or,  if  you  prefer,  the 
first  civil  war,  and  it  resulted  in  dividing  China  into 


THE   JADE   PAGODA    NEAR  PEKING 


CHINA  197 

two  armed  camps — "the  North"  under  Yuan  Shih- 
kai,  and  "the  South"  under  Sun  Yat-sen. 

Emboldened  by  the  success  of  his  coup  d'etat,  Yuan 
Shih-kai  became  more  autocratic  than  ever.  In  order 
to  strengthen  his  grip  on  the  northern  provinces,  he 
appointed  his  militaiy  satellites  as  tuchuns,  or  pro- 
vincial military  governors,  who,  supported  by  large 
forces  of  soldiery  and  vested  with  dictatorial  powers, 
proceeded  to  enforce  Yuan's  dictates  in  their  respec- 
tive provinces.  Early  in  January,  1914,  President 
Yuan  formally  dissolved  the  rump  parliament  in 
Peking,  thereby  ridding  himself  of  the  last  vestige  of 
constitutional  control.  He  then  set  about  taking 
measures  to  strengthen  and  consolidate  his  power. 
The  first  of  these  measures  was  the  creation  of  a 
political  council,  composed  of  members  appointed  by 
himself.  This  body,  which  was  nothing  more  than 
Yuan's  instrument  and  mouthpiece,  recommended 
that  the  president  call  into  being  an  elected  assembly 
— the  idea  being,  no  doubt,  that  it  would  give  to  his 
unconstitutional  actions  at  least  a  flavor  of  legality. 
Within  six  weeks  the  political  council,  acting  under 
Yuan's  dictation,  had  drawn  up  an  "amended  pro- 
visional constitution"  which  provided  for  a  single- 
chambered  legislature,  whose  members  were  to  be 
elected  by  popular  vote,  and  a  council  of  state,  whose 
members,  appointed  by  the  president,  were  to  advise 
him  on  those  matters  on  which  he  might  consult  them. 


198       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

The  legislature  was  never  elected,  but  the  council 
of  state  sat  in  the  capacity  of  the  legislature  during 
1914  and  1915.  All  this  was  but  camouflage,  how- 
ever, designed  to  cloak  the  wholesale  usurpation  of 
power  by  Yuan  Shih-kai. 

In  the  summer  of  1915  a  movement  began  in  favor 
of  the  reestablishment  of  the  monarchy — a  movement 
secretly  inspired  by  Yuan,  who,  though  yielding  lip- 
service  to  the  republican  form  of  government,  har- 
bored the  secret  ambition  of  himself  ascending  the 
Dragon  Throne.  In  October  the  political  coimcil 
made  a  show  of  constitutional  procedure  by  referring 
the  question  of  reestablishing  the  monarchy  to  a  vote 
of  the  provinces,  or  rather  to  a  number  of  Yuan's 
political  henchmen.  The  issue,  of  which  there  never 
was  the  slightest  doubt,  was  a  practically  unanimous 
"vote"  in  favor  of  Yuan's  accession  to  the  throne  as 
emperor  of  a  constitutional  monarchy.  On  December 
12,  1915,  the  monarchy  was  formally  proclaimed,  the 
coronation  ceremony  being  set  for  the  February  fol- 
lowing. But  it  was  not  to  be.  For  within  a  week 
the  storm,  long  brewing,  which  was  to  put  an  end  to 
the  dictator  and  his  ambitions,  suddenly  burst  in  the 
distant  province  of  Yunnan,  which  declared  its  inde- 
pendence and  emphasized  its  opposition  to  the  restor- 
ation of  the  monarchy  by  despatching  a  rabble  army 
against  the  imperial  forces  which  had  been  hurried 
to  the  adjacent  province  of  Szechwan.  The  insur- 
rectionary movement  spread  with  surprising  rapidity 


CHINA  199 

and  Yuan's  star  quickly  began  to  decline.  Other 
provinces  followed  the  example  of  Yunnan  in  re- 
nouncing their  allegiance  to  the  Peking  government 
and  bodies  of  imperial  troops  began  to  make  common 
cause  with  the  rebels.  Late  in  January  Yuan's 
friends  persuaded  him  to  issue  a  proclamation  an- 
nouncing that  the  establishment  of  the  monarchy  had 
been  indefinitely  postponed.  But  the  announcement 
came  too  late.  The  debacle  had  begun.  In  April, 
1916,  Yuan,  in  a  last  desperate  attempt  to  retrieve 
something  from  the  wreck  of  his  ambitions,  agreed 
to  surrender  all  civil  authority  to  the  cabinet,  which 
had  been  reconstructed  under  the  premiership  of 
Yuan's  former  minister  of  war,  Tuan  Chi-ju,  an 
able  diplomatist  and  a  professional  harmonizer,  who, 
despite  his  monarchical  sympathies,  was  popular  with 
the  southern  faction.  Upon  coming  into  power, 
Premier  Tuan  Chi-ju  attempted  to  placate  the  South 
by  promising  that  parliamentary  government  would 
be  reestablished  at  an  early  date.  But  meantime  the 
members  of  the  Kuo-min-tang,  who  had  been  ex- 
pelled from  Peking,  had  organized  a  government  of 
their  own  at  Canton  and  had  proclaimed  Vice-Presi- 
dent Li  Yuan-hung  president  of  the  repubhc.  Thus 
China  found  itself  with  two  presidents  and  two  gov- 
ernments at  the  same  time.  But  on  June  5,  1916, 
Yuan  Shih-kai  simplified  the  comphcated  situation 
by  dying.  The  physicians  who  attended  him  an- 
nounced that  his  death  was  due  to  kidney  trouble  and 


200       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

nervou;S  prostration.  The  man  in  the  street  was 
probably  nearer  the  mark  when  he  said  that  he  died 
from  disappointment  and  humiliation — from  "loss  of 
face." 

The  parliament  which  had  been  dissolved  by  Yuan 
in  1913  was  reconvened  in  August,  1916,  under  the 
presidency  of  Li  Yuan-hung,  and  the  provisional 
constitution  of  1912  was  again  recognized  as  the 
fimdamental  law  of  the  republic.  The  reestab- 
lished parliament  at  once  began  consideration  of  a 
draft  of  a  permanent  constitution,  but  friction  quickly 
developed  between  the  militarists  of  the  North  and 
the  republicans  of  the  South.  After  some  months  of 
bickering,  the  military  governors  of  several  of  the 
northern  provinces  declared  their  independence  of 
Peking  and  proceeded  to  establish  a  provisional  gov- 
ernment at  Tientsin.  President  Li's  position  had  now 
become  difficult  and  dangerous.  In  the  hope  of  gain- 
ing support  in  his  struggle  with  the  military  gov- 
ernors, who,  backed  by  armies  of  mercenaries,  had 
become  all-powerful  in  their  respective  provinces,  the 
president  invited  to  Peking  as  a  mediator  General 
Chang  Hsun,  a  swashbuckling  soldier  and  a  former 
pillar  of  the  Manchu  dynasty,  who  since  1911  had 
maintained  himself  as  virtual  dictator  of  southern 
Shantung.  General  Chang  Hsun  came  promptly, 
bringing  with  him  a  "bodyguard"  of  several  thousand 
men,  who  proceeded  to  occupy  railway  junctions  and 
other  strategic  positions  about  the  capital.    The  day 


CHINA  201 

after  Chang  Hsun's  arrival  in  the  capital  President 
Li  issued  a  mandate  dissolving  parliament. 

Though  summoned  to  Peking  as  a  mediator,  Chang 
Hsun  did  not  accept  the  role  assigned  to  him.  He 
had  been  a  dictator  and-  a  dictator  he  intended  to 
remain.  He  dreamed,  as  had  Yuan  Shih-kai,  of 
attaining  supreme  power,  but,  remembering  the  dis- 
aster that  had  overtaken  his  predecessor,  he  did  not 
plan  to  himself  assume  the  imperial  yellow.  He  de- 
cided that  it  was  safer,  and  equally  satisfactory,  to 
be  the  power  behind  the  throne,  his  plans  calling  for 
the  restoration  of  the  Manchu  dynasty  in  the  form 
of  a  regency  administered  by  himself  as  viceroy  of 
Chihli — ^the  province  in  which  the  capital  is  situated. 
For  Chinese  history  has  repeatedly  shown  that  he  who 
holds  Chihli  holds  Peking.  Accordingly,  before  day- 
break of  July  1,  1917,  General  Chang  Hsun  sum- 
moned from  his  bed  the  boy-emperor,  who  for  five 
years  had  been  living  in  enforced  but  luxurious  seclu- 
sion in  the  Forbidden  City,  and  informed  the  bewil- 
dered and  frightened  lad  that  he  was  to  reascend  the 
Dragon  Throne.  But  the  restored  monarchy  found 
itself  confronted  with  opposition  on  every  hand. 
Even  the  military  governors,  on  whose  support 
Chang  Hsun  had  confidently  counted,  refused  to 
support  the  new  regime — not  because  they  were  op- 
posed to  the  monarchy,  but  because  they  were  afraid 
that  Chang  Hsun,  as  regent,  might  succeed  in  under- 
mining their  own  power.    An  army  under  the  former 


202       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

premier,  Tuan  Chi-ju,  advanced  on  the  capital  from 
Tientsin,  while  another  force  threatened  to  move  up 
from  the  South  under  the  command  of  Vice-President 
Feng  Kuo-chang.  On  July  7,  after  less  than  a 
week's  reign,  the  emperor  announced  his  abdication. 
Chang  Hsun's  troops  attempted  a  feeble  defense  of 
the  imperial  city,  but  capitulated  after  a  few  days  of 
comic-opera  warfare,  the  would-be  dictator  seeking 
refuge  in  the  Dutch  legation. 

President  Li  Yuan-hung,  who,  upon  the  restora- 
tion of  the  monarchy,  had  fled  to  the  Japanese  lega- 
tion, declined  to  resume  a  post  for  which  he  had  no 
Uking  and  for  which  he  was  not  adapted,  and  resigned 
in  favor  of  his  vice-president.  General  Feng  Kuo- 
chang,  who  had  been  in  command  of  the  South's  mili- 
tary forces.  The  accepted  theory  in  Peking  at  this 
time  was  that  the  situation  had  now  reverted  to  the 
one  which  had  existed  in  1912,  immediately  after  the 
promulgation  of  the  Provisional  Constitution;  that 
all  that  had  transpired  during  the  interim  was  illegal ; 
and  that  everything  must  be  done  over  again.  Presi- 
dent Feng  Kuo-chang  accordingly  convened  a  council 
for  the  purpose  of  drafting  new  laws  for  the  election 
of  a  new  parliament,  which  was  duly  opened  in  Au- 
gust, 1918.  A  few  days  later,  by  425  out  of  436  votes, 
Hsu  Shih-chang,  a  native  of  Himan,  who  had  held 
in  turn  the  posts  of  Viceroy  of  Manchuria,  Grand 
Secretary,  Grand  Councillor,  Vice-Premier,  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff,  and  Grand  Guardian  of  the  Em- 


CHINA  203 

peror,  was  elected  President  of  the  republic.  His 
term  of  office  will  expire  in  1923. 

But  the  Peking  reading  of  the  situation  did  not 
satisfy  South  China  or  the  members  of  the  old  par- 
liament, who  had  been  unseated  a  second  time.  These 
were  summoned  to  meet  at  Canton  and  to  constitute 
the  real  representative  legislature  of  the  republic. 
During  the  summer  of  1918  a  quorum  of  the  old  par- 
liament was  obtained,  and  for  about  a  year  China  had 
two  parliaments — ^the  one  sitting  at  Peking,  the  other 
at  Canton — each  subscribing  to  the  Provisional  Con- 
stitution of  1912  and  each  claiming  to  be  the  sole 
legislative  body  of  the  republic.  The  Canton  Parlia- 
ment finally  broke  up,  however,  in  1919. 

Throughout  the  whole  of  1918  there  was  desultory 
fighting  between  the  North  and  the  South,  the 
provinces  chiefly  affected  being  those  along  the 
Yangtze  River.  But  the  inabihty  of  the  North  to 
make  any  headway  in  the  campaign,  the  financial 
embarrassments  of  both  sides,  and  the  growing  dis- 
satisfaction with  a  state  of  affairs  that  disrupted  the 
country  and  promised  to  lead  nowhere  resulted  in  the 
president  proclaiming  an  armistice  when  the  news  of 
the  armistice  in  Europe  reached  China.  At  about  the 
time  the  Peace  Conference  was  assembhng  at  Ver- 
sailles, another  peace  conference,  composed  of  rep- 
resentatives of  the  North  and  the  South,  was  as- 
sembhng on  the  neutral  ground  provided  by  (the 
Foreign  Settlement  of  Shanghai.    But  after  months 


204       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

of  parleying  the  two  factions  appear  to  be  no  nearer 
an  agreement  than  before  the  conference  began.  At 
the  moment  of  writing,  President  Hsu  Shih-chang  is 
still  nominally  in  power  in  the  North,  while  Dr.  Sun 
Yat-sen,  with  the  title  of  Administrative  Director, 
appears  to  be  in  control  of  affairs  in  South  China. 

To  add  to  the  existing  confusion,  were  such  a  thing 
possible,  both  the  North  and  the  South  proceeded  to 
spht  into  opposing  factions,  so  that  the  already  dis- 
tracted country,  instead  of  being  divided  into  two 
camps,  found  itself  broken  up  into  four  clearly  de- 
fined groups,  each  plotting  against  and  checkmating 
the  others.  The  North  split  into  the  Anfu  Club  and 
the  Chihli  factions.  The  Anfu  Club  was  a  political 
organization  composed  of  military  men  who  were  pro- 
Japanese  in  their  sympathies  and  most  of  whom  were 
popularly  credited  with  being  in  the  pay  of  Japan. 
The  Chihli  group  took  its  name  from  the  metro- 
politan province  in  which  Peking  is  situated. 

Upon  the  death  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  the  leadership 
of  the  North  passed,  as  I  have  already  explained,  to 
General  Tuan  Chi-ju,  a  native  of  Anhwei  Province 
and  a  pillar  of  the  Anfu  Club,  who  became  premier 
in  the  cabinet  of  President  Feng  Kuo-chang,  who  was 
a  native  of  Chihli.  In  making  his  appointments, 
President  Feng  naturally  favored  men  from  his  own 
province  of  ChihH,  whereas  Premier  Tuan  insisted 
on  filling  the  positions  with  men  from  Anhwei.  This 
was  the  beginning  of  a  schism  which  split  the  North 


<  o 

W  .2 
SI 

K  ^ 


The  official   residence  of   the  President   of  China 


The    Throne    Hall 
IN   THE   FORBIDDEN   CITY 


CHINA  205 

wide  open.  The  president  and  his  premier  intrigued 
against  each  other  in  every  possible  way  and  on  every 
possible  occasion.  Premier  Tuan  and  his  fellow- 
members  of  the  Anfu  Club,  bought  with  Japanese 
gold,  advocated  a  rapprochement  with  Japan.  Presi- 
dent Feng  and  his  Chihli  adherents,  on  the  contrary, 
recognizing  the  popular  hostility  toward  Japan, 
steadfastly  opposed  everything  which  threatened  to 
strengthen  Japan's  grip  on  China.  The  military  men 
of  the  Anfu  Club  insisted  on  bringing  the  South  to 
terms  by  force  of  arms,  whereas  the  Chihli  group 
believed  in  conciliatory  measures.  When  Premier 
Tuan  despatched  a  military  expedition  against  the 
southern  insurgents,  the  provinces  of  Kiangsu, 
Kiangsi,  and  Hupeh,  all  controlled  by  President 
Feng  and  the  Chihli  faction  and  all  occupying  strate- 
gic positions  along  the  Yangtze  River,  not  only  re- 
fused to  assist  the  enterprise,  but  even  adopted  to- 
ward the  South  a  policy  of  friendly  neutraUty.  In 
the  simimer  of  1920  the  smoldering  enmity  between 
the  Anfu  and  Chihli  factions  flamed  into  open  war- 
fare. There  was  a  skirmish  in  the  imperial  city  in 
which  a  few  lives  were  lost,  whereupon  the  Anfu 
troops  either  fled  or  surrendered,  leaving  the  Chihli 
faction  in  undisputed  control  of  the  North.  By  this 
time  pubhc  opinion  had  become  so  inflamed  against 
those  officials  who  were  believed  to  be  intriguing  with 
Japan  that  Tuan  Chi-ju,  sensing  the  rising  storm, 
hastily  resigned  the  premiership  and  withdrew  from 


206       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

public  life,  his  fellow- Anfuites  seeking  safety  in  the 
Japanese  legation.  Thus  collapsed  the  notorious 
Anfu  Club,  one  of  the  most  potent  agencies  for  evil 
in  China. 

The  story  of  the  dissensions  which  resulted  in  split- 
ting the  South  into  two  factions  is  equally  saturated 
with  jealousy,  intrigue,  and  corruption.  Here,  as  in 
the  North,  personal  greed  and  ambition  were  the  prin- 
cipal factors.  In  Canton,  as  in  Peking,  it  was  a  case 
of  the  "outs"  versus  the  "ins."  The  southern  govern- 
ment originally  consisted  of  those  members  of  the  first 
Chinese  Parliament  who  had  been  unseated  by  Yuan 
Shih-kai,  and  who,  fleeing  to  Canton,  had  there  organ- 
ized the  provisional  government.  This  government 
had  no  president,  but  was  headed  by  a  board  of  seven 
men,  known  as  Administrative  Directors.  For  a  time 
things  went  smoothly  enough,  but  friction  eventually 
developed  and  the  directorate  split  into  two  factions. 
One  faction  came  to  be  known  as  the  Sun- Wu-Tang 
group  from  the  first  names  of  its  principal  leaders — 
Sun  Yat-sen,  Wu  Ting-fang,  and  Tang  Shao-yi. 
The  other  faction,  headed  by  two  other  directors, 
Chen  Chun-hsien  and  Lu  Yung-ting,  in  like  manner 
took  the  appellation  of  the  Chen-Lu  group.  The  split 
came  because  Chen  and  Lu  persisted  in  ignoring  the 
decisions  of  the  majority  of  the  directorate,  because 
they  used  funds  appropriated  to  pay  members  of  par- 
hament  for  the  payment  of  their  own  troops,  and 
because  it  was  discovered  that  they  were  carrying  on 


CHINA  207 

secret  negotiations  with  the  Chihli  group  in  the  North. 
The  Chen-Lu  faction  replied  to  these  accusations  by 
charging  the  Sun- Wu-Tang  party  with  intriguing 
with  the  Anfu  Club.  The  existing  relations  between 
the  two  southern  factions  are  ill-defined.  Though 
both  maintain  armed  forces  in  the  field,  they  fight 
but  rarely,  and,  to  add  to  the  Gilbert  and  Sulli- 
van atmosphere,  their  leaders  are  in  constant  tele- 
graphic communication  with  each  other  and  with 
Peking. 

Nor  should  you  get  the  idea  that  the  North  and 
the  South  are  seriously  at  war.  More  than  that,  there 
is  no  longer  any  serious  pretense  of  vital  difference 
between  them.  The  only  real  warfare  now  being 
waged  in  China  is  the  interminable  struggle  for  place, 
power,  patronage,  and  pelf  between  the  "ins"  and 
the  "outs,"  which  has  gone  on,  almost  without  inter- 
ruption, since  the  dawn  of  Chinese  history.  Despite 
all  the  talk  about  patriotic  ideals,  constitutional  gov- 
ernment, and  parliamentary  reform,  it  is,  in  the  last 
analysis,  a  sordid  and  purely  mercenary  conflict.  The 
"governments"  at  Peking  and  Canton  ("misgovern- 
ments"  would  be  a  more  fitting  term)  consist  of 
groups  of  predatory,  self-seeking  officials  who  are 
far  more  concerned  in  strengthening  their  own  posi- 
tions and,  incidentally,  in  filling  their  own  pockets 
than  they  are  in  pulling  China  out  of  the  slough  of 
despond,  setting  her  on  her  feet,  and  giving  her  an 
honest  and  efficient  administration. 


208       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

Overshadowing  both  the  northern  and  the  southern 
governments,  and  still  further  complicating  a  political' 
situation  already  confused  almost  past  understand- 
ing, is  the  tuchunate — the  system  of  tuchuns,  or  pro- 
vincial military  governors,  who  are  the  real  rulers  of 
China.  In  theory,  each  tuchun  represents  the  central 
government  in  his  respective  province,  being  respon- 
sible to  Peking  for  the  entire  local  administration — 
political,  judicial,  fiscal,  and  military.  In  theory,  I 
have  said.  For  in  practice  he  is  accountable  to  no 
one  but  himself  and  obeys  the  orders  of  Peking  or 
Canton — depending  upon  whether  he  is  a  supporter 
of  the  North  or  the  South — only  when  it  suits  him  to 
do  so.  Each  tiichun  exercises  autocratic  power  within 
the  limits  of  his  own  province.  Though  he  is  supposed 
to  govern  with  the  assistance  and  advice  of  a  civil  gov- 
ernor and  a  provincial  assembly,  he  always  over- 
shadows them  and  usually  ignores  them  completely, 
making  and  administering  his  own  laws,  imposing  his 
own  taxes,  collecting  his  own  revenues,  and  using 
them  for  his  own  purposes.  As  a  result  of  this  anom- 
alous situation,  conditions  in  China  are  comparable 
in  many  respects  to  those  which  prevailed  in  Mexico 
when  Villa  was  dictator  of  the  North  and  Zapata 
held  sway  in  the  South,  both  of  them  completely  ig- 
noring the  mandates  issued  by  the  central  govern- 
ment from  the  City  of  Mexico. 

Perhaps  the  closest  parallel  to  the  tuchtms,  how- 
ever, is  to  be  found  in  those  leaders  of  mercenaries. 


CHINA  209 

known  as  condottieri,  who  for  nearly  three  hundred 
years  held  medieval  Italy  in  their  grasp.  As  the  great 
mass  of  the  Italian  peasantry  took  no  part  in  the  wars 
of  that  period,  contenting  themselves  with  the  role 
of  onlookers,  war  was  not  merely  the  trade  of  the 
condottiere,  but  also  his  monopoly,  and  he  was  thus 
able  to  obtain  whatever  terms  he  demanded,  whether 
money  payments  or  political  concessions.  Precisely 
the  same  holds  true  of  the  tuchun.  The  condottieri 
were  always  ready  to  change  sides  at  the  prospect  of 
higher  pay.  So  are  the  tuchuns.  As  the  condottieri 
were  to  a  certain  extent  bound  together  by  the  bonds 
of  a  common  profession  and  by  a  common  contempt 
for  the  civilian  population,  and  as  they  realized  that 
the  enemy  of  to-day  might  well  be  the  ally  of  to-mor- 
row, their  battles  were  often  as  bloodless  as  they  were 
theatrical.  A  similar  lack  of  bloodshed  usually  charac- 
terizes the  clashes  between  the  forces  of  the  tuchuns. 
Just  as  the  great  condottiere,  Francisco  Sforza,  the 
son  of  a  Neapolitan  peasant,  climbed  on  the  lances  of 
his  mercenaries  to  the  dukedom  of  Milan  and  the 
overlordship  of  northern  Italy,  so  Chang  Tso-lin,  a 
one-time  bandit,  has  climbed  on  the  bayonets  of  his 
mercenaries  to  the  tuchunate  of  Mukden  and  to- 
day holds  the  whole  of  Manchuria  in  the  hollow  of  his 
hand. 

The  tvxihvAis  keep  themselves  in  power  by  means  of 
personal  armies — usually  little  more  than  uniformed 
bandits — which  vary  in  size  from  the  few  battalions 


210       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

maintained  by  the  less  important  governors  to  the 
well-organized  force  of  one  hundred  thousand  men 
maintained  by  the  great  supeT-tuchurij  Chang  Tso-lin. 
There  are  to-day  more  than  a  score  of  such  private 
armies,  totaling,  it  is  estimated,  not  far  from 
1,200,000  men.  Thus  is  presented  the  astonishing 
paradox  of  China,  the  weakest  of  all  nations,  having 
under  arms  more  soldiers  than  any  other  nation  in 
the  world.  Though  these  armies  are  supported  from 
the  public  revenues,  the  ttwhims  brazenly  use  them 
for  private  purposes.  They  will  always  sell  their 
services  to  the  party  or  faction  that  will  pay  the 
highest  price,  and  they  use  the  threat  of  their  mili- 
tary power  to  strengthen  their  own  position.  As 
a  result,  the  more  powerful  tuchv/ns  wield  a  power 
more  arbitrary  and  absolute  than  was  ever  dreamed  of 
by  the  dictators  of  Latin-America.  For  example, 
when  Chang  Tso-lin  wishes  to  move  troops  he  seizes  a 
sufficient  number  of  railway  cars  and  moves  them 
whither  he  will.  If  his  army  requires  aircraft,  he 
sends  troops  to  Peking  with  orders  to  help  themselves 
from  the  government  supply,  puts  the  planes  on  flat- 
cars,  and  without  so  much  as  a  by-your-leave  trans- 
ports them  to  his  stronghold  at  Mukden.  When  he 
needs  money  to  pay  his  troops,  or  for  the  purpose  of 
raising  more  men,  or  for  investment  in  some  new  busi- 
ness enterprise,  he  sends  a  telegram  to  Peking — and 
gets  it.  The  government  does  not  dare  to  oppose  or 
refuse  him,  for  it  is  perfectly  aware  that  it  exists  only 


I 


CHINA  211 

on  his  sufferance.  And  what  is  true  of  Chang  Tso-lin 
is  equally  true  of  Tsao  Kun,  tuchun  of  the  metropoli- 
tan province  of  Chihli,  and  in  a  lesser  degree  of  all  the 
other  tuchuns.  As  a  result  of  their  strangle-hold  on 
the  country,  these  military  dictators  have  succeeded  in 
amassing  far  greater  fortunes  under  the  republic  than 
the  viceroys  ever  did  under  the  empire.  Indeed,  the 
most  pressing  question  in  China  to-day  is  how  to  limit 
the  power  and  rapacity  of  the  tuchuns,  how  to  bring 
them  under  the  authority  of  the  central  government. 
If  China  is  to  escape  complete  disruption,  the  tuchu/ns 
must  cease  being  each  a  law  unto  himself.  And  this 
will  come  about  only  when  their  so-called  armies  have 
been  disbanded  under  some  scheme  which  will  insure 
their  disappearance  for  good  and  all.  As  Mr.  J.  O. 
P.  Bland  concisely  puts  it:  "Nobody  doubts  for  a  mo- 
ment that  the  whole  Chinese  army  would  be  dehghted 
to  return  to  its  ancestral  homes  with  all  arrears  of  pay 
and  a  three  months'  bonus.  The  question  is,  however, 
who  is  going  to  prevent  the  tuchum^  from  replacing 
them  next  morning  by  a  new  set  of  loot-hungry 
coolies?" 

The  whole  deplorable  situation  has  been  set  forth 
with  admirable  fairness  by  a  supporter  of  the  south- 
ern faction,  Mr.  S.  G.  Cheng,  in  his  book,  "Modern 
China."  One  passage  is  so  illuminating  that  it  de- 
serves quoting  in  full : 

"For  military  operations  against  the  North,  the 
South  depends  on  governors  who  are  just  as  selfish 


212       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

as  their  northern  colleagues.  It  also  receives,  as  its 
allies,  brigands  or  military  leaders  who  have  some 
personal  grievance  against  the  North  and  who  desire 
to  gratify  their  greed  and  ambition  by  taking  advan- 
tage of  the  quarrel  between  the  constitutionalists  and 
the  militarists.  Among  the  army  commanders  of  the 
South,  many  have  no  sympathy  at  all  with  the  demo- 
cratic aspirations  of  the  constitutionalists,  but  fight 
their  own  battle  under  the  cloak  of  a  good  cause. 
This  hopeless  state  of  affairs  is  acknowledged  and  de- 
plored by  the  southern  leader.  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen,  who 
summarizes  the  situation  by  saying  that  the  struggle 
of  military  leaders  for  supremacy  is  equally  rampant 
in  the  South  and  in  the  North,  and  that  he  has  almost 
exhausted  his  voice,  with  no  effect,  in  calling  atten- 
tion to  the  incoherent  situation." 


Ill 

In  works  of  reference  and  official  publications  China 
is  referred  to — at  least  by  implication — as  a  sovereign 
state,  an  independent  nation.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
however,  her  independence  is  largely  fictitious,  the 
fiction  being  maintained  because  an  official  admission 
of  her  true  status  would  be  as  embarrassing  to  those 
foreign  nations  which  really  control  the  country  as  it 
would  be  humiHating  to  the  Chinese  themselves. 
Doubtless  there  are  those  who  will  attempt  to  ques- 


CHINA  213 

tion  my  assertion  that  China  is  not  an  independent 
nation  by  pointing  out  that  she  has  her  own  govern- 
ment, her  own  army,  her  own  diplomatic  service,  her 
own  postal  system,  and  her  own  flag.  Let  me  answer 
such  critics  by  asking  if  a  nation  can  truthfully  be 
called  independent,  in  the  generally  accepted  sense  of 
the  term,  which  ( 1 )  does  not  control  its  own  fiscal  af- 
fairs; which  (2)  is  not  permitted  to  revise  its  own 
tariff;  which  (3)  is  not  permitted  to  collect  its  own 
revenues ;  which  ( 4 )  is  not  permitted  to  appoint  or  re- 
call its  officials  in  certain  portions  of  its  own  territory 
without  the  consent  of  a  foreign  power;  which  (5)  can- 
not negotiate  foreign  loans  or  grant  concessions  to  for- 
eigners without  the  permission  of  other  powers ;  which 
(6)  is  not  permitted  to  control  its  own  inland  water- 
ways; which  (7)  cannot  sell,  cede,  or  lease  its  own 
territory  as  it  sees  fit;  which  (8)  does  not  possess 
jurisdiction  over  foreigners  dwelling  within  its  bor- 
ders ;  which  ( 9 )  is  forced  to  agree  to  the  maintenance 
on  its  soil  of  foreign  courts,  foreign  police  forces,  for- 
eign prisons,  and  foreign  post-offices;  (10)  within 
whose  borders  four  foreign  powers  maintain  armed 
forces;  and  (11)  whose  territory  is  seized  and  held  by 
foreign  nations  without  provocation  or  excuse?  With 
foreign  armies  on  her  soil,  with  foreign  flags  flying 
over  her  seaports,  with  foreign  courts  functioning 
in  her  cities,  with  foreign  gunboats  patrolling  her 
rivers,  with  foreign  officials  collecting  her  customs  and 
her  salt-duties,  and  with  other  foreigners  supervising 


214       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

her  fiscal  affairs,  China  might  be  described,  without 
taking  undue  hberties  with  the  truth,  as  a  country 
under  foreign  occupation.  It  is  a  curious  commen- 
tary on  international  standards  of  morality  and  jus- 
tice that  China  should  receive  less  consideration  from 
her  late  allies,  so  far  as  their  refraining  from  inter- 
ference with  her  domestic  affairs  is  concerned,  than 
is  accorded  to  unregenerate  and  resentful  Germany. 

The  position  of  virtual  vassalage  in  which  China 
finds  herself  to-day  is  not  due  to  centuries  of  persis- 
tent nibbling  by  land-hungry  nations,  as  in  the  case 
of  Africa;  it  is  the  result  of  barely  four  score  years 
of  foreign  aggression  and  spoliation.  Until  nearly 
the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  regions  di- 
rectly under  the  sway  of  the  Chinese  emperors  ex- 
tended from  the  borders  of  Siberia  on  the  north  to  An- 
nam  and  Burmah  on  the  south,  and  from  the  Pacific 
Ocean  on  the  east  to  Russian  Turkestan  on  the  west. 
There  was  also  a  fringe  of  tributary  states — Korea, 
Annam,  Burmah,  and  Nepaul — which  still  kept  up 
the  ancient  forms  of  allegiance  and  which  acknowl- 
edged in  greater  or  less  degrees  the  suzerainty  of 
Peking. 

The  dismemberment  of  China  may  be  said  to  have 
been  initiated  by  Great  Britain  in  1840,  when,  as 
the  result  of  her  ignoble  victory  in  the  so-called 
"Opium  War" — a  war  waged  to  impose  a  poisonous 
drug  on  China  against  her  will — ^the  Chinese  Gov- 


CHINA  215 

ernment  was  forced  to  cede  to  the  victors  the  island 
of  Hong  Kong,  occupying  a  position  of  immense 
strategic  and  commercial  importance  in  that  it  com- 
mands the  approaches  to  the  great  port  of  Canton ;  to 
pay  an  indemnity  of  twenty-one  million  dollars;  and 
to  consent  to  the  importation  of  opium. 

In  1849  the  Portuguese,  who  some  three  centuries 
earlier  had  estabhshed  a  trading-post  at  Macao,  a 
small  island  at  the  mouth  of  the  Canton  River  for 
which  they  had  long  paid  a  trifling  annual  rental  to 
the  government  at  Peking,  emulated  the  high-handed 
methods  pursued  by  the  Great  Powers  in  their  treat- 
ment of  China  by  suddenly  expelling  the  Chinese  gar- 
rison and  declaring  the  island  a  Portuguese  posses- 
sion. For  nearly  forty  years  there  was  a  state  of 
quasi-war  between  Portugal  and  China  over  Macao, 
but  a  treaty  was  finally  concluded  in  1887  whereby 
the  Chinese  Government  ceded  the  island  to  Portugal 
in  perpetuity.  Though,  by  the  terms  of  this  treaty, 
Portugal  agreed  to  cooperate  with  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment in  the  suppression  of  the  opium  trade,  she  has 
never  adhered  to  her  promise.  On  the  contrary,  she 
has  steadily  developed  her  lucrative  opium  and  gam- 
bling monopolies  in  Macao,  free  rein  being  given  in 
this  European-owned  territory  to  those  vices  of  which 
the  Chinese  have  honestly  endeavored  to  rid  them- 
selves. As  a.  result,  Macao  is  the  most  notorious  sink 
of  iniquity  in  the  China  Seas,  vice  in  every  form 


216       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

flaunting  itself,  naked  and  unashamed,  where  the  ban- 
ished poet,  Camoens,  wrote  the  immortal  epic  of  his 
native  land. 

Sixteen  years  after  the  "Opium  War"  Great  Brit- 
ain again  went  to  war  with  China,  this  time  because 
Chinese  authorities  had  seized  a  Chinese  vessel  flying 
the  British  flag  on  the  gi:ound  that  it  was  manned 
by  Chinese  pirates.  By  way  of  punishment  for  this 
affront  to  British  dignity.  Canton  was  bombarded 
and  occupied  and  its  viceroy  exiled  to  Calcutta, 
where  he  died  in  prison.  Before  the  menace  of 
the  guns  of  an  Anglo-French  squadron  the  Chinese 
Government  agreed  to  sign  treaties  with  Great  Brit- 
ain and  France  granting  their  nationals  extraterri- 
torial rights  and  opening  the  Yangtze  River  to  Brit- 
ish and  French ,  commerce.  But  before  the  treaty 
could  be  ratified  an  incident  occurred  which  over- 
shadowed the  war  in  the  seriousness  of  its  conse- 
quences. The  Pei-ho  River,  which  connects  Tient- 
sin with  Peking,  was  closed  to  foreign  vessels,  but 
the  warships  bearing  the  British  and  French  en- 
voys, who  were  on  their  way  to  the  capital  to  obtain 
the  ratification  of  the  treaty,  attempted  to  force  the 
river  defenses  and  were  repulsed.  Thereupon  a 
second  allied  expedition  was  hurried  from  Europe, 
Peking  was  occupied  and  looted  of  priceless  treasures 
in  jewels,  jade,  bronze,  and  porcelain,  and,  as  a  crown- 
ing act  of  vandalism,  the  Summer  Palace  was  burned. 
As  this  was  not  deemed  suflicient  punishment,  China 


CHINA  217 

was  forced  to  pay  large  indemnities  to  France  and 
Great  Britain  and  to  cede  to  the  latter  a  strip  of  ter- 
ritory along  the  Kowloon  peninsula,  on  the  mainland 
opposite  Hong  Kong. 

The  next  nation  to  exert  pressure  on  China  was 
Russia,  which,  during  the  middle  years  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  had  begun  to  colonize  the  territory 
along  the  lower  reaches  of  the  Amur  as  a  step  in  her 
advance  toward  the  Pacific.  This  was  a  remote  region, 
imdeveloped  and  sparsely  settled,  and,  as  the  Rus- 
sians pointed  out,  it  had  only  been  a  part  of  the 
Chinese  Empire  for  a  few  hundred  years.  In  1860, 
China,  yielding  to  Muscovite  coercion,  ceded  to  Russia 
all  the  Chinese  territory  lying  north  of  the  Amur  and 
between  the  Ussuri  and  the  Pacific.  On  the  coast 
of  this  territory,  which  comprises  the  present  Amur 
and  Maritime  Provinces,  Russia  founded  the  port 
of  Vladivostok,  thereby  obtaining  her  long-desired 
outlet  on  the  ice-free  waters  of  the  Japan  Sea.  So 
easily  was  this  vast  territory  acquired — ^taking  land 
from  China  was  like  taking  candy  from  a  child — ^that 
in  1881  the  Tsar's  government  tried  its  luck  again, 
this  time  obtaining  the  cession  of  a  portion  of  the 
fertile  province  of  Kulja,  in  westernmost  China,  bor- 
dering on  Russian  Turkestan.  I  almost  forgot  to 
mention  that,  in  addition  to  her  loss  of  territory,  China 
had  to  pay  Russia  an  indemnity  of  nine  million  rubles. 

In  1883  it  was  France's  turn  again.  The  French 
Government,  having  decided  to  round  out  its  pos- 


218       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

sessions  in  Indo-China,  despatched  an  expedition  for 
the  conquest  of  Annam,  which  had  always  been  re- 
garded as  tributary  to  China.  The  Peking  govern- 
ment protested,  and  there  was  a  frontier  skirmish  in 
which  both  French  and  Chinese  troops  were  killed, 
whereupon  France  promptly  declared  war.  The 
French  were  victorious  at  sea  and  the  Chinese  on  land, 
but,  as  the  former  had  political  troubles  of  their  own 
at  home,  they  consented  to  a  compromise,  which  con- 
sisted in  China  recognizing  the  French  protectorate 
over  Annam.  This  time,  thanks  to  the  diplomacy  of 
Li  Hung-chang,  France  did  not  succeed  in  extracting 
an  indemnity. 

While  China  had  been  engaged  in  her  controversy 
with  France  over  Annam,  Great  Britain  had  invaded 
Burmah,  occupied  its  capital,  and  deposed  King  The- 
baw.  Hitherto  Burmah  had  been  considered  a  vassal 
state  of  China  and  had  paid  her  tribute  annually, 
so,  merely  to  satisfy  diplomatic  etiquette  and  to 
make  the  title  clear,  China  was  asked  to  give  her 
formal  assent  to  the  incorporation  of  Burmah  in  the 
Indian  Empire.  She  gave  her  assent — ^there  was 
nothing  else  for  her  to  do — and,  for  a  wonder,  no 
indemnity  was  demanded  by  Great  Britain. 

In  1894-95  came  China's  brief  but  disastrous  war 
with  Japan,  to  which,  as  the  price  of  defeat,  she  was 
forced  to  cede  the  great,  rich  island  of  Formosa  and 
the  Liao-tung  Peninsula,  on  which  were  the  towns  of 
Dalny  and  Port  Arthur.     But  it  did  not  suit  the 


CHINA  219 

policies  of  certain  European  powers,  particularly  Rus- 
sia, to  see  the  Island  Empire  obtain  a  foothold  on  the 
Asian  mainland,  so  Russia,  France,  and  Germany 
presented  a  joint  note  to  Japan  suggesting  that  the 
Liao-tung  Peninsula  be  restored  to  China.  As 
Japan  was  in  no  position  to  resist  the  pressure  thus 
brought  to  bear,  she  sullenly  obeyed,  retaining  only 
Formosa.  But  though  China  retrieved  the  Liao-tung 
Peninsula,  thanks  to  European  intervention,  a  huge 
indemnity  (230  million  taels)  was  exacted  by  Japan 
and  she  was  also  forced  to  renounce  her  claims  of 
suzerainty  over  Korea,  thus  losing  the  third  of  her 
great  tributary  states. 

Evidence  was  soon  forthcoming,  however,  that 
Russia  and  France  had  not  been  disinterested  in 
rescuing  Chinese  territory  from  the  grasp  of  Japan, 
for  Russia  now  demanded  from  Peking  and  obtained 
the  right  to  carry  the  trans-Siberian  Railway  straight 
across  Manchuria  to  Vladivostok,  thus  avoiding  a  long 
and  costly  detour.  The  syndicate  which  was  to  build 
the  railway  was  also  granted  enormous  timber  and 
mining  concessions  in  the  regions  through  which  the 
line  was  to  pass  and  was  authorized  to  maintain  its 
own  gendarmerie.  This  was  the  first  step  in  the 
alienation  of  Manchuria.  As  payment  for  the  part 
she  had  played  in  resisting  the  Japanese  demands, 
France  asked  for  and  obtained  a  rectification  of  the 
frontier  between  China  and  Indo-China,  as  well  as  cer- 
tain mining  rights  in  Kiangsi  and  Yunnan.     Both 


220       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

powers  also  obtained  territorial  concessions  in  Han- 
kow for  French  and  Russian  settlements  in  that  city. 
But  as  a  result  of  the  rectification  of  the  Indo-China 
frontier  England  claimed  that  her  interests  had  been 
injured  and  demanded  compensation  in  the  form  of 
considerable  modifications  in  the  boundaries  of  Bur- 
mah,  thereby  adding  several  thousand  square  miles  to 
the  British  Empire. 

While  Russia  and  France  were  profiting  by  what 
they  were  pleased  to  call  the  generosity  of  China, 
Germany  alone  had  so  far  received  no  reward  for 
her  share  in  compelling  the  restitution  of  Liao-tung, 
but  in  1897  she  proceeded  to  help  herself  by  suddenly 
seizing  the  Bay  of  Kiauchau,  on  the  eastern  side  of  the 
Shantung  Peninsula.  The  seizure  was  made  osten- 
sibly in  order  to  obtain  redress  for  the  murder  of  two 
German  missionaries,  but  in  reality  because  Ger- 
many's scheme  of  naval  expansion  demanded  a  har- 
bor and  naval  base  in  the  Far  East.  The  following 
year  Germany  succeeded  in  extracting  from  China  a 
ninety-nine-year  lease  of  Kiauchau  Bay,  together 
with  the  city  of  Tsing-tau  and  a  considerable  area  of 
adjacent  territory,  with  liberty  to  build  docks,  erect 
fortifications,  and  exercise  all  the  rights  of  sover- 
eignty. In  the  same  year  Russia,  which  only  a  short 
time  before  had  forced  Japan  to  restore  Port  Arthur 
and  Dalny  to  China,  demanded  from  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment a  twenty-five-year  lease  of  those  ports  on  the 
ground  that  her  interests  in  Manchuria  must  be  pro- 


CHINA  221 

tected  against  German  penetration.  This  was  the 
cue  for  England  and  France  to  again  appear  upon  the 
scene,  both  of  them  demanding  further  concessions 
from  China  in  order,  as  they  explained,  to  preserve 
the  balance  of  power  in  Eastern  Asia.  France  de- 
manded and  obtained  a  ninety-nine-year  lease  of 
Kwang-chou-wan,  on  the  mainland,  opposite  the 
island  of  Hainan,  while  England  took  Weihaiwei,  at 
the  extremity  of  the  Shantung  Peninsula,  for  as  long 
as  Russia  remained  in  Port  Arthur.  ( Though  Russia 
surrendered  Port  Arthur  to  Japan  in  1905,  the  Union 
Jack  still  flies  over  Weihaiwei. )  France,  finding  that 
fruit  could  be  had  for  the  picking,  then  demanded 
and  obtained  some  valuable  mining  concessions  in 
South  China,  England  responding  to  this  move 
by  exacting  from  the  government  at  Peking 
a  pledge  that  the  Yangtze  Valley  would  not  be 
alienated  to  a  third  power.  Thereupon  France  came 
back  with  a  demand  that  China  agree  not  to  alienate 
to  a  third  power  the  three  southern  provinces  of 
Kwangtung,  Kwangsi,  and  Yunnan.  This  left 
France  slightly  in  the  lead,  so,  to  make  matters  even, 
England  demanded  a  ninety-nine-year  lease  of  the 
Kowloon  Peninsula,  comprising  nearly  four  hundred 
square  miles  on  the  mainland  opposite  Hong  Kong, 
a  portion  of  which,  it  will  be  remembered,  had 
been  ceded  to  her  forty  years  before.  And  by  way 
of  getting  good  measure  she  also  obtained  from  China 
an  undertaking  to  throw  open  the  whole  of  her  inland 


222       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

waterways  to  steam  traffic,  at  the  same  time  exacting 
a  promise  that  the  post  of  Inspector-General  of  Cus- 
toms (then  held  by  Sir  Robert  Hart)  should  always 
be  held  by  an  Englishman  as  long  as  the  trade  of 
Great  Britain  with  China  was  greater  than  that  of 
any  other  nation. 

The  territorial  concessions  thus  exacted  from 
China  by  the  European  nations  marked  the  be- 
ginning of  the  "spheres  of  influence"  policy  and 
would  have  inevitably  resulted  in  the  complete  parti- 
tion of  the  country  had  not  the  United  States  stepped 
in,  in  1899,  and  enunciated  its  pohcy  of  "the  open 
door,"  meaning  equal  opportunity  for  all.  By  her 
insistence  that  the  customs  duties  in  the  leased  terri- 
tories and  spheres  of  influence  should  be  made  no 
higher  than  those  prevailing  in  other  parts  of  the 
empire,  the  United  States  secured  an  equal  oppor- 
tunity for  the  commerce  of  all  nations,  large  and 
small,  and  minimized  the  chances  of  a  conflict  between 
the  powers  which  might  have  led  to  an  extension  of 
their  territory  at  the  expense  of  China.  Great  Britain, 
to  her  credit,  was  the  first  to  endorse  this  policy  of 
"the  open  door,"  and  the  other  powers,  though  some- 
what reluctantly,  followed  her  example. 

As  was  only  to  have  been  expected,  the  long  series 
of  aggressions  by  the  foreign  powers  eventually  re- 
sulted in  arousing  among  the  patient  and  long-suffer- 
ing Chinese  people  a  feeling  of  bitter  resentment  and 


CHINA  223 

a  desire  for  revenge.  This  smoldering  resentment  was 
fanned  into  flame  by  a  secret  society,  known  as  "Har- 
monious and  Peaceful  Fists,"  which  organized  an  agi- 
tation with  the  avowed  object  of  killing  all  the  for- 
eigners in  China  in  order  to  save  the  country  from 
further  territorial  encroachments  and  humiliations. 
In  June,  1900,  the  movement,  which  came  to  be  known 
as  the  Boxer  Rebellion,  burst  over  northeastern  China 
with  the  fury  of  a  hurricane.  Hundreds  of  foreign 
traders  and  missionaries  were  murdered  in  the  out- 
lying provinces.  In  Peking  the  Europeans  sought 
refuge  in  the  legations,  which,  though  besieged  by 
thousands  of  Boxers,  aided  by  imperial  troops,  suc- 
ceeded in  holding  out  until  the  arrival  of  an  allied 
relief  expedition.  The  reparations  demanded  by  the 
Allies  for  this  affair  were  calculated  to  discourage  the 
Chinese  Government  from  ever  again  countenancing 
an  attack  on  foreigners  within  its  borders.  China  was 
forced  to  execute  certain  of  the  officials  responsible 
for  the  outbreak  and  to  degrade  others ;  to  send  special 
envoys  to  Berlin  and  Tokio  to  formally  apologize  for 
the  murder  of  the  German  minister  and  the  secretary 
of  the  Japanese  legation ;  to  raze  the  Taku  forts  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Pei-ho  River;  to  permit  a  foreign  mili- 
tary occupation  of  the  strategic  points  between  the 
capital  and  the  coast,  thereby  insuring  communication 
with  the  sea ;  to  permit  the  fortification  of  the  legation 
quarter  in  Peking  and  the  maintenance  of  permanent 


224       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

legation  guards  therein ;  and  to  pay  an  indemnity  of 
450  million  taels,  equivalent  to  about  337  million  dol- 
lars. 

This  staggering  indemnity,  which  is  now  generally 
admitted  to  have  been  excessive  and  unjust,  was  se- 
cured (1)  on  the  balance  of  the  maritime  customs 
revenue  not  already  mortgaged  for  previous  loans, 
the  Powers  permitting  the  Chinese  Government  to 
raise  its  tariff  on  imported  articles  to  an  effective  five 
per  cent,  ad  valorem;  (2)  on  the  revenue  of  the  "na- 
tive" customs  in  the  treaty  ports;  and  (3)  on  the 
total  revenues  of  the  Salt  Gabelle,  salt  being  a  gov- 
ernment monopoly.  The  collection  of  these  revenues 
was  insured  by  the  establishment  of  effective  foreign 
control  of  both  the  customs  and  salt  administrations. 
The  Boxer  indemnity  was  converted  into  a  loan 
which  was  to  be  repaid  in  annual  installments  extend- 
ing over  a  period  of  thirty-nine  years,  so  that,  had 
events  followed  a  normal  course,  China  would  not  have 
regained  control  of  her  own  finances  until  1940.  But 
in  1908  the  American  Government,  desiring  to  set 
China  on  her  feet  financially,  informed  the  govern- 
ment at  Peking  that  the  United  States  was  prepared 
to  refund  the  shares  of  the  indemnity  that  it  had  al- 
ready received  and  to  remit  the  balance,  on  condition 
that  the  money  should  be  used  for  the  purpose  of 
sending  Chinese  youths  to  the  United  States  to  be 
educated.  By  this  altruistic  action  the  United  States 
won  the  confidence  and  friendship  of  the  Chinese  for 


CHINA  225 

all  time.  When,  following  the  advice  of  the  United 
States  and  the  pleading  of  the  Allies,  China  declared 
war  against  Germany  in  1917,  she  promptly  ceased 
payment  of  the  German  share  of  the  indemnity,  and 
a  few  months  later  also  ceased  payment  to  Russia. 
Her  financial  burden  was  still  further  relieved,  at 
least  temporarily,  when,  upon  her  entry  into  the  war, 
the  Alhes  agreed  to  suspend  the  payment  of  their 
shares  of  the  indemnity  for  five  years,  or  until  1922. 
In  view  of  the  great  assistance  which  China  rendered 
the  Allies  during  the  war  by  supplying  them  with 
laborers  and  her  extinction  of  German  competition  in 
Chinese  markets,  it  would  seem  that  the  least  the  Al- 
lies could  have  done  by  way  of  showing  their  gratitude 
was  to  follow  the  example  of  the  United  States  and 
write  off  the  payments  of  the  indemnity  still  due  them. 
More  selfish,  more  short-sighted  than  the  United 
States,  however,  they  contented  themselves  with  a 
five-year  suspension.  If  the  Powers  concerned  are 
sincerely  desirous  of  rehabilitating  China,  their  first 
step  should  be  to  completely  remit,  or  at  least  mate- 
rially reduce,  the  intolerable  burden  imposed  by  the 
Boxer  indemnities. 

The  next  assault  against  Chinese  sovereignty  was 
made  by  Great  Britain  in  1904,  when  the  British 
Government  despatched  an  expedition  to  Lhassa,  the 
capital  of  Tibet,  under  Colonel  Sir  Francis  Young- 
husband.    Yielding  to  the  pressure  thus  brought  to 


226       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

bear,  the  Dalai  Lama  was  forced  to  sign  a  treaty 
which  provides  (1)  "that  no  portion  of  Tibetan  terri- 
tory shall  be  ceded,  sold,  leased,  or  mortgaged  to  any 
other  Power  without  the  previous  consent  of  the  Brit- 
ish Government";  (2)  "that  no  representative  of  any 
other  country  may  be  admitted" ;  (3)  "that  no  conces- 
sion for  railways,  telegraphs,  mining,  or  other  rights 
shall  be  granted  to  another  Power";  and  (4)  "that  no 
Tibetan  revenues  shall  be  pledged  or  assigned  to  any 
other  government."  This  treaty,  which  the  Tibetans 
were  forced  to  sign  literally  at  the  mouths  of  British 
guns,  constituted  a  flagrant  infringement  of  Chinese 
sovereignty,  for  from  time  beyond  reckoning  Tibet 
had  formed  an  integral  part  of  the  Chinese  Empire 
and  its  rulers  had  acknowledged  the  suzerainty  of 
Peking.  Under  the  circumstances,  however,  there 
was  nothing  for  Peking  to  do  but  submit  with  the 
best  grace  possible,  the  Chinese  Government  con- 
firming the  treaty  in  exchange  for  Great  Britain's 
pledge  not  to  annex  Tibet  or  to  encroach  on  its  in- 
ternal autonomy.  Since  then  Great  Britain  has 
steadily  strengthened  her  position  in  Tibet,  demand- 
ing and  obtaining  new  privileges  and  pursuing  a 
policy  which  has  for  its  object,  apparently,  the  even- 
tual alienation  of  Tibetan  territory.  For  example,  a 
recent  agreement  provides  that  China  may  not  dis- 
miss officials  in  Tibet,  or  appoint  new  ones,  without 
first  obtaining  British  permission.  In  short,  the 
Chinese  Government  was  warned  by  Great  Britain 


CHINA  227 

that  the  acknowledged  sovereignty  of  China  in  Tibet 
must  not  be  allowed  to  lead  to  the  exercise  of  actual 
sovereignty.  Yet  Tibet  is  represented  by  five  depu- 
ties in  the  Chinese  parliament. 

In  the  same  year  that  England  invaded  Tibet 
came  the  war  between  Japan  and  Russia,  a  war  fought 
almost  wholly  on  Chinese  soil  in  cynical  disregard  of 
Chinese  rights  or  neutrality.  The  result  of  this  con- 
flict did  not  greatly  alter  China's  position  in  Man- 
churia. In  South  Manchuria  Japan  fell  heir  to  the 
special  privileges  which  Russia  had  wrung  from 
China,  taking  over  the  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and 
Dalny  (now  known  as  Dairen)  and  the  South  Man- 
chm-ia  Railway  as  far  north  as  Changchun.  This  in- 
cludes seventy  square  miles  in  the  railway  zone  about 
the  fifty-five  stations  along  the  line.  Over  this  zone 
and  the  1300  square  miles  of  leased  land  surrounding 
Port  Arthur  and  Dairen  Japan  rules  as  absolutely  as 
in  her  own  island  realm.  Japan  also  retained  posses- 
sion of  the  Hght  military  railway  which  she  built  dur- 
ing the  war  from  Antung,  on  the  Korean  frontier,  to 
Mukden,  and  which  she  later  converted  into  a 
standard-gauge  line.  This  line  connects  at  Antung 
with  the  Korean  system,  which,  in  August,  1917, 
passed  under  the  control  of  the  South  Manchuria 
Railway,  thus  giving  the  Japanese  a  through  line, 
under  their  own  management,  from  Fusan,  the  Ko- 
rean port  nearest  Japan,  to  Changchun,  where  con- 
nection  with   the   railway   system   to    Harbin,    on 


228       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

the  main  line  of  the  Trans-Siberian,  is  effected. 
The  section  from  Changchun  to  Harbin,  and  that 
portion  of  the  Trans-Siberian  which  traverses  Man- 
churia, are  at  present  under  Japanese  control  and 
guarded  by  Japanese  troops.  As  these  railways 
traverse  the  central  and  most  fertile  areas  of  a  prov- 
ince larger  than  our  three  Pacific  Coast  states  put  to- 
gether, capable  of  supporting  a  population  of  100 
millions,  their  value  to  Japan  is  obvious,  and,  unless 
I  am  greatly  mistaken,  she  will  not  readily  relax  her 
grip  on  them.  Though  at  Portsmouth  both  Russia 
and  Japan  solemnly  agreed  to  evacuate  Manchuria 
and  restore  it  to  China,  it  remains  an  imperium  in 
imperio,  theoretically  an  integral  part  of  the  Chinese 
Republic  but  to  all  intents  and  purposes  a  territory 
of  the  Japanese  Empire. 

We  now  come  to  the  question  of  Shantung — a 
question  as  easy  of  explanation  as  it  should  be 
of  solution.  In  1898,  as  I  have  already  mentioned, 
Germany  coerced  China  into  granting  her  a  ninety- 
nine-year  lease  of  Kiauchau  Bay,  on  the  coast  of 
Shantung  Province,  together  with  the  territory  in  a 
fifty  kilometer  radius  of  the  bay,  including  the  sea- 
port of  Tsingtau.  On  the  coast  of  one  of  the  richest 
and  most  populous  provinces  of  China,  midway  be- 
tween Peking  and  Shanghai,  within  a  few  hours* 
steam  of  Weihaiwei,  Tientsin,  and  Port  Arthur,  it 
occupies  a  position  of  immense  strategic  importance. 
Here  the  Germans  proceeded  to  intrench  themselves, 


1 


CANAL    SCENE    IN    CANTON 


THE    PAWNSHOPS    OF    CANTON 
'I'hese  are  the  only  fireproof  buildings  in  the  city 


VIEW    FROM    THE    TERRACE    OF    THE    SUMMER    PALACE 


BRIDGE  IN  THE  GARDENS  OF  THE  SUMMER  PALACE,  PEKING 


CHINA  229 

pouring  out  money  like  water  in  the  construction  of  an 
elaborate  system  of  fortifications,  a  spacious  harbor, 
dockyards,  machine-shops,  warehouses,  and  all  the 
other  appurtenances  of  a  great  naval  base.  At  the 
same  time  that  the  Germans  obtained  the  lease  of 
Kiauchau  they  extracted  from  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment a  concession  to  build  a  railway  across  the  prov- 
ince from  Tsingtau  to  Tsinanfu,  a  station  on  the 
trunk-line  from  Shanghai  to  Peking.  The  Germans 
proved  themselves  rapid  workers,  transforming  the 
squalid  Chinese  seaport  of  Tsingtau  into  a  modern 
city,  with  paved  streets  and  electric-lights  and  sub- 
stantial buildings,  and  constructing  the  railway  to 
Tsinanfu,  a  distance  of  256  miles,  in  a  surprisingly 
short  time.  By  1914,  therefore,  the  whole  peninsula 
of  Shantung  was  pretty  thoroughly  under  German 
domination. 

Within  a  fortnight  after  the  outbreak  of  the  World 
War  Japan  sent  an  ultimatum  to  Germany  demand- 
ing the  unconditional  surrender  of  the  entire  leased 
territory  of  Kiauchau,  "with  a  view  to  the  eventual 
restoration  of  the  same  to  China."  No  reply  being 
received  from  the  German  Government,  Japan  de- 
clared war  on  August  23,  1914,  and  the  harbor  of 
Kiauchau  was  blockaded  by  a  Japanese  squadron.  A 
few  days  later  a  Japanese  expeditionary  force  landed 
on  the  coast  of  Shantung  and,  with  the  cooperation  of 
a  contingent  of  British  and  Indian  troops  from  Wei- 
haiwei,  captured  the  forts  defending  the  harbor  and 


230       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

the  city  on  November  6,  1914.  After  the  triumphal 
entry  of  the  allied  forces  into  Tsingtau,  Great  Britain, 
having  done  her  part  in  aiding  Japan  to  oust  the  Ger- 
mans, withdrew  her  troops  and  abstained  from  inter- 
fering with  the  administration  of  the  leased  territory, 
which  was  now  completely  occupied  by  the  Japanese, 
who  also  proceeded  to  take  over  and  operate  the  rail- 
way from  Tsingtau  to  Tsinanfu. 

Now  it  should  be  kept  in  mind,  in  considering  the 
Shantung  controversy,  that  at  this  time  China  was 
neutral,  for  she  did  not  enter  the  war  until  three  years 
later.  According  to  international  law,  "the  territory 
of  neutral  powers  is  inviolable."  And  Kiauchau  was 
indisputably  Chinese  territory,  having  only  been 
leased  to  Germany.  A  nation  may  lease  a  portion  of 
its  territory,  just  as  an  individual  may  lease  a  build- 
ing, but  the  territory,  like  the  building,  remains  the 
property  of  the  lessor.  Hence,  when  Japan  and 
Great  Britain  attacked  and  captured  Kiauchau  they 
were,  strictly  speaking,  violating  Chinese  neutrality. 
As  it  was  common  knowledge,  however,  that  Germany 
was  fitting  out  raiders  in  Kiauchau  harbor  for  the 
purpose  of  preying  on  allied  commerce,  and  it  was 
obvious  that  China  did  not  herself  possess  sufficient 
strength  to  reoccupy  Kiauchau  and  intern  the  Ger- 
man garrison,^  in  the  judgment  of  most  fair-minded 

*  I  am  informed  by  Dr.  J.  C.  Ferguson,  the  Adviser  to  the  President 
of  China,  that  the  Chinese  Government  would  have  taken  steps  to 
reoccupy  Kiauchau  and  intern  the  German  garrison  had  Japan  not 
objected.     E.  A.  P. 


CHINA  231 

men,  Japan  was  fully  justified  in  capturing  the  Ger- 
man forts  on  the  ground  of  self -protection.  If,  after 
the  capitulation  of  the  garrison,  Japan  had  contented 
herself  with  dismantling  the  forts  and  had  then  re- 
stored the  leased  territory  to  China,  there  would  have 
been  no  Shantung  question.  Japan,  however,  took 
the  position  that  by  her  capture  of  Kiauchau  she 
automatically  succeeded  Germany  as  lessee  and  that 
she  need  not  restore  the  territory  to  China,  unless  she 
saw  fit  to  do  so,  until  the  expiration  of  the  original 
lease  in  1997.  As  though  to  still  further  show  their 
contempt  for  Chinese  neutrality,  a  Japanese  army 
pushed  inland  as  far  as  Tsinanfu,  the  terminus  of  the 
railway  from  Tsingtau  and  two  hundred  miles  beyond 
the  limits  of  the  leased  territory,  requisitioning  with- 
out compensation  cattle,  horses,  carts,  boats,  grain, 
and  provisions  from  the  peaceful  Chinese  inhabitants 
of  the  country  through  which  it  passed  and  threaten- 
ing with  severe  punishment  any  one  who  disobeyed  the 
orders  of  the  Japanese  high  command.  All  this,  mark 
you,  in  a  region  which  had  never  been  leased  to  or 
occupied  by  the  Germans  and  which  was  as  essentially 
Chinese  as  Peking  itself. 

The  Chinese  Government  protested  against  Japan's 
actions  with  unexpected  vigor,  demanding  the  restora- 
tion of  Kiauchau  on  the  ground  that  the  lease  was  not 
transferable  and  the  immediate  evacuation  of  the  por- 
tion of  Shantung  occupied  by  Japanese  troops  on  the 
ground  that  such  occupation  constituted  an  unjusti- 


232        ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

fiable  invasion  of  a  neutral  country.  Japan  replied 
that  the  territory  along  the  line  of  the  Tsingtau-Tsin- 
anfu  railway  had  been  occupied  as  "a  military  neces- 
sity," but  that  it  was  her  intention  eventually  to  with- 
draw her  troops  from  this  region  and  to  restore  Kiau- 
chau  to  China — vmder  certain  conditions. 

These  conditions  were  made  known  to  China  in  a 
Japanese  note  presented  to  the  government  at  Peking 
in  May,  1915: 

"When,  after  the  termination  of  the  present  war, 
the  leased  territory  of  Kiauchau  Bay  is  completely 
left  to  the  free  disposal  of  Japan,  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment will  restore  said  leased  territory  to  China 
under  the  following  conditions : 

"1.  The  whole  of  Kiauchau  Bay  to  be  opened  as  a 
commercial  port. 

"2.  A  concession  under  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of 
Japan  to  be  established  at  a  place  designated  by  the 
Japanese  Government. 

"3.  If  the  foreign  powers  desire  if,  an  international 
settlement  may  be  established. 

"4.  As  regards  the  disposal  to  be  made  of  the  build- 
ings and  properties  of  Germany,  and  the  conditions 
and  procedure  relating  thereto,  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment and  the  Chinese  Government  shall  arrange 
the  matter  by  mutual  agreement  before  the  restora- 
tion." 

This  constituted  Japan's  idea  of  keeping  the  pledge, 
as  made  in  her  ultimatum  to  Germany,  to  restore 


CHINA  233 

Kiauchau  to  China,  but  it  is  obvious  that  the  operation 
of  the  four  conditions  attached  to  the  offer  would  at 
the  same  time  transfer  to  her,  in  effect,  all  the  rights, 
privileges,  interests,  and  advantages  formerly  enjoyed 
by  the  Germans.  China's  acceptance  of  these  condi- 
tions not  only  would  have  given  Japan  effective  con- 
trol of  the  Kiauchau  territory,  even  though  the  Rising 
Sun  flag  did  not  actually  fly  over  it,  but  of  the  railways 
of  the  province  and  the  rich  iron  and  coal  districts 
through  which  they  pass.  Under  such  circumstances 
it  would  be  an  easy  matter  for  Japan  to  bring  the 
whole  province  of  Shantung  within  her  sphere  of  in- 
fluence, thence  penetrating  the  adjacent  provinces 
and  finally  realizing  her  ambition  of  dominating  the 
whole  of  that  rich  and  populous  littoral  which  stretches 
from  Port  Arthur  to  Canton.  It  was  not  the  transfer 
of  a  few  concessions  or  a  few  square  miles  of  territory 
which  aroused  the  apprehension  and  the  resentment 
of  China.  It  required  no  great  discernment  on  the 
part  of  the  Chinese  to  recognize  that,  with  Japan  al- 
ready impregnably  intrenched  in  Korea,  in  Man- 
churia, and  on  the  Kwantung  peninsula,  the  establish- 
ment of  Japanese  domination  in  Shantung  would 
complete  a  slip-noose  about  the  capital  itself,  enabling 
Japan  to  choke  the  republic  into  submission  whenever 
she  saw  fit. 

When,  therefore,  the  representatives  of  China,  one 
of  the  Allies  since  1917,  took  their  seats  at  the  Peace 
Conference  at  the  close  of  the  war,  they  demanded  di- 


284       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

rect  and  unconditional  restoration  of  Kiauchau  hy 
Germany,  instead  of  through  the  agency  of  Japan, 
basing  their  argument  on  the  ground  that  China 
should  enjoy  the  same  rights  as  the  other  Allies,  and 
that,  moreover,  there  was  nothing  to  be  gained  by 
taking  two  steps  to  make  the  transfer,  when  it  could 
be  effected  by  one.  It  is  not  my  intention  to  enter  into 
an  account  of  the  furious  controversy  precipitated  at 
Paris  by  China's  resolute  stand  on  the  Shantung  ques- 
tion, a  controversy  which  came  perilously  near  to 
wrecking  the  Peace  Conference.  The  Japanese  dele- 
gates not  only  refused  to  accept  the  arguments  of  the 
Chinese,  but  were  infuriated  that  the  case  should  have 
been  brought  before  the  Conference  at  all,  strong 
pressure  being  brought  by  Tokio  upon  the  govern- 
ment at  Peking  to  recall  its  representatives  at  Paris 
forthwith.  When,  late  in  April,  1919,  the  question  of 
Kiauchau  was  brought  before  the  Council  of  Four  for 
final  decision  the  Italian  delegation  had  withdrawn 
from  the  Conference,  owing  to  the  dispute  over 
Fiume,  and  Japan,  taking  advantage  of  the  delicate 
situation  which  had  thus  been  created,  threatened  to 
follow  Italy's  example  should  the  matter  of  Kiauchau 
not  be  decided  to  her  satisfaction.  In  all  likelihood 
Japan's  withdrawal  would  have  resulted  in  the  break- 
up of  the  Conference,  a  catastrophe  which  even  a  man 
so  iron-willed  as  President  Wilson  did  not  dare  to  risk. 
Persuaded,  therefore,  by  the  verbal  assurances  of  the 
Japanese,  that  Kiauchau  and  the  rest  of  the  Shantung 


CHINA  285 

peninsula  would  be  voluntarily  restored  in  full  sov- 
ereignty to  China,  he  reluctantly  agreed  to  the  inser- 
tion in  the  Treaty  of  Peace  of  the  much-criticized 
Articles  156  and  157.    They  read: 

Article  156.  Germany  renounces,  in  favour  of  Japan,  all 
her  rights,  title,  and  privileges — particularly  those  con- 
cerning the  territory  of  Kiaochow,  railways,  mines,  and 
submarine  cables — which  she  acquired  in  virtue  of  the 
Treaty  concluded  by  her  with  China  on  March  6,  1898,  and 
of  all  other  arrangements  relative  to  the  Province  of  Shan- 
tung. All  German  rights  in  the  Tsingtao-Tsinanfu  Rail- 
way, including  its  branch  lines,  together  with  its  subsidiary 
property  of  all  kinds,  stations,  shops,  fixed  and  rolling 
stock,  mines,  plant  and  material  for  the  exploitation  of  the 
mines,  are  and  remain  acquired  by  Japan,  together  with  all 
her  rights  and  privileges  attaching  thereto.  The  German 
State  submarine  cables  from  Tsingtao  to  Shanghai  and 
from  Tsingtao  to  Chefoo,  with  all  the  rights,  privileges,  and 
properties  attaching  thereto,  are  similarly  acquired  by 
Japan  free  and  clear  of  all  charges  and  encumbrances. 

Article  157.  The  movable  and  immovable  property 
owned  by  the  German  State  in  the  territory  of  Kiaochow, 
as  well  as  all  the  rights  which  Germany  might  claim  in  con- 
sequence of  the  works  or  improvements  made  or  of  the  ex- 
penses incurred  by  her  directly  or  indirectly  in  connexion 
with  this  territory,  are  and  remain  acquired  by  Japan,  free 
and  clear  of  all  charges  and  encumbrances. 

In  order  to  defend  their  country's  rights  and  at  the 
same  time  obviate  an  open  breach  with  the  Allies,  the 
Chinese  delegates,  while  protesting  these  articles,  of- 
fered to  sign  the  treaty  provided  they  were  permitted 
to  make  a  reservation  regarding  the  clause  relating  to 
Shantung.  Informed  that  no  reservation  would  be 
permitted,  the  Chinese  delegation  reluctantly  with- 


236       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

drew  from  the  Conference.  It  has  been  held  by  some 
that  they  would  have  placed  their  country  in  a  stronger 
position  had  they  signed  the  treaty,  trusting  to  Japan 
to  redeem  her  promises  to  restore  Shantung.  But 
the  truth  of  the  matter  was  that  the  Chinese  did  not 
trust  Japan — and  with  good  reason.  For  Japan  had 
made  promises  to  China  on  other  occasions — notably 
in  the  case  of  Manchuria — and  those  promises  had  not 
been  kept.  With  nations,  as  with  individuals,  prom- 
ises count  for  little  if  sincerity  is  lacking. 

This  outline  of  the  systematic  spoliation  of  China 
would  be  incomplete  without  some  mention  of  the 
Lao  Hsi  Kai  incident,  which,  though  it  involved  a 
comparatively  insignificant  amount  of  territory,  pro- 
vides a  glaring  example  of  the  rapacity,  cynicism,  and 
injustice  which  have  characterized  certain  European 
nations  in  their  treatment  of  China.  Lao  Hsi  Kai  is 
the  name  of  a  district  in  the  heart  of  Tientsin,  the 
greatest  seaport  of  North  China.  Tientsin  is  only 
about  two  hours  by  rail  from  Peking  and  is  a  trade 
center  of  immense  importance,  with  about  one  million 
inhabitants.  In  it  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  and 
Japan  have  concessions. 

On  the  night  of  October  19, 1916,  a  force  of  French 
soldiery,  led  by  the  French  charge  d'affaires,  who  had 
come  down  from  Peking  for  the  purpose,  without  the 
slightest  warning  suddenly  took  possession  of  the  Lao 


CHINA  -  237 

Hsi  Kai  district,  consisting  of  333  acres  of  wharfage, 
streets,  warehouses,  shops,  and  dwellings  in  one  of 
the  busiest  parts  of  Tientsin.  They  arrested  and  i'Ti- 
prisoned  the  Chinese  soldiers  on  duty  in  the  district, 
substituted  the  tricolor  for  the  flag  of  China,  and  in 
the  name  of  France  formally  annexed  this  territory  to 
the  overseas  dominions  of  the  republic.  And  this, 
mark  you,  at  a  time  when  France  was  engaged  in  a 
life-and-death  struggle  with  Germany,  which  had 
done  precisely  the  same  thing,  only  on  a  larger  scale, 
in  Belgium.  The  French  did  not  seize  Lao  Hsi  Kai 
as  a  punitive  measure,  or  for  strategic  purposes,  or 
from  military  necessity,  or  in  payment  of  unsatisfied 
claims.  They  seized  it  because  they  wanted  it 
and  because  they  knew  that  China  was  powerless 
to  resist  them.  They  could  not  even  offer  the 
excuse  that  they  took  it  in  order  to  obtain  the  same 
advantages  as  other  nations,  for  they  already  pos- 
sessed one  of  the  most  valuable  and  extensive  con- 
cessions in  the  city.  When  I  questioned  an  official 
of  the  French  Legation  as  to  the  reason  for  the  seizure 
he  naively  explained  that  France  had  been  asking  for 
Lao  Hsi  Kai  for  fifteen  years,  but  that  the  Chinese 
authorities  had  met  her  demands  with  procrastination 
and  evasion,  whereupon  she  had  decided  to  help  her- 
self to  the  territory  in  question.  To  my  way  of 
thinking  France's  theft  of  Lao  Hsi  Kai  was  on  the 
same  moral  plane  as  stealing  pennies  from  a  cripple. 


238       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

As  things  stand  to-day,  fully  three  quarters  of  all 
the  territory  nominally  included  within  the  Chinese 
Republic  is  under  foreign  influence,  if  not  actually  un- 
der foreign  control.  Tibet  is  to  all  intents  and  purposes 
a  British  protectorate,  the  government  at  Peking 
exercising  over  it  only  a  vicarious  rule,  and  Britain 
likewise  considers  the  teeming  valley  of  the  Yangtze, 
potentially  the  greatest  market  in  all  Asia,  as  within 
her  recognized  sphere  of  interest.  Hong  Kong,  Kow- 
loon,  and  Weihaiwei  bristle  with  British  bayonets  and 
British  guns.  France  has  appropriated  for  her  sphere 
of  interest  the  great,  rich  province  of  Yunnan  and  on 
the  coast  of  Kwantung  Province  has  intrenched  her- 
self at  Kwang-chau-wan.  The  flag  of  Japan  flies  over 
the  former  German  leasehold  of  Kiauchau  and  over 
the  former  Russian  territory  on  the  Kwantung  penin- 
sula, while  Japanese  influence,  in  the  form  of  Japa- 
nese railways,  banks,  traders,  and  gendarmes,  has  been 
extended  over  the  whole  of  Manchuria  and  the  fringes 
of  Mongolia.  Small  wonder  that  the  American  con- 
cession-hunter, studying  a  map  of  the  republic  to  dis- 
cover some  region  where  he  could  operate  without  en- 
croaching on  territory  preempted  by  other  nations, 
finally  exclaimed,  "But  where  in  hell  is  China?" 


IV 

At  the  opening  of  the  year  1915  Europe  found 
itself    in    unparalleled    turmoil.    The    triumphant 


CHINA  239 

legions  of  Germany  had  overrun  Belgium  and 
had  pushed  deep  into  France  and  Russia.  The 
Allies  were  fighting  with  their  backs  to  the 
wall.  Paris  was  in  imminent  danger,  the  Channel 
ports  were  threatened,  the  sea-borne  commerce  of 
Britain  was  being  slowly  throttled  by  the  submarine 
campaign.  America,  huge,  inert,  unprepared,  was 
apathetically  looking  on.  China,  with  her  incalculable 
wealth  in  trade  and  natural  resources,  was  isolated, 
forgotten,  helpless,  without  a  friend  on  whom  she 
could  count  for  assistance  or  support.  In  this  situa- 
tion Japan,  whose  settled  policy  had  long  had  as  its 
object  the  domination  of  China  and  the  hegemony  of 
Eastern  Asia,^  saw  her  golden  opportunity.  And 
that  opportunity  she  was  quick  to  seize.  On  the 
eighteenth  of  January,  then,  when  Western  ears  were 
deaf  to  everything  save  the  cannon-roll  in  Flanders, 
the  Japanese  minister  at  Peking  presented  to  the 
Chinese  Government  the  famous  Twenty-One  De- 
mands. 

Because  they  afford  concrete,  indisputable  evidence 
of  the  sinister  and  predatory  character  of  Japanese 
policy  at  that  time ;  because  they  so  clearly  explain  the 
universal  hatred  and  distrust  which  the  people  of 
China  have  for  Japan;  and  because  they  constitute 
the  most  colossal  blunder  ever  committed  by  the 

*This  is  not  the  policy  of  the  present  government  of  Japan.  One 
of  the  highest  officieils  of  the  Empire  said  to  me  in  December,  1921, 
"The  greatest  blessing  that  could  come  to  Japan  would  be  a  prosperous 
and  well-governed  China,"    E.  A.  P. 


240       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

Tokyo  government,  I  feel  justified,  despite  the  many 
times  they  have  been  quoted,  in  reproducing  them  in 
fuU: 


THE  OEIGINAL  TWENTY-ONE   DEMANDS,  AS   PRESENTED  TO  THE 
CHINESE   GOVERNMENT  JANUARY   18^  1915 


The  Japanese  government  and  the  Chinese  government, 
being  desirous  of  maintaining  the  general  peace  in  Eastern 
Asia  and  further  strengthening  the  friendly  relations  and 
good  neighborhood  existing  between  the  two  nations,  agree 
to  the  following  articles: 

Article  I.  The  Chinese  government  engages  to  give  full 
assent  to  all  matters  upon  which  the  Japanese  government 
may  hereafter  agree  with  the  German  government  relating 
to  the  disposition  of  all  rights,  interests,  and  concessions 
which  Germany,  by  virtue  of  treaties  or  otherwise,  pos- 
sesses in  relation  to  the  province  of  Shantung. 

Article  II.  The  Chinese  government  engages  that  within 
the  province  of  Shantung,  and  along  its  coast,  no  territory 
or  island  will  be  ceded  or  leased  to  a  third  power  under  any 
pretext. 

Article  III.  The  Chinese  government  consents  to  Japan's 
building  a  railway  from  Chefoo  or  Lungkou  to  join  the 
Kiaochow-Tsinanfu  Railway. 

Article  IV.  The  Chinese  government  engages,  in  the  in- 
terest of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open 
by  herself  as  soon  as  possible  certain  important  cities  and 
towns  in  the  province  of  Shantung  as  commercial  ports. 
What  places  shall  be  opened  are  to  be  jointly  decided  upon 
in  a  separate  agreement. 

n 

The  Japanese  government  and  the  Chinese  government, 
since  the  Chinese  government  has  always  acknowledged  the 


A  FUNERAL  PROCESSION  IN  PEKING 


FUNERAL  PROCESSION  OF  A  HIGH  OFFICIAL 
The  catafalque 


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CHINA  241 

special  position  enjoyed  by  Japan  in  south  Manchuria  and 
eastern  inner  Mongolia,  agree  to  the  following  articles : 

Article  I.  The  two  contracting  parties  mutually  agree 
that  the  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  and  the 
term  of  lease  of  the  South  Manchurian  Railway  and  the 
Antung-Mukden  Railway  shall  be  extended  to  the  period  of 
ninety-nine  years. 

Article  II.  Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria  and 
eastern  inner  Mongolia  shall  have  the  right  to  lease  or  own 
land  required  either  for  erecting  suitable  buildings  for  trade 
and  manufacture  or  for  farming. 

Article  III.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to  reside  and 
travel  in  south  Manchuria  and  eastern  inner  Mongolia  and 
to  engage  in  business  and  in  manufacture  of  any  kind  what- 
soever. 

Article  IV.  The  Chinese  government  agrees  to  grant  to 
Japanese  subjects  the  right  of  opening  the  mines  in  south 
Manchuria  and  eastern  Mongolia.  As  regards  what  mines 
are  to  be  opened,  they  shall  be  decided  upon  jointly. 

Article  V.  The  Chinese  government  agrees  that  in  respect 
of  the  (two)  cases  mentioned  herein  below  the  Japanese 
government's  consent  shall  be  first  obtained  before  such 
action  is  taken : 

(a)  Whenever  permission  is  granted  to  the  subject  of 
a  third  power  for  the  purpose  of  building  a  railway  in 
south  Manchuria  and  eastern  inner  Mongolia. 

(b)  Whenever  a  loan  is  to  be  made  with  a  third  power 
pledging  the  local  taxes  of  south  Manchuria  and  eastern 
inner  Mongolia. 

Article  VI.  The  Chinese  government  agrees  that  if  the 
Chinese  government  employs  political,  financial,  or  military 
advisers  or  instructors  in  south  Manchuria  or  eastern  Mon- 
golia, the  Japanese  government  shall  first  be  consulted. 

Article  VII.  The  Chinese  government  agrees  that  the 
control  and  management  of  the  Kirin-Changchun  Railway  ^ 
shall  be  handed  over  to  the  Japanese  government  for  a  term 

*This  relates  to  a  branch  line  running  from  Changchun,  the  terminus 
of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway,  to  Kirin,  capital  of  the  province  of 
|the  same  name.  The  line  is  important  because  it  taps  the  Manchurian 
poal-fields. 


242       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

of  ninety-nine  years  dating  from  the  signing  of  this  agree- 
ment. 


m 

The  Japanese  government  and  the  Chinese  government, 
seeing  that  Japanese  financiers  and  the  Hanyehping  Com- 
pany ^  have  close  relations  with  each  other  at  present,  and 
desiring  that  the  common  interests  of  the  two  nations  shall 
be  advanced,  agree  to  the  following  articles: 

Article  I.  The  two  contracting  parties  mutually  agree 
that  when  the  opportune  moment  arrives  the  Hanyehping 
Company  shall  be  made  a  joint  concern  of  the  two  nations, 
and  they  further  agree  that,  without  the  previous  consent  of 
Japan,  China  shall  not  by  her  own  act  dispose  of  the  rights 
and  property  of  whatsoever  nature  of  the  said  company  nor 
cause  the  said  company  to  dispose  freely  of  the  same. 

Article  II.  The  Chinese  government  agrees  that  all  mines 
in  the  neighborhood  of  those  owned  by  the  Hanyehping 
Company  shall  not  be  permitted,  without  the  consent  of  the 
said  company,  to  be  worked  by  other  persons  outside  of 

*  The  Hanyehping  Company  is  a  combination  of  three  concerns — the 
Hang  Yang  Steel  &  Iron  Works,  the  Tayeh  Mines,  and  the  Pinghsiang 
Collieries.  Its  mills  are  at  Hang  Yang,  one  of  the  most  important  com- 
mercial centers  in  the  upper  Yangtze  valley.  The  company  was  orig- 
inally purely  a  Chinese  property,  but  in  1912  the  whole  property  was 
piortgaged  to  the  Yokohama  Specie  Bank  as  security  for  a  loan.  As 
a  condition  of  the  loan  it  is  provided  that  the  auditor  and  certain  tech- 
fiical  experts  employed  by  the  company  shall  be  Japanese  and  that  the 
total  output  of  the  Tayeh  mines  must  be  sold  to  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment Iron  Works  at  rates  to  be  fixed  biennially,  but  much  below 
paarket  prices.  The  bank  has  also  acquired  the  preferential  right  to 
advance  further  loans.  The  mines  in  Tayeh,  according  to  a  Japanese 
official  report,  are  almost  inexhaustible  and  will  produce  1,000,000  tons 
annually  for  700  years,  the  quality  of  the  ore  being  as  good  as  that 
produced  in  Germany  or  the  United  States.  In  the  districts  surround- 
ing the  Tayeh  mines  there  are  many  other  mines — copper,  lead,  and 
zinc — which  are  not  the  property  of  the  Hanyehping  Company.  It  will 
be  noted  that  in  Article  II  Japan  demands  that  these  mines  shall  not 
be  exploited  without  the  consent  of  the  company,  which,  being  con- 
trolled by  the  Yokohama  Specie  Bank,  really  means  that  they  shall  not 
be  exploited  without  the  consent  of  Japan.  This  group  of  demands  is 
significant  in  that  it  illustrates  Japan's  intention  to  enter  and  control 
a  region  in  the  valley  of  the  Yangtze  which  Great  Britain  has  always 
considered  within  her  own  sphere  of  interest. 


CHINA  243 

the  said  company ;  and  further  agrees  that  if  it  is  desired  to 
carry  out  any  undertaking,  which,  it  is  apprehended,  may 
directly  or  indirectly  affect  the  interests  of  the  said  com- 
pany, the  consent  of  the  said  company  shall  first  be  obtained. 


IV 

The  Japanese  government  and  the  Chinese  government, 
with  the  object  of  effectively  preserving  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  China,  agree  to  the  following  special  article : 

The  Chinese  government  engages  not  to  cede  or  lease  to  a 
third  power  any  harbor  or  bay  or  island  along  the  coast  of 
China. 


Article  I.  The  Chinese  central  government  shall  employ 
influential  Japanese  as  advisers  in  political,  financial,  and 
military  affairs. 

Article  II.  Japanese  hospitals,  churches,  and  schools  in 
the  interior  of  China  shall  be  granted  the  right  of  owning 
land. 

Article  III.  Inasmuch  as  the  Japanese  government  and 
the  Chinese  government  have  had  many  cases  of  dispute 
between  Japanese  and  Chinese  police  which  caused  no  little 
misunderstanding,  it  is  for  this  reason  necessary  that  the 
police  departments  of  important  places  (in  China)  shall  be 
jointly  administered  by  Japanese  and  Chinese,  or  that  the 
police  departments  of  these  places  shall  employ  numerous 
Japanese,  so  that  they  may  at  the  same  time  help  to  plan 
for  the  improvement  of  the  Chinese  police  service. 

Article  IV.  China  shall  purchase  from  Japan  a  fixed 
amount  of  the  munitions  of  war  (say,  50  per  cent  or  more) 
that  are  needed  by  the  Chinese  government,  or  there  shall 
be  established  in  China  a  Sino- Japanese  jointly  worked 
arsenal.  Japanese  technical  experts  are  to  be  employed  and 
Japanese  material  to  be  purchased. 

Article  V.     China  agrees  to  grant  to  Japan  the  right  of 


244       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

constructing  a  railway  connecting  Wuchang  with  Kiukiang 
and  Nanchang,  another  line  between  Nanchang  and  Hang- 
chow,  and  another  between  Nanchang  and  Chaochou.^ 

Article  VI.  If  China  needs  foreign  capital  to  work  mines, 
build  railways,  and  construct  harbor-works  (including 
dockyards)  in  the  province  of  Fukien,  Japan  shall  be  first 
consulted. 

Article  VII.  China  agrees  that  Japanese  subjects  shall 
have  the  right  of  missionary  propaganda  in  Buddhist.  China. 

It  requires  no  profound  knowledge  of  diplomacy 
to  recognize  the  sweeping  and  peculiarly  sinister  na- 
ture of  these  demands.  Their  acceptance  in  their 
original  form  would  have  been  tantamount  to  an 
admission  by  the  Peking  government  that  China  was 
a  Japanese  protectorate.  The  article  demanding  that 
the  police  departments  of  important  cities  in  China 
be  jointly  administered  by  Japanese  and  Chinese 
was  as  humiliating  to  Chinese  pride,  as  flagrant  an 
infringement  of  Chinese  sovereignty,  as  the  clause 
in  the  ultimatum  presented  by  Austro-Hungary  to 
Serbia  in  the  spring  of  1914  demanding  that  Austria 
be  given  joint  control  of  the  Serbian  police  system. 
China's  acceptance  of  the  original  Twenty-One  De- 
mands would  have  given  Japan  paramount  influence 
in  many  branches  of  the  Chinese  Government;  it 
would  have  placed  the  Chinese  army  and  its  materiel 
under  the  control  of  the  Japanese  General  Staff;  it 
would  have  transformed  the  occupied  territory  of 

*  These  cities  are  in  the  provinces  of  Hupeh  and  Kiangsi.  Such  a 
railway  would  have  enabled  Japan  to  obtain  control  of  one  of  the  most 
populous  and  important  districts  in  all  China. 


CHINA  245 

Kiauchau  into  a  wedge  which  would  eventually  have 
opened  the  whole  of  Shantung  to  Japanese  penetra- 
tion; it  would  have  added  the  maritime  province  of 
Fukien  to  the  Japanese  spheres  of  interest;  and  it 
would  have  permitted  a  small  army  of  Japanese  secret 
agents,  under  the  guise  of  missionaries  and  school- 
teachers, to  penetrate  far  into  the  hinterland  of  China, 
where  it  would  have  been  a  simple  matter  for  them 
to  have  created  "incidents"  which  would  provide 
Japan  with  excuses  for  still  further  aggression. 

The  publication  of  the  Demands  aroused  a  storm 
of  indignation  and  protest  which  swept  China  from 
Yunnan  to  the  Great  Wall.  Mass-meetings  and 
demonstrations  were  held  everywhere.  Even  the 
warring  cliques  and  factions  were  unanimous  in  in- 
sisting that  the  Demands  must  be  rejected.  Thus 
bolstered  up,  the  feeble  and  vacillating  administra- 
tion at  Peking  became  so  obstinate  in  its  refusal  to 
consider  the  Fifth  Group  of  the  Demands  that  the 
Japanese  Government,  apparently  realizing  that  by 
its  greed  it  had  outreached  itself,  caused  them  to  be 
withdrawn.  It  is  worthy  of  remark  in  this  connec- 
tion that  when  Japan  notified  the  Western  Powers 
of  her  demands  on  China,  Japanese  diplomacy  exe- 
cuted a  characteristic  manoeuver  by  omitting  all  men- 
tion of  the  obnoxious  Fifth  Group,  and  when  the 
Powers  were  presented  by  China  with  a  complete 
copy  of  the  Demands,  as  they  had  been  presented  to 
President  Yuan  Shih-kai,  the  authenticity  of  the 


246       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

Fifth  Group  was  denied  by  the  Japanese  Foreign 
Office.  Concerning  this  unblushing  attempt  at  de- 
ception as  eminent  a  Japanese  as  Baron  Hayashi, 
later  Japanese  Ambassador  to  England,  is  quoted 
as  having  said : 

"When  Viscount  Kato  sent  China  a  note  contain- 
ing five  groups,  and  then  sent  to  England  what  pur- 
ported to  be  a  copy  of  his  note  to  China,  and  that  copy 
only  contained  four  of  the  groups  and  omitted  the 
fifth  altogether,  which  was  directly  a  breach  of  the 
agreement  contained  in  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance, 
he  did  something  which  I  can  no  more  explain  than 
you  can.  Outside  of  the  question  of  probity  involved, 
his  action  was  unbelievably  foolish."  ^ 

As  the  Peking  government  remained  obdurate 
even  after  the  withdrawal  of  Group  V,  being  par- 
ticularly opposed  to  acceptance  of  the  articles  con- 
firming Japan  in  her  possession  of  Kiauchau,  Japan, 
on  May  7,  1915,  presented  China  with  an  ultimatum. 
The  attitude  of  Tokio  in  regard  to  the  restoration  of 
the  territory  captured  from  Germany  was  unequiv- 
ocally expressed  in  the  paragraph  which  read:  ^'The 
Imperial  Japanese  Government^  in  taking  Kiauchau, 
made  immense  sacrifices  in  hlood  and  money.  There- 
fore, after  taking  the  place,  there  is  not  the  least 
obligation  .  .  .  to  return  the  place  to  China." 

For  four  months  China  had  held  off  Japan  by  de- 
lay and  evasion,  hoping  against  hope  that  aid  would 

*"llie  Far  East  Unveiled,"  by  Frederick  Coleman. 


CHIlSrA  247 

be  forthcoming  from  Europe  or  America.  But  no 
help  came,  and  Japan  having  consented  to  withdraw 
the  obnoxious  Fifth  Group  (or,  more  accurately,  to 
treat  its  provisions  in  "Notes  to  be  Exchanged")  and 
having  somewhat  modified  the  other  four  groups, 
Peking  finally  gave  way  and  on  May  9  the  agree- 
ment was  signed. 

Two  days  later,  however,  tardy  help  arrived  from 
the  United  States  in  the  form  of  identical  notes  ad- 
dressed by  the  United  States  Government  to  China 
and  to  Japan.    The  note  to  Japan  read : 

In  view  of  the  circumstances  of  the  negotiations  which 
have  taken  place  and  which  are  now  pending  between  the 
Government  of  Japan  and  the  Government  of  China  and  of 
the  agreements  which  have  been  reached  as  a  result  thereof, 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  has  the  honor  to  notify 
the  Government  of  the  Japanese  Empire  that  it  cannot 
recognize  any  agreement  or  undertaking  which  has  been 
entered  into  or  which  may  be  entered  into  between  the 
Governments  of  Japan  and  China  impairing  the  treaty 
rights  of  the  United  States  and  its  citizens  in  China,  the 
political  or  territorial  integrity  of  the  Republic  of  China, 
or  the  International  policy  relative  to  China  commonly 
known  as  the  Open  Door  policy. 

The  firm  tone  of  the  American  note  served  to  tem- 
porarily check  Japanese  aggression,  but  its  salutary 
effect  was  largely  undone  by  a  note  which  was  ex- 
changed on  November  15,  1917,  between  Viscount 
Ishii,  who  had  been  sent  by  his  government  on  a  spe- 
cial mission  to  the  United  States,  and  the  American 
Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Lansing.     This  note  con- 


248       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

stitutes  what  is  commonly  known  as  the  Lansing- 
Ishii  Agreement.    It  says: 

The  Governments  of  Japan  and  of  the  United  States 
recognize  that  territorial  propinquity  creates  special  rela- 
tions between  countries,  and  consequently  the  United  States 
recognizes  that  Japan  has  special  interests  in  China,  par- 
ticularly in  that  part  to  which  her  possessions  are  con- 
tiguous. 

The  territorial  sovereignty  of  China  nevertheless  remains 
unimpaired,  and  the  Government  of  the  United  States  has 
every  confidence  in  the  repeated  assurance  of  the  Imperial 
Japanese  Government  that,  while  geographical  position  gives 
Japan  such  special  interests,  it  has  no  desire  to  discriminate 
against  the  trade  of  other  nations  or  to  disregard  the  com- 
mercial rights  heretofore  granted  by  China  in  the  treaties 
with  other  nations. 

The  Governments  of  Japan  and  the  United  States  deny 
that  they  have  any  purpose  of  infringing  in  any  way  the 
independence  or  territorial  integrity  of  China,  and  they 
declare  furthermore  that  they  always  adhere  to  the  principle 
of  the  so-called  "open  door,"  or  equal  opportunity  of  com- 
merce and  industry  in  China. 

Moreover,  they  mutually  declare  that  they  are  opposed 
to  the  acquisition  by  any  Government  of  any  special  rights 
or  privileges  that  would  affect  the  independence  or  terri- 
torial integrity  of  China,  or  that  would  deny  to  the  subjects 
or  citizens  of  any  country  the  full  enjoyment  of  equal 
opportunity  in  the  commerce  and  industry  of  China. 


Though  the  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement  reiterated 
the  principle  of  the  Open  Door,  it  was  in  one  point 
substantially  different  from  preceding  notes  ex- 
changed between  the  United  States  and  Japan  (par- 
ticularly, the  Root-Takahira  Agreement  of  1909) 
in  that  it  recognized  that  Japan  possessed  "special 


CHINA  249 

interests"  in  China.  Whatever  may  have  been  Presi- 
dent Wilson's  intentions  in  the  matter,  whatever  men- 
tal reservations  Mr.  Lansing  may  have  made  in  dis- 
cussing the  wording  with  Viscount  Ishii,  the  effect 
of  the  agreement,  once  it  was  published,  was  to  re- 
verse America's  traditional  policy  toward  China.  By 
recognizing  special  rights  for  one  country,  Mr.  Lan- 
sing abandoned  the  principle  of  equal  rights  for  all. 
The  commitment  was  an  evil  one,  and  no  one  has 
ever  explained  why  it  was  made.  It  was  virtually 
repudiated,  however,  by  Mr.  Hughes  shortly  after 
he  became  secretary  of  state  in  1921,  when  he  reaf- 
firmed the  poHcy  of  the  Open  Door. 


China,  as  you  will  see  by  referring  to  the  map,  is 
crisscrossed  by  a  network  of  railways,  completed, 
under  construction,  or  in  contemplation.  Sentimental 
persons  have  referred  to  these  railways  as  "paths 
of  progress,"  but  they  might  more  fittingly  be  de- 
scribed as  bonds  of  servitude.  For  it  should  be  under- 
stood that  railways  in  China,  unlike  those  in  other 
countries,  are  not  purely  commercial  enterprises.  In 
most  countries  the  construction  of  a  railway  means 
the  acquirement  of  a  right-of-way,  the  laying  of  rails, 
the  building  of  stations  and  workshops,  and  the  op- 
eration of  trains — nothing  more.    But  not  so  in  China. 


250       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

There,  at  least  until  very  recently,  railway  building 
has  been  primarily  a  political  enterprise,  the  railways 
themselves  having  been  utilized  by  the  foreign  na- 
tions which  supplied  the  funds  for  their  construction 
as  instruments  for  military  aggression  and  political 
coercion.  In  the  majority  of  cases  the  railways  of 
China  are  financed  by  foreign  or  other  institutions 
with  the  approval  and  support  of  their  respective 
governments  and  subject  to  their  control.  Chinese 
railway  concessions,  moreover,  have  frequently  car- 
ried with  them  extraordinary  commercial  and  poHtical 
privileges,  and  monopolies  such  as  the  right  of  ex- 
ploiting the  mines  and  forests  in  the  territory  trav- 
ersed by  the  railway ;  maintaining  armed  forces  along 
the  hne,  ostensibly  for  its  protection  against  bandits; 
and  in  some  cases  (notably,  in  Shantung)  the  estab- 
lishment of  civil  administrative  centers.  Such  rail- 
ways, it  will  be  reahzed,  are  far  more  of  a  liability 
than  an  asset  to  a  country  as  weak  and  disorganized 
as  China. 

The  most  important  of  these  "pohtical"  railways 
are: 

1.  The  Chinese  Eastern  Railway,  with  a  total  mile- 
age, including  branches,  of  1275  miles,  which  runs 
from  Manchouli  (Manchuria),  on  the  Siberian-Chi- 
nese frontier,  straight  across  Manchuria,  via  Harbin 
(whence  a  section  runs  southward  to  Changchun)  to 
Suifenho  (Pogranitchnaia) ,  on  the  border  of  the  Rus- 


CHINA  251 

sian  Maritime  Province.  This  line  is  of  immense 
commercial  and  strategic  importance  in  that  it  forms 
a  "cut-off"  for  the  Trans-Siberian  system,  shortening 
the  distance  between  Moscow  and  Vladivostok  by- 
several  hundred  miles.  It  effects  junctions  at  Man- 
chouli  with  the  Trans-Siberian  to  Europe,  at  Suifenho 
with  the  continuation  of  the  Trans-Siberian  to  Vladi- 
vostok, and  at  Changchun  with  the  South  Manchuria 
Railway  to  Mukden.  It  forms,  in  short,  a  Chinese 
section  of  the  Trans-Siberian  route  from  Europe  to 
the  Pacific.  Built  by  a  Russian  syndicate,  with  the 
full  power  of  control  originally  vested  in  the  Russian 
minister  of  finance,  it  has  been  occupied  by  Japanese 
troops  since  the  collapse  of  the  Russian  constitutional 
government,  and  is  to-day  under  the  control  of  Japan. 
2.  The  South  Manchuria  Railway,  with  a  total 
mileage  of  697  miles,  which  runs  from  Changchun 
(the  southern  terminus  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Rail- 
way) to  Mukden,  where  it  splits  into  three  sections: 
one  running  southwest  to  Newchwang,  where  it  con- 
nects with  the  Chinese  Government  Railways  for 
Peking;  another  section  running  in  a  southerly  direc- 
tion, down  the  Kwantung  peninsula,  to  Dalny,  where 
it  connects  with  the  short  branch  line  to  Port  Arthur ; 
and  the  third  section  running  southeast  to  Antung, 
where  it  links  up  with  the  Korean  system.  Prior  to 
the  Russo-Japanese  War  it  was  part  of  the  Chinese 
Eastern  Railway  and  was  controlled  by  Russia, 
but  by  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  the 


252       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

section  running  from  Mukden  to  Changchun, 
as  well  as  the  branches  from  Mukden  to  Antung 
and  Mukden  to  Port  Arthur,  was  transferred  by 
Russia  to  Japan.  Under  the  terms  of  the  agreement 
between  Russia  and  China  the  latter  had  the  right 
to  redeem  this  line  thirty-six  years  after  it  was  opened 
to  traffic,  but  after  its  transfer  to  Japan  the  Japanese 
Government  forced  Peking  to  extend  the  term  for 
redemption  to  ninety-nine  years,  so  that  China  can- 
not obtain  possession  of  the  property  until  2002. 

3.  The  Shantung  (Tsingtau-Tsinanfu)  Railway. 
This  line,  of  which  about  300  miles  has  been  opened 
to  traffic,  was  built  by  German  capitalists  upon  Ger- 
many's acquirement  of  the  lease  of  Kiauchau  Bay, 
at  the  extremity  of  the  Shantung  peninsula.  Start- 
ing from  Tsingtau,  it  runs  westward  across  the  prov- 
ince of  Shantung  to  Tsinanfu,  on  the  Yellow  River, 
where  it  effects  a  junction  with  the  Pukow-Tientsin 
Railway,  which  forms  a  section  of  the  trunk-line  from 
Shanghai  to  Peking.  This  railway,  together  with  the 
accompanying  concessions  to  exploit  the  mines  within 
ten  miles  of  the  line  and  to  prospect  for  minerals  in 
certain  specified  areas  outside  the  railway  zone,  was 
transferred  by  Germany  to  Japan  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

4.  The  Yunnan  Railway.  This  line,  which  is  an 
extension  of  France's  system  in  Indo-China,  runs 
on  French  territory  from  Haiphong  to  Laokay,  and 


CHINA  253 

on  Chinese  territory  from  Laokay  to  Yunnanfu,  the 
capital  and  chief  city  of  Yunnan,  the  southernmost 
and  one  of  the  richest  provinces  of  the  republic.  Its 
total  mileage  is  533  miles,  of  which  slightly  more  than 
half  is  within  the  borders  of  China.  This  concession, 
like  those  for  the  Manchurian  and  the  Shantung  sys- 
tems, carries  with  it  mining  and  other  valuable  priv- 
ileges. 

AU  the  above-mentioned  railway  concessions  are  im- 
mune from  any  interference  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment until  the  dates  fixed  for  their  redemption,  and 
all  of  them  were  granted  under  pressure  from  the 
powers  concerned,  who  demanded  them  not  with  the 
motive  of  developing  the  country,  but  for  the  pur- 
pose of  strengthening  their  positions  in  certain  parts 
of  it,  so  that  they  might  the  more  readily  transform 
their  spheres  of  influence  into  colonial  possessions  in 
the  event  of  China  being  partitioned. 

Thanks  to  these  railway  holdings  and  the  conces- 
sions which  accompany  them,  Japan  is  to-day  to  all 
intents  and  purposes,  mistress  of  Manchuria  and  of 
Shantung.  In  Yunnan  French  influence  is  predomi- 
nant, though  it  is  only  fair  to  say  that  they  have  not 
utilized  their  railway  concession  to  undermine  Chinese 
sovereignty  in  the  south  as  the  Japanese  have  done 
in  the  north.  The  railways  of  Middle  China,  par- 
ticularly those  in  the  valley  of  the  Yangtze,  are,  gen- 
erally   speaking,    under    British    financial    control, 


254       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

though  here  again  it  must  be  admitted  that  Great 
Britain  has  rarely  utihzed  them  to  advance  her  poHti- 
cal  designs. 

In  the  railway  loans  signed  prior  to  1908  China 
consented  to  the  lending  banks  exercising  a  large 
measure  of  supervision  in  regard  to  construction  and 
expenditure.  In  every  case  the  lending  banks  in- 
sisted on  selecting  the  chief  engineer,  who  was  charged 
not  only  with  the  construction  of  the  line  but  with  its 
operation  after  it  was  built.  Hence,  though  these 
lines  are  nominally  the  property  of  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, China  is  not  in  full  control  of  them  and,  if 
she  wishes  to  take  any  measures  not  provided  for  in 
the  original  agreements,  she  has  first  to  obtain  the  per- 
mission of  the  corporations  representing  the  investors. 
In  the  railway  loans  floated  since  1908,  however, 
foreign  control,  though  by  no  means  eliminated,  is 
greatly  diminished,  though  even  in  the  later  agree- 
ments it  is  stipulated  that  the  chief  engineers  shall  be 
foreigners  and  that  expenditures  shall  be  controlled 
by  auditors  appointed  by  the  lending  banks. 

Ever  since  China  floated  her  first  foreign  loan  she 
has  been  a  happy  hunting-ground  for  "the  powers 
that  prey."  English,  French,  Russian,  German,  Aus- 
trian, Dutch,  Swiss,  Belgian,  and  Japanese  investors 
and  concession-hunters  jostled  and  snarled  at  each 
other  in  their  attempts  to  reach  the  Chinese  trough. 
At  one  period  there  was  such  a  scramble  among  the 
Treaty  Powers  to  lend  money  to  China  that  there 


CHINA  255 

were  not  enough  loans  to  go  round,  The  almost  in- 
credible selfishness  which  characterized  the  attitude 
of  the  European  nations  toward  China  is  strikingly- 
set  forth  by  Miss  Ellen  LaMotte  in  "Peking  Dust" : 

When  a  European  Power  finds  a  piece  of  rich,  juicy  ter- 
ritory which  has  not  already  been  appropriated  by  some  one 
else,  it  simply  proclaims  it  a  sphere  of  influence,  notifies 
the  Chinese  government  to  that  effect,  and  forces  it — as 
often  as  not  by  threats  of  one  kind  and  another — to  ratify 
the  transaction  by  a  treaty.  After  that  China  cannot 
even  build  a  railway  in  that  sphere  without  the  permission 
of  the  ruling  Power;  she  cannot  dismiss  or  appoint  officials; 
even  the  police  are,  as  likely  as  not,  officered  by  Europeans. 
Do  you  appreciate  that  in  1916,  when  the  European  war  was 
at  its  height,  England,  France,  and  Russia  lodged  protests 
with  the  Chinese  Government  on  the  ground  that  the  railway 
loan  which  it  had  recently  contracted  with  American  bank- 
ers for  the  construction  of  a  railway  from  Fengchen  to 
Ninghsi  trespassed  upon  the  preferential  rights  of  those 
Powers  to  build  railways.?  In  this  affair  France  also  acted 
for  Belgium.  Think  of  it!  China  needing  a  railway,  an 
American  firm  willing  to  build  it,  and  England,  France, 
Russia,  and  even  poor  little  Belgium  forbidding  her  to  build 
it,  although  they  were  themselves  unable  to  help  her  finan- 
cially! Such  incidents  would  be  ludicrous,  were  they  not 
so  tragic. 

Now  if  China  is  to  be  saved,  such  conditions  cannot 
be  permitted  to  continue.  A  stop  must  be  put  to 
the  jealous  rivalries  of  those  foreign  nations  who, 
through  the  instrumentality  of  loans,  have  been  cal- 
lously exploiting  the  country  for  their  own  selfish 
ends.  The  realization  by  the  foreign  banking 
groups  that  if  China  was  not  to  be  irretrievably 


256       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

wrecked  these  abuses  must  be  abolished  and  interna- 
tional cooperation  substituted  for  international  com- 
petition resulted  in  the  signing  of  the  Consortium  on 
October  15,  1920.  The  Consortium  is  an  agreement 
to  which  the  banking  groups  of  the  United  States, 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Japan  are  parties,  whose 
declared  purpose  is  to  assist  China  in  developing  her 
railways  and  public  utilities.  As  each  banking  group 
signed  with  the  approval  of  its  government,  the  Con- 
sortium, though  in  some  respects  a  private  contract, 
is,  in  effect,  an  international  agreement. 

The  framers  of  the  Consortium  recognized  the  ob- 
stacles in  the  path  of  rehabilitating  China.  First 
of  all,  there  was  China's  deep-seated  distrust  of 
the  foreigner — ^the  result  of  years  of  coercion, 
intrigue,  injustice,  and  oppression — coupled  with  the 
fear  that  the  Consortium  would  prove  to  be  only  a 
stepping-stone  to  some  form  of  international  control 
of  China's  finances.  Then  there  was  the  fact 
that  every  politician  in  China,  irrespective  of 
party,  violently  opposed  the  Consortium  because 
he  saw  in  it  a  curtailment  of  lucrative  oppor- 
tunities for  graft.  And  finally,  it  was  necessary  to 
overcome  the  mutual  jealousies  and  suspicions  of  the 
foreign  capitaHsts  themselves.  The  Consortium  be- 
came, therefore,  an  ordinance  of  mutual  self-denial. 
Unselfishness  and  cooperation  are  at  the  bottom  of 
the  agreement.  There  is  to  be  no  further  crowding 
or  jostling  at  the  Chinese  trough.    There  is  to  be  a 


CHINA  257 

common  holding  company,  as  it  were,  with  each  set 
of  shareholders  represented  on  the  board  of  direc" 
tors.  In  short,  the  Consortium  applies  the  Open 
Door  principle  to  the  financial  problems  of  the  repub- 
lic. China  is  to  be  loaned  money  for  her  legitimate 
needs,  but  henceforth  it  is  to  be  loaned  wisely  and  dis- 
criminatingly, and  steps  will  be  taken  to  see  that 
it  is  used  for  the  purposes  intended,  instead  of  being 
diverted,  as  heretofore,  into  the  pockets  of  the  poli- 
ticians and  military  chieftains.  The  Consortium  has 
been  described  as  a  financial  league  of  nations  whose 
decisions,  based  on  justice  and  forbearance,  are  ex- 
pected to  prevent  China  from  being  in  the  future  a 
bone  of  warlike  contention  and  which  will  at  the  same 
time  guarantee  her  fair  treatment  from  all.  I  might 
add,  however,  that  the  Chinese  themselves  are  by  no 
means  as  optimistic  about  the  Consortium  as  are  its 
American  promoters.  Nor  is  this  at  all  surprising. 
Their  previous  experiences  with  foreign  financiers 
have  made  them  "gun-shy." 

If  the  foreign  powers  are  really  sincere  in  their 
protestations ,  that  they  wish  to  set  China  upon  her 
feet  financially,  if  they  are  genuinely  desirous  of  re- 
storing her  self-respect,  their  first  step  is  plain.  She 
should  be  permitted  to  regulate  her  own  customs 
duties.  Do  you  realize,  I  wonder,  that  under  existing 
conditions  if  China  wishes  to  raise  or  lower  the  duty 
on  a  single  imported  article,  she  must  first  obtain  the 
permission  of  thirteen  nations?    And  if  those  nations 


258       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

that  do  not  produce  the  article  in  question  consent  to 
having  the  duty  raised  on  that  item,  those  nations  that 
do  produce  that  article  may  be  counted  upon  to  refuse 
their  consent.  The  United  States  and  Great  Britain, 
for  example,  would  probably  interpose  no  objections 
to  the  Chinese  Government  raising  the  duties  on  im- 
ported wines,  for  the  reason  that  they  are  not  wine- 
producing  countries  and  therefore  their  exports  would 
not  be  affected,  whereas  France  and  Italy,  both  of 
which  export  great  quantities  of  wine,  might  be  ex- 
pected to  offer  the  most  strenuous  objections.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  China  desired  to  raise  the  duty  on 
breadstuff  s,  France  and  Italy,  not  being  grain-grow- 
ing countries,  might  give  their  assent,  while  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,  with  their  vast 
grain-fields,  would  almost  certainly  oppose  such  a 
change  in  the  tariff. 

As  a  result  of  this  selfish  attitude  on  the  part  of 
the  treaty  states,  China,  with  its  three  hundred  mil- 
lions of  people,  rich  as  she  is  or  as  she  might  become, 
enjoys  a  wholly  inadequate  revenue,  for  she  is  per- 
mitted to  levy  only  a  nominal  tariff — five  per  cent, 
ad  valorem.  She  has  no  encouragement,  therefore, 
to  develop  her  industries,  for  the  treaty  states  will 
not  permit  her  to  erect  a  tariff  wall  for  their  protec- 
tion. Instead,  they  allow  her  just  enough  revenue 
to  return  to  them  in  the  form  of  Boxer  indemnities 
and  interest  on  their  loans.  When  all  is  said  and 
done,  the  financial  regeneration  of  China  is  not  due 


CHINA  259 

nearly  so  much  to  the  corruption  and  incompetency 
of  her  own  officials  as  it  is  to  the  supreme  selfishness 
of  those  foreign  nations  which  have  her  in  their  power. 

The  principal  sources  of  revenue  of  the  Chinese 
Government  are  the  land  tax,  excise,  li-kin,  the  salt 
duty,  and  the  maritime  customs.  In  order  that  you 
may  understand  why  they  do  not  produce  sufficient 
revenue,  it  is  necessary  for  me  to  briefly  sketch  the 
curious,  and  in  some  instances  archaic,  methods  em- 
ployed in  their  collection.  Let  us  take  the  land  taxes 
first.  These  are  usually  collected  by  the  magistrates, 
who,  however,  sometimes  delegate  their  collection  to 
the  village  elders.  They  are  then  forwarded  to  the 
provincial  governors,  or  tuchuns,  who,  instead  of  pass- 
ing them  on  to  the  central  government  in  Peking,  in- 
variably retain  them  to  defray  the  expenses  of  the 
provincial  administration,  the  chief  item  in  which  is 
usually  the  upkeep  of  the  large  "personal"  armies  to 
which  I  have  already  made  reference.  Thus,  though 
the  land  taxes  of  the  republic  produce  a  very  consider- 
able sum,  only  an  insignificant  part  of  it  reaches  Pe- 
king for  the  use  of  the  state.  This  is  likewise  true  of 
the  collection  of  the  excise  duties  and  of  li-kin,  a  sort 
of  inland  customs  duty  assessed  on  goods  in  transit 
and  comparable  in  certain  respects  to  the  octroi 
charges  levied  by  various  European  municipalities. 
From  time  to  time  the  Peking  government  has  made 
attempts  to  collect  the  internal  revenues  direct,  but 


260       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

owing  to  its  weakness  in  dealing  with  the  provincial 
governors  its  tax-gatherers  have  usually  returned  to 
the  capital  empty-handed.  To  tell  the  truth,  the  of- 
ficials sent  out  from  Peking  usually  receive  about  as 
much  consideration  in  the  provinces  as  United  States 
internal  revenue  agents  are  accorded  in  the  "moon- 
shine" districts  of  the  South. 

The  trade  in  salt  is  a  government  monopoly.  Only 
licensed  merchants  are  permitted  to  deal  in  it,  and 
the  importation  of  foreign  salt  is  forbidden  by  the 
treaties  with  foreign  nations.  For  the  purpose  of  salt 
administration  China  is  divided  into  some  seven  or 
eight  zones,  each  of  which  has  its  own  source  of  pro- 
duction. The  boundaries  of  these  zones  are  carefully 
defined  and  salt  produced  in  one  cannot  be  consigned 
to  or  sold  in  another.  There  are  great  variations  in 
price  between  the  various  zones,  but  the  customer  is 
not  permitted  to  buy  his  salt  in  the  cheapest  market. 
He  can  only  buy  from  the  licensed  merchants  in  his 
own  zone,  who  in  turn  are  debarred  from  procuring 
supplies  except  at  the  depots  in  their  respective  dis- 
tricts. Conveyance  from  one  zone  to  another  is  con- 
sidered as  smuggling,  and  salt  thus  transported  is 
liable  to  confiscation.  Duty  is  levied  under  two  heads, 
the  first  being  a  duty  proper,  payable  on  the  issue  of 
salt  from  the  depot,  the  second  being  li-kin  levied  in 
transit  or  at  the  place  of  destination.  As  the 
total  consumption  of  salt  for  all  China  is  estimated 
at  nearly  1,500,000  tons  a  year,  it  will  be  seen  that 


CHINA  261 

the  salt  duties  form  a  very  important  source  of 
revenue/  When  China  floated  the  Currency  Re- 
form, Crisp,  and  Reorganization  Loans  in  1911-12-13, 
she  pledged  as  security  the  revenues  from  the  salt 
tax,  the  administration  of  which — ^known  as  the  Salt 
Gabelle — was  placed  under  a  Chinese  chief  inspector 
and  a  foreign  associate  chief  inspector  (British),  who 
are  assisted  by  a  numerous  staff  of  foreigners. 

The  Chinese  Maritime  Customs  was  organized  at 
Shanghai  in  1854.  The  Taiping  rebels,  who  had  over- 
run nearly  the  whole  of  China,  then  being  in  posses- 
sion of  the  native  city,  the  collection  of  customs  dues 
was  placed  in  the  hands  of  foreigners.  This  de- 
veloped into  a  permanent  institution,  the  European 
staff  being  mainly  British.  But  upon  the  proclama- 
tion of  the  republic  a  decree  was  issued,  in  conformity 
with  the  new  national  sentiment,  appointing  Chinese 
commissioners  to  administer  the  customs.  As,  how- 
ever, the  whole  of  the  customs  revenue  was  (and 
still  is)  pledged  to  foreign  bondholders  and  absorbed 
in  the  service  of  the  several  loans,  the  foreign  powers 
interested  felt  that  to  take  the  customs  adminis- 
tration out  of  the  hands  of  Sir  Robert  Hart,  who 
had  been  inspector-general  since  1863,  would  seriously 
imperil  the  efficiency  and  integrity  for  which  the 
service  had  become  famous.  The  British  Government 
promptly  protested  against  the  decree  placing  the 
customs  under  native  supervision,  pointing  out  that 

*The  revenue  from  the  salt  tax  in  1916  was  about  $38,000,000, 


262       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

the  continuation  of  the  established  system  had  been 
stipulated  in  the  loan  agreements  of  1896  and  1898. 
The  original  understanding,  which  provided  that 
China  should  employ  a  Briton  at  the  head  of  the  serv- 
ice as  long  as  the  trade  of  Great  Britain  exceeds  in 
aggregate  that  of  any  other  treaty  state,  was  there- 
upon reaffirmed.^ 

The  staff  of  the  maritime  customs  now  nimibers 
about  7200,  of  whom  nearly  one  fourth  are  foreigners. 
It  should  be  added  that  the  foreign  members  of  the 
customs  service  have  served  China  with  the  utmost  loy- 
alty, having  shown  no  bias  in  favor  of  their  own  coun- 
tries. All  the  posts  in  the  service,  save  only  that  of 
inspector-general,  are  open  to  candidates  from  all  the 
treaty  states,  ranging  in  commercial  importance  from 
Great  Britain  to  Peru.  Barring  the  Salt  GabeUe, 
the  maritime  customs  is  the  one  department  of  finance 
in  China  which  is  managed  with  honesty  and  effi- 
ciency, this  being  due  to  the  fact  that  it  is  under  for- 
eign control.  It  collects  all  the  duties  leviable  under 
the  treaties  on  the  foreign  trade  of  China,  as  well  as 
all  the  duties  on  the  coasting  trade  so  far  as  carried 
on  by  vessels  of  foreign  build,  whether  Chinese  or 
foreign-owned.  But  it  does  not  control  the  trade  in 
native  craft,  the  so-called  junk  trade,  the  duties  on 
which  are  still  collected  by  the  officials  of  the  native 
customs  houses. 

*  Sir  Robert  Hart  died  in  1911.    He  was  succeeded  as  inspector-general 
by  Sir  Francis  Aglen. 


CHINA  263 

So  long  as  the  loans  and  indemnities  secured  by 
mortgages  on  customs  receipts  remain  unredeemed 
by  China  it  will  prove  exceedingly  difficult  to  induce 
the  foreign  powers,  who  are  frankly  distrustful  of 
the  Chinese  in  financial  matters,  to  consent  to  restor- 
ing the  administration  of  the  customs  to  the  Chinese 
themselves.  During  recent  years,  indeed,  when  the 
country  has  been  almost  constantly  in  turmoil,  the 
customs  receipts  have  not  even  been  remitted  to  the 
Chinese  Government,  but  have  been  deposited  by  the 
inspector-general  in  foreign  banks  in  Shanghai,  Can- 
ton, and  Tientsin  in  order  to  meet  the  annual  loan 
charges,  the  surplus  then  being  remitted  to  Peking. 
Long  and  costly  experience  with  sticky-fingered 
Chinese  officials  has  taught  the  foreigner  to  take  no 
chances. 

In  concluding  this  brief  survey  of  the  cur;ioU(S 
and  anomalous  tariff  arrangements  which  obtain  in 
China,  I  repeat  that,  in  my  judgment,  the  prompt 
restoration  to  China  of  the  right  to  fix  her  own  tariffs 
is  dictated  by  wisdom  no  less  than  by  justice.^  The 
only  argument  that  has  been  advanced  in  favor 
of  retaining  the  existing  five  per  cent,  tariff  is  that, 
since  the  customs  receipts  have  been  mortgaged  for 
indemnities  and  loans,  an  alteration  in  the  schedules 
might  conceivably  result  in  diminishing  the  yield, 
instead  of  augmenting  it,  thereby  endangering  the 

*  Measures  to  this  eflFect  were  agreed  to  by  the  Powers  represented 
at  the  Washington  Conference  of  1921-22. 


264       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

security  of  the  foreign  investors.  But  it  seems  to  me 
that  by  permitting  China  to  fix  her  own  tariff  she 
could  be  required  to  give  a  guarantee  that  the  total 
revenues  from  the  customs  would  not  fall  below 
the  amount  required  to  pay  the  principal  and  interest 
on  the  debts  and  loans  thus  secured.  What  I  have 
said  above  should  not  be  interpreted  as  meaning  that 
I  believe  in  doing  away,  at  least  for  the  present,  with 
the  existing  customs  administration.  If  China  is  well 
advised,  she  will  pocket  her  pride  and  permit  the  di- 
rection of  her  customs  to  remain  in  the  honest  and 
efficient  hands  of  the  present  administration  until 
she  has  had  time  to  build  up  an  equally  honest  and 
efficient  organization  of  her  own. 


VI 

China  is  at  present  passing  through  a  period  of 
reconstruction  not  dissimilar  to  that  experienced  by 
the  United  States  during  the  decade  succeeding  the 
close  of  the  Civil  War.  Just  as  we  struggled  to  free 
ourselves  from  the  intrigue,  corruption,  and  political 
chaos  that  so  nearly  overwhelmed  the  republic  in  the 
years  that  followed  Appomattox,  so  China  is  strug- 
gling to-day.  There  is  the  same  embittered,  unrec- 
onciled South  and  the  same  politically  dominant 
North.  The  "carpet-bag"  rulers  of  the  post-bellum 
South  have  their  Chinese  counterparts  in  the  corrupt 


CHINA  265 

and  tyrannical  tuchuns;  the  brigands  and  demobilized 
soldiery  who  are  terrorizing  portions  of  China  to-day 
correspond  to  the  "bad  men"  and  gun-fighters  who 
terrorized  our  own  West  during  reconstruction  days. 
And  the  ruthless  exploitation  of  China's  natural  re- 
sources by  foreign  financial  groups  finds  a  fairly  close 
parallel  in  the  exploitation  of  the  Pacific  Coast  states 
by  American  railway  interests.  We,  however,  were 
permitted  to  manage  our  own  affairs,  to  bring  order 
out  of  chaos,  harmony  out  of  strife,  without  interfer- 
ence by  foreign  nations  who  sought  to  prolong  the 
period  of  internal  dissension  in  order  to  serve  their 
own  selfish  ends.  But  not  so  in  the  case  of  China.  She 
has  not  been  left  free  to  work  out  her  own  salvation. 
She  has  been  systematically  hampered  by  unjust  re- 
strictions and  limitations;  she  has  been  forced  to  ac- 
cept from  foreign  nations  so-called  "advice"  which  in 
reality  has  been  dictation.  Though  in  theory  she  is 
a  sovereign  state,  an  independent  nation,  she  does  not 
control  her  own  finances,  her  own  railways,  her  own 
tariff,  her  own  customs,  her  own  army,  her  own  sea- 
ports, or  large  areas  of  her  own  territory.  When  all 
is  said  and  done,  China  is,  like  Charles  of  Austria,  an 
international  prisoner. 

I  have  already  explained  how  by  means  of  conces- 
sions, leases,  and  other  privileges  extracted  from 
China  under  duress  Japan  has  made  herself  the  vir- 
tual mistress  of  Manchuria  and  Shantung.  I  have 
traced  the  steps  whereby  Great  Britain  has  attained 


266       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

commercial  supremacy  in  the  Valley  of  the  Yangtze 
and  political  supremacy  in  Tibet.  I  have  shown  how 
France  has  brought  within  her  sphere  of  influence  the 
great  province  of  Yunnan.  I  have  made  it  clear 
how  all  three  of  these  powers,  by  intrenching  them- 
selves in  the  leased  territories  of  Kwantung, 
Weihaiwei,  Kiauchau,  Kowloon,  and  Kwang-chau- 
wan,  have  subjected  to  the  menace  of  their  guns  and 
fleets  the  whole  coast  of  China.  And  I  have  outlined 
the  procedure  whereby  the  Great  Powers,  through  in- 
demnities and  loans,  have  obtained  control  of  China's 
finances.  But  these,  though  the  most  important,  are 
by  no  means  the  only  infringements  on  the  republic's 
sovereignty.  Were  you  aware,  for  example,  that  a 
foreigner  living  in  China  is  as  much  under  the  law  of 
his  own  country  as  though  he  were  within  its  borders  ? 
By  virtue  of  the  extraterritorial  rights  enjoyed  by  the 
treaty  powers,  he  is  beyond  the  reach  of  the  Chinese 
law.  The  treaty  with  the  United  States  explicitly 
states : 

Citizens  of  the  United  States  (in  China),  either  on 
shore  or  in  any  merchant  vessel,  who  may  insult,  trou- 
ble, or  wound  the  persons,  or  injure  the  property,  of 
Chinese,  or  commit  any  improper  act  in  China,  shall 
be  punished  by  the  Consul  or  other  public  functionary 
thereto  authorized,  according  to  the  laws  of  the  United 
States. 

And  there  are  other  rights,  powers,  and  privileges 
which  the  foreign  nations  have  arrogated  to  them- 


CHINA  267 

selves  for  which  there  is  now  little  justification.  The 
foreign  legations  in  Peking,  for  example,  are  sur- 
rounded by  ramparts,  defended  by  artillery  and  ma- 
chine-guns, and  garrisoned  by  troops — miniature 
fortresses,  in  fact,  set  down  in  the  heart  of  China's 
capital.  No  Chinese  may  walk  on  that  portion  of  the 
Tartar  Wall  which  commands  the  legation  quarter, 
and  a  somewhat  similar  prohibition  is  enforced  on 
Shameen,  the  island  on  which  is  Canton's  European 
settlement.  Japan  has  introduced  the  pillar-boxes 
and  postmen  of  the  Imperial  Japanese  Post  into 
every  district  of  Peking,  as  well  as  in  numerous  other 
Chinese  cities,  and  even  the  United  States  maintains 
at  Tientsin  and  Shanghai  its  extraterritoriahzed 
post-offices  which  compete  with  the  and  underbid  the 
Chinese  postal  service.  For  upward  of  one  thousand 
miles  China's  greatest  waterway,  the  Yangtze  River, 
is  patrolled  by  American  and  British  gunboats;  a 
battalion  of  American  infantry  is  stationed  in  Tien- 
tsin; the  Japanese  maintain  a  garrison  as  far  inland 
as  Hankow;  and  a  considerable  part  of  the  province 
of  Shantung  is  under  Japanese  civil  administration. 
In  short,  China  is  to-day  a  country  under  foreign 
occupation. 

Now  it  is  obviously  impracticable  to  abruptly  abol- 
ish all  of  these  powers  and  privileges,  even  if  the  con- 
sent of  the  foreign  nations  which  are  directly  inter- 
ested could  be  obtained.  Such  a  proceeding  would 
not  be  in  the  best  interest  of  the  Chinese  themselves. 


268       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

But  there  are  certain  things  which  should  and  must 
be  done  if  the  foreign  powers  are  sincere  in  their  pro- 
testations that  they  wish  to  rehabihtate  China.  If 
they  are  really  desirous  of  making  the  Chinese  Re- 
public an  independent  nation  in  fact  as  well  as  in 
name,  one  of  their  first  steps  should  be  the  restora- 
tion of  the  territories  which  they  have  leased,  or  have 
otherwise  alienated,  in  China  proper^ — the  Japanese 
withdrawing  from  Shantung,  the  British  from  Wei- 
haiwei  and  the  Kowloon  peninsula  (opposite  Hong 
Kong) ,  the  Portuguese  from  Macao,  and  the  French 
from  Kwang-chau-wan.  Though  abstract  justice 
doubtless  also  demands  the  evacuation  of  Port  Arthur 
and  Dalny  by  Japan,  and  the  evacuation  of  Hong 
Kong  by  Great  Britain,  I  do  not  think  that  such 
action  is  likely  to  be  realized  for  many  years  to  come, 
if  at  all.  The  two  powers  in  question  have  expended 
vast  sums  on  these  great  strongholds,  they  play  highly 
important  parts  in  their  respective  schemes  of  national 
defense,  and  I  can  no  more  conceive  of  their  consent- 
ing to  abandon  them  than  I  can  of  the  United  States 
consenting  to  withdraw  from  the  Canal  Zone. 

The  restoration  of  the  leased  territories  should  be 
followed  by  the  abolition  of  all  "spheres  of  influence" 
in  China  proper,  and  eventually,  when  political  con- 
ditions justify  it,  in  the  outlying  territories — Man- 
churia, Mongolia,  and  Tibet.  But  it  will  be  time 
enough  to  discuss  the  renunciation  by  Great  Britain 

*  TTiat  is,  the  China  of  the  Eighteen  Provinces.    See  Appendix. 


CHINA  269 

of  her  political  predominancy  in  Tibet,  and  the  sur- 
render by  Japan  of  her  "special  interests"  in  Man- 
churia and  Inner  Mongolia,  when  China  has  shown 
herself  capable  of  establishing  and  maintaining  a 
stable  and  efficient  central  government,  strong 
enough  to  properly  administer  those  troubled  regions. 
For  Japan  to  withdraw  her  troops  from  Manchuria 
under  existing  conditions  would  merely  add  to  the 
power  of  Chang  Tso-lin  and  his  fellow-bandits  and 
increase  the  prevaihng  unrest  and  disorder. 

The  next  step  should  be  the  unification  of  all  rail- 
way concessions  in  the  republic  under  a  Chinese 
board  patterned  on  the  lines  of  the  board  of  the 
United  States  Steel  Corporation,  but  with  the  neces- 
sary foreign  financial  control.  A  large  measure  of 
fiscal  independence  should  be  restored  to  China  by 
permitting  her  to  fix  her  own  tariffs,  though,  as  I  have 
already  remarked,  I  should  question  the  advisability, 
from  the  standpoint  of  China's  own  best  interests,  in 
doing  away  with  the  present  international  customs 
administration,  at  least  for  some  years  to  come. 

The  extraterritorial  rights  at  present  enjoyed  by 
the  treaty  powers  should  be  abolished  as  soon  as  China 
has  modernized  her  prisons,  reformed  her  civil  and 
criminal  codes,  and  organized  a  judiciary  capable  of 
enforcing  those  codes  with  impartiality  and  justice.^ 

^The  nations  represented  at  the  Washington  Conference  agreed,  in 
December,  1921,  to  send  a  commission  to  China  for  the  purpose  of  draw- 
ing up  a  plan  for  judicial  reform  as  a  preliminary  to  the  abolition  of 
extraterritorial  privileges. 


270       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

Nor,  in  view  of  the  development  of  aircraft  and  means 
of  communication  and  of  the  fact  that  the  capital  is 
less  than  one  hundred  miles  from  the  sea  coast,  does 
there  appear  to  be  any  further  necessity  for  the  main- 
tenance of  foreign  troops  in  Peking.  The  postal 
services  maintained  in  China  by  the  United  States, 
Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan  should  also 
come  to  an  end.  And  finally,  there  should  be  com- 
plete abolition  of  all  the  shadowy  claims,  advisorships, 
and  other  petty  but  irritating  encroachments  on  Chi- 
nese sovereignty  which  have  grown  out  of  concessions, 
leased  territories,  and  railway  rights.  Thus  reestab- 
lished in  possession  of  her  own  house,  China  should 
be  given  an  opportunity  to  set  it  in  order  without  be- 
ing hampered  by  foreign  interference. 

Now  I  am  perfectly  aware  that  certain  of  the  meas- 
ures which  I  have  outlined  above  for  the  restoration 
of  China  to  the  status  of  a  sovereign  state  would  fall 
far  short  of  satisfying  the  Chinese  and  their  friends. 
They  insist  that  the  powers  must  betake  themselves 
from  Chinese  soil  forthwith,  bag  and  baggage.  They 
strenuously  object  to  any  form  of  foreign  political  or 
financial  control.  They  demand  the  restoration  not 
only  of  the  foreign-occupied  territories  in  China 
proper,  but  likewise  of  Port  Arthur,  Dalny,  and 
Hong  Kong.  Considering  the  question  purely  from 
the  ethical  viewpoint,  there  can  be  no  denying  that 
the  Chinese  are  fully  justified  in  these  demands.  The 
difficulty  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  are  not  possible  of 


CHINA  271 

realization,  while  those  which  I  have  outlined,  in  all 
probability,  are.  And.  when  all  is  said  and  done,  it 
is  a  question  of  practical  politics  that  we  are  discuss- 
ing. Everything  considered,  it  seems  to  me  that 
for  a  hungry  person  even  three  quarters  of  a  loaf  is 
considerably  better  than  none. 

But  if  China  is  to  obtain  even  a  portion  of  her 
demands,  she  must  herself  be  prepared  to  initiate  and 
carry  through  wide  reforms,  to  make  many  changes 
in  the  conduct  of  her  national  aflPairs.  Though  she 
possesses  to  an  altogether  extraordinary  degree  the 
sympathy  and  liking  of  other  peoples,  she  does  not 
possess  their  confidence.  She  has  disappointed  and, 
irritated  them  too  often.  Her  interminable  internal 
dissensions,  the  weakness,  inefficiency,  and  corruption 
which  have  characterized  her  various  administrations, 
her  dilatoriness  in  meeting  her  financial  obligations, 
her  failure  to  put  down  tyranny  and  brigandage — all 
these  have  weakened  her  position  among  the  nations. 
So  she  must  begin  by  wiping  the  slate  clean. 
The  North  and  South  must  sink  their  differ- 
ences and  wholeheartedly  unite  in  the  establishment 
of  an  honest,  efficient,  and  stable  central  govern- 
ment. The  corrupt  and  tyrannical  tuchuns  must 
be  stripped  of  their  power  and  their  armies  dis- 
banded, the  great  sums  required  for  their  upkeep 
being  devoted  to  the  construction  of  roads  throughout 
the  country,  the  completion  of  the  trunk-lines,  and 
the  amelioration  of  the  peasantry.    And  lastly,  the 


272       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

whole  of  China  must  be  opened  to  foreigners  for  pur- 
poses of  travel,  residence,  and  commerce. 

If  China  will  do  these  things,  and  if  she  and  the  for- 
eign powers  will  exercise  mutual  tolerance,  forbear- 
ance, unselfishness,  and  charity  in  dealing  with  one 
another,  I  am  convinced  that  the  republic  will  become 
a  respected  and  prosperous  member  of  the  family  of 
nations  in  a  much  nearer  future  than  most  people  sup- 
pose. If  these  things  are  not  done,  China  will  con- 
tinue in  a  state  of  chaos,  a  bone  of  international  con- 
tention, a  perpetual  menace  to  the  peace  of  the  world. 
But  she  will  never  be  conquered,  her  people  will  never 
be  assimilated  by  those  of  some  other  nation.  Make 
no  mistake  about  that.  For,  when  all  is  said  and  done, 
China  is  an  anvil  which,  by  mere  passive  resistance, 
will  eventually  wear  out  every  hammer  that  beats 
upon  it.^ 

^  See  Appendix  for  text  of  Chinese  treaties  apjjroved  by  the  Powers 
at  the  Washington  Conference  of  19^1-22. 


CHINESE  RAILWAY  GUARDS 
South    Manchuria 


JAPANESE   RAILWAY   GUARD 
Shantung 


A   FEAST   GIVEN  BY  A   BOY   OF   13   YEARS   AND   HIS   12-YEAR-OLD   WIFE 
ON  THE  ANNIVERSARY  OF  THE  DEATH  OF  THEIR  SON 


PART    IV 
THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS 


WE  are  an  inconsistent  and  contradictory  peo- 
ple. Though  we  boast  of  being  a  world 
power,  in  reality  our  national  horizons  are  Sandy 
Hook  and  the  Golden  Gate,  the  Great  Lakes  and  the 
Rio  Grande.  Though  the  most  altruistic  motives 
which  ever  inspired  a  nation  have  led  us  to  assume 
the  white  man's  burden  for  fifteen  millions  of  people 
in  the  Philippines,  Guam,  Samoa,  Hawaii,  Alaska, 
the  Canal  Zone,  Haiti,  Santo  Domingo,  the  Virgin 
Islands,  and  Porto  Rico,  we  know  and  care  far  less 
about  their  needs  and  their  problems  then  we  do 
about  those  of  many  countries  in  which  we  have  only 
the  most  vicarious  interest.  Though  our  colonial 
responsibilities  have  gradually  increased  until  they 
stretch  from  the  Caribbean  to  the  China  Seas; 
though  we  are  steadily  expanding,  for  the  protection 
of  our  position  at  Panama,  over  all  the  smaller  states 
of  the  Central  American  seaboard,  we  have  neither  a 
colonial  office  nor  a  colonial  policy.    To  paraphrase 

the  lines  of  Kipling: 

273 


274       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

We  think  our  country  still 

Is  Broadway  and  Beacon  Hill. 

Nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century  has  passed  since 
George  Dewey,  his  commodore's  pennant  flaunting 
from  the  Olympias  masthead,  blazed  his  way  into 
Manila  Bay,  sunk  the  Spanish  fleet,  and  gave  to  the 
United  States  a  colonial  empire.  It  would  seem  that 
that  was  ample  time  for  the  American  people  to 
become  tolerably  familiar  with  the  politics,  prob- 
lems, and  potentialities  of  the  great  archipelago  of 
which,  through  the  fortunes  of  war,  we  unexpectedly 
found  ourselves  the  guardians,  yet  the  discouraging 
fact  remains  that,  despite  all  that  has  been  said  and 
written  on  the  subject,  the  average  American  knows 
far  less  about  the  Philippine  Islands,  over  which 
floats  the  American  flag,  than  he  does  about  Mexico 
or  Ireland  or  Germany  or  Russia.  It  is  to  be  pre- 
sumed that  you  who  read  these  pages  possess  intelli- 
gence and  information  above  the  average,  yet  how 
many  of  you,  I  wonder,  have  other  than  the  haziest 
conception  of  what  the  Philippines  are  like?  You 
conceive  them,  no  doubt, — when  you  think  of  them 
at  all, — as  jungle-covered,  palm-fringed  islands  set 
down  in  a  turquoise  sea  beneath  a  merciless  sun.  You 
think  of  the  natives  as  reformed  head-hunters  dwell- 
ing in  huts  of  bamboo  thatched  with  nipa  and  living 
on  dog-meat,  for  such  was  the  impression  you  ob- 
tained from  the  Igorot  villages  at  the  St.  Louis  and 
San  Francisco  expositions.     You  know,  of  course, 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        275 

that  Manila  is  in  certain  respects  an  up-to-date  city 
— you  have  gathered  this  from  the  pictures  in  the 
Sunday  supplements  and  the  magazines — ^but  you 
also  assume  that  it  is  cursed  with  almost  unendurable 
heat,  because  the  people  in  the  pictures  are  wearing 
white  suits  and  straw  hats.  You  are  aware  that  the 
chief  products  of  the  islands  are  Manila  hemp,  popu- 
larly associated  with  executions,  and  cocoanut-oil, 
which  is  used  for  beautifying  the  complexion,  and  you 
have  heard  stories  to  the  effect  that  the  Sultan  of 
Sulu  presents  pearls  of  great  price  to  those  who  visit 
him.  Were  you  asked  to  enumerate  a  few  well- 
known  Filipinos,  you  would  almost  certainly  name 
Emilio  Aguinaldo  and  you  might  add  Manuel 
Quezon.  That,  with  a  few  other  odds  and  ends  of 
information,  constitute  the  sum  total  of  the  average 
American's  knowledge  of  the  Philippine  Islands. 

Perhaps  you  did  not  realize,  however,  that  the 
land  area  of  the  archipelago  is  considerably  greater 
than  that  of  England,  Scotland,  and  Ireland  put  to- 
gether and  that  its  population  is  larger  than  that  of 
the  state  of  New  York.  Were  you  aware  that  the 
distance  from  Cape  Bojeador,  in  northern  Luzon,  to 
Tawi  Tawi,  in  the  Sulu  group,  is  equal  to  the  entire 
width  of  the  United  States  from  Canada  to  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico?  Your  imagination  doubtless  pictures  a 
group  of  low-lying  islands,  like  those  you  have  read 
of  in  South  Sea  stories,  covered  with  dense  and  steam- 
ing jungles,  so  it  may  be  something  of  a  revelation 


276       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

to  learn  that  the  Philippines  have  no  less  than  half 
a  dozen  mountains  which  are  higher  than  any  peaks  in 
the  United  States  east  of  the  Rockies,  that  they  have 
at  least  three  rivers  which  are  as  long  as  the  Hudson, 
and  that  two  thirds  of  their  surface  is  covered  not 
with  steaming  jungle,  but  with  splendid  forests  in 
which  hard  woods  abound,  some  of  the  mountains 
being  clothed  with  pines.  You  think  of  the  Philip- 
pines being  in  the  tropics,  as  they  are,  yet  I  imagine 
that  you  will  be  surprised  to  learn  that  the  average 
maximum  summer  heat  of  Manila  is  considerably 
lower  than  that  of  New  York.  If  you  have  read  the 
accounts  of  the  voyages  of  the  early  explorers  you  are 
aware  that  Cebu  was  a  flourishing  city  when  the  only 
settlement  on  Manhattan  Island  was  an  Indian  vil- 
lage, and  that  Manila  had  been  founded  for  half  a 
century  when  the  Pilgrims  set  foot  on  the  Plymouth 
shore.  Nor  do  I  need  to  remind  you  that  the  Fil- 
ipinos are  the  only  Christian  race  in  Asia.  And 
finally,  did  you  ever  pause  to  think  that  the  nation 
which  holds  the  Philippines  is  the  traffic  policeman  at 
the  Broadway  and  Forty-Second  Street  of  the 
world's  commerce,  for  the  archipelago  lies  squarely 
athwart  every  trade  route  of  the  Farther  East,  our 
great  naval  base  at  Cavite  being  only  sixteen  hours 
by  a  fast  destroyer  from  Hong  Kong,  fifty  hours  from 
Singapore,  and  about  the  same  from  Nagasaki? 

The  average  American's  lack  of  knowledge  about 
the  largest  and  richest  of  our  insular  possessions  is 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        277 

due  to  two  causes — indifference  and  misinformation. 
Each  year  thousands  of  American  tourists  visit  Japan 
and  the  China  Coast,  yet  comparatively  few  of  them 
take  the  time  or  trouble  to  visit  Manila,  which  can  be 
reached  from  Hong  Kong  as  quickly  and  as  easily 
as  New  Orleans  can  be  reached  from  New  York,  in 
order  to  see  for  themselves  the  miracles  that  have 
been  wrought  in  those  islands  by  their  countrymen. 
The  president  of  a  great  motion-picture  corporation, 
in  whose  interests  I  recently  went  to  the  Far  East, 
urged  me  to  waste  no  time  in  the  Philippines.  "The 
American  public  is  not  interested  in  them,"  he  as- 
sured me,  "and  there  isn't  much  to  see  there,  any- 
way." Some  months  ago  an  American  weekly  whose 
circulation  runs  into  the  millions  published  an  article 
on  the  poHtical  situation  in  the  islands  by  a  journalist 
who  based  his  statements  on  the  superficial  informa- 
tion gathered  during  the  brief  period  the  vessel  on 
which  he  was  traveling  remained  at  Manila.  And  a 
high  official  of  the  insular  administration  told  me  that 
his  aunt — by  no  means  an  unintelligent  or  uneducated 
woman — asked  him  during  one  of  his  periodical  visits 
home  how  often  he  ran  over  to  Havana  I 

I  am  perfectly  well  aware  that  certain  of  the  Ameri- 
can, and  probably  all  of  the  Filipino  officials  who  by 
their  hospitality  and  thoughtfulness  made  my  journey 
through  the  archipelago  almost  a  triumphal  progress 
so  far  as  entertainments,  comforts,  and  traveling  ar- 
rangements were  concerned  will  accuse  me  of  ingrati- 


278       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

tude  when  they  read  this  book.  They  entertained  me 
with  a  lavishness  which  I  have  seen  equalled  in  few 
countries  and  surpassed  in  none;  they  provided  me 
with  motor  cars  and  launches  and  canoes  and  saddle- 
horses  and  military  escorts.  Over  their  railways  I 
was  permitted  to  travel  only  by  special  train,  and, 
thanks  to  the  courtesy  of  the  then  governor-general, 
Francis  Burton  Harrison,  and  of  the  Honorable 
Manuel  Quezon,  president  of  the  Philippine  Senate, 
there  was  placed  at  my  disposal  a  government  vessel, 
the  coastguard  cutter  Negros,  on  which  I  made  a 
cruise  of  nearly  six  thousand  miles.  Not  for  one  in- 
stant do  I  think  that  these  exceptional  facilities  for 
observation  were  afforded  me  in  an  attempt  to  pur- 
chase my  opinion,  but  rather  because  the  insular  gov- 
ernment desired  me  to  see  the  islands  under  the  most 
comfortable  conditions,  hoping,  no  doubt,  that  I 
would  form  a  favorable  impression  of  what  it  had 
accomplished  and  would  pass  on  my  opinions  to  my 
readers  in  the  United  States.  But  it  seems  to  me 
that  a  writer's  first  duty  is  to  keep  faith  with  those 
who  read  his  writings  and  whose  opinions  are  pre- 
sumably molded  to  a  considerable  extent  by  what 
he  tells  them.  So  if  in  the  following  pages  I  do  not 
always  agree  with  the  opinions  or  approve  of  the 
policies  of  those  who  so  lavishly  entertained  me;  if  I 
do  not  indorse  all  of  the  claims  that  are  made  by  the 
Filipinos  and  the  American  officials  of  the  recent 
Democratic  administration,  it  is  not  because  I  am  un- 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       279 

grateful  or  imappreciative,  but  because  I  am  trying 
to  paint  for  you  a  truthful  picture,  uncolored  by  politi- 
cal partisanship  or  racial  prejudice  or  personal  bias, 
of  conditions  as  I  found  them  in  the  Philippines. 


n 

You  will  pardon  me,  I  trust,  if  I  recall 
to  your  minds  certain  geographic  facts  in  or- 
der that  you  may  have  a  substantial  foundation  on 
which  to  build  an  intelligent  opinion  of  the  problem 
which  confronts  us  in  the  Philippines.  To  begin  with, 
the  Philippine  Archipelago,  which  consists  of  some- 
thing over  three  thousand  islands,  large  and  small, 
could  be  enclosed,  roughly  speaking,  in  an  isosceles 
triangle  with  a  base  line  of  six  hundred  miles  and  the 
other  two  sides  of  twelve  hundred  miles  each.  This 
triangle  lies  between  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  the  China 
Sea  in  the  same  latitude  as  Central  America.  Form- 
ing the  apex  of  the  triangle  is  the  island  of  Luzon, 
which  is  about  the  size  of  Ohio.  The  lower  right- 
hand  corner  of  the  triangle  is  formed  by  another  great 
island,  Mindanao,  whose  area  corresponds  to  that  of 
Indiana.  Sprinkled  about  between  these  dominating 
islands  are  the  lesser  islands  of  Samar,  Negros, 
Panay,  Palawan,  and  Mindoro,  each  about  the  size 
of  Connecticut,  and  Leyte,  Cebu,  Bohol,  and  Masbata, 
each  of  which  is  somewhat  larger  than  Rhode  Island. 


280       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

Outside  the  southern  boundary  of  the  triangle — out- 
side it  in  more  senses  than  one — is  the  Sulu  Archi- 
pelago, of  which  Jolo,  on  the  island  of  Sulu,  is  the 
provincial  capital  and  the  principal  town. 

Now  in  considering  the  question  of  the  Philippines 
one  should  never  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  the  Fili- 
pinos are  not  a  people.  This  assertion,  I  might  add, 
directly  contradicts  Mr.  Maximo  M.  Kalaw,  a  bril- 
liant young  Filipino  writer,  who  says  in  one  of  his 
books,  "One  fact  must  be  conceded  in  studying  the 
Philippine  question:  the  Filipinos  are  a  people,  like 
the  Cubans  or  the  Irish  or  the  French — a  distinct 
political  entity,  with  a  consciousness  of  kind  and  with 
national  feelings  and  aspirations."  With  this  con- 
tention most  ethnologists  flatly  disagree.  The  Fili- 
pinos belong,  it  is  true,  to  the  great  Malay  race,  as  do 
the  natives  of  the  Malay  Peninsula,  Sumatra,  Java, 
and  Borneo ;  just  as  the  Irish  belong  to  the  Celtic  race, 
the  French  to  the  Latin  race,  and  the  Cubans  to  the 
Latin  and  African  races.  But  that  does  not  make 
them  a  people  in  the  generally  accepted  sense  of  the 
word.  As  Mr.  A.  R.  Colquhoun  in  "The  Mastery  of 
the  Pacific"  says :  "No  Malay  nation  has  ever  emerged 
from  the  hordes  of  that  race,  which  is  spread  over 
the  islands  of  the  Pacific.  Wherever  they  are  found 
they  have  certain  marked  characteristics  and  of  these 
the  most  remarkable  is  their  lack  of  that  spirit  which 
goes  to  form  a  homogeneous  people,  to  weld  them  to- 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       281 

gether.  The  Malay  is  always  a  provincial ;  more,  he 
rarely  rises  outside  the  interests  of  his  own  town  or 
village."  The  truth  is  that  the  Filipinos,  instead  of 
being  a  people,  are  a  congeries  of  peoples  which  have 
come  to  the  Philippines  at  various  periods  in  succes- 
sive waves  of  immigration.  Although,  as  the  result 
of  four  centuries  of  white  man's  rule,  they  have  grad- 
ually come  to  resemble  one  another  more  and  more 
and  to  have  more  and  more  in  common,  they  are  still 
as  distinct  in  their  genealogies,  their  languages,  and 
their  characteristics  as  the  Chinooks,  the  Zunis,  the 
Iroquois,  and  the  Sioux.  That  they  possess  certain 
national  characteristics  and  a  certain  homogeneity  of 
population  which  may  eventually  weld  them  into  a 
people  I  do  not  attempt  to  deny,  but  that  day  has  not 
yet  arrived. 

There  are  many  methods  of  classifying  the  races 
of  mankind  and  their  subdivisions,  but  that  which 
measures  them  by  their  speech  is  sanctioned  by  long 
usage  and  by  logic.  Now  one  of  the  first  things  that 
impressed  the  early  explorers,  as  well  as  the  mission- 
aries who  came  after  them,  was  the  amazing  multiplic- 
ity of  languages  among  the  inhabitants  of  the  Philip- 
pines. And  what  was  true  in  Magellan's  time  is 
equally  true  to-day,  the  only  common  medium  of 
communication  between  the  various  peoples  being  the 
alien  tongues  which  they  have  learned  from  their 
Spanish  and  American  rulers,  there  being,  in  fact, 


282       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

more  sharply  distinct  dialects  than  there  are  tribes  in 
the  islands/  Though  English  is  the  official  language, 
being  a  compulsory  subject  in  the  schools,  the  pro- 
ceedings of  both  the  Phihppine  Senate  and  House  of 
Representatives  are  conducted  in  Spanish.  Ability 
to  read  and  write  EngUsh  or  Spanish  or  a  native 
language  entitles  a  male  citizen  of  the  Philippines 
who  is  twenty-one  or  more  years  of  age  to  vote. 
Yet  out  of  the  total  of  more  than  two  mil- 
lion Filipinos  of  voting  age  in  the  islands  in 
1919,  barely  one  third  possessed  this  qualification. 
Though  the  Philippines  were  ruled  from  Madrid  for 
more  than  three  hundred  and  seventy-five  years,  the 
use  of  Spanish  never  became  common,  a  knowledge  of 
that  tongue  being  limited  to  the  educated  minority. 
This  was  probably  due  in  considerable  measure,  how- 
ever, to  the  fact  that  the  Spaniards  rather  discouraged 
the  natives  from  learning  Spanish,  doubtless  because 
they  feared  that  a  common  medium  of  communication 
would  tend  to  unite  the  Filipinos  against  them.  That 
fear  never  troubled  the  Americans,  however,  for  they 
began  teaching  English  to  the  natives  from  the  be- 
ginning of  the  occupation.  It  is  a  striking  commen- 
tary on  the  efficacy  of  our  educational  methods  that 
after  less  than  a  quarter  of  a  century  of  American 
rule  English  is  far  more  widely  spoken  than  Spanish 
ever  was.    When  it  comes  into  comparatively  general 

^  There  are  forty-three  ethnographic  groups  or  tribes  in  the  archipelago 
and  eighty-seven  distinct  dialects  are  spoken. 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        283 

use,  as  it  will  if  the  politicians  in  Washington  and 
Manila  permit  the  present  educational  system  to  be 
adhered  to,  one  of  the  chief  obstacles  in  the  way  of 
welding  the  Filipinos  into  a  homogeneous  people  will 
have  disappeared. 

The  practical  difficulties  resulting  from  this  multi- 
plicity of  tongues  are  legion.  Here  is  a  typical  ex- 
ample. When,  during  the  Aguinaldo  revolt  of  1898, 
a  number  of  insurrectionary  leaders  met  at  Gerona,  in 
Tarlac  Province,  Luzon,  to  elect  municipal  officers, 
the  revolutionary  decrees  had  to  be  read  in  Tagalog, 
in  Ilocano,  in  Pampanga,  and  in  Pangasinan,  all  of 
which  languages  were  spoken  in  the  town.  And  Jus- 
tice Johnson  of  the  Philippine  Supreme  Court  tells  of 
the  trial  of  seven  men  charged  with  a  murder,  at  which 
it  was  necessary  to  read  the  complaint  in  four  different 
dialects.  Imagine,  if  you  please,  what  would  be  the 
obstacle  to  self-government  in  the  British  Isles,  which 
in  area  very  nearly  correspond  to  the  Philippines,  if 
the  English  could  not  make  themselves  understood 
by  the  Welsh,  if  the  Welsh  were  unable  to  converse 
with  the  Scotch,  if  the  Scotch  spoke  a  different  tongue 
from  the  Irish,  and  if  the  languages  of  all  four  were 
whoUy  unintelligible  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Isle 
of  Man,  the  only  common  medium  of  communication 
being  French  or  German,  with  which  only  the  edu- 
cated classes  were  familiar. 

There  is  another  reason  than  the  lingual  one  why 
the  inhabitants  of  the  Phihppines  cannot  truthfully  be 


284       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

called  a  people.  I  refer  to  the  barriers  of  mutual 
dislike  and  prejudice  which  have  separated  the  vari- 
ous island  races  ever  since  the  dawn  of  their  recorded 
history.  Political  power  in  the  Philippines  is  at  pres- 
ent about  equally  divided  between  the  Visayans,  most 
of  whom  live  in  the  Visaya  group,  in  the  center  of  the 
archipelago,  and  comprise  more  than  forty  per  cent, 
of  the  total  population,  and  the  Tagalogs,  who  dwell 
mainly  in  central  Luzon  and  have  less  than  half  the 
numerical  strength  of  their  southern  neighbors.  The 
only  other  element  which  really  counts  politically  is 
the  Ilocanos,  also  from  Luzon,  who,  though  they 
form  only  about  twenty  per  cent,  of  the  total  popula- 
tion, are  quite  capable  of  holding  their  own.  Though 
the  Tagalogs,  who  are  preeminently  politicians,  in 
which  respect  they  might  aptly  be  compared  to  the 
French-Canadians,  have  heretofore  been  the  dominat- 
ing Filipino  people  of  the  islands,  their  pohtical  su- 
premacy has  been  successfully  challenged  in  recent 
years  by  the  Visayans.  The  differences  of  the  two 
chief  racio-political  groups  have  been  successfully  har- 
monized of  late,  however,  through  the  tact,  ability,  and 
vision  of  their  respective  leaders — the  Honorable 
Manuel  Quezon,  President  of  the  Senate,  who  is  a 
Tagalog,  and  Senor  Osmena,  Speaker  of  the  House 
of  Representatives,  who  is  a  Visayan. 

Of  all  the  Christian  races,  the  Tagalogs  are  the  most 
intelligent,  the  most  progressive,  and,  it  is  usually 
conceded,  the  least  reliable.    The  Visayans,  though  in 


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THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       285 

many  respects  less  capable,  are  generally  more  docile 
and  law-abiding.  The  Ilocanos  have  a  well-deserved 
reputation  for  industry  and  for  real  ability  which 
both  of  the  others  lack.  These  three  peoples,  which 
between  them  control  the  governmental  machinery  of 
the  islands,  are  at  heart  about  as  mutually  friendly 
as  the  South  Irish  and  the  Ulstermen,  though  it  must 
be  admitted,  in  all  fairness,  that  they  have  to  a  great 
extent  buried  their  animosities  for  political  reasons. 
But  whether  these  mutual  animosities  would  be  per- 
mitted to  remain  buried,  were  the  islanders  granted 
complete  independence,  is  quite  another  question. 

The  Visayans,  the  Tagalogs,  and  the  Ilocanos,  to- 
gether with  the  Bicols,  the  Pangasinans,  the  Caga- 
yans,  and  the  Zambalans,  comprise  the  seven  princi- 
pal Christian  tribes  commonly  referred  to  as  Filipinos 
and  form  approximately  seven  eighths  of  the  total 
population  of  the  islands.  In  addition  to  the  racial 
divisions  just  enumerated,  there  are  some  twenty- 
seven  non-Christian  or  pagan  tribes,  such  as  the  Igo- 
rots,  the  Ifugaos,  and  the  Kalingas,  all  from  the 
mountainous  districts  of  northern  Luzon  and  all,  until 
quite  recently,  addicted  to  the  exciting  pastime  of 
head-hunting;  and  the  Mandayas  and  Monobos,  two 
large  tribes  inhabiting  Mindanao.  Another  of  the 
pagan  tribes  is  the  Negritos,  black  dwarfs,  numbering 
only  some  twenty-five  thousand,  who  are  the  aborig- 
ines and  the  original  owners  of  the  Philippines.  The 
Negritos  had  been  in  undisturbed  possession  of  the 


286       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

islands  for  centuries  when  there  came  a  stronger  and 
more  advanced  race,  the  Igorots,  who  conquered  the 
aborigines  and  appropriated  their  lands,  precisely  as 
we  appropriated  the  lands  of  the  Indians.  Later  came 
the  wave  of  Malays  we  now  know  as  Filipinos  and 
took  from  the  Igorots  what  they  had  gained.  Though 
several  of  the  pagan  tribes  have  attained  the  same 
level  of  civilization  as  the  Christians,  the  latter,  never- 
theless, treat  them  socially  and  politically  with  undis- 
guised contempt,  superciliously  referring  to  them 
as  "wild  men."  Finally  we  find,  far  to  the  south  in 
the  Sulu  Archipelago,  something  over  a  quarter  of  a 
million  Moros,  intensely  warlike  and  fanatical  Mo- 
hammedans whom  the  Christian  Filipinos  profess  to 
despise,  but  of  whose  fighting  qualities  they  have  in 
reality  an  inherited  and  well-grounded  fear. 

Even  more  significant,  however,  than  the  differ- 
ences which  separate  the  Christians,  the  Mohamme- 
dans, and  the  pagans,  or  the  dissensions  which  disunite 
the  Tagalogs,  the  Ilocanos,  and  the  Visayans,  are 
those  which  divide  the  individuals  themselves.  I  refer 
to  the  covert  but  none  the  less  existent  antagonism 
of  the  great  brown  mass  of  the  people  for  the  mestizos, 
or  half-castes.  For  it  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  very 
few  of  the  political  leaders  are  of  pure,  or  anywhere 
near  pure,  Malayan  blood.  One  has  only  to  trace 
their  ancestry  back  a  little  way  to  find  indubitable 
evidence  of  the  admixture  of  European  or  Mongolian 
blood.    Of  the  three  men  who  are  generally  conceded 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        287 

to  be  the  ablest  politicians  in  the  islands  and  who 
hold  the  most  responsible  positions  open  to  Filipinos, 
one  is  reputed  to  be  at  least  half  Spanish,  another 
three  fourths  Spanish,  and  a  third  half  Chinese.  The 
dominance  of  the  mestizos  in  insular  affairs  is  un- 
doubtedly due  in  part  to  the  advantages  of  education 
and  travel  which  they  owe  to  the  wealth  and  influence 
of  their  fathers,  but  I  am  convinced  that  an  even 
greater  factor  in  gaining  their  present  ascendancy  is 
the  alien  blood — particularly  the  European  blood — 
which  courses  in  their  veins.  Whatever  may  be  the 
cause,  nothing  is  more  certain  than  that  until  the  na- 
tives put  aside  their  petty  rivalries  and  dissensions 
and  develop  a  national  consciousness,  until  they  sup- 
plant indolence  by  energy,  until  they  acquire  the 
courage  to  assert  themselves,  the  mestizos  will  remain 
in  the  saddle.  As  things  stand  at  present  the  mestizos, 
some  of  whom  are  men  of  undeniable  ability,  are  the 
only  element  in  the  islands  to  whom  we  could  con- 
ceivably turn  over  the  reins  of  power.  What  most 
Americans  fail  to  understand  is  this :  Were  we,  upon 
evacuating  the  islands,  to  intrust  the  machinery  of 
government  to  the  little  group  of  professional  poli- 
ticians who  at  present  control  it  (and  who  are  the 
only  natives  in  any  degree  qualified  by  education  and 
experience  to  control  it),  the  Filipinos  themselves 
would  be  no  nearer  independence  than  they  are  to-day, 
for  we  merely  would  be  supplanting  the  present  form 
of  government  by  an  oligarchy. 


288       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 


ni 

Nothing  is  more  unwise,  generally  speaking, 
than  to  indulge  in  generalizations  about  a  people. 
Yet  the  Filipinos,  taken  as  a  whole,  possess  cer- 
tain characteristics  which  are  so  outstanding  that 
they  are  admitted  by  their  enemies  and  their  friends. 
Were  I  asked  to  enumerate  their  desirable  qualities 
which  most  impressed  me  I  should  name  without  hesi- 
tation their  boundless  hospitality,  their  personal  clean- 
liness, their  dignity  and  self-respect,  their  good  na- 
ture, their  innate  courtesy  and  their  consideration  for 
strangers,  their  love  of  children,  their  mental  activity, 
their  devotion  to  their  country,  and  their  consuming 
passion  for  education.  No  matter  how  poor  a  Filipino 
may  be,  no  matter  how  scanty  his  food  and  how 
wretched  his  dwelling,  he  may  always  be  relied  upon 
to  offer  a  stranger  the  best  that  his  house  affords. 
American  soldiers  repeatedly  have  told  me  of  the  hos- 
pitality shown  them  in  remote  Filipino  villages  in 
which  they  chanced  to  find  themselves  at  nightfall,  the 
natives  frequently  sleeping  out  of  doors  in  order  that 
their  guests  might  have  shelter.  In  no  country  which  I 
know — and  I  can  claim  familiarity  with  something 
over  a  hundred — have  I  met  with  such  universal  cour- 
tesy as  in  the  Philippines,  the  native  character  com- 
bining the  politeness  of  the  Latin  with  the  easy  com- 
plaisance of  the  Malay.     They  are  passionately  de- 


/  •»  PHILIPPINE 

'  ISLANDS 


/'     ,0      ^'- 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       289 

voted  to  their  children  and  will  make  any  sacrifice  in 
order  to  educate  them,  a  quality  which  offers  great  en- 
couragement for  their  future.  The  family  bonds 
among  the  Filipinos  are  much  closer  than  with  us. 
In  fact,  a' Filipino  will  make  no  decision  without  first 
consulting  with  his  family.  This  love  of  family  is 
carried  to  an  extreme,  however,  in  the  so-called  pa- 
riente  system,  which  is  almost  universal  in  the  islands ; 
that  is,  when  a  man  begins  to  make  money,  or  when 
he  obtains  an  even  moderately  profitable  position,  he 
is  expected  as  a  matter  of  course  to  support  all  those 
members  of  his  family  and  of  his  wife's  family  who 
cannot  support  themselves,  even  to  first  and  second 
cousins.  It  is  no  infrequent  occurrence,  indeed,  for 
his  poorer  relatives  to  move  to  his  home,  bag  and  bag- 
gage, and  proceed  to  make  it  their  own,  a  burden 
which  he  assumes  without  complaint.  This  is  family 
affection  carried  to  the  nth  degree,  but  it  has  the  ob- 
vious disadvantage  of  inflicting  a  penalty  on  any  ef- 
fort to  better  one's  condition.  "Why  should  I  work 
any  harder  than  I  do?"  argues  the  Filipino  peasant. 
"Were  I  to  make  any  more  money,  I  should  be  ex- 
pected to  support  my  mother-in-law  and  my  cousins 
and  my  uncles  and  my  aunts." 

Though  the  Filipinos  still  suffer  among  foreigners 
from  the  evil  reputation  which  they  gained  as  a  result 
of  their  cruel  and  inhuman  treatment  of  Spanish  and 
American  captives,  and  though  they  certainly  are 
callous  of  the  pain  suffered  by  others,  they  are  not 


290       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

treacherous  under  ordinary  circumstances.  If  they 
are  jealous  and  eager  for  revenge,  it  is  because  these 
quahties  are  inherent  in  the  Malay  character.  If  they 
are  prone  to  settle  their  differences  with  knives  instead 
of  with  their  fists,  it  is  because  they  have  been  for 
centuries  under  the  rule  of  Latins  instead  of  Anglo- 
Saxons.  When  well  disciplined  and  under  the  leader- 
ship of  American  officers,  they  make  faithful  and  de- 
pendable soldiers,  as  has  been  proved  on  a  hundred 
occasions  by  the  Philippine  Scouts  and  the  Philippine 
Constabulary. 

Notwithstanding  the  assertion  often  made  by  for- 
eigners that  the  Filipinos  are  indolent,  fond  of  ease, 
and  dislike  toil  exceedingly,  those  who  know  them 
best  assure  me  that  under  proper  hygienic  conditions 
they  make  willing,  industrious,  and  faithful  laborers. 
In  those  cases  where  they  have  displayed  a  lack  of 
energy  and  industry  it  has  usually  been  found  upon 
investigation  that  their  apparent  indolence  was  due 
to  the  fact  that  their  vitality  had  been  sapped  by  the 
unhygienic  conditions  under  which  they  were  living 
— a  statement  which  applies  with  equal  force  to  many 
of  the  "poor  whites"  of  our  South.  Moreover  the 
Filipinos  are  almost  invariably  courteous  and  cheer- 
ful, qualities  which  are  not  characteristic  of  all  Orien- 
tal races. 

Like  all  Malay  peoples,  they  are  much  addicted  to 
gambling  and  cock-fighting,  which  are  their  national 
pastimes,  though  it  is  a  healthy  sign  that  they  are  now 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       291 

rivaled  in  the  popular  esteem  by  baseball  and  boxing, 
which  were  introduced  by  our  soldiers  in  the  early 
days  of  the  American  occupation  and  which  have 
grown  steadily  in  popularity  ever  since.  Indeed,  there 
is  scarcely  a  barrio  in  the  islands  which  does  not  have 
its  baseball  team  and  its  local  boxing  talent,  the  towns- 
people "rooting"  for  their  representatives  with  all  the 
enthusiasm  shown  by  "fans"  in  the  United  States. 
The  Olympic  Stadium  in  Manila,  where  the  important 
boxing  contests  are  held,  can  accommodate  thirty-five 
hundred  persons  and  is  invariably  packed  to  the 
point  of  suffocation  when  matches  between  well- 
known  fighters  are  pulled  off.  The  fighters  are 
usually  recruited  from  the  cochero  class,  though  news- 
boys and  even  golf  caddies  have  at  times  won  honors 
in  the  ring.  The  better  boxers  possess  ample  cour- 
age and  considerable  science,  usually  being  well  able 
to  hold  their  own  against  pugilists  of  their  own  weight 
from  the  Pacific  Coast  and  Australia.  Filipinos  being 
almost  universally  of  slight  stature,  the  native  boxers 
are  classified  as  welter-weights,  feather-weights,  ban- 
tam-weights, fly-weights,  paper-weights,  and  vacuum- 
weights,  the  last  class  comprising  boxers  weighing  less 
than  sixty  pounds,  though  the  sporting  press  occasion- 
ally refers,  perhaps  facetiously,  to  mosquito-weights. 
Cock-fighting  is  as  popular  in  the  Philippines  as 
baseball  is  in  the  United  States,  every  town  and  ham- 
let having  its  cockpits  and  its  fighting  birds.  The 
chief  feature  of  cock-fighting  is  the  gambling  con- 


292       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

nected  with  it,  for  as  the  birds  are  armed  with  four- 
inch  spurs  of  razor  sharpness,  very  little  sport  attaches 
to  the  contest,  one  or  both  birds  usually  being  killed 
within  a  few  minutes  after  they  enter  the  pit.  The 
townspeople  are  inordinately  proud  of  their  local 
fighting-cocks,  boasting  of  their  prowess  as  a  Boston- 
ian  brags  of  the  "Braves"  or  a  New  Yorker  of  the 
"Giants"  and  always  being  ready  to  back  them  to  the 
limit  of  their  pocketbooks. 

An  overwhelming  majority  of  the  Filipinos  are 
farmers.  But  though  the  American  Government  has 
made  every  effort  to  improve  agricultural  conditions 
in  the  islands  by  sending  out  experts  and  machinery, 
by  the  establishment  of  agricultural  schools  and  farm 
bureaus,  and  by  the  free  distribution  of  seeds,  the 
Filipino  peasant  farmer  has  not  made  the  prog- 
ress which  might  be  looked  for  in  nearly  four 
centuries  of  white  man's  rule.  Though  rice  is 
the  bread  of  the  people  and  is  grown  in  great 
quantities,  the  peasants  still  prepare  the  land  for 
planting  with  an  implement  which  can  be  called  a  plow 
only  by  courtesy — a  sort  of  pointed  wooden  snag, 
sometimes  tipped  with  iron  and  sometimes  not,  drawn 
by  a  carabao  whose  movements  are  as  leisurely  as 
those  of  its  owner.  In  order  to  give  it  a  start  over  the 
weeds  which  would  otherwise  strangle  it,  rice  is  first 
planted  in  seed-beds  and,  when  partly  grown,  is 
transplanted  by  hand,  it  being  by  no  means  uncom- 


These   are    among    the    most    extraordinary    examples    of    hydraulic    engineering    in 
existence,    being    far    more    remarkable    than    tlie    a-lebrated    •'lianging    gunlcns      of 
Babvlon. 
RICE    TERRACES    BUILT    BY    TUB    IFUGAOES    IN    THE    MOUNTAIN 
PROVINCE,   LUZON 


FlLiriNOS   TliliKtJlli.NG    liiCK    WITH    TilElR   TKET 
Bulaoan  Province 


PLO\\'lNG   AND   HARROWING  THE   ZACATE   FIELDS 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       293 

mon  to  see  scores  of  women  and  children  squatting  on 
their  heels  in  the  shallow  water  of  the  paddy-fields 
and  working  to  the  music  of  a  small  string  band  with 
which  they  keep  time,  so  that  the  faster  the  music 
plays  the  faster  they  work.  Mr.  Dean  C.  Worcester, 
acknowledgedly  one  of  the  foremost  authorities  on  the 
Philippines,  states  that  orchestras  which  have  the  rep- 
utation of  maintaining  a  rapid  tempo  are  in  great 
demand  during  the  planting  season  because  of  the  in- 
creased amount  of  rice  set.  Imagine  the  agricultural 
prodigies  that  might  be  performed  with  the  coopera- 
tion of  an  American  jazz  band!  When  harvest  time 
comes  around  the  grain  is  usually  separated  from  the 
chaff  by  the  family  and  the  neighbors  of  the  rice- 
growers,  who  put  in  several  pleasant  and  not  over- 
strenuous  days  leaning  against  a  long  rail,  set  loosely 
in  supports  so  that  it  will  revolve,  smoking,  gossiping, 
and  singing  as  they  thresh  out  the  grain  with  their 
feet. 

What  I  have  said  above  refers,  of  course,  only  to  the 
small  peasant  farmers  who  form  the  bulk  of  the 
agricultural  population.  The  larger  landowners,  on 
the  contrary,  have  eagerly  availed  themselves  of  the 
agricultural  devices  introduced  by  the  Americans,  the 
primitive  Malay  methods  having  been  entirely  sup- 
planted on  the  large  plantations  by  steel  plows,  trac- 
tors, and  threshing-machines.  The  fact  remains,  how- 
ever, that  modern  agricultural  methods  are  still  the 


294       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

exception  instead  of  the  rule,  so  that  the  Philippines, 
which  should  be  one  of  the  great  rice-exporting  coun- 
tries of  the  world,  are  compelled  to  import  it. 

To  see  rice-growing  in  its  most  picturesque  and 
interesting  form  one  must  journey  to  the  country 
of  the  Ifugaos  in  Central  Luzon.  These  people,  who 
up  to  the  time  of  the  American  occupation  were  in- 
veterate head-hunters,  are  under  a  heavy  agricultural 
handicap  by  reason  of  living  in  a  region  as  mountain- 
ous as  Switzerland.  Yet  on  slopes  as  steep  as  a 
church  roof  they  cultivate  their  rice  on  a  vast  series 
of  terraces,  which  are  held  in  position  by  stone  re- 
taining walls  laid  without  mortar  or  cement  of  any 
kind  and  which  in  places  ascend  the  mountainsides  for 
more  than  three  thousand  feet.  It  will  give  you  some 
idea  of  the  sort  of  masonry  required  to  withstand  the 
weather  conditions  when  I  mention  that  in  this  region 
thirty-eight  inches  of  rain  has  fallen  in  twenty-four 
hours  and  seventy-two  inches  in  five  days.  The  rice 
terraces  of  the  Ifugaos  are  among  the  most  extraordi- 
nary examples  of  primitive  hydraulic  engineering  in 
existence,  being,  when  the  climatic  and  physical  con- 
ditions are  taken  into  consideration,  far  more  re- 
markable than  the  celebrated  "hanging  gardens"  of 
Babylon. 

Now  that  the  trail  of  our  narrative  has  led  us  into 
the  mountains,  suppose  that  we  pause  long  enough 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        295 

for  me  to  tell  you  something  about  those  singular 
and  little-known  peoples — the  Igorots,  the  Kalingas, 
and  the  Ifugaos — who  inhabit  them.  There  are  many 
degrees  of  civilization  among  these  peoples,  perhaps 
their  distinguishing  difference  being  that  in  their  per- 
sonal habits  the  Igorots  are  disgustingly  filthy,  while 
the  Kalingas  and  Ifugaos  are,  everything  considered, 
surprisingly  clean.  Comparatively  speaking,  the 
Igorots  living  in  the  vicinity  of  Baguio,  the  beautiful 
summer  capital  of  the  Philippines,  are  highly  civilized, 
often  dwelling  in  substantially  built  houses  and  eager- 
ly availing  themselves  of  the  educational  opportunities 
afforded  by  the  provincial  government.  One  of  the 
battalions  of  Philippine  Scouts  stationed  at  Camp 
John  Hay  when  I  was  there  was  composed  entirely 
of  Igorots,  and  they  were  as  smart  and  well-disciplined 
a  body  of  native  soldiery  as  I  have  ever  seen.  Officers 
who  have  served  with  them  are  loud  in  their  praises 
of  their  courage,  discipline,  and  loyalty.  But  an 
hour's  ride  on  horseback  into  the  surrounding  moun- 
tains brings  you  into  the  country  of  the  real  wild 
man.  Here  the  men  wear  nothing  except  a  rag, 
known  as  a  "gee-string,"  twisted  about  their  loins; 
the  women  cover  a  portion  of  their  nakedness  with 
an  apron  of  cloth  made  from  the  bark  of  a  tree. 
Though  head-hunting  has  been  "officially"  abolished 
these  dozen  years,  the  wilder  spirits  still  surrepti- 
tiously indulge  in  this  savage  sport  when  a  safe  oppor- 
tunity offers,  their  success  in  the  pursuit  being  evi- 


296        ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

denced  by  the  number  of  lines  tattooed  on  their  faces, 
which  have  precisely  the  same  significance  as  the 
notches  which  the  "bad  men"  of  the  old  West  were 
wont  to  file  on  their  revolver  barrels. 

The  Igorots  live  in  flimsy  huts  thatched  with  nipa 
leaves,  many  of  which  contain  a  trophy  room  for 
skulls.  They  are  extremely  superstitious  and  live  in 
constant  fear  of  the  spirits  of  the  dead.  Their  favorite 
food  is  dog-meat,  it  being  no  uncommon  thing  for  an 
Igorot  to  walk  a  hundred  miles  in  order  to  attend  the 
dog-market  which  is  held  at  Baguio  every  Sunday 
morning.  Here  are  brought  hundreds  of  dogs — 
usually  underfed  and  mangy  mongrels — which  are 
bought  or  stolen  by  the  dealers  in  the  villages  of  the 
plain.  A  dog  will  bring  anywhere  from  three  to  eight 
pesos,  according  to  his  size  and  condition,  and  the 
prospective  purchasers  inspect  them  as  critically  as  an 
American  housewife  inspects  the  turkey  which  she  is 
buying  for  the  Thanksgiving  dinner.  The  process 
of  buying  a  dog  often  takes  the  better  part  of  a  day, 
the  Igorot  raising  his  offer  and  the  dealer  dropping 
his  price  centavo  by  centavo.  I  was  told  by  con- 
stabulary officers — I  cannot  personally  vouch  for  the 
accuracy  of  this  statement — that  the  Igorot,  after 
leading  his  purchase  back  to  his  home  in  the  moun- 
tains, starves  the  wretched  animal  for  a  week  or  more. 
When  it  is  sufficiently  famished  to  devour  anything 
that  is  offered  it,  the  Igorot  feeds  it  to  repletion  with 
great  quantities  of  rice,  together  with  plenty  of  water. 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        297 

and  then  slowly  beats  it  to  death  with  a  bamboo  club 
for  the  purpose  of  making  the  meat  more  tender. 

Once  while  on  a  riding  trip  through  the  mountain 
country  my  attention  was  attracted  by  the  deep, 
low  roll  of  tom-toms,  coming,  I  discovered,  from  an 
Igorot  village  whose  huts  clung  precariously  to  the 
precipitous  slope  half  a  mile  below.  Descending  the 
steep  and  narrow  trail  which  led  to  the  village,  I  came 
upon  a  caniau,  or  feast,  in  full  blast.  Two  husky 
Igorots,  naked  except  for  their  gfee-strings,  were 
swinging  the  carcass  of  what  evidently  had  been  a 
large  yellow  dog  over  a  fire,  while  at  one  side  women 
were  cutting  up  the  body  of  another  animal  which  had 
already  been  roasted.  Squatting  in  the  doorway  of 
a  hut  were  two  musicians,  one  of  whom  was  beating 
monotonously  on  a  drum  made  from  a  hollow  log 
with  a  skin  stretched  across  the  end,  the  other  now 
and  again  striking  a  resounding  blow  upon  a  large 
metal  tom-tom.  Lying  about  in  a  drunken  stupor 
on  the  grass  were  several  members  of  the  tribe  who 
had  been  overcome  by  the  enormous  quantities  of  fiery 
rice  liquor,  called  tapuy,  which  they  had  consumed. 
It  was  a  scene  which  would  have  satisfied  the  most 
avid  sensation-seeker.  Yet  the  educated  Filipinos 
who  entertained  me  so  delightfully  in  Manila  assured 
me  over  and  over  again  that  the  Igorots  had  been 
completely  civilized  and  were  no  longer  a  problem. 
It  is  the  barest  justice  to  add,  however,  that  the  prob- 
lem presented  by  the  wild  tribes  is  being  rapidly 


298       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

solved  by  the  steady  spread  of  education.  The  young 
Igorots  whom  I  saw  attending  an  agricultural  school 
in  the  Trinidad  Valley  impressed  me  as  being  fully  as 
intelligent  and  alert  as  most  American  youngsters  of 
the  same  age. 

The  Igorots  practice  the  curious  custom  of  smoking 
their  dead,  though  I  gathered  that  this  mummifying 
process  is  confined,  as  a  rule,  to  the  wealthy.  The 
body  of  the  dead  man  is  lashed  in  a  sitting  position  in 
a  sort  of  skeleton  armchair  beneath  which  is  kindled 
a  fire,  or  rather  a  smudge,  of  green  branches,  the  pro- 
cedure being  much  the  same  as  that  employed  by  an 
American  farmer  in  smoking  a  ham.  The  body  is 
generally  smoked  for  about  four  weeks,  at  the  end 
of  which  period  it  is  as  dry  and  shriveled  as  the  Phar- 
aohs who  sleep  under  the  glass  cases  in  the  Cairo 
Museum.  It  is  then  conveyed  by  relatives  and  friends 
to  the  tribal  burial  cave,  usually  hidden  away  in  the 
recesses  of  the  mountains,  where  it  is  set  against  the 
wall  in  a  sitting  posture  at  the  end  of  a  long  line  of 
other  departed  Igorots.  Though  the  Bureau  of 
Science  in  Manila  is  said  to  possess  a  remarkable  col- 
lection of  photographs  of  this  curious  custom,  its  of- 
ficials would  neither  sell  me  copies  nor  permit  me  to 
see  them.  The  picture  of  the  burial  cave  which  is 
reproduced  herewith  I  obtained,  though  not  without 
some  difficulty,  from  an  enterprising  Japanese  pho- 
tographer in  Baguio. 

The  Filipinos  assert  with  considerable  truth  that 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       299 

the  publication  of  such  photographs  gives  the  for- 
eigner an  exaggerated  notion  of  the  importance  of 
the  wild  tribes,  which,  they  contend,  play  as  insig- 
nificant a  role  in  the  Philippines  as  the  Indians  do  in 
the  United  States.  This  statement  is  hardly  exact, 
however,  as  there  are  about  four  times  as  many  non- 
Chris};ians  in  the  islands  as  there  are  Indians  in  this 
country. 

"But  you  have  pictures  of  the  Igorots?"  I  asked  the 
courteous  Filipino  official  who  was  in  charge  of  the 
photographic  section  of  the  Bureau  of  Science. 

"Certainly  we  have  them,"  was  the  answer.  "In 
fact,  we  have  the  largest  and  finest  collection  in 
existence.  But  some  months  ago  we  received  orders 
that  no  more  prints  from  them  were  to  be  sold  to 
foreigners,  and  last  week  the  album  containing  the 
Igorot  pictures  was  removed  from  this  bureau  to  the 
office  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior." 

Now  I  can  entirely  sympathize  with  the  sensitive- 
ness of  the  civilized  and  cultured  Filipinos,  who  nat- 
urally resent  being  confused  by  strangers  with  the  sav- 
age hillmen,  but  I  believe  that  in  attempting  to  pre- 
vent the  publication  of  photographs  of  their  uncivil- 
ized countrymen  they  are  pursuing  an  unwise  and 
short-sighted  policy.  When  you  tell  a  traveler  who  is 
of  an  inquiring  turn  of  mind  that  there  is  something 
hidden  in  the  mountains  which  it  is  thought  wise  for 
him  not  to  see,  something  of  which  he  must  not  even  be 
shown  pictures,  his  curiosity  is  immediately  aroused 


800       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

and  he  determines  to  find  out  what  it  is  that  is  being  so 
sedulously  concealed  from  him.  Imagine  the  fantastic 
rumors  that  would  quickly  gain  currency  among  for- 
eigners were  the  American  Government  to  forbid  the 
publication  of  the  official  photographs,  taken  by  the 
Bureau  of  Indian  Affairs,  of  the  Hopi  snake  dances, 
which  are  fully  as  revolting  as  many  of  the  Igorot 
customs.  The  Fihpinos  are  a  young  and  sensitive 
people;  they  are  sincerely  endeavoring  to  gain  the 
respect  of  the  world,  and  they  are  making  remarkable 
progress,  but  their  task  would  be  lighter  if  they  would 
approach  it  with  the  sense  of  humor  possessed  by  a 
quick-witted  young  woman  from  Sioux  City  who  was 
visiting  at  an  English  country  house. 

"So  you  're  from  Sioux  City?"  remarked  the  Eng- 
lishman who  was  her  dinner-partner,  screwing  a 
monocle  into  his  eye  and  surveying  her  with  undis- 
guised curiosity.  *'I  say,  though,  you  speak  jolly 
good  English,  you  know.  Hardly  a  trace  of  Indian 
accent — yes,  really." 

"That 's  easily  explained,"  she  replied  dryly, 
though  with  a  twinkle  of  amusement  in  her  eyes.  "You 
see,  we  had  an  English  missionary  in  our  tribe." 

Now  in  justice  to  the  Filipinos  I  ought  to  explain 
before  proceeding  that  some  of  the  pictures  I  have 
chosen  to  illustrate  this  chapter  are  not  characteristic 
of  present-day  conditions  in  the  Philippines.  But 
they  are  unusual  and  they  are  interesting;  that  is  why 
I  have  used  them.    Had  I  so  desired,  I  could  have 


KOA STING  A  DOG   AT  AN  IGOROT  OANIAU 
IN   THE  MOUNTAINS   OF   LUZON 


AN    IGOIiOT    BUUIAL-CAVE 


^ 


•■ 

'"      «      ''    3^^^-^      _         "       •-»< 

r" 

--    ,.  ':i^-'--;->-V.''  ^-^^-".'^ 

1^.. 

',>"5^^':!"^'^ 

FRUIT-BATS    IN    FLIGHT,    LAGANGILANG 


^■1 


BOOBIES   ON   TUBBATAJA   Kl^Ei' 
Sulu  Archipelago 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        301 

used  a  picture  of  a  Manila  hotel  which  would  attract 
attention  in  Atlantic  City;  a  club  which  would  do 
credit  to  any  city  in  the  United  States;  a  town  in 
Mindanao  which  is  the  most  beautifully  kept  munici- 
pality, bar  none,  that  I  have  ever  seen;  a  cocoanut-oil 
factory  which  is  said  to  be  paying  its  stockholders  one 
hundred  per  cent,  annually  on  their  investments;  a 
mountain  highway  in  Luzon  which  for  sheer  audacity 
of  engineering  has  no  equal,  even  in  the  Alps;  and 
schools,  hospitals,  and  other  public  buildings  ad  in- 
finitum. Of  course  the  Filipinos  will  deprecate  my 
choice  of  illustrations.  When  I  was  writing  a  book  on 
the  Far  West  some  years  ago  I  experienced  great  diffi- 
culty in  obtaining  pictures  of  cow-punchers,  pack- 
trains,  and  Indians.  The  citizens  of  that  busthng 
region,  filled  with  civic  pride,  insisted  that  I  confine 
myself  to  pictures  of  apple  orchards,  alfalfa  fields, 
and  artesian  wells.  So  the  Filipinos  cannot  be  blamed 
so  much,  after  all. 


We  now  come  to  one  of  the  gravest,  if  not 
indeed,  the  gravest  of  the  numerous  problems 
which  go  to  make  up  the  Philippine  Question — ^the 
Moro.  Though  these  warlike  Mohammedans  of  the 
south  embrace  five  distinct  tribes — Sulu,  Yankan, 
Samal,  Magindanao,  and  Tarao — they  may  be  con- 
sidered, for  the  purpose  of  this  article,  as  one  people. 


302       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

They  were  the  last  of  the  Malays  to  migrate  to  the 
Philippines,  having  at  one  period  overrun  the  islands 
as  far  north  as  Manila,  just  as  the  Moors — from 
whom,  by  the  way,  the  Moros  derive  their  name — over- 
ran Spain.  Like  the  Moors,  too,  they  have  never  been 
completely  subjugated.  Though  they  comprise  less 
than  one  third  of  the  total  non-Christian  population — 
there  are  only  about  three  hundred  thousand  of  them 
— ^their  relative  numerical  insignificance  is  far 
from  being  a  criterion  of  their  military  strength  and 
ability.  Not  only  have  the  Filipinos  been  unable  to 
protect  themselves  against  these  bloodthirsty  fanatics, 
but  the  Spaniards  for  nearly  two  centuries  and  a  half 
were  unable  to  give  them  adequate  protection,  the 
shores  of  northern  Luzon  being  dotted  to-day  with 
the  forts  which  were  built  for  defence  against  them. 
The  bulk  of  the  Moro  population  is  found  within 
the  boundaries  of  the  recently  created  Department  of 
Mindanao  and  Sulu,  though  a  few  thousand  of  them 
inhabit  the  southern  districts  of  Palawan.  Until  very 
recently  their  chief  pursuits  were  piracy,  brigandage, 
murder,  and  arson,  in  which  they  still  indulge  when  a 
safe  and  favorable  opportunity  offers,  though  of  late, 
thanks  to  the  patience  and  tact  of  the  American  offi- 
cials, they  have  made  surprising  progress  in  agricul- 
ture. An  official  of  the  Philippine  Bureau  of  Educa- 
tion named  Warner,  who  spent  seven  years  on  Siasi, 
one  of  the  islands  of  the  Sulu  group,  where  he  was  the 
only  white  man,  teaching  its  Moro  inhabitants  modern 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       303 

methods  of  agriculture,  told  me  that  the  Moros  possess 
a  much  higher  type  of  intelligence  than  the  Filipinos 
and  assimilate  new  ideas  far  more  quickly.  As  he 
had  spent  four  years  among  the  Visayans  before  go- 
ing to  Moroland,  he  was  eminently  qualified  to  com- 
pare the  two  races.  He  added  that  they  have  a  highly 
developed  sense  of  humor;  that  they  are  quick  to  ap- 
preciate subtle  stories,  which  the  Tagalogs  and  Visa- 
yans are  not,  and  that  they  are  much  readier  to  accept 
advice  on  agricultural  and  economic  matters  than  the 
Christian  Filipinos.  In  this  he  is  corroborated  by  Mr. 
Dean  C.  Worcester,  who  says,  "The  Moros  exemplify 
what  may  be  considered  the  highest  stage  of  civiliza- 
tion to  which  Malays  have  ever  attained  unaided." 

Though  the  Moros  are  cruel,  haughty,  and  often 
treacherous,  they  are  at  the  same  time  exceedingly 
courteous,  observing  their  own  code  of  manners 
rigidly.  They  are  inordinately  fond  of  brilliant  colors, 
blacken  their  lips  and  teeth  with  betel-nut,  and  are 
justly  proud  of  their  skill  with  their  characteristic 
weapons — the  serpentine-bladed  Malay  kris  and  the 
terrible  Moro  barong.  The  latter  is  a  knife  with  an 
exceptionally  broad  and  heavy  blade  which  the  Moro 
carries  slung  over  his  left  shoulder  in  a  scabbard  con- 
sisting of  two  thin  pieces  of  board  held  together  with 
string.  When  he  goes  into  action  he  wastes  no  time 
in  freeing  the  weapon  from  his  sheath,  but  sweeps  it 
down,  sheath  and  all,  on  the  head  of  his  enemy,  the 
razor-sharp  blade  cutting  the  strings  of  the  scabbard 


304.       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

as  it  whistles  through  the  air.  The  Moros  are  fine 
horsemen  and  fearless  sailors.  Mounted  on  their  wiry 
island  ponies,  they  hunt  the  native  stags  over  incred- 
ibly rough  country,  down  piountainsides,  through 
jungles,  and  across  swamps,  tiring  them  out  and  kill- 
ing them  with  spears.  Those  who  have  ridden  in  the 
first  flight  of  the  Quorn  and  the  Pytchley  would  find 
themselves  hard  put  to  it  to  keep  pace  with  the  field 
in  a  hunt  in  Moroland.  In  their  slim  vintas,  dugouts 
equipped  with  double  outriggers,  they  jeer  at  the 
roughest  seas,  it  being  for  this  reason  virtually  im- 
possible to  suppress  the  opium-smuggling  and  gun- 
running  which  are  being  carried  on  unceasingly  by  the 
Moros,  as  much,  I  imagine,  from  love  of  danger  and 
excitement  as  for  gain. 

Though  they  proudly  profess  themselves  followers 
of  the  prophet,  theirs  is  not  the  Mohammedanism  one 
finds  in  Turkey  or  North  Africa,  but  a  brand  of 
religion  peculiarly  their  own.  They  neither  pray 
five  times  a  day  nor  observe  the  fasting  month  of 
Ramadan,  duties  enjoined  on  all  true  believers.  The 
Koran  is  read  to  them  in  Arabic,  a  language  of  which 
they  know  nothing,  and  occasionally  the  priests  and 
chiefs,  who  are  often  identical,  assemble  in  the  flimsy, 
gaudily  painted  wooden  structures  which  are  the  Moro 
equivalents  of  mosques  and  pray  for  the  entire  com- 
munity. Yet  many  of  the  wealthy  Moros  have  made 
the  long  hadj  to  the  holy  places,  half  the  world  away. 


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THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        305 

and  wear  about  their  turbans  the  white  scarf  which  is 
the  emblem  of  a  Jiadji  from  one  end  of  Islam  to  the 
other.  It  was  curious  to  see  how  quickly  the  demeanor 
of  the  datos  with  whom  I  talked  changed  from  sul- 
lenness  to  eagerness  when  they  learned  that  I  had  re- 
cently been  in  Constantinople  and  had  seen  the  Com- 
mander of  the  Faithful.  The  Sultan  of  Sulu,  who 
dined  with  me  aboard  the  Negros  at  Sandakan — 
where  he  had  gone  to  collect  his  monthly  subsidy  from 
the  British  North  Borneo  Company — ^told  me  that  he 
still  regarded  the  Sultan  of  Turkey  as  the  head  of 
Islam;  but  the  Dato  of  Dansalan,  the  most  powerful 
chieftain  in  the  Lake  Lanao  district  of  Mindanao, 
asserted  that  he  and  his  followers  had  accepted  the 
spiritual  leadership  of  the  King  of  Hedjaz,  who  fulfills 
the  most  important  of  the  koranic  qualifications  for 
the  khalifate  by  being  in  actual  possession  of  the  holy 
cities  of  Mecca  and  Medina.  It  struck  me,  however, 
that  their  knowledge  of  Islamic  political  and  theologi- 
cal questions  was  no  more  profound  than  the  average 
Roman  Catholic's  comprehension  of  the  policy  of  the 
Holy  See.  Though  the  datos  and  priests  doubtless 
keep  in  touch  to  a  certain  extent  with  the  affairs  of 
Islam,  I  am  convinced  that  to  the  rank  and  file  of  the 
Moros  Mohammedanism  is  a  meaningless  shibboleth 
about  which  they  know  little  and  care  less. 

The  Filipinos  are  afraid  of  the  Moros  and  they  have 
the  best  of  reasons  to  be,  for  the  Moro  is  not  only  a 


806       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

desperate  fighter,  a  dangerous  and  resourceful  enemy, 
but  he  goes  into  battle  with  the  conviction  that  he  is 
assured  of  gaining  Paradise  if  he  kills  a  Christian. 
The  Filipino,  on  the  contrary,  is  not  inspired  by  any 
such  fanatic  willingness  to  sacrifice  himself;  he  much 
prefers  the  comfort  and  safety  of  his  native  village  to 
a  martyr's  crown.  The  fighting  record  of  the  Moros 
is  written  large  in  the  history  of  the  Philippines.  Not 
only  did  they  successfully  defy  for  two  centuries  and  a 
half  the  best  troops  that  Spain  could  bring  against 
them,  but  it  was  only  by  turning  Moroland  into  an 
armed  camp  that  we  ourselves  were  able  to  subjugate 
them.  Let  me  add,  parenthetically,  that  the  Moros 
took  no  part  in  the  Filipino  insurrection  against  the 
United  States,  being  deaf  to  the  appeals  made  to  them 
by  Aguinaldo.  The  guerrilla  warfare  which  they 
waged  against  us  for  several  years  was  due  to  much 
the  same  reasons  which  inspired  the  various  outbreaks 
among  the  Indians.  Though  the  Filipinos  are  not 
lacking  in  courage  under  ordinary  circumstances, 
those  of  our  army  officers  who  are  familiar  with  both 
peoples  are  unanimous  in  asserting  their  conviction 
that  they  could  never  impose  their  rule  on  the  Moros 
or  that  they  could  even  keep  them  at  home.  A  strik- 
ing example  of  what  can  be  accomplished  with  these 
savage  warriors  when  properly  disciphned  and  well 
led  is  provided  by  the  Moro  battalions  of  the  Philip- 
pine Scouts,  which  compare  very  favorably  with  the 
Pathans  and   Ghurkas,  the  best  native  troops  in 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        807 

Britain's  Indian  army,  and  are  greatly  superior,  in  my 
estimation,  to  Egyptian  or  Senegalese  soldiery. 

Let  the  Moro  be  ruled  with  justice  and  unyielding 
firmness,  and,  though  he  will  still  be  far  from  making 
an  ideal  citizen,  he  will  not  be  a  troublesome  one.  I 
can  see  no  reason,  indeed,  why  he  should  not  become 
as  amenable  to  law  and  order  as  has  the  American 
Indian.  But  I  am  convinced  from  what  I  have  seen 
and  heard  of  both  races  that  Filipino  rule  in  Moroland 
would  be  neither  just  nor  firm,  first,  because  the  Fili- 
pinos hate  the  Moros  too  bitterly  to  give  them  a  square 
deal ;  and  secondly,  because  they  are  in  too  great  fear 
of  them  to  rule  them  with  the  necessary  firmness. 
Despite  the  fact  that  the  Moros  fought  us  desper- 
ately for  years,  they  have  become,  of  all  the  peoples 
in  the  archipelago  except  the  Igorots  and  the  Macca- 
bebes,  our  staunchest  friends.  They  still  occasionally 
indulge  in  outbursts  of  lawlessness,  it  is  true,  just  as 
a  party  of  cow-punchers  occasionally  shoots  up  a  cat- 
tle town,  but  such  affairs  are  wholly  without  political 
significance.  That  their  suspicion  and  distrust  of 
Americans  has  been  replaced  by  confidence  and  liking 
is  largely  due  to  the  extraordinary  tact  and  ability  in 
handling  them  displayed  by  two  men:  Mr.  Frank 
Carpenter,  Governor  of  the  Department  of  Mindanao 
and  Sulu,  and  Mr.  P.  W.  Rogers,  formerly  Governor 
of  Jolo.  As  long  as  the  Moros  are  permitted  to  con- 
tinue under  American  rule  they  will  remain  as  peace- 
able as  their  naturally  turbulent  natures  permit,  but 


808       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

once  attempt  to  replace  the  American  troops  and  offi- 
cials with  Filipinos  and  there  will  be  an  outburst  that 
will  shake  the  archipelago. 

The  Filipino  officials  at  Manila  complacently  assert 
that  the  Moros  are  now  completely  disarmed,  and 
therefore  powerless.  In  order  that  this  assertion 
might  not  be  open  to  question  they  cabled  Governor 
Rogers  that  the  magnificent  collection  of  blade 
weapons  which  he  had  borrowed  from  the  local  chief- 
tains must  not  be  included  in  the  Moro  exhibit  at  the 
1920  Manila  Exposition.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
Moros  are  very  far  from  being  disarmed,  and  no  one 
knows  it  better  than  the  Filipino  officials.  British 
officials  with  whom  I  talked  in  North  Borneo  told  me 
that  arms  and  ammunition  in  small  quantities  are  con- 
stantly being  run  across  the  Sulu  Sea  from  the  Dutch 
islands,  and  that  there  is  scarcely  a  Moro  warrior  in 
the  archipelago  who  does  not  have  a  rifle  and  a  store 
of  cartridges  cached  in  some  secret  hiding-place 
against  the  day  when  the  hated  Filipinos  attempt  to 
assert  their  authority  over  them.  I  discussed  the  ques- 
tion of  disarmament  with  Governor  Rogers,  who  told 
me  that  there  were  blade  weapons  in  every  house  and 
probably  considerable  quantities  of  firearms  concealed 
in  the  jungle,  and  that  the  official  who  attempted  to 
deprive  the  Moros  of  them  would  precipitate  an  in- 
surrection which  would  threaten  the  peace  of  the  entire 
archipelago.  Several  of  the  datos  and  panglimas  with 
whom  I  talked  frankly  asserted  that,  though  the 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       309 

Moros  are  intensely  loyal  to  the  United  States,  they 
will  resist  any  attempt  to  impose  Filipino  rule  upon 
them  as  long  as  they  have  any  powers  of  resistance 
left.  I  cannot  be  too  emphatic  in  asserting  that,  in  the 
event  of  our  eventually  granting  independence  to  the 
Filipinos,  were  we  to  withdraw  our  protection  from 
the  Moros  and  hand  them  over  against  their  wills  to 
the  tender  mercies  of  their  northern  neighbors,  we 
would  be  guilty  of  a  most  shameful  breach  of  faith 
and  would  almost  certainly  precipitate  a  bloody  and 
interminable  civil  war.  The  specious  arguments  of 
the  independistas  to  the  contrary,  the  Moros  are  not 
Filipinos.  They  are  a  different  breed,  speaking  a 
different  tongue,  following  different  customs,  prac- 
tising a  different  faith.  The  Sulu  Archipelago,  in 
which  the  bulk  of  them  dwell,  is  a  geographical  entity, 
as  distinct  from  the  Philippine  Islands  as  the  Bahamas 
are  from  the  Greater  Antilles.  And  they  distrust 
and  detest  the  Filipinos  with  a  vehemence  which  I 
have  never  seen  equalled.  For  us  to  attempt  to  coerce 
the  Moros  into  submission  to  Filipino  rule  would  be  as 
unjustifiable  as  for  the  British  Government  to  coerce 
the  people  of  Ulster  into  accepting  the  rule  of  the  Dail 
Eireann. 


VI 

Since  the  American  occupation  in  1898  the  Phil- 
ippines have  had  four  distinct  forms   of  govern- 


310       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

ment.  The  first  was  the  miHtary  government,  which 
lasted  from  August,  1898  until  February,  1900 — "the 
days  of  the  Empire,"  as  this  period  is  proudly  re- 
ferred to  by  the  older  Americans.  Next  came 
the  government  of  the  Philippine  Commission, 
which  ruled  the  archipelago  for  upward  of  seven  years. 
This  was  followed  by  a  dual  government,  composed 
of  the  Phihppine  Commission  and  a  Philippine  as- 
sembly elected  by  popular  vote,  the  two  bodies  bear- 
ing much  the  same  relation  to  each  other  as  the  upper 
and  lower  houses  of  Congress.  This  was  supplanted 
in  1916,  under  the  provisions  of  the  so-called  Jones 
Bill,  by  a  form  of  government  that  is  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  completely  autonomous,  since  when  Ameri- 
can sovereignty  has  meant  little  more  to  the  Filipinos 
than  the  governor-general  and  the  flag. 

Though  the  present  Philippine  Government  is  pat- 
terned in  the  main  on  that  of  the  United  States,  it  is 
characterized  by  a  distinct  tendency  toward  paternal- 
ism and  the  English  system  of  parliamentary  respon- 
sibility. The  governor-general,  who  is  the  chief  execu- 
tive; the  vice-governor,  who  is  also  the  secretary  of 
public  instruction ;  the  auditor,  and  the  deputy  auditor 
are  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  United  States 
and  are  always  Americans.  The  governor-general 
exercises  control  through  the  secretaries  of  the 
six  executive  departments — Public  Instruction,  In- 
terior, Justice,  Commerce  and  Communications,  Fi- 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        311 

nance,  Agriculture  and  Natural  Resources — ^who 
form  his  cabinet  and  all  of  whom,  except  the  first,  are 
Filipinos.  Through  the  auditor  the  government  at 
Washington  keeps,  or  is  supposed  to  keep,  a  guiding 
and  restraining  hand  on  the  finances  of  the  islands, 
though  recent  events,  about  which  I  shall  speak  fur- 
ther on,  suggest  that  neither  guidance  nor  restraint 
was  exercised  to  any  appreciable  extent  during  the 
last  administration. 

The  legislative  functions  of  the  insular  government 
are  vested  in  the  Philippine  Legislature,  consisting 
of  a  Senate  and  a  House  of  Representatives,  their 
members  being  elected  by  those  Christian  Filipinos 
who  can  qualify  as  voters.  The  non-Christian  tribes, 
being  regarded  as  "backward"  peoples,  remain  unen- 
franchised, but  the  governor-general  appoints,  without 
confirmation,  senators  and  representatives  for  the  dis- 
trict which  includes  all  the  non-Christian  peoples,  in- 
cluding the  Moros.  The  legislature  exercises  com- 
plete legislative  powers,  though  the  power  of  veto 
inheres  to  the  governor-general  and,  of  course,  to  the 
government  at  Washington.  The  Christian  provinces 
are  governed  by  provincial  governors  and  provincial 
boards,  the  members  of  which  are  elected  by  the  quali- 
fied voters  of  their  respective  provinces.  The  Moun- 
tain Province,  in  which  the  bulk  of  the  Igorots  dwell, 
and  the  recently  created  Department  of  Mindanao 
and  Sulu,  which  contains  most  of  the  Moro  popula- 


812       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

tion,  are  governed  under  special  acts  of  the  Philippine 
Legislature  in  accordance  with  the  specific  provisions 
of  the  Jones  Bill. 

The  judiciary  consists  of  justice  of  the  peace  courts 
in  the  various  municipalities,  courts  of  first  instance 
in  the  various  provinces,  and  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  Philippine  Islands,  the  decisions  of  the  latter 
being  subject  to  review  in  certain  cases  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States.  The  justices  of  the 
peace  and  of  the  courts  of  first  instance  are  appointed 
by  the  governor-general  with  the  approval  of  the 
Philippine  Senate.  The  nine  members  of  the  su- 
preme court  are  appointed  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  five  of  them  being  Americans  and 
four,  including  the  chief  justice,  Filipinos.  It  will 
be  seen,  therefore,  that,  though  the  Filipinos  enjoy 
virtually  complete  autonomy  so  far  as  their  domestic 
affairs  are  concerned,  the  government  at  Washington, 
through  the  American  governor-general,  the  Amer- 
ican auditor,  and  the  American  majority  on  the  su- 
preme bench,  retains  control  of  the  executive,  finan- 
cial, and  judicial  branches  of  the  insular  government. 
In  short,  the  government  at  Washington  occupies 
much  the  same  position  toward  the  Manila  govern- 
ment that  a  guardian  occupies  toward  a  minor  ward. 
As  long  as  the  ward  behaves  himself  the  guardian  is 
content  to  let  him  run  his  own  affairs,  but  he  is  in  a 
position  to  make  his  authority  felt  if  the  youth  shows 
a  disposition  to  kick  over  the  traces. 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       313 

Though  the  Filipinos  were  granted  a  steadily  in- 
creasing measure  of  autonomy  during  the  Roosevelt 
and  Taft  administrations,  certain  departments  of  the 
insular  government,  particularly  those  concerned  with 
public  health,  public  security,  and  public  instruc- 
tion, were  kept  under  American  control  by  retaining 
Americans  in  most  of  the  higher  positions.  But  the 
return  to  power  of  the  Democratic  party  in  1913  was 
the  signal  for  a  complete  reversal  of  American  policy 
toward  the  Philippines.  When  Francis  Burton  Har- 
rison arrived  at  Manila  in  that  year  he  apparently 
bore  a  mandate  from  President  Wilson  to  lose  no 
time  in  taking  the  reins  of  government  out  of  Amer- 
ican hands.  This  he  proceeded  to  do  with  a  thor- 
oughness and  despatch  which  filled  the  Americans  in 
the  islands  with  dismay  and  the  Filipinos  with  exulta- 
tion. Those  best  acquainted  with  the  character  and 
limitations  of  the  Filipino  viewed  the  wholesale  dis- 
missal of  trained  and  tried  American  officials  with 
grave  misgivings,  believing  it  to  be  unwise,  prema- 
ture, and  as  inimical  to  the  best  interests  of  the 
United  States  as  to  those  of  the  FiHpinos  them- 
selves. 

The  impression  appears  to  prevail  that  the  "Fil- 
ipinization"  of  the  PhiHppine  Government  —  by 
which  is  meant  the  replacement  of  American  officials 
by  natives — began  with  the  Harrison  administration. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  began  with  the  establishment 
of  the  Philippine  Commission  in   1900   and  made 


314       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

steady  progress  under  the  administrations  of  Taft 
and  Forbes.  But  whereas  Messrs.  Taft  and  Forbes 
did  their  Filipinizing  from  the  bottom  up,  cautiously- 
feeling  their  way  and  at  first  putting  natives  only  in 
the  lower  positions,  the  Democratic  administration 
recklessly  jumped  in  and  proceeded  to  Filipinize  the 
highest  and  most  responsible  positions  in  the  gov- 
ernment, appointing  Filipinos  with  little  or  no  expe- 
rience as  judges,  bureau  chiefs,  and  secretaries  of  de- 
partments, many  of  these  appointments  being  based 
on  the  political  influence  of  the  appointees  instead  of 
on  merit,  as  had  been  the  invariable  rule  theretofore. 
That,  together  with  the  substitution  of  a  popularly 
elected  senate  for  the  appointed  commission  which 
had  hitherto  taken  the  place  of  an  upper  house,  may 
be  said  to  comprise  the  principal  measures  of  Filipin- 
ization  under  the  administration  of  Woodrow  Wilson. 
When  the  Democratic  party  came  into  power  in  1913 
it  was  generally  admitted  by  experienced  foreign  ob- 
servers that  the  Philippines  had  the  best  colonial  gov- 
ernment in  the  world.  The  Democrats  had  eight 
years  in  which  to  put  their  theories  to  the  test.  What 
has  been  the  result?  Owing  to  improper  financial 
transactions  the  credit  of  the  insular  government  has 
been  seriously  impaired;  the  gold  reserve  has  been 
almost  wiped  out,  so  that  to-day  the  currency  of  the 
islands  is  practically  a  fiat  currency ;  the  rate  of  taxa- 
tion has  been  sharply  advanced;  standards  of  effi- 
ciency in  every  branch  have  declined;  the  foreign 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       315 

trade  of  the  islands  has  fallen  off;^  uncertainty  and 
discontent  exist  everywhere.  It  is  only  fair  to  say, 
however,  that  whatever  mistakes  have  been  made, 
they  have  not  been  sufficient  to  arrest  the  steady  rate 
of  progress  in  the  islands. 

Now  in  justice  to  Mr.  Harrison  it  should  be  said 
that  the  partisan  policy  which  he  executed  did  not 
originate  with  him.  Nor,  for  that  matter,  did  it  orig- 
inate with  President  Wilson.  It  originated  in  the 
early  days  of  the  American  occupation,  when  the 
pohticians  in  Washington  used  the  Philippine  Ques- 
tion for  purely  partisan  purposes  instead  of  attempt- 
ing to  solve  it  according  to  the  best  traditions  of  Amer- 
ican statesmanship.  From  the  very  outset,  it  is  true, 
the  Democratic  party  has  advocated  eventual  inde- 
pendence for  the  Filipinos,  but  it  was  a  Republican 
president,  William  McKinley,  who  stole  the  Demo- 
cratic thunder  by  specifically  declaring,  "The  Phil- 
ippines are  not  ours  to  exploit,  but  to  develop,  to  civ- 
ilize, to  educate,  to  train  in  the  science  of  self-gov- 
ernment." It  was  the  first  phrase  of  that  sentence, 
"The  Philippines  are  not  ours,"  which,  by  raising 
false  hopes  in  Filipino  breasts,  started  the  uncertainty 
and  discontent  which  have  prevailed  in  the  islands  to 
this  day.  I  believe  that  we  would  have  saved  our- 
selves much  embarrassment  and  anxiety,  and  that  the 

*  Compared  to  the  peak  of  prosperity  attained  during  the  period 
unmediately  following  the  war,  there  is,  of  course,  a  marked  falling  off 
in  Philippine  trade,  but  it  is  an  encouraging  sign  that  there  is  less 
business  depression  in  the  Philippines  than  in  any  other  tropical  country. 


316       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

Filipinos  would  now  be  a  contented  and  prosperous 
people,  had  we  had  the  moral  courage  to  adopt  and 
unfalteringly  follow  the  declaration  of  policy  issued 
by  General  Otis,  the  commander  of  the  American 
forces  during  the  Filipino  insurrection:  "Honor, 
justice,  and  friendship  forbid  the  exploitation  of  the 
islands.  The  purpose  of  the  American  Government 
is  the  welfare  and  advancement  of  the  Filipino  peo- 
ple." What  a  pity  that  the  politicians  did  not  let 
it  go  at  that. 

In  the  opinion  of  competent  and  unprejudiced  ob- 
servers, vehement  denials  of  the  Filipinos  to  the  con- 
trary, the  dismissal  en  masse  of  Americans  under  the 
Harrison  regime  has  seriously  lowered  the  standards 
of  efficiency  which  formerly  prevailed  in  the  various 
branches  of  the  insular  government.  Though  the 
portfolio  of  pubhc  instruction  could  not  be  trans- 
ferred under  the  law  to  native  hands,  the  American 
vice-governor  who  held  it  conscientiously  followed  the 
orders  of  his  superiors  to  Filipinize  his  department  as 
thoroughly  as  possible.  As  a  result,  American  teach- 
ers have  been  almost  entirely  supplanted  by  natives  in 
the  lower  and  intermediate  grades  and  higher  educa- 
tion was  rapidly  being  turned  over  to  the  latter  when 
the  Democratic  administration  came  to  an  end.  There 
are  now  upward  of  eleven  thousand  Filipino  teachers 
and  less  than  four  hundred  American  ones  in  the 
islands,  though  truth  compels  me  to  add  that  in  its 
dying  days  the  Harrison  regime,  presumably  alarmed 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        317 

at  the  steady  deterioration  of  the  educational  system, 
attempted  to  obtain  additional  teachers  from  the 
United  States.  One  of  the  regrettable  results  of  the 
Filipinization  of  the  schools — regrettable  from  the 
American  point  of  view,  at  least — is  the  movement 
which  has  as  its  object  the  substitution  of  Spanish  for 
English  in  their  curricula.  This  tendency  may  be 
checked,  however,  when  the  young  Filipinos,  who  are 
being  sent  in  steadily  increasing  numbers  to  the 
United  States  to  be  educated,  begin  to  make  them- 
selves felt  in  the  public  life  of  the  Philippines.  I  am 
not  sufficiently  familiar  with  educational  conditions 
in  the  islands  to  discuss  them  intelligently,  but  my 
observations  convinced  me  that,  though  the  whole- 
sale ehmination  of  American  teachers  has  unques- 
tionably resulted  in  a  marked  lowering  of  educational 
standards,  the  native  teachers,  considering  their  lim- 
itations, are  doing  exceedingly  well. 

One  of  the  most  important  accomplishments  of  the 
Philippine  Commission  was  the  establishment  in  Ma- 
nila of  the  great  Bureau  of  Science  for  the  purpose  of 
coordinating  in  one  building  and  under  one  head  all 
the  agencies  of  scientific  research,  such  as  geology, 
zoology,  botany,  mineralogy,  ethnology,  forestry,  and 
medicine.  Upon  its  completion  its  founders  were  able 
to  say  with  justifiable  pride  that  the  opportunities 
for  tropical  research  offered  at  Manila  were  unequaled 
anywhere  in  the  world.  Yet  this  remarkable  institu- 
tion, at  one  time  the  best  staffed,  the  most  completely 


818       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

equipped,  and  the  most  efficient  of  its  kind  in  exist- 
ence, is  now  a  veritable  morgue,  its  once  busy  cor- 
ridors being  almost  deserted  and  much  of  its  dehcate 
and  costly  apparatus  remaining  unused  and  covered 
with  dust.  Before  the  policy  of  Filipinization  assumed 
its  later  dimensions  the  Bureau  of  Science  boasted  a 
staff  of  truly  remarkable  men,  many  of  them  with 
world-wide  reputations,  who  were  employed  solely  on 
the  strength  of  their  scientific  qualifications  and  re- 
gardless of  their  nationality.  But  to-day,  as  a  result 
of  the  policy  of  filling  every  lucrative  post  with  a  Fil- 
ipino, only  two  foreigners  remain — an  American  and 
an  Austrian. 

Far-reaching  in  its  ultimate  effect  on  the  progress 
of  the  islanders  as  the  Filipinization  of  the  educa- 
tional system  is  bound  to  prove,  equally  serious  and 
far  more  immediate  developments  are  certain  to  re- 
sult from  the  Filipinization  of  the  Health  Service.  Its 
director.  Dr.  J.  B.  Long,  resigned  in  January,  1919, 
despite  the  remonstrances  of  the  governor-general, 
because  he  asserted  that  his  organization  was  falling 
to  pieces  as  a  result  of  the  wholesale  replacement  of 
experienced  Americans  by  unqualified  Filipinos,  so 
that  he  could  no  longer  assure  responsibility  for  the 
maintenance  of  public  health  in  the  archipelago. 
When  the  Americans  landed  in  the  Philippines  in 
1898,  smallpox  and  cholera  stalked  almost  unchecked 
throughout  the  islands,  and  that  scourge  of  the  East, 
bubonic  plague,  was  always  hovering  at  the  gate. 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       319 

But  with  the  estabhshment  of  the  Health  Service,  fol- 
lowed by  the  rigid  enforcement  of  sanitary  and  pre- 
ventive measures,  all  three  of  these  diseases  were 
stamped  out,  making  the  Philippines  the  healthiest 
tropical  country  in  the  world.  But  within  the  past 
three  years,  due,  so  it  was  claimed  by  those  American 
medical  men  with  whom  I  talked,  to  the  impaired  effi- 
ciency of  the  Filipinized  Health  Service,  both  cholera 
and  smallpox  have  again  made  their  appearance.  The 
statistics  also  show  that  there  has  been  a  steady  in- 
crease in  recent  years  in  preventable  diseases,  espe- 
cially malaria,  beriberi,  tuberculosis,  and  typhoid.  As 
the  Quarantine  Service  fortunately  remains  under 
American  control,  there  has  been  no  plague  in  the 
islands  for  upward  of  fifteen  years. 

Much  the  same  state  of  affairs  exists  (October, 
1921 )  in  the  Bureau  of  Public  Lands.  Due  to  the  in- 
efficiency of  this  bureau  the  land-title  situation  in  the 
Philippines  is  a  serious  one,  and,  if  the  abuses  are  not 
corrected,  will  inevitably  lead  to  dangerous  discon- 
tent. When  I  was  in  the  Lake  Lanao  district  of  Min- 
danao the  local  government  land  agent  was  on  the  eve 
of  returning  to  the  United  States  with  his  wife  and 
three  children,  after  nearly  a  decade  of  faithful  and 
meritorious  service,  because  his  place  was  wanted  for 
a  Filipino.  Yet  that  man,  by  the  exercise  of  unremit- 
ting patience,  tact,  energy,  and  courage,  had  brought 
the  savage  and  predatory  Moros  of  his  district  from 
the  hunting  stage  of  existence,  where  he  had  found 


320       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

them,  through  the  grazing  stage  and  well  into  the  ag- 
ricultural stage.  And  he  realized,  just  as  all  the  other 
Americans  in  his  district  realized,  that  much,  if  not 
all,  of  the  progress  which  he  had  made  during  those 
years  of  bitter  struggle  would  be  lost  because  of  the 
hostility  of  the  Moros  for  any  Filipino  who  might  suc- 
ceed him. 

Public  order  is  maintained  throughout  the  archi- 
pelago by  the  police  forces  of  the  various  municipali- 
ties and  by  the  Philippine  Constabulary,  an  organiza- 
tion which  has  long  had  an  enviable  reputation  for 
discipline  and  efficiency.  The  constabulary,  which 
was  raised  and  trained  by  officers  of  the  American 
army,  consists  at  present  of  about  three  hundred  and 
sixty  officers  and  nearly  six  thousand  men.  At  the 
height  of  its  efficiency  the  force  had  three  hundred 
and  seventy-five  American  officers,  most  of  whom  had 
gone  to  the  islands  with  volunteer  regiments  in  1898, 
but  as  a  result  of  the  Filipinization  of  the  commis- 
sioned personnel  only  twenty  Americans  remain. 
Though  the  present  chief  of  constabulary,  Brigadier- 
General  Crame,  is  for  political  purposes  a  Filipino, 
he  is  by  blood  and  training  far  more  European  than 
Asiatic,  being  three  quarters  Spanish  and  having  re- 
ceived his  military  education  in  Spain.  He  has  dis- 
played such  marked  energy  in  the  pursuit  and  punish- 
ment of  malefactors,  and  is  said  to  have  in  his  secret 
files  so  much  information  which  might  prove  highly 
embarrassing  to  certain  powerful  politicoSj  that  he  is 


I 


^     ^^1^1!^ 


A    MORO    DA TO 
Jolo,    Sulu    Archipelago 


A     MOHO     ENLISTED 

MAN 
Philippine    Constabulary 


AN  IFUOAO  SOLDI  1,K 
I'liilippiiH-     C<)iistal)ulary 

(Note     Ki'p-ftriiijf     and 

anklets) 


THE   FAMOUS  "ZIGZAG"    ON    THE   BENGUET  ROAD 

This    leads   from    Manila    to  Baguio,    the   summer    capital.      This    road,    which    cost 

upward    of    three    million  dollars,    is    unequaled    for    sheer    audacity    of    engineering, 
even  in  the  Alps. 


THE   PASIG   RIVER,    MANILA 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       321 

credited  with  having  remarked  that  he  would  leave  the 
islands  the  day  the  American  flag  was  hauled  down, 
because  it  would  not  be  safe  for  him  to  remain. 

I  might  mention  in  this  connection  that  an  Amer- 
ican general  who  has  seen  many  years  of  service  in 
the  Philippines  recently  remarked  to  me  that,  in  the 
event  of  the  United  States  withdrawing  from  the  is- 
lands, it  would  be  little  short  of  criminal  for  us  not 
to  take  some  measures  which  would  insure  the  safety 
and  well-being  of  the  Uttle  tribe  of  Maccabebes,  only 
a  few  thousand  strong,  who  have  so  faithfully  served 
us  as  native  scouts  from  the  very  beginning  of  our 
occupation.  He  led  me  to  believe  that,  were  satis- 
factory guarantees  for  their  safety  not  exacted,  the 
Maccabebes  would  be  in  danger  of  meeting  the  same 
fate  which  befell  the  leading  Moro  dato,  of  the  Lake 
Lanao  district,  who  was  assassinated  in  the  summer 
of  1921  because,  according  to  rumor,  he  had  urged 
upon  the  Wood-Forbes  Mission  the  necessity  of  keep- 
ing the  Moro  islands  under  American  rule,  thereby 
arousing  the  deadly  enmity  of  the  Fihpinos.  But 
this  is  a  digression. 

No  nation  was  ever  more  faithfully  served  by  its 
pubhc  servants  than  the  Philippines  have  been  served 
by  the  American  officers  of  the  constabulary.  They 
have  given  their  best  years  and  the  best  that  was  in 
them  to  the  service  of  the  Filipinos.  Most  of  the  hand- 
ful of  Americans  remaining  in  the  force  have  worn 
its  scarlet-trimmed  khaki  for  close  on  two  decades; 


322       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

several  of  them  bear  on  their  breasts  the  bit  of  star- 
spangled  crimson  ribbon — "the  red  badge  of  courage" 
— ^which  signifies  that  the  wearer  has  won  the  Philip- 
pine Medal  of  Honor;  one  of  them  irretrievably 
ruined  his  health  while  caring  for  native  refugees 
during  the  eruption  of  Taal  Volcano;  others  carry- 
on  their  bodies  the  scars  of  bullet,  spear,  and  knife 
wounds  which  they  received  while  making  safe  for 
the  Filipinos  the  savage-infested  islands  of  Mindanao 
and  "dark  and  bloody  Samar." 

Yet,  though  the  Filipinos  owe  to  these  men  a  debt 
which  they  can  never  hope  to  repay,  injustice  and 
ingratitude  have  been  their  portion.  For  the 
politicians  in  Manila,  quick  to  recognize  how  ef- 
fective a  weapon  the  constabulary  might  prove  in 
partisan  hands,  eagerly  seized  upon  the  policy  of 
universal  Filipinization  as  a  pretext  for  getting  rid 
of  the  American  officers.  The  politicians  succeeded 
in  forcing  out  most  of  the  American  officers  in  the 
lower  grades  by  the  enactment  of  a  bill  cutting  off 
their  fogies,  that  is,  their  progressive  increases  in 
pay  for  long  service.  The  officers  of  the  constabulary 
have  never  been  highly  paid,  and  thus  deprived  of 
their  fogies  there  was  small  incentive  for  young  and 
ambitious  men  to  remain  in  the  service.  But  when 
all  except  a  score  of  senior  officers  who  were  too  old 
to  embark  on  new  careers  had  been  forced  out  of  the 
service,  the  fogies  were  restored  in  order  that  the  Fil- 
ipino officers  might  have  the  benefit  of  them.    Just  as 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       323 

military  men  of  experience  predicted,  the  Filipiniza- 
tion  of  the  constabulary,  combined  with  the  demoraliz- 
ing effect  of  political  influence,  has  resulted  in  a  con- 
siderable lowering  of  the  force's  discipline,  efficiency, 
and  morale,  for  the  enlisted  men,  particularly  those 
recruited  from  the  non-Christian  tribes,  will  not  ac- 
cord to  their  Filipino  officers  the  same  measure  of  re- 
spect, the  same  unquestioning  obedience,  which  they 
gave  to  their  American  superiors. 


VII 

But  by  far  the  most  serious  consequence  of  the  pol- 
icy pursued  by  the  Wilson  administration  has  been 
the  complete  breakdown  of  the  insular  finances  and 
the  resulting  impairment  of  Philippine  credit. 
Though  the  story  of  the  financial  disaster  which  has 
overtaken  the  insular  government  is  a  long  and  com- 
plicated one,  involving  many  technical  details,  I  will 
endeavor  to  compress  it  into  tabloid  dimensions. 

The  currency  of  the  Philippines  consists  of  silver 
and  paper,  the  latter  comprising  treasury  certificates 
and  notes  of  the  Philippine  National  Bank.  Until 
recently  this  paper  currency  was  kept  at  par  by  a  gold 
reserve,  which  amounted  to  $41,500,000  at  the  begin- 
ning of  1919.  This  reserve,  which  represented  about 
97  per  cent,  of  the  outstanding  paper  currency,  was 
deposited  in  fifteen  different  banks  in  the  United 


324       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

States.  But  in  1916  the  Philippine  Legislature 
passed  an  act  establishing  the  Philippine  National 
Bank  and  not  long  thereafter,  and  without  legal  au- 
thority, this  reserve  fund  was  transferred  from  the 
fifteen  depositories  to  the  New  York  agency  of  the 
new  bank,  to  be  kept  there  to  the  credit  of  the  bank 
instead  of  the  government.  In  other  words,  the  Fili- 
pino politicians  wanted  the  money  where  they  could 
get  at  it  with  the  greatest  possible  ease.  Exactly  what 
happened  after  that  transfer  took  place  has  not  yet 
been  satisfactorily  explained,  but  the  indisputable  fact 
remains  that  the  reserve  fund  which  in  1919  amounted 
to  $41,500,000  had  by  1921  dwindled  to  about  $2,000,- 
000.  In  short,  approximately  95  per  cent,  of  the 
gold  reserve  which  secured  the  currency  of  the  is- 
lands disappeared  in  two  years.  In  consequence,  there 
being  virtually  no  funds  in  New  York  with  which  to 
honor  Philippine  drafts,  the  Philippine  Government 
was  forced  to  issue  an  order  suspending  the  sale  of 
bills  of  exchange  on  New  York.  As  was  to  be  ex- 
pected this  resulted  in  tying  up  the  import  trade  of 
the  islands  and  demoralizing  business  generally. 

The  first  question  that  is  asked,  naturally,  is  what 
has  become  of  the  $39,000,000  which  are  missing? 
Where  has  this  great  sum  gone?  A  large  part  of  it 
appears  to  have  gone  in  what  may  be  described,  for 
want  of  a  better  term,  as  political  investments.  It 
is  known  that  the  Philippine  National  Bank  made 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       325 

large  loans  to  both  Filipinos  and  Americans  in  sums 
running  into  millions  of  pesos  without  security  of 
any  kind  except  the  borrowers'  political  affiliations. 
Some  of  these  loans  are  good ;  most  of  them  are  not. 
In  other  cases  money  was  loaned  to  an  individual  to 
finance  a  private  enterprise,  the  enterprise  itself  be- 
ing accepted  as  security  for  the  loan.  The  enter- 
prise failed,  and  the  bank  was  left  with  some  hand- 
somely engraved  stock  certificates  and  a  sheaf  of 
notes.  In  these  and  other  ways  not  yet  disclosed  many 
millions  have  disappeared.^  But  whatever  the  meth- 
ods employed  by  the  looters,  the  fact  remains  that 
the  currency  reserve  has  been  all  but  wiped  out  and 
that  now  there  is  nothing  behind  the  paper  money 
of  the  islands  except  the  credit  of  the  Philippine  Gov- 
ernment, or,  to  be  exact,  the  credit  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States.  No  matter,  therefore, 
how  loudly  the  Filipinos  may  proclaim  their  suc- 
cess in  administering  certain  other  departments  of 
the  government — claims  which,  as  I  have  already 
shown,  are  by  no  means  substantiated  by  the  facts — 
they  are  compelled  to  admit  their  failure  in  the  field 
of  national  finance.  This  being  so,  it  might  be  prof- 
itable for  the  Filipinos  to  ponder  the  fact  that, 
had  the  independence  which  they  have  so  insistently 
demanded  been  given  them,  their  country  would  be 

*  The  insular  auditor  estimates  that  the  losses  will  reach  the  total  of 
$22,500,000. 


826       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

facing  bankruptcy  to-day.  And  there  would  be  no 
rich  and  indulgent  Uncle  Sam  standing  in  the  back- 
ground, hand  in  pocket,  ready  to  help  them  out. 

The  propaganda  so  zealously  disseminated  by  the 
bureau  which  the  Philippine  Government  maintains 
in  Washington  at  a  cost  of  one  million  pesos  a  year 
has  given  many  foreigners  the  impression  that  the 
business  of  the  islands  is  mainly  in  Filipino  hands. 
Nothing  could  be  further  from  the  truth.  The  facts 
are  that  fully  85  per  cent,  of  the  local  trade  is  in 
the  hands  of  the  Chinese,  while  the  wholesale  and 
foreign  business  is  nearly  all  in  American  and  Brit- 
ish hands,  though  the  Japanese  interests  in  certain 
sections  of  the  archipelago  are  increasing  at  a  rate 
which  is  causing  the  government  some  apprehension. 

Americans  living  in  the  Philippines  will  tell  you 
that  the  insular  government  is  rotten  to  the  core  with 
corruption.  They  will  tell  you  that  the  treasury  and 
the  national  bank  have  been  looted — which  would  ap- 
pear to  be  true — and  that  the  politicos  and  their 
friends  have  suddenly  and  mysteriously  come  into 
possession  of  great  fortunes.  They  will  assure  you 
that  the  government  pay-rolls  have  been  padded,  that 
government  labor  and  vast  quantities  of  government 
materials  have  been  used  for  private  purposes,  that 
it  is  impossible  to  obtain  a  building  permit  or  to  pass 
goods  through  the  customs  without  having  recourse 
to  bribery,  that  graft  and  chicanery  are  to  be  found 
everywhere,  that  nepotism  and  political  favoritism 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       827 

are  universal.  Of  the  truth  of  these  accusations  I 
do  not  feel  that  I  am  competent  to  judge.  That  much 
corruption  and  more  incompetency  exist  is  hardly 
open  to  question.  That  certain  of  the  pohtical  lead- 
ers have  scandalously  abused  their  power  is  admitted 
by  every  one  who  will  tell  the  truth  and  who  has  real 
knowledge  of  the  situation.  But  I  do  not  think 
that  conditions  are  as  black  as  the  Americans  have 
painted  them,  any  more  than  I  believe  that  they  are 
as  rosy  as  the  Filipinos  claim.  The  truth  lies  some- 
where between  these  extremes.  Viewing  the  experi- 
ment of  Filipino  self-government  as  it  has  been  es- 
sayed under  the  provisions  of  the  Jones  Bill  as  im- 
partially as  I  am  able,  I  think  that  the  scales  incline 
more  to  the  side  of  failure  than  of  success. 

During  the  eight  years  of  the  Wilson  administra- 
tion the  government  at  Washington  took  the  view 
that  Americans  who  engaged  in  business  outside  the 
United  States,  whether  in  Mexico,  or  Central  Amer- 
ica, or  the  Philippines,  did  so  at  their  own  risk.  It 
assumed  by  some  inexplicable  process  of  reasoning 
that  these  men  were  adventurers,  commercial  fihbus- 
ters,  and  it  took  the  attitude  that  in  case  of  trouble, 
they  need  not  look  to  their  own  government  for  sup- 
port or  protection.  Contrast  this  attitude,  if  you 
please,  with  that  of  the  British  Government,  which 
regards  those  of  its  nationals  engaged  in  legitimate 
business  overseas  as  outposts  of  trade,  as  commercial 
empire-builders,  and  recognizes  their  services  to  the 


828       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

nation  with  honors  and  rewards.  Perhaps  that  ex- 
plains why  after  more  than  two  decades  of  American 
sovereignty  the  British  investment  in  the  Philippines 
is  nearly  double  the  American  investment.  For  the 
Englishman  can  invest  his  capital  in  the  Philippines 
with  the  comforting  knowledge  that  as  long  as  he 
behaves  himself  he  has  his  government  solidly  behind 
him — and  the  Filipino  knows  it,  too,  and  treats  him 
accordingly.  Is  it  too  much  to  expect,  then,  that 
the  American  residing  and  doing  business  in  a  land 
which  was  freed  from  tyranny  by  the  sacrifice  of 
American  lives,  which  was  purchased  with  American 
dollars,  which  is  guarded  by  the  American  navy, 
which  has  been  made  safe  by  the  American  army, 
whose  credit  is  guaranteed  by  the  American  treas- 
ury, whose  schools  and  hospitals  and  railways  are 
due  to  American  initiative  and  enterprise,  whose  sea- 
gates  are  guarded  against  disease  by  American  quar- 
antine surgeons,  whose  industries  have  been  devel- 
oped by  American  capital,  and  over  which  flies  the 
American  flag — is  it  too  much  to  expect,  I  repeat, 
that  the  American  resident  should  be  accorded  the 
same  measure  of  representation  and  protection  en- 
joyed by  an  Englishman  or  a  Mexican  or  a  Jap- 
anese? 

It  was  to  obtain  for  Americans  the  same  rights  en- 
joyed by  citizens  of  other  countries  that  two-and- 
twenty  years  after  Commodore  Dewey  took  posses- 
sion of  the  archipelago  in  the  name  of  the  United 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       329 

States  there  was  organized  in  Manila  the  American 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  PhiHppine  Islands. 
This  organization,  to  quote  its  own  words,  "repre- 
sents every  phase  of  American  business  and  interest 
in  the  Philippines  and  is  taking  the  place  of  a  lega- 
tion to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  residing  in 
the  Philippine  territory,  irrespective  of  whether  they 
are  members  of  the  organization  or  not.  It  purposes 
to  be  heard  on  every  subject  affecting  the  business 
or  political  life  of  the  community.  It  purposes  in  all 
matters:  first,  to  suggest  a  remedy;  second,  to  ask 
for  its  application;  third,  to  demand  its  application; 
and  fourth,  to  fight  for  its  application  if  other  proc- 
esses are  not  successful."  There  you  have  the  Bill 
of  Rights  of  the  Americans  in  the  Phihppines. 


vm 

Though  the  bitterest  opponents  of  American  rule 
in  the  Philippines  cannot  charge  us  with  having  ex- 
ploited the  natives  for  our  own  profit — and  we  are 
the  only  nation  having  colonial  possessions  of  which 
this  can  truthfully  be  said — in  our  social  relations 
with  the  natives  we  are  no  whit  different  from  other 
ruling  white  races.  The  Englishman  in  India  is  no 
more  supercihous  or  condescending  in  his  attitude 
toward  the  brown-skinned  peoples  of  the  peninsula 
than  the  Americans  in  the  Philippines  are  toward 


330       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

the  Filipinos.  In  the  islands  the  white  men  and  the 
brown  are  separated  by  a  social  chasm  as  deep  and 
impassable  as  that  which  separates  army  officers  and 
enlisted  men.  In  certain  respects  we  have  carried 
this  social  discrimination  to  even  greater  lengths  than 
have  the  English,  for  whereas  the  Khedivial  Club, 
Cairo's  most  exclusive  organization,  has  as  many 
Egyptian  as  European  members,  no  Filipino  can  be 
elected  to  a  Manila  club,  no  matter  how  high  his 
official  position.  It  did  not  take  our  various  gov- 
ernor-generals long  to  learn  that  it  was  the  part  of 
wisdom  not  to  mix  Americans  and  Filipinos,  except  at 
large  official  functions  when  entertaining  at  the 
Palace  of  Malacanan.  The  American  who  marries 
a  Filipina  is  promptly  ostracized.  She  may  be  a 
graduate  of  Bryn  Mawr  or  Vassar  or  Wellesley,  she 
may  be  beautiful  and  cultured  and  charming,  but  no 
matter — she  is  not  white. 

As  the  result  of  many  years  spent  in  Oriental  coun- 
tries I  can  understand,  even  if  I  do  not  entirely  sym- 
pathize with,  the  white  man's  point  of  view  on  this 
question.  I  must  confess,  however,  that  it  amuses 
me  to  see  the  wives  and  daughters  of  men  who  were 
originally  small-town  merchants  or  mechanics,  or 
who  first  went  out  to  the  islands  as  enlisted  men  in 
the  army  of  occupation,  treating  with  condescension 
Filipinos  who  have  in  their  veins  the  proudest  blood 
of  Spain.  But,  mind  you,  I  do  not  subscribe  to  the 
social  creed  of  former  Governor-General  Harrison, 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        331 

who  said  in  his  farewell  address,  "I  want  you  to  re- 
member that  in  all  but  face  and  race  I  am  a  Fil- 
ipino," any  more  than  I  approve  of  the  American 
soldier's  sentiment  toward  "the  little  brown  brother" 
as  inelegantly  expressed  in  the  once-famous  army 
song:  "He  may  be  a  brother  of  William  H.  Taft, 
but  he  ain't  no  brother  of  mine."  Viewing  this  deli- 
cate and  difficult  question  purely  from  the  political 
angle,  it  seems  to  me  that  were  the  Americans  in  the 
Philippines  to  lower  in  some  degree  the  social  bar- 
rier which  they  have  raised  between  themselves  and 
the  natives,  were  they  to  draw  the  color  line  a  shade 
less  sharply,  it  would  go  far  toward  soothing  the 
wounded  pride  of  the  Filipinos  and  reconcihng  them 
to  American  rule  without  entailing  any  sacrifice  of 
that  prestige  which  is  the  fetich  of  the  colonizing 
white  man. 

Another  source  of  Filipino  resentment  is  to  be 
found  in  the  lack  of  ordinary  tact  which  characterizes 
the  attitude  of  American  residents  toward  the  natives. 
Mr.  Nathaniel  Peffer,  himself  a  keen  observer  and 
for  many  years  a  resident  in  the  East,  quotes  a  Fil- 
ipino educated  in  the  United  States  as  saying: 
"Don't  give  us  independence  if  you  don't  want  to. 
The  decision  is  yours  to  make  and  we  must  resign 
ourselves  to  it  if  it  is  unfavorable.  We  can  even 
sympathize  with  some  of  the  reasons  why  independ- 
ence would  be  unwise  now.  But  stop  harping  on  our 
'unfitness.'    It  is  that  we  hear  all  the  time,  and  not 


382       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

some  of  the  other  reasons.  We  have  come  to  hate 
that  word.  All  its  associations  are  rasping  to  us.  It 
suggests  a  savage  people  come  up  for  judgment  be- 
fore supermen."  With  that  attitude  most  fair- 
minded  Americans  will  heartily  sympathize.  For  an 
educated  and  self-respecting  Filipino  to  be  told  over 
and  over  again  that  he  is  "unfitted"  for  self-govern- 
ment (no  matter  how  true  the  statement  may  be)  is 
as  exasperating  and  as  difficult  to  refute  as  the  charge 
that  a  man  is  "temperamentally  unsuited"  to  hold  a 
certain  position.  Until  we  can  school  ourselves  to 
exercise  greater  tact  and  courtesy  in  our  relations 
with  the  Filipinos,  until  we  can  broaden  our  horizons 
sufficiently  to  look  at  things  from  their  viewpoint  as 
well  as  our  own,  until  we  can  forget  whether  a  man 
is  born  east  or  west  of  Suez  and  gage  our  attitude 
toward  him  by  his  brains  instead  of  his  blood,  by  his 
character  instead  of  his  complexion,  we  shall  never 
win  from  the  Filipinos  that  confidence  and  liking 
which  are  indispensable  to  successful  colonial  admin- 
istration. 


IX 

The  Philippine  Question  naturally  resolves  itself 
into  two  distinct  problems.  First,  how  would  the 
granting  of  independence  to  the  Philippines  affect 
our  own  constantly  increasing  interest  in  the  Far 
East?    And  second,  would  independence  be  best  for 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        333 

the  Filipinos  themselves?    The  Filipinos  assert,  and 
with  truth,  that  the  former  is  a  purely  selfish  consid- 
eration, but  the  lessons  of  the  World  War  have  taught 
us  that  national  considerations,  selfish  though  they 
may  be,  cannot  safely  be  disregarded.    England  has 
not  remained  in  military  occupation  of  Egypt  for 
forty  years  through  any  desire  to  exploit  the  Egyp- 
tians or  because  she  has  been  financially  benefited  by 
her  hold  on  the  Valley  of  the  Nile — on  the  contrary, 
the  occupation  of  Egypt  has  added  enormously  to 
the  burdens  borne  by  the  British  taxpayer — but  be- 
cause in  controlling  Egypt  she  insures  the  safety  of 
the  Suez  Canal,  which  is  the  gateway  through  which 
passes  Britain's  enormous  commerce  with  the  Farther 
East.    Our  own  position  in  the  Philippines  is  some- 
what  analogous   to   England's   position   in   Egj'^pt. 
Within  fifteen  hours  of  the  China  Coast,  within  fifty 
hours  of  Japan  and  of  the  Straits  of  Malacca,  the 
archipelago  forms  a  commercial  gateway  to  the  whole 
of  eastern  Asia  and  to  the  great,  rich  islands  of  Ma- 
laysia.   Glance  for  a  moment  at  the  map  and  note  the 
amazing  strategic  value  of  the  Philippines  from  the 
point  of  view  of  American  world  commerce.     Just 
across  the  China  Sea  lie  the  great  ports  of  Haiphong, 
Hong  Kong,  Canton,  Shanghai,  Tsingtau,  Cheefoo, 
Tientsin,  through  which  pour  the  imports  of  the  four 
hundred  millions  of  people  in  Indo-China  and  China. 
And  as  surely  as  darkness  follows  the  day,  as  smoke 
goes  upward,  our  commerce  with  the  Orient,  now 


334       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

growing  by  leaps  and  bounds,  in  a  considerable  meas- 
ure at  least,  will  be  won  away  from  us  by  those  nations 
which  are  better  situated  geographically  to  push  their 
commercial  interests — England  through  Hong  Kong 
and  Tientsin,  France  through  Haiphong  and  her  con- 
cessions in  Yunnan,  Japan  through  Korea,  Siberia, 
Manchuria,  and  the  Shantung  Peninsula — if  our  jflag 
comes  down  in  the  Philippines. 

I  consider  it  unlikely  in  the  extreme  that  we  will 
ever  be  forced  to  resort  to  arms  in  defense  of  our 
interests  in  the  Pacific,  but  that  does  not  mean  that 
there  is  no  possibility  of  such  a  contingency  arising. 
As  this  possibility,  however  remote  it  may  seem,  al- 
ways exists,  let  me  direct  your  attention  to  the  im- 
mense strategic  advantages  afforded  us  by  the 
Philippines,  which  are  within  easy  striking  distance  of 
every  Asiatic  port  between  Yokohama  and  Singa- 
pore and  lie  squarely  athwart  every  trade  route  be- 
tween the  Far  East  and  Europe,  Australia,  South 
America,  and  Mexico.  With  a  powerful  fleet  having 
its  base  in  Subic  Bay,  we  could  not  only  guarantee  the 
Pacific  Coast,  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  the  Canal 
against  enemy  attack,  but  we  would  hold  the  com- 
merce of  the  Pacific  at  our  mercy.  Deprived  of  the 
Philippines  as  a  base  of  operations  in  any  struggle  in 
which  we  might  become  involved  in  the  Pacific,  we 
would  be  forced  to  fight  on  the  defensive,  which,  as 
most  naval  experts  agree,  is  usually  doubtful  strat- 
egy. 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       335 


"The  Philippines  are  more  trouble  than  they  are 
worth.  Let's  get  rid  of  them"  has  long  been  the 
slogan  of  many  uninformed  Americans.  Permit  me 
to  call  the  attention  of  those  who  hold  this  view  to 
the  fact  that  the  Philippines  are  not  costing  the  Amer- 
ican taxpayer  a  single  penny,  the  insular  finances  for 
several  years  past  having  shown  a  surplus  instead  of 
a  deficit.  In  making  this  statement  I  do  not  con- 
sider, of  course,  the  cost  of  maintaining  our  naval 
and  military  forces  in  the  islands,  for  it  is  to  be 
assumed  that,  should  we  grant  the  Filipinos  independ- 
ence, these  forces  would  not  be  disbanded,  but  would 
merely  be  ordered  to  other  stations,  so  that  the  ex- 
pense of  their  maintenance,  if  anything,  would  be 
increased.  The  Philippines,  as  I  have  attempted  to 
show  you,  constitute  America's  military  and  commer- 
cial outpost  in  the  Orient.  In  view  of  the  present 
condition  of  world  affairs,  whether  it  would  be  high 
patriotism,  good  business,  sound  strategy,  to  abandon 
such  an  outpost,  with  the  possibility  that  it  might  fall 
into  unfriendly  hands,  is  a  question  which  the  Amer- 
ican people  must  decide  for  themselves. 

In  considering  the  question  of  whether  independ- 
ence would  be  best  for  the  Filipinos  themselves,  it 
must  be  kept  in  mind  that  very  few  educated  Filipinos 


336       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

expect,  or  really  want,  complete  autonomy.  What 
they  seek,  rather,  is  a  form  of  independence  which 
will  insure  them  unrestricted  freedom  of  action  and 
absolute  security  without  anxiety  or  expense,  in  short, 
a  protectorate.  While  vociferously  demanding  the 
profits  of  the  business,  they  are  unwilling  to  assume 
the  risks;  yet  there  is  a  general  failure  to  appreciate 
the  fact  that  independence  under  the  protection  of 
another  nation  is  not  true  independence.  The  fact 
that  their  legislative  measures  are  subject  to  the  veto 
of  the  American  governor-general,  that  their  finances 
are  under  the  supervision  of  an  American  auditor, 
that  a  few,  a  very  few  positions  in  the  Constabulary, 
the  Health  Service,  and  the  Department  of  Public 
Instruction  are  still  held  by  Americans,  makes  the 
Filipinos — or,  to  be  precise,  the  native  politicians  and 
office-seekers — almost  childishly  resentful,  yet  they 
instantly  would  become  panic-stricken  were  we  to 
announce  that  we  proposed  to  cut  them  adrift  and  to 
withdraw  immediately  from  the  islands,  taking  our 
troops,  our  warships,  and  our  financial  credit  with 
us.  Though  I  am  convinced  from  my  conversations 
with  a  large  number  of  intelligent  and  thoughtful 
Filipinos,  who  appeared  to  have  the  best  interests 
of  their  country  genuinely  at  heart,  that  they  would 
view  with  the  gravest  misgivings  a  complete  sev- 
erance of  relations  with  the  United  States,  the  polit- 
ical leaders  have  harped  so  long  on  the  theme  of 
"la  independencia"  that  the  great  ignorant  mass  of 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        337 

the  people  have  come  to  believe  that  only  in  absolute 
independence  will  they  find  happiness  and  national 
salvation. 

In  order  to  understand  the  political  situation  in 
the  Philippines  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  the 
Filipinos  have  no  political  parties  as  we  have  in  the 
United  States,  because  there  is  no  question  of  suffi- 
cient importance  to  divide  public  opinion.  As  a  re- 
sult, the  only  political  factions  are  the  "ins"  and  the 
"outs,"  and  both  of  them,  lacking  any  other  issue, 
such  as  taxation,  or  the  tariff,  or  the  League  of  Na- 
tions, clamor  for  independence,  though  not  one  Fil- 
ipino in  a  hundred  has  other  than  the  haziest  ideas 
of  what  independence,  with  all  that  it  implies,  would 
mean.  The  average  Filipino's  conception  of  inde- 
pendence is  well  illustrated  by  a  story  which  was  told 
me  in  Manila.  A  provincial  political  boss  who  had 
been  a  candidate  for  the  governorship  of  a  province, 
but  had  met  with  overwhelming  defeat  at  the  polls, 
burst  into  his  party  headquarters  shortly  after  the 
results  of  the  election  had  been  announced,  livid  with 
rage. 

"I'm  for  independence  I"  he  bellowed.  "I'm  for 
independence  instantly!  If  only  these  cursed  Amer- 
icanos were  out  of  here,  I  'd  come  into  town  with  a 
thousand  of  my  bolo  men  and  wipe  out  the  gang  that 
defeated  me  and  make  myself  governor,  votes  or  no 
votes.  It 's  all  the  fault  of  these  damned  interfering 
Americanos.    They're  always  insisting  on  law  and 


338       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

order — always  talking  about  the  decision  of  the  bal- 
lot-box. If  we  could  get  rid  of  them,  we'd  decide 
things  with  the  bolo  instead  of  the  ballot.  To  hell 
with  Americano  rule!    [Viva  la  independencia!" 

Now  that  man,  opera  bouffe  as  he  may  seem,  rep- 
resents the  sentiments  of  a  by  no  means  inconsider- 
able number  of  Filipino  politicians.  These  men,  in 
order  to  attain  their  selfish  ends,  would  prefer  to  see 
the  Philippines  saddled  with  the  brand  of  "independ- 
ence" that  Mexico  knew  under  the  rule  of  Carranza, 
or  that  Russia  is  enjoying  under  Lenine  and  Trotsky, 
to  the  reign  of  decency,  security,  and  justice  which 
Lord  Cromer  gave  to  the  Egyptians.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  the  Filipinos  are  already  as  free  as  the  peo- 
ples of  Canada,  South  Africa,  and  Australia,  enjoy- 
ing what  unprejudiced  foreign  observers  have  de- 
clared to  be  the  most  just  and  advanced  system  of 
government  in  the  world.  But  to  these  facts  they 
wilfully  close  their  eyes,  stubbornly  insisting  that 
they  must  have  independence  in  name  as  well  as  in 
substance. 

The  American  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  Phil- 
ippines has  advocated  that  the  archipelago  be  given 
a  territorial  form  of  government,  such  as  was  enjoyed 
for  many  years  by  Arizona,  New  Mexico,  and  Okla- 
homa, and  that  under  the  name  of  the  "Territory  of 
Malaya"  it  be  added  to  the  Union.  This  would  doubt- 
less solve  many  of  the  present  problems,  but  it  is  a 
solution  which  the  leaders  of  the  independence  agita- 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS       339 

tion  would  almost  certainly  reject.  What  they  de- 
mand is  an  absolute  severance  of  every  tie  which  binds 
the  Philippines  to  the  United  States.  They  insist  on 
being  turned  loose,  a  free  and  sovereign  people,  to 
lead  their  own  lives  and  to  work  out  their  own  destiny. 
With  this  demand  I  can  sympathize.  The  love  of  free- 
dom is  inherent  in  every  human  being.  Yet  it  would 
involve  several  questions  requiring  earnest  considera- 
tion. To  begin  with,  the  United  States  paid  Spain 
twenty  million  dollars  for  the  Philippines.  Do  the 
Filipinos  propose,  in  the  event  of  being  given  their  in- 
dependence, to  refund  this  sum?  A  sordid  sugges- 
tion, perhaps,  but  it  is  to  be  assumed  that  the  pride  of 
the  Filipinos  would  scarcely  permit  them  to  ignore 
such  an  obligation.  Again,  the  Filipinos  are  the  only 
people  on  earth  who  enjoy  the  privilege  of  absolute 
free  trade  with  the  United  States.  Certain  authorities 
claim  that  the  surest  way  of  strangling  them  would  be 
to  withdraw  that  privilege  from  them.  But  as  a  free 
and  sovereign  nation  could  the  Filipinos  advance  any 
sound  reason  why  their  products  should  not  be  sub- 
ject to  the  same  duties,  upon  entering  the  United 
States,  as  those  of  other  foreign  nations?  The  Fil- 
ipinos bitterly  resent  the  suggestion  of  an  American 
protectorate,  so,  in  the  event  of  their  becoming  in- 
volved in  hostilities  with  another  power,  what  excuse 
would  they  have  for  turning  to  us  for  protection? 
Let  me  remark  here,  for  the  benefit  of  such  Filipinos 
as  may  read  this  book,  that  if  they  seriously  believe 


340       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

that  the  American  people,  once  our  troops  have  been 
withdrawn  and  our  flag  hauled  down,  would  ever 
consent  to  despatch  a  fleet  or  raise  an  army  to  defend 
the  Philippines  againt  foreign  aggression,  then  they 
are  only  deceiving  themselves.  I  believe  that  I  am 
expressing  the  sentiments  of  the  great  majority  of 
the  American  people  when  I  assert  that  if  the  Fil- 
ipinos insist  on  cutting  themselves  adrift,  then  they 
must  be  prepared  to  paddle  their  own  canoe  and  need 
not  look  to  the  United  States  for  assistance,  either 
military  or  flnancial,  if  a  storm  comes. 

It  is  a  deplorable  fact  that  much  of  the  unrest, 
uncertainty,  and  discontent  which  exist  in  the  Phil- 
ippines to-day  are  directly  traceable  to  certain  Amer- 
ican poHticians  who,  eager  to  obtain  cheap  publicity 
and  to  make  political  capital,  or  obsessed  with  altru- 
istic but  utterly  impracticable  ideas,  have  espoused 
the  cause  of  Filipino  independence,  regarding  which 
few  of  them  possess  first-hand  knowledge  and  which 
still  fewer  are  qualified  intelligently  to  discuss.  What 
we  need  for  a  just  and  intelligent  solution  of  the  Phil- 
ippine Question  are  not  the  philippics  of  politicians 
or  the  appeals  of  impractical  sentimentalists,  but  the 
reasoned  advice  of  men  with  long  experience  in  co- 
lonial administration,  men  of  the  stamp  of  Cromer 
and  Milner,  Smuts  and  Curzon,  men  who  serve  neither 
personal  nor  party  interests.  Until  we  raise  the  Phil- 
ippine Question  from  the  slough  of  partisan  politics 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        341 

to  the  plane  of  a  great  national  problem,  until  we 
abolish  our  present  system  of  selecting  our  colonial 
officials  on  the  strength  of  their  political  records  and 
affiliations  instead  of  for  their  actual  qualifications 
for  the  duties  to  be  performed,  until  we  adopt  and 
adhere  to  a  definite  colonial  policy,  regardless  of  the 
political  party  which  may  be  in  power,  until  the  gov- 
ernment at  Washington  will  give  heed  to  the  disinter- 
ested men  who,  through  long  experience,  know  where- 
of they  speak,  the  Philippines  will  not  know  enduring 
tranquillity  or  prosperity.  The  despatch  of  the  Wood- 
Forbes  Mission  to  investigate  conditions  on  the  spot 
and  the  appointment  of  General  Wood  as  governor- 
general  are  steps  in  the  right  direction.  If  the  Wash- 
ington Government  will  heed  the  suggestions  made 
by  this  mission,  if  it  will  back  up  the  new  insular 
administration,  much  will  be  done  toward  dissipating 
the  cloudiness  and  uncertainty  which  have  enveloped 
the  future  of  the  islands.* 

The  conclusions  and  recommendations  of  the  Wood- 
Forbes  Mission  are  so  clear,  concise,  and  enlighten- 
ing that  I  quote  them  here : 

If  the  Filipinos  could  present  more  convincing 
proofs  than  they  have  yet  done  that  they  are  really 
fitted  for  the  independence  which  they  covet;  if  they 
could  show  beyond  all  peradventure  that  they  are 
prepared  to  take  care  of  themselves  without  further 

»See  Appendix. 


342       ASIA  AT  THE  CROSSROADS 

assistance  or  protection  from  the  United  States,  then 
I  believe  the  majority  of  the  American  people  would 
say:  "Here  is  your  independence.  Take  it,  and 
God  be  with  you."  But  before  that  happy  state  of 
affairs  can  be  realized  we  must  ask  ourselves  in  all 
seriousness  certain  questions.  If  we  are  to  grant  the 
Filipinos  their  independence,  to  which  of  the  various 
races  shall  we  intrust  the  machinery  of  government 
— to  the  Tagalogs,  the  Ilocanos,  or  the  Visayans,  to 
name  only  three  of  them?  Then  again,  shall  we  hand 
over  the  reins  of  power  to  the  great  brown  mass  of 
people  who  are  the  real  natives  of  the  islands,  or  shall 
we  give  them  to  the  little  group  of  half-caste  poli- 
ticians and  agitators  who  are  at  present  in  the  sad- 
dle ?  Shall  we  deliver  the  pagan  tribes — the  Igorots, 
Ifugaos,  Kalingas,  Mandayas,  Monobos,  and  the  rest 
— to  the  Christian  Filipinos,  and  if  we  do,  what  satis- 
factory guaranty  can  we  obtain  that  their  rights  will 
be  respected,  that  they  will  not  be  oppressed  and 
exploited  as  they  were  before  the  American  occupa- 
tion? Shall  we  attempt  to  coerce  the  Moros  into 
submission  to  the  rule  of  the  Filipinos  whom  they 
despise  and  hate,  and  if  we  do  coerce  them  and  they 
revolt,  as  they  almost  certainly  would  do,  shall  we 
send  troops  to  the  islands  to  aid  the  FiUpinos  in  sub- 
jugating them  ?  If  the  "Republic  of  the  Philippines'* 
should  become,  as  the  result  of  internal  jealousies  and 
dissensions,  another  Haiti,  shall  we  intervene,  as  we 
did  in  Haiti,  and  restore  order?    Should  Japan,  or 


THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS        343 

China,  or  both,  insist  on  the  unrestricted  admission 
of  their  nationals  to  the  rich  lands  of  the  Philippines, 
— as  the  Japanese,  at  least,  are  reasonably  certain  to 
do,  once  American  protection  is  withdrawn — and 
should  the  Filipinos  refuse  them  such  admission,  shall 
we  be  prepared  to  back  up  the  Filipinos  in  their  re- 
fusal with  fleets  and  armies,  or  shall  we  stand  aloof 
and  see  the  archipelago  overrun  by  yellow  men? 
And  finally,  if  the  independence  of  the  5  oung  re- 
public were  menaced  by  a  covetous  and  warlike  neigh- 
bor, would  we  be  prepared  to  spend  thousands  of 
lives  and  billions  of  dollars  in  rescuing  the  Filipinos 
and  setting  them  on  their  feet  and  starting  them  in 
business  all  over  again? 

In  asking  these  hypothetical  questions  nothing  is 
further  from  my  purpose  than  to  embarrass  the  Fil- 
ipinos, whom  I  like,  or  to  belittle  their  very  real  abil- 
ities, or  to  prejudice  my  readers  against  them.  But 
whether  embarrassing  to  the  Filipinos  or  not,  they  are 
questions  which  the  American  people  must  answer, 
and  answer  satisfactorily,  before  they  can  conscien- 
tiously turn  adrift  the  ten  million  "little  brown  broth- 
ers" whom  they  so  light-heartedly  adopted  nearly  a 
quarter  of  a  century  ago. 


APPENDIX  A 


GENERAL    CONCLUSIONS 


We  find  the  people  happy,  peaceful,  and  in  the  main  pros- 
perous, and  keenly  appreciative  of  the  benefits  of  American 
rule. 

We  find  everywhere  among  the  Christian  Filipinos  the 
desire  for  independence,  generally  under  the  protection  of 
the  United  States,  The  non-Christians  and  Americans  are 
for  continuance  of  American  control. 

We  find  a  general  failure  to  appreciate  the  fact  that 
independence  under  the  protection  of  another  nation  is  not 
true  independence. 

We  find  that  the  Government  is  not  reasonably  free  from 
those  underlying  causes  which  result  in  the  destruction  of 
government. 

We  find  that  a  reasonable  proportion  of  officials  and 
employees  are  men  of  good  character  and  ability,  and 
reasonably  faithful  to  the  trust  imposed  upon  them;  but 
that  the  efficiency  of  the  public  services  has  fallen  off,  and 
that  they  are  now  relatively  inefficient,  due  to  lack  of 
inspection  and  to  the  too  rapid  transfer  of  control  to 
oflScials  who  have  not  had  the  necessary  time  for  proper 
training. 

We  find  that  many  Filipinos  have  shown  marked  capacity 
for  government  service  and  that  the  young  generation  is 
full  of  promise;  that  the  civil  service  laws  have  in  the  main 
been  honestly  administered,  but  there  is  a  marked  deteriora- 
tion due  to  the  injection  of  politics. 

We  find  there  is  a  disquieting  lack  of  confidence  in  the 
administration  of  justice,  to  an  extent  which  constitutes 
a  menace  to  the  stability  of  the  government. 

We  find  that  the  people  are  not  organized  economically 

346 


346  APPENDIX 

nor  from  the  standpoint  of  national  defense  to  maintain  an 
independent  government. 

We  find  that  the  legislative  chambers  are  conducted  with 
dignity  and  decorum  and  are  composed  of  representative 
men. 

We  feel  that  the  lack  of  success  in  certain  departments 
should  not  be  considered  as  proof  of  essential  incapacity 
on  the  part  of  Filipinos,  but  rather  as  indicating  lack  of 
experience  and  opportunity,  and  especially  lack  of  inspec- 
tion. 

We  find  that  questions  in  regard  to  confirmation  of 
appointments  might  at  any  time  arise  which  would  make  a 
deadlock  between  the  Governor  General  and  the  Philippine 
Senate. 

We  feel  that  with  all  their  many  excellent  qualities,  the 
experience  of  the  past  eight  years,  during  which  they  have 
had  practical  autonomy,  has  not  been  such  as  to  justify 
the  people  of  the  United  States  relinquishing  supervision 
of  the  Government  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  withdrawing 
their  army  and  navy,  and  leaving  the  islands  a  prey  to  any 
powerful  nation  coveting  their  rich  soil  and  potential  com- 
mercial advantages. 

In  conclusion  we  are  convinced  that  it  would  be  a  betrayal 
of  the  Philippine  people,  a  misfortune  to  the  American 
people,  a  distinct  step  backward  in  the  path  of  progress, 
and  a  discreditable  neglect  of  our  national  duty  were  we 
to  withdraw  from  the  islands  and  terminate  our  relation- 
ship there  without  giving  the  Filipinos  the  best  chance  pos- 
sible to  have  an  orderly  and  permanently  stable  government. 


EECOMMENDATIONS 

1.  We  recommend  that  the  present  general  status  of  the 
Philippine  Islands  continue  until  the  people  have  had  time 
to  absorb  and  thoroughly  master  the  powers  already  in 
their  hands. 

2.  We  recommend  that  the  responsible  representative  of 
the  United  States,  the  Governor  General,  have  authority 


APPENDIX  347 

commensurate  with  the  responsibilities  of  his  position.  In 
case  of  failure  to  secure  the  necessary  corrective  action  by 
the  Philippine  Legislature,  we  recommend  that  Congress 
declare  null  and  void  legislation  which  has  been  enacted 
diminishing,  limiting,  or  dividing  the  authority  granted  the 
Governor  General  under  Act  No.  240  of  the  Sixty-fourth 
Congress,  known  as  the  Jones  bill. 

3.  We  recommend  that  in  case  of  a  deadlock  between  the 
Governor  General  and  the  Philippine  Senate  in  the  confirma- 
tion of  appointments  that  the  President  of  the  United 
States  be  authorized  to  make  and  render  the  final  decision. 

4.  We  recommend  that  under  no  circumstances  should 
the  American  Government  permit  to  be  established  in  the 
Philippine  Islands  a  situation  which  would  leave  the  United 
States  in  a  position  of  responsibility  without  authority. 

Leonard  Wood,  Chairman, 
W.  Cameron  Forbes. 
October  8,  1921. 


APPENDIX  B 

The  text  of  the  two  treaties  regarding  China,  approved 
at  Washington,  Feb.  4,  1922,  by  the  Conference  for  the 
Limitation  of  Armament  and  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  Ques- 
tions, follows.  The  one  embodying  the  Root  four  points  for 
the  integrity  of  China  and  the  open  door  reads : 

TREATY  ON  CHINESE  INTEGRITY 

The  United  States  of  America,  Belgiwm,  the  British  Em- 
pire, China,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands  and  Por- 
tugal: 

Desiring  to  adopt  a  policy  designed  to  stabilize  conditions 
in  the  Far  East,  to  safeguard  the  rights  and  interests  of 
China,  and  to  promote  intercourse  between  China  and  the 
other  powers  upon  the  basis  of  equality  of  opportunity; 

Have  resolved  to  conclude  a  treaty  for  that  purpose  and 
to  that  end  have  appointed  as  their  respective  plenipoten- 
tiaries : 

[Here  follow  the  names  of  the  plenipotentiaries.] 

Who,  having  communicated  to  each  other  their  full 
powers,  foiund  to  be  in  good  and  du£  form,  have  agreed  as 
follows: 

ARTICLE  I 

The  contracting  powers,  other  than  China,  agree: 

1.  To  respect  the  sovereignty,  the  independence,  and  the 
territorial  and  administrative  integrity  of  China. 

2.  To  provide  the  fullest  and  most  unembarrassed  oppor- 

348 


APPENDIX  349 

tunity  to  China  to  develop  and  maintain  for  herself  an  effec- 
tive and  stable  Government. 

3.  To  use  their  influence  for  the  purpose  of  effectually 
establishing  and  maintaining  the  principle  of  equal  oppor- 
tunity for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  through- 
out the  territory  of  China. 

4.  To  refrain  from  taking  advantage  of  conditions  in 
China  in  order  to  seek  special  rights  or  privileges  which 
would  abridge  the  rights  of  subjects  or  citizens  of  friendly 
States,  and  from  countenancing  action  inimical  to  the  se- 
curity of  such  States. 

AETICLE  n 

The  contracting  powers  agree  not  to  enter  into  any 
treaty,  agreement,  arrangement,  or  understanding,  either 
with  one  another  or  individually  or  collectively  with  any 
power  or  powers  which  would  infringe  or  impair  the  prin- 
ciples stated  in  Article  I. 

AETICLE  III 

With  a  view  to  applying  more  effectually  the  principles  of 
the  open  door  or  equality  of  opportunity  in  China  for  the 
trade  and  industry  of  all  nations,  the  contracting  powers, 
other  than  China,  agree  they  will  not  seek,  nor  support  their 
respective  nations  in  seeking: 

(A) — Any  arrangement  which  might  purport  to  establish 
in  favor  of  their  interests  any  general  superiority  of  rights 
with  respect  to  commercial  or  economic  development  in  any 
designated  region  in  China; 

(B) — Any  such  monopoly  or  preference  as  would  deprive 
the  nationals  of  any  other  power  of  the  right  of  undertak- 
ing any  legitimate  trade  or  industry  in  China,  or  of  partici- 
pating with  the  Chinese  Government,  or  with   any   local 


350  APPENDIX 

authority,  in  any  category  of  public  enterprise,  or  which 
by  reason  of  its  scope,  duration  or  geographical  extent  is 
calculated  to  frustrate  the  practical  application  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  equal  opportunity. 

It  is  understood  that  the  foregoing  stipulations  of  this 
article  are  not  to  be  so  construed  as  to  prohibit  the  acqui- 
sition of  such  properties  or  rights  as  may  be  necessary  to 
the  conduct  of  a  particular  commercial,  industrial  or  finan- 
cial undertaking  or  to  the  encouragement  of  invention  and 
research. 

China  undertakes  to  be  guided  by  the  principles  stated  in 
the  foregoing  stipulations  of  this  article  in  dealing  with 
applications  for  economic  rights  and  privileges  from  Gov- 
ernments and  nationals  of  all  foreign  countries,  whether 
parties  to  the  present  treaty  or  not. 

AETICLE  IV 

The  contracting  powers  agree  not  to  support  any  agree- 
ments by  their  respective  nationals  with  each  other,  designed 
to  create  spheres  of  influence  or  to  provide  for  the  enjoy- 
ment of  mutually  exclusive  opportunities  in  designated  parts 
of  Chinese  territory. 

ABTICLE  V 

China  agrees  that,  throughout  the  whole  of  the  railways 
in  China,  she  will  not  exercise  or  permit  unfair  discrimina- 
tions of  any  kind.  In  particular  there  shall  be  no  discrim- 
ination whatever,  direct  or  indirect,  in  respect  of  charges 
or  of  facilities  on  the  ground  of  the  nationality  of  passen- 
gers or  the  countries  from  which  or  to  which  they  are 
proceeding,  or  the  origin  or  ownership  of  goods  or  the 
country  from  which  or  to  which  they  are  consigned,  or  the 
nationality  or  ownership  of  the  ship  or  other  means  of  con- 


APPENDIX  351 

veying  such  passengers  or  goods  before  or  after  their  trans- 
port on  the  Chinese  railways. 

The  contracting  powers,  other  than  China,  assume  a  cor- 
responding obligation  in  respect  of  any  of  the  aforesaid 
railways  over  which  they  or  their  nationals  are  in  a  position 
to  exercise  any  control  in  virtue  of  any  concession,  special 
agreement  or  otherwise. 

AETICLE  VI 

The  contracting  parties,  other  than  China,  agree  fully  to 
respect  China's  rights  as  a  neutral  in  time  of  war  to  which 
China  is  not  a  party ;  and  China  declares  that  when  she  is  a 
neutral  she  will  observe  the  obligations  of  neutrality. 

ARTICLE  vn 

The  contracting  powers  agree  that,  whenever  a  situation 
arises  which,  in  the  opinion  of  any  one  of  them,  involves  the 
application  of  the  stipulations  of  the  present  treaty,  and 
renders  desirable  discussion  of  such  application,  there  shall 
be  full  and  frank  communication  between  the  contracting 
powers  concerned. 

ARTICLE  vra 

Powers  not  signatory  to  the  present  treaty  which  have 
governments  recognized  by  the  signatory  powers  and  which 
have  treaty  relations  with  China  shall  be  invited  to  adhere 
to  the  present  treaty.  To  this  end  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  will  make  the  necessary  communications  to 
non-signatory  powers  and  will  inform  the  contracting 
powers  of  the  replies  received.  Adherence  by  any  power 
shall  become  effective  on  receipt  of  notice  thereof  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States. 


352  APPENDIX 


ARTICLE  IX 


The  present  treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  the  contracting 
powers  in  accordance  with  their  respective  constitutional 
methods  and  shall  take  effect  on  the  date  of  the  deposit  of 
all  the  ratifications,  which  shall  take  place  at  Washington 
as  soon  as  possible.  The  Government  of  the  United  States 
will  transmit  to  the  other  contracting  powers  a  certified 
copy  of  the  process  verbed  of  the  deposit  of  ratifications. 

The  present  treaty,  of  which  the  English  and  French  texts 
are  both  authentic,  shall  remain  deposited  in  the  archives 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  duly  certified 
copies  thereof  shall  be  transmitted  by  that  Government  to 
the  other  contracting  powers. 

In  faith  whereof  the  above-named  plenipotentiaries  have 
signed  the  present  treaty. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington,  the  sixth  day  of  Febru- 
ary, one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  twenty-two. 


TREATY  ON  CHINESE  TARIFF 

The  treaty  relative  to  the  Chinese  tariff  and  cognate  mat- 
ters reads : 

The  United  States  of  America,  Belgkim,  British  Empire, 
China,  France,  Italy,  Japan*,  The  Netherlands  and  Por- 
tugal: 

With  a  view  to  increasing  the  revenues  of  the  Chinese 
Govermnent,  have  resolved  to  conclude  a  treaty  relating  to 
the  revision  of  the  Chinese  cu^toins  tariff  and  cognate  mat- 
ters, and  to  that  end  have  appointed  as  their  plenipoten- 
tiaries: 

[Here  follow  the  names  of  the  plenipotentiaries.] 

WhOy    having   commumcated   to   each   other   their   fvU 


APPENDIX  353 

powers,  found  to  be  in  good  and  diie  form,  have  agreed  at 
follows: 

ARTICLE  I 

The  representatives  of  the  contracting  powers  having 
adopted,  on  the  4th  day  of  February,  1922,  in  the  City  of 
Washington,  a  resolution,  which  is  appended  as  an  annex  to 
this  article,  with  respect  to  the  revision  of  Chinese  customs 
duties,  for  the  purpose  of  making  such  duties  equivalent  to 
an  effective  5  per  centum  ad  valorem,  in  accordance  with 
existing  treaties,  concluded  by  China  with  other  nations,  the 
contracting  powers  hereby  confirm  the  said  resolution  and 
undertake  to  accept  the  tariff  rates  fixed  as  a  result  of  such 
revision.  The  said  tariff  rates  shall  become  effective  as  soon 
as  possible,  but  not  earlier  than  two  months  after  publica- 
tion thereof. 

ANNEX 

With  a  view  to  providing  additional  revenue  to  meet  the 
needs  of  the  Chinese  Government,  the  powers  represented  at 
this  conference,  namely,  the  United  States  of  America,  Bel- 
gium, The  British  Empire,  China,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  the 
Netherlands  and  Portugal,  agree: 

That  the  customs  schedule  of  duties  on  imports  into 
China,  adopted  by  the  Tariff  Revision  Commission  at  Shang- 
hai on  Dec.  19,  1918,  shall  forthwith  be  revised  so  that  rates 
of  duty  shall  be  equivalent  to  5  per  cent,  effective,  as  pro- 
vided for  in  the  several  commercial  treaties  to  which  China 
is  a  part. 

A  revision  commission  shall  meet  at  Shanghai,  at  the 
earliest  practicable  date,  to  effect  this  revision  forthwith 
and  on  the  general  lines  of  the  last  revision. 

This  commission  shall  be  composed  of  representatives  of 
the  powers  above  named  and  of  representatives  of  any  addi- 


354  APPENDIX 

tional  jKJwers  having  governments  at  present  recognized  by 
the  powers  represented  at  this  conference  and  who  have 
treaties  with  China  providing  for  a  tariff  on  imports  and 
exports  not  to  exceed  5  per  cent,  ad  valorem  and  who  desire 
to  participate  therein. 

The  revision  shall  proceed  as  rapidly  as  possible,  with  a 
view  to  its  completion  within  four  months  from  the  date  of 
the  adoption  of  this  resolution  by  the  Conference  on  Limita- 
tion of  Armament  and  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  Questions. 

The  revised  tariff  shall  become  effective  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible, but  not  earlier  than  two  months  after  its  publication 
by  the  Revision  Commission. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  as  convener  of  the 
present  conference,  is  requested  forthwith  to  communicate 
the  terms  of  this  resolution  to  the  Governments  of  powers 
not  represented  at  this  conference,  but  who  participated  in 
the  revision  of  1918  aforesaid. 

AETicLE  n 

Immediate  steps  shall  be  taken  through  a  special  confer- 
ence to  prepare  the  way  for  the  speedy  abolition  of  likin  and 
for  the  fulfillment  of  the  other  conditions  laid  down  in  Ar- 
ticle VIII  of  the  treaty  of  Sept.  5,  1902,  between  Great 
Britain  and  China;  in  Articles  IV  and  V  of  the  treaty  of 
Oct.  8,  1903,  between  the  United  States  and  China,  and  in 
Article  I  of  the  supplementary  treaty  of  Oct.  8,  1903,  be- 
tween Japan  and  China,  with  a  view  to  levying  the  surtaxes 
provided  for  in  these  articles. 

The  special  conference  shall  be  composed  of  representa- 
tives of  the  signatory  powers,  and  of  such  other  powers  as 
may  desire  to  participate  and  may  adhere  to  the  present 
treaty,  in  accord  with  the  provisions  of  Article  VIII,  in 
sufficient  time  to  allow  their  representatives  to  take  part.    It 


APPENDIX  355 

shall  meet  in  China  within  three  months  after  the  coming 
into  force  of  the  present  treaty  on  a  day  and  at  a  place  to 
be  designated  by  the  Chinese  Government. 

ARTICLE   m 

The  special  conference  provided  for  in  Article  II  shall 
consider  the  interim  provisions  to  be  applied  prior  to  the 
abolition  of  likin  and  the  fulfillment  of  the  other  conditions 
laid  down  in  the  articles  of  the  treaties  mentioned  in  Article 
II ;  and  it  shall  authorize  the  levying  of  a  surtax  on  dutiable 
imports  as  from  such  date,  for  such  purposes  and  subject 
to  such  conditions  as  it  may  determine. 

The  surtax  shall  be  at  a  uniform  rate  of  2^  per  centum 
ad  valorem,  provided  that  in  case  of  certain  articles  of 
luxury  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  special  conference,  can 
bear  a  greater  increase  without  unduly  impeding  trade,  the 
total  surtax  may  be  increased,  but  may  not  exceed  5  per 
centum  ad  valorem. 

AETICLE  IV 

Following  the  immediate  revision  of  the  customs  schedule 
of  duties  on  imports  into  China,  mentioned  in  Article  I, 
there  shall  be  a  further  revision  thereof,  to  take  effect  at  the 
expiration  of  four  years  following  the  completion  of  the 
aforesaid  immediate  revision,  in  order  to  insure  that  the 
customs  duties  shall  correspond  to  the  ad  valorem  rates 
fixed  by  the  special  conference  provided  in  Article  II. 

Following  this  further  revision  there  shall  be,  for  the  same 
purpose,  periodical  revisions  of  the  customs  schedule  of 
duties  on  imports  into  China  every  seven  years,  in  lieu  of  the 
decennial  revision  authorized  by  existing  treaties  with  China. 

In  order  to  prevent  delay,  any  revision  made  in  pursuance 
of  this  article  shall  be  effected  in  accord  with  rules  to  be 


356  APPENDIX 

prescribed  by  the  special  conference  provided  for  in  Article 
II. 

AKTICLE  V 

In  all  matters  relating  to  customs  duties  there  shall  be 
effective  equality  of  treatment  and  of  opportunity  for  all  the 
contracting  powers. 

ARTICLE   VI 

The  principle  of  uniformity  in  the  rates  of  customs  duties 
levied  at  all  the  land  and  maritime  frontiers  of  China  is 
hereby  recognized.  The  special  conference  provided  for  in 
Article  II  shall  make  arrangements  to  give  practical  effect  to 
this  principle,  and  it  is  authorized  to  make  equitable  adjust- 
ments in  those  cases  in  which  a  customs  privilege  to  be 
abolished  was  granted  in  return  for  some  local  economic 
advantage. 

In  the  meantime,  any  increase  in  the  rates  of  customs 
duties  resulting  from  tariff  revision  or  any  surtax  hereafter 
imposed  in  pursuance  of  the  present  treaty,  shall  be  levied 
at  a  uniform  rate  ad  valorem  at  all  land  and  maritime  fron- 
tiers of  China. 

ARTICLE  vn 

The  charge  for  transit  passes  shall  be  at  the  rate  of  2^^ 
per  centum  ad  valorem  until  the  arrangements  provided  for 
by  Article  II  come  into  force. 

ARTICLE  vni 

Powers  not  signatory  to  the  present  treaty,  whose  Gov- 
ernments are  at  present  recognized  by  the  signatory  powers 
and  whose  present  treaties  with  China  provide  for  a  tariff 
on  imports  and  exports  not  to  exceed  5  per  centum  ad  va- 
lorem, shall  be  invited  to  adhere  to  the  present  treaty. 


APPENDIX  357 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  undertakes  to  make 
the  necessary  communications  for  this  purpose  and  to  in- 
form the  Governments  of  the  contracting  powers  of  the  re- 
plies received.  Adherence  by  any  power  shall  become  ef- 
fective on  receipt  of  notice  thereof  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States. 

ARTICLE   DC 

The  provisions  of  the  present  treaty  shall  override  all 
stipulations  of  treaties  between  China  and  the  respective 
contracting  powers,  which  are  inconsistent  therewith,  other 
than  stipulations  according  most  favored  nation  treatment. 

ARTICLE    X 

The  present  treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  the  contracting 
powers  in  accord  with  their  respective  constitutional 
methods  and  shall  take  effect  on  the  date  of  the  deposit  of 
all  the  ratifications,  which  shall  take  place  at  Washington  as 
soon  as  possible.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  will 
transmit  to  the  other  contracting  powers  a  certified  copy  of 
the  proces  verbal  of  the  deposit  of  ratifications. 

The  present  treaty,  of  which  the  English  and  French 
texts  are  both  authentic,  shall  remain  deposited  in  the  ar- 
chives of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and  duly  cer- 
tified copies  thereof  shall  be  transmitted  by  that  Govern- 
ment to  the  other  contracting  powers. 

In  faith  whereof  the  above-named  plenipotentiaries  have 
signed  the  present  treaty. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington,  the  sixth  day  of  Febru- 
ary, one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  twenty-two. 

SUPPLEMENT  TO  FAR  EAST  TREATY 

This  resolution  was  adopted  as  a  supplement  to  the  gen- 
eral Far  Eastern  treaty : 


358  APPENDIX 

The  United  States  of  America,  Belgium,  the  British  Em- 
pire, China,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands  and 
Portugal, 

Desiring  to  provide  a  procedure  for  dealing  with  questions 
that  may  arise  in  connection  with  the  execution  of  the  pro- 
visions of  Articles  III  and  V  of  the  treaty  to  be  signed  at 
Washington  on  Feb.  6,  1922,  with  reference  to  their  general 
policy,  designed  to  stabilize  conditions  in  the  Far  East,  to 
safeguard  the  rights  and  interests  of  China,  and  to  promote 
intercourse  between  China  and  the  other  powers  upon  the 
basis  of  equality  of  opportunity. 

Resolve,  That  there  shall  be  established  in  China  a  board 
of  reference  to  which  any  questions  arising  in  connection 
with  the  execution  of  the  aforesaid  articles  may  be  referred 
for  investigation  and  report. 

The  special  conference,  provided  in  Article  II  of  the 
treaty  to  be  signed  at  Washington  on  Feb.  6,  1922,  with 
reference  to  the  Chinese  customs  tariff,  shall  formulate  for 
the  approval  of  the  powers  concerned  a  detailed  plan  for 
the  constitution  of  the  board. 

DECLARATIONS  BY  AND  ON  CHINA 

The  Chinese  declaration  regarding  alienation  of  territory, 
also  added  to  the  Far  Eastern  treaty,  was  stated  thus : 

China  upon  her  part  is  prepared  to  give  an  undertaking 
not  to  alienate  or  lease  any  portion  of  her  territory  or  lit- 
toral to  any  power. 

The  Chinese  delegation  also  announced  an  "undertaking" 
in  connection  with  the  tariff  treaty,  which  stated  that  "the 
Chinese  Government  have  no  intention  to  effect  any  change 
which  may  disturb  the  present  administration  of  the  Chinese 
maritime  customs." 


APPENDIX  359 

The  resolution  regarding  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railroad 
reads : 

Resolved,  that  the  preservation  of  the  Chinese  Eastern" 
Railway  for  those  in  interest  requires  that  better  protection 
be  given  the  railway  and  the  persons  engaged  in  its  opera- 
tion and  use,  a  more  careful  selection  of  personnel  to  secure 
efficiency  of  service,  and  a  more  economical  use  of  funds  to 
prevent  waste  of  the  property;  that  the  subject  should  be 
dealt  with  through  the  proper  diplomatic  channels. 

The  powers  in  the  Far  Eastern  Committee,  other  than 
China,  added  to  this  a  supplementary  resolution  as  follows: 

The  powers  other  than  China,  in  agreeing  to  the  resolu- 
tion regarding  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway,  reserve  the 
right  to  insist  hereafter  upon  the  responsibility  of  China  for 
performance  or  non-performance  of  the  obligations  toward 
the  foreign  stockholders,  bondholders,  and  creditors  of  the 
Chinese  Eastern  Railway  Company,  which  the  powers  deem 
to  result  from  the  contracts  under  which  the  railroad  was 
built,  and  the  action  of  China  thereunder,  and  the  obligations 
which  they  deem  to  be  in  the  nature  of  a  trust,  resulting 
from  the  exercise  of  power  by  the  Chinese  Government  over 
the  possession  and  administration  of  the  railroad. 

TEXT  OF  SHANTUNG  AGREEMENT 

The  terms  of  settlement  as  agreed  upon,  Feb.  1,  1922,  by 
the  representatives  of  the  Governments  of  Japan  and  China 
follow : 

I.       THE    FORMER    GERMAN    LEASED    TERRITORY    OF    KIAO-CHAU 

1.  Japan  shall  restore  to  China  the  former  German  leased 
territory  of  Kiao-Chau. 

2.  The  Governments  of  Japan  and  China  shall  each  ap- 
point a  commission  with  powers  to  make  and  carry  out  de- 
tailed arrangements  relating  to  the  transfer  of  the  adminis- 


360  APPENDIX 

tration  and  of  public  property  in  the  said  territory  and 
to  settle  other  matters  equally  requiring  adjustment.  For 
such  purposes  the  Japanese  and  Chinese  commissions  shall 
meet  immediately  upon  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present 
agreement. 

3.  The  said  transfer  and  adjustment  shall  be  completed 
as  soon  as  possible,  and  in  any  case  not  later  than  six 
months  from  the  date  of  the  coming  into  force  of  this  agree- 
ment. 

4.  The  Japanese  Government  agrees  to  hand  over  to  the 
Chinese  Government,  upon  the  transfer  to  China  of  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  former  German-leased  territory  of  Kiao- 
Chau  such  archives,  registers,  plans,  title-deeds  and  other 
documents,  in  the  possession  of  Japan  or  certified  copies 
thereof,  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  said  transfer,  as  well 
as  those  that  may  be  useful  for  the  administration  by  China, 
after  such  transfer,  of  that  territory,  and  of  the  50-kilome- 
ter zone  around  Kiao-Chau  Bay. 

n.       PUBLIC    PROPEETIES 

1.  The  Government  of  Japan  undertakes  to  transfer  to 
the  Government  of  China  all  public  properties,  including 
land,  buildings,  works  or  establishments  in  the  leased  terri- 
tory of  Kiao-Chau,  whether  formerly  possessed  by  the  Ger- 
man authorities  or  purchased  or  constructed  by  the  Japa- 
nese authorities  during  the  Japanese  administration  of  the 
said  territory,  save  those  indicated  in  this  article  (Para- 
graph 3)  of  this  treaty. 

2.  In  the  transfer  of  such  public  properties  no  compensa- 
tion will  be  claimed  from  the  Government  of  China  except 
(1)  for  those  purchased  or  constructed  by  the  Japanese 
authorities  and  also  (2)  for  the  improvement  on  or  addi- 
tions to  those  formerly  possessed  by  the  German  authorities. 


APPENDIX  361 

With  regard  to  cases  under  these  two  categories,  the  Gov- 
ernment of  China  shall  refund  a  fair  and  equitable  propor- 
tion of  the  expenses  actually  incurred  by  the  Government 
of  Japan  for  such  properties  specified  in  (1)  or  such  im- 
provements or  additions  specified  in  (2),  having  regard  to 
the  principle  of  depreciation. 

3.  It  is  agreed  that  such  public  properties  in  the  leased 
territory  of  Kiao-Chau  as  are  required  for  the  Japanese 
Consulate  to  be  established  in  Tsing-tao  shall  be  retained 
by  the  Government  of  Japan,  and  that  those  required  more 
especially  for  the  benefit  of  the  Japanese  community,  in- 
cluding public  schools,  shrines  and  cemeteries,  shall  be  left  in 
the  hands  of  the  said  community. 

Details  of  such  matters  shall  be  arranged  by  the  joint 
commission  provided  for  in  an  article  of  this  treaty. 

III.      JAPANESE  TROOPS 

The  Japanese  troops,  including  gendarmes  now  stationed 
along  the  Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu  Railway  and  its  branches, 
shall  be  withdrawn  as  soon  as  the  Chinese  police  or  military 
force  shall  have  been  sent  to  take  over  the  protection  of  the 
railway. 

The  disposition  of  the  Chinese  police  or  military  force  and 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Japanese  troops  under  the  foregoing 
provisions  may  be  effected  in  sections.  The  date  of  the  com- 
pletion of  such  process  for  each  section  shall  be  arranged 
in  advance  between  the  competent  authorities  of  Japan  and 
China.  The  entire  withdrawal  of  such  Japanese  troops 
shall  be  effected  if  possible  within  three  months,  and,  in  any 
case,  not  later  than  six  months  from  the  date  of  the  signa- 
ture of  the  present  agreement. 

The  Japanese  garrison  at  Tsing-tao  shall  be  completely 
withdrawn,  simultaneously,  if  possible,  with  the  transfer  of 


362  APPENDIX 

the  administration  of  the  leased  territory  of  Kiao-Chau  to 
China,  and  in  any  case  not  later  than  thirty  days  from  the 
date  of  such  transfer. 

IV.      THE  MARITIME  CUSTOMS 

1.  It  is  agreed  that  upon  the  coming  into  force  of  the 
present  treaty,  the  Customs  House  of  Tsing-tao  shall  be 
made  an  integral  part  of  the  Chinese  maritime  customs. 

2.  It  is  understood  that  the  provisional  agreement  of 
Aug.  6,  1915,  between  Japan  and  China  relative  to  the  mari- 
time customs  office  at  Tsing-tao  will  cease  to  be  effective 
upon  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  treaty. 

V.       THE    TSING-TAO-TSINANFU    EAILWAT 

1.  Japan  shall  transfer  to  China  the  Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu 
Railway  and  its  branches,  together  with  all  the  properties 
appurtenant  thereto,  including  wharves,  warehouses  and 
other  similar  properties. 

China,  on  her  part,  undertakes  to  reimburse  to  Japan  the 
actual  value  of  the  railway  properties  mentioned  in  the  pre- 
ceding paragraph.  The  actual  value  to  be  so  reimbursed 
shall  consist  of  the  sum  of  53,406,141  gold  marks  (which  is 
the  assessed  value  of  such  portion  of  the  said  properties  as 
was  left  behind  by  the  Germans)  or  its  equivalent,  plus  the 
amount  which  Japan,  during  her  administration  of  the  rail- 
way has  actually  expended  for  permanent  improvements  on 
or  additions  to  the  said  properties,  less  a  suitable  allowance 
for  depreciation.  It  is  understood  that  no  charge  will  be 
made  with  respect  to  the  wharves,  warehouses  and  other 
similar  properties  mentioned  in  Paragraph  1  of  this  article, 
except  for  such  permanent  improvements  on  or  additions  to 
them  as  may  have  been  made  by  Japan  during  her  adminis- 
tration of  the  railway,  less  a  suitable  allowance  for  depre- 
ciation. 


APPENDIX  363 

The  Government  of  Japan  and  the  Government  of  China 
shall  each  appoint  three  Commissioners  to  form  a  joint  rail- 
way commission,  with  powers  to  appraise  the  actual  value 
of  the  railway  properties  on  the  basis  defined  in  the  pre- 
ceding paragraph,  and  to  arrange  the  transfer  of  the  said 
properties. 

Such  transfer  shall  be  completed  as  soon  as  possible,  and, 
in  any  case,  not  later  than  nine  months  from  the  date  of  the 
coming  into  force  of  the  present  agreement. 

To  effect  the  reimbursement  under  Paragraph  2  of  this 
article,  China  shall,  simultaneously  with  the  completion  of 
the  transfer  of  the  railway  properties,  deliver  to  Japan  Chi- 
nese Government  Treasury  notes,  secured  on  the  properties 
and  revenues  of  the  railway,  and  running  for  a  period  of 
fifteen  years,  but  redeemable  at  the  option  of  China  at  the 
end  of  five  years  from  the  date  of  the  delivery  of  the  Treas- 
ury notes,  or  at  any  time  thereafter  upon  six  months'  pre- 
vious notice. 

Pending  the  redemption  of  the  said  Treasury  notes,  the 
Chinese  Government  will  select  and  appoint,  for  so  long  a 
period  as  the  said  notes  remain  unredeemed,  a  Japanese  sub- 
ject to  the  post  of  traffic  manager  and  another  Japanese 
subject  to  the  chief  accountant  jointly  with  the  Chinese 
chief  accountant  with  co-ordinate  functions.  These  of- 
ficials shall  all  be  under  the  direction,  control  and  super- 
vision of  the  Chinese  managing  director,  and  removable  for 
cause. 

Financial  details  of  a  technical  character  relating  to  the 
said  Treasury  notes,  not  provided  for  in  this  article,  shall 
be  determined  in  mutual  accord  between  the  Japanese  and 
China  authorities  as  soon  as  possible  and,  in  any  case,  not 
later  than  six  months  from  the  date  of  the  coming  into  force 
of  the  present  agreement. 


364  APPENDIX 

VI,      THE    EXTENSIONS   OF    THE    TSING-TAO-TSINANFU    EAILWAT 

It  is  agreed  that  the  concessions  relating  to  the  two  ex- 
tensions of  the  Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu  Railway,  namely,  the 
Tsinanfu-Shunteh  and  the  Kaomi-Hsuchowfu  lines,  will  be 
thrown  open  for  the  common  activity  of  an  international 
financial  group,  on  terms  to  be  arranged  between  the  Chinese 
Government  and  the  said  group. 

VII.      MINES 

The  mines  of  Tsechuan,  Fangtse  and  Chinlingchen,  for 
which  the  mining  rights  were  formerly  granted  by  China  to 
Germany,  shall  be  handed  to  a  company  to  be  formed  by  a 
special  charter  of  the  Chinese  Government,  in  which  the 
Japanese  commissions  which  are  to  be  amount  of  the  Chi- 
nese capital.  The  mode  and  terms  of  such  arrangement  shall 
be  determined  by  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  commissions 
which  are  to  be  appointed  for  that  purpose  and  which  shall 
meet  immediately  upon  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present 
agreement. 

Vm.       OPENING   OF    THE    FORMER    GERMAN    liEASED    TERRITORY 

The  Japanese  Government  declares  that  it  has  no  inten- 
tion of  seeking  the  establishment  of  an  exclusive  Japanese 
settlement  or  of  an  international  settlement  in  Tsing-tao. 

The  Chinese  Government,  on  its  part,  declares  that  the 
entire  area  of  the  former  German  leased  territory  of  Kiao- 
Chau  will  be  opened  to  foreign  trade,  and  that  foreigners 
will  be  permitted  freely  to  reside  and  to  carry  on  commerce, 
industry  and  other  lawful  pursuits  within  such  area. 

The  vested  rights  lawfully  and  equitably  acquired  by 
foreign  nationals  in  said  area,  whether  under  the  German 
regime  or  during  the  Japanese  military  occupation,  will  be 
respected. 


APPENDIX  365 

All  questions  relating  to  the  status  or  validity  of  such 
vested  rights  acquired  by  Japanese  nationals  shall  be  ar- 
ranged by  the  Sino-Japanese  Joint  Commission. 

DC.       SALT    INDUSTRY 

Whereas,  the  salt  industry  is  a  Government  monopoly  in 
China,  it  is  agreed  that  the  interests  of  Japanese  companies 
of  Japanese  nationals  actually  engaged  in  the  said  industry 
along  the  coast  of  Kiao-Chau  Bay  are  to  be  purchased  by 
the  Chinese  Government  on  payment  of  fair  compensation, 
and  that  exportation  to  Japan  of  a  quantity  of  salt  pro- 
duced by  the  said  industry  along  the  said  coast  is  to  be  per- 
mitted on  reasonable  terms.  Arrangements  for  the  above 
purposes,  including  the  transfer  of  said  interests  to  the 
Chinese  Government,  shall  be  completed  by  the  Chinese  and 
Japanese  commissions  as  soon  as  possible,  and  in  any  case 
not  later  than  six  months  from  date  of  the  coming  into  force 
of  the  present  agreement. 

X.      SUBMARINE  CABLES 

Japan  declares  that  all  the  rights,  title  and  privileges  con- 
cerning former  German  submarine  cable  between  Tsing-tao 
and  Chefoo,  and  between  Tsing-tao  and  Shanghai,  are  vested 
in  China,  with  the  exception  of  those  portions  of  the  said 
two  cables  which  have  been  utilized  by  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment for  the  laying  of  a  cable  between  Tsing-tao  and 
Sasebo — it  being  understood  that  the  question  relating  to 
thi  landing  and  operation  at  Tsing-tao  and  the  said  Tsing- 
tao-Sasebo  cable  shall  be  arranged  by  the  Chinese  and  Japa- 
nese commissions  as  subject  to  the  terms  of  the  existing  con- 
tracts to  which  China  is  a  party. 

XI.       WIRELESS    STATIONS 

The  Japanese  wireless  stations  at  Tsing-tao  and  Tsinanfu 
shall  be  transferred  to  China  upon  the  withdrawal  of  the 


866  APPENDIX 

Japanese  troops  at  those  two  places,  respectively,  with  fair 
compensation  for  the  value  of  these  stations. 

The  details  of  such  transfer  and  compensation  shall  be  ar- 
ranged by  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  commissions. 

ANNEXES 

I.      PEEFERENTIAL  RIGHTS 

Japan  declares  that  she  renounces  all  preferential  rights 
with  regard  to  foreign  assistance  in  persons,  capital  and 
material,  stipulated  in  the  Sino-German  Treaty  of  March 
6,  1898. 

II.      PUBLIC  ENTERPRISES 

Enterprises  relating  to  electric  light,  telephone,  stock 
yards,  &c.,  shall  be  handed  over  to  the  Chinese  Government, 
with  the  understanding  that  the  stock  yard,  electric  light 
and  laundry  enterprises  are,  in  turn,  to  be  handed  over  to 
the  municipal  government  of  Tsing-tao,  which  will  form 
Chinese  corporations  in  conformity  with  the  Chinese  com- 
pany law  to  manage  them  under  municipal  supervision  and 
regulations. 

m.      TELEPHONES 

1.  The  Japanese  Government  agrees  to  turn  over  to  the 
Chinese  Government  the  telephone  enterprise  in  the  former 
German  leased  territory  of  Kiao-Chau. 

2.  As  regards  such  telephone  enterprise,  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment will  give  due  consideration  to  requests  from  the 
foreign  community  at  Tsing-tao  for  such  extensions  and 
improvements  as  may  be  reasonably  required  by  the  general 
interests  of  the  public. 

IV.       PUBLIC    WORKS 

The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  in  the  management 
and  maintenance  of  the  public  works  in  Tsing-tao,  such  as 


APPENDIX  367 

roads,  waterworks,  parks,  drainage,  sanitary  equipment,  &c., 
handed  over  to  the  Chinese  Government  by  the  Japanese 
Government,  the  foreign  community  in  Tsing-tao  shall  have 
fair  representation. 

V.      MARITIME  CUSTOMS 

The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  it  will  move  the 
Inspector  General  of  the  Chinese  maritime  customs  to  per- 
mit the  Japanese  traders  at  Tsing-tao  to  communicate  with 
the  said  customs  in  the  Japanese  language,  and,  in  the  se- 
lection of  a  suitable  staff  for  the  Tsing-tao  customs,  to  give 
consideration  within  the  limits  of  its  established  service  regu- 
lations to  the  diverse  needs  of  the  trade  of  Tsing-tao. 

VI.      THE  TSING-TAO-TSINANFU   EAILWAY 

Should  the  joint  railway  commission  fail  to  reach  an 
agreement  on  any  of  the  matter  entrusted  to  its  charge,  the 
points  at  issue  shall  be  taken  up  by  the  two  Governments 
for  discussion  and  adjustment  by  means  of  diplomacy.  In 
the  determination  of  such  points  the  two  Governments  shall, 
if  necessary,  obtain  recommendations  of  an  expert  or  ex- 
perts of  a  third  power  or  powers  who  shall  be  designated  in 
mutual  agreement  with  each  other. 

Vn.         EXTENSION   OF   THE   TSING-TAO-TSINANFU   EAILWAY 

The  Japanese  Government  has  no  intention  of  claiming 
that  the  option  for  the  construction  of  the  Chefoo-Weihsien 
Railway  should  be  thrown  open  for  the  common  activity  of 
the  International  Financial  Consortium  if  that  railway  is  to 
be  constructed  with  Chinese  capital. 

Vin.        OPENING  OF   THE   FORMER  LEASED  TERRITORY 

The  Chinese  Government  declares  that,  pending  the  enact- 
ment and  general  application  of  laws  regulating  the  system 


368  APPENDIX 

of  local  self-government  in  China,  the  Chinese  local  authori- 
ties will  ascertain  the  views  of  the  foreign  residents  in  the 
former  German  leased  territory  of  Kiao-Chau  in  such  mu- 
nicipal matters  as  may  directly  affect  their  welfare  and 
interests. 

WEI-HAI-WEI  RESTORED  TO  CHINA 

On  February  1,  1922,  the  Hon.  Arthur  J.  Balfour,  senior 
British  delegate,  announced  to  the  fifth  plenary  session  of 
the  Conference  on  Limitation  of  Armaments  at  Washington, 
D.  C,  that  Great  Britain  proposed  to  hand  back  Wei-hai- 
wei  to  China.     He  spoke,  in  part,  as  follows : 

The  second  reason  is  one  in  which  I  speak  for  the  British 
Empire  delegation  and  for  them  alone.  The  result  of  the 
termination  of  this  Shantung  dispute  is  to  hand  back  to 
the  sovereignty  of  China  a  great  port  and  a  most  important 
railway,  the  port  giving  access  to  and  the  railway  giving 
communications  within  what  I  believe  is  the  most  thickly 
populated  province  of  China.  But  there  is  another  leased 
territory,  other  than  those  we  have  been  discussing  to-day, 
which  is  under  lease  to  the  British  Government.  I  refer  to 
Wei-hai-wei. 

Those  who  have  followed  the  course  of  events  in  China 
during  the  last  generation  are  aware  that  a  most  critical 
position  arose  when  Russia  and  Germany  began  to  attempt 
to  dominate  more  and  more  the  Chinese  Empire.  It  was 
when  Russia  seized  Port  Arthur  that  in  order  to  bring 
some  foreign  equipoise  to  the  assistance  of  China,  to  pre- 
vent the  increase  of  such  operations,  the  arrangement  was 
come  to  between  the  Chinese  Government  and  the  British 
Government  by  which  Wei-hai-wei  was  leased  to  Great 
Britain  for  a  term  of  years  under  arrangements  which  left 
it  possible  to  use  that  port  as  a  defense  against  Russia, 


APPENDIX  369 

though  impossible  to  use  it  as  any  great  commercial  center 
or  as  a  rival  to  any  existing  commercial  interests. 

The  circumstances  under  which  Wei-hai-wei  thus  came 
under  the  control  of  British  have  now  not  only  provisionally 
changed,  but  they  have  altogether  disappeared.  The  rest 
of  Shantung  province  is  now  handed  back  under  suitable 
conditions  to  the  complete  sovereignty  of  China.  Under 
like  suitable  conditions  I  have  to  announce  that  Great 
Britain  proposes  to  hand  back  Wei-hai-wei  to  the  country 
within  whose  frontier  it  lies.  I  doubt  not  it  has  been  used 
so  far  merely  as  a  sanatorium  or  summer  resort  for  the 
ships  of  war  coming  up  from  the  tropical  or  more  southern 
portions  of  the  China  station.  I  doubt  not  that  it  will  be 
available  for  that  innocent  and  healthful  purpose  in  time 
to  come. 

But  the  sovereignty  will  now  be  restored,  as  the  sov- 
ereignty of  China  has  been  restored  in  other  parts  of  the 
province,  and  we  shall  be  largely  guided  in  the  arrangements 
that  we  will  have  to  make  and  that  we  propose  at  once  to 
initiate — we  shall  be  largely  guided  in  those  arrangements 
by  the  course  that  the  arrangement  in  regard  to  the  Japa- 
nese lease  in  Shantung  has  come  to  this  so  happy  and  so 
satisfactory  conclusion — a  conclusion  which  has  met  with 
your  universal  approbation  in  this  hall. 

When  that  is  accomplished,  this  great  province  of  China 
will  again  be  what  every  Chinese  citizen  must  desire  that  it 
should  be,  in  the  fullest  sense  an  integral  part  of  that  great 
empire,  and  I  rejoice  to  think  that  I  am  in  a  position  to-day 
to  add,  if  I  may  say  so,  this  crowning  word  to  the  statement 
of  policy  made  by  your  Chairman  on  behalf  of  the  country, 
and  responded  to  in  such  felicitous  terms  by  our  Japanese 
and  our  Chinese  colleagues. 


5 


«•     / 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  UBRARY  FAaLITY 


A     000  676  147     2 


